Daniel R. Miller v. Municipal Employee Retirement System of Michigan

* The Honorable Glen M. Williams, United States District Judge for the Western District of
Virginia, sitting by designation.
1 After Miller’s termination, OSEA changed its name to Oxford Public Fired and EMS
Commission. In this order, we refer to the organization by its prior name.
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 05a0585n.06
Filed: July 11, 2005
No. 04-1459
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DANIEL R. MILLER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT
SYSTEM OF MICHIGAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
BEFORE: KEITH, DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges, and WILLIAMS, * District Judge.
PER CURIAM. The Plaintiff-Appellant, Daniel R. Miller, appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment for the Defendant-Appellee, Municipal Employees’ Retirement System
of Michigan (“MERS”). Miller was a police sergeant employed by the Oxford Emergency Safety
Authority (“OSEA”) 1 in Oxford, Michigan. MERS is a statewide, public employee pension fund
serving governmental entities. At all times relevant to this matter, OSEA was a “participating
municipality” in MERS. Miller brought suit against MERS, alleging that MERS treated him
differently than other similarly-situated employees in calculating his retirement benefits, violating

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No. 04-1459
Miller v. Oxford
Page 2
42 U.S.C. § 1983, Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. § 37.2701(a), and Michigan’s
Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. § 37.1602(a).
On June 17, 2003, the district court, Judge George Caram Steeh presiding, entered an order
denying MERS’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that there existed genuine
issues of material fact over whether the cost discrepancies were part of MERS’s policy or custom.
After additional discovery, MERS renewed its motion for summary judgment. On January 24, 2004,
the district court concluded that based on the evidence presented, including testimony from Miller’s
actuary, MERS did not have a policy of disparate treatment.
Having had the benefit of oral argument and having reviewed the parties’ briefs, we conclude
that the district court was correct in its decision granting summary judgment for MERS. Because
the district court thoroughly articulated its reasons for granting summary judgment, we find that the
issuance of a full written opinion by this court would be duplicative and serve no useful purpose.
We therefore adopt the reasoning of the district court in its opinion dated January 24, 2004, and
AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment for MERS.

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