Dewey Michael Williams v. London Utility Commission

*The Honorable Glen M. Williams, Senior United States District
Judge for the W estern D istrict of Virginia, sitting by designation.
1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0215P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0215p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
DEWEY MICHAEL WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LONDON UTILITY
COMMISSION, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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No. 03-5573
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky at London.
No. 01-00161—William O. Bertelsman, District Judge.
Argued: June 10, 2004
Decided and Filed: July 8, 2004
Before: MARTIN and SUTTON, Circuit Judges;
WILLIAMS, Senior District Judge.*
2 Williams v. London
Utility Comm’n, et al.
No. 03-5573
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Christopher D. Miller, RAMBICURE, MILLER
& PISACANO, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant. Charles
D. Cole, STURGILL, TURNER, BARKER & MALONEY,
Lexington, Kentucky, Robert L. Roark, WALTHER,
ROARK, GAY & TODD, Lexington, Kentucky, for
Appellees. ON BRIEF: Christopher D. Miller, William C.
Rambicure, RAMBICURE, MILLER & PISACANO,
Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant. Charles D. Cole,
Douglas L. McSwain, STURGILL, TURNER, BARKER &
MALONEY, Lexington, Kentucky, Robert L. Roark,
LaDonna L. Koebel, WALTHER, ROARK, GAY & TODD,
Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellees.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Dewey Michael
Williams appeals from the adverse grant of summary
judgment on his breach-of-contract and disability-
discrimination claims, arising from his employment as
superintendent of the London Utility Commission. Mr.
Williams alleges that the district court erred: (1) in holding
that Mr. Williams's employment agreement was void from its
inception because the London Utility Commission exceeded
its statutory authority by creating the contract without the
approval of the Mayor; and (2) in holding that Mr. Williams
did not prove that the City of London's reasons for firing him
were pretext for purposes of the Americans with Disabilities
Act. Finding no error, we affirm.

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Utility Comm’n, et al.
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1Mayor Smith was elected in 1994.
2The district court states that Mayor Smith was mo tivated, at least in
part, by Ken Wilson's comp laint. However, the deposition of Mayor
Smith is directly contrary to this. Mayor Smith clearly states that this did
not motivate his decisio n to term inate Mr. W illiams. In fact, Ma yor Sm ith
believed that the letter of reprimand that was p laced in Mr. W illiams's file
was enough to de al with the situation. At the summary judgment stage,
the district court is bound to view the facts in the light most favorable to
the non-mo ving party, in this case Mr. W illiams.
I.
The London Utility Commission of London, Kentucky,
hired Mr. Williams in late 1992. In March 1998, the Utility
Commission entered into an employment contract with Mr.
Williams. At the time that the contract was signed, both the
Utility Commission and Mr. Williams knew that the contract
might be invalid if the Utility Commission lacked authority
to enter into the agreement.
The contract provided that Mr. Williams would be
employed for a three-year term, and the contract would renew
automatically for another three-year term unless one party
gave the other 90-days written notice of termination, which
the defendants concede was not given. The contract also
provided that Mr. Williams could be removed only for cause
by the Utility Commission. The agreement was signed by the
Commissioners, but not signed by Mayor Smith.
In early 2001, Mayor Smith1 decided to terminate Mr.
Williams. He has given various reasons for this decision,
including: Mr. Williams's inability to deal with personnel
problems on his own, Mr. Williams's inability to get along
with customers and the public, and a complaint by Ken
Wilson, a former employee.2 Mayor Smith also perceived
that after the city passed Ordinance 981 (discussed below),
Mr. Williams became obstinate and difficult. Mayor Smith
4 Williams v. London
Utility Comm’n, et al.
No. 03-5573
3Although the age-discrimination claim was alleged in the complaint,
Mr. W illiams did not contest summary judgment on this claim and does
not appeal this issue.
alleged that Mr. Williams was upset by the removal of his
authority and refused to solve petty employment issues on his
own. The Mayor also believed that Mr. Williams had lied to
him, but he was unable to identify a specific instance in which
Mr. Williams lied.
On February 22, 2001, one of the London Utility
Commissioners told Mr. Williams that he must attend a
meeting with Mayor Smith. The Commissioner told Mr.
Williams that he was going to be fired. At the meeting with
the mayor, the subject of Mr. Williams's health arose. At the
conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Williams and the Mayor
agreed that Mr. Williams could stay until June 2001, so that
he could apply for disability benefits. Subsequently, Mr.
Williams sent a letter to the Mayor stating that he had a valid
contract and that the Mayor did not have the power to
terminate him. After receipt of this letter, Mayor Smith
terminated Mr. Williams on February 28, 2001.
Mr. Williams filed suit in the district court claiming that he
suffered disability discrimination and age discrimination.3
Mr. Williams also brought due process claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state-law claims for breach of contract,
intentional interference with contractual rights, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court
granted summary judgment to defendants on all claims. Mr.
Williams appeals the section 1983 and state-law contract
claims and the disability-discrimination claim. He does not
appeal the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim.

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II.
This Court reviews the grant of summary judgment de
novo. Lake v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 73 F.3d 1372, 1376
(6th Cir. 1996).
We must first determine whether the London Utility
Commission had the power to enter into the contract with Mr.
Williams. Thus, we must examine the applicable Kentucky
constitutional and statutory provisions, together with the
ordinances of the City of London.
In 1891, section 162 of the Kentucky Constitution was
adopted, which provides that "[n]o county, city, town or other
municipality shall ever be authorized or permitted to pay any
claim created against it, under any agreement or contract
made without the express authorization or law, and all such
unauthorized agreements or contracts shall be null and void."
Subsequently, in 1942, the Kentucky legislature passed
section 96.530 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, which
allows cities to create and operate light, heat, and power
plants. This statute allows for the establishment of a utility
commission as a separate corporate body with the power to
contract and the power to manage all employment issues. As
the district court noted, this statute specifically does not
include water commissions. In fact, in 1942, the Kentucky
legislature also passed section 96.350 of the Kentucky
Revised Statutes, which allows certain cities, including the
City of London, to operate waterworks facilities. This statute
does not provide for a commission organized as a separate
corporate body with control of its own employees as does
section 96.530.
In 1948, the City of London passed Ordinance 344, which
created the Utility Commission for water and sewers. This
ordinance gave the Utility Commission the authority to hire
a project superintendent, who could be removed by the
Commission "for inefficiency, neglect of duty, misfeasance
6 Williams v. London
Utility Comm’n, et al.
No. 03-5573
or malfeasance in office." As noted by the district court,
Ordinance 344 appears as if it were organized to meet the
strictures of section 96.530, rather than section 96.350.
In 1980, the Kentucky legislature passed the "Home Rule
Statutes." Section 83A.130(9) of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes provides that "[t]he mayor shall be the appointing
authority with the power to appoint and remove all city
employees . . . except as tenure and terms of employment are
protected by statute, ordinance or contract." Furthermore,
section 83A.020 provides that all ordinances which conflict
with the Home Rule Statutes are void.
The London Utility Commission hired Mr. Williams in
1992, and the parties entered into the employment contract in
question in 1998. In December 2000, the City of London
passed Ordinance 981, which repealed Ordinance 344 and
reorganized the Utility Commission to align with the Home
Rule Statutes. Ordinance 981 states that the Utility
Commission shall recommend to the mayor a person to
employ as superintendent. Acknowledging the Home Rule
Statutes, Ordinance 981 also states that the "[m]ayor shall
make all decisions relating to employment[, including] hiring,
lay-offs, terminations, and other similar decisions relating to
employment." Section 9 of Ordinance 981 states that the
"Commission shall be bound under the terms of any previous
contracts and/or agreements made and entered into by or on
behalf of the Commission that exist at the time of enactment."
We agree with the district court that the contract was void
from its inception. Mr. Williams was hired after the passage
of the Home Rule Statutes, which indicate that only the
mayor has the power to hire and fire city employees.
According to the Home Rule Statutes, any ordinances in
conflict with the Home Rule Statutes are void. Thus,
Ordinance 344 was void, at least in part, upon the passage of
the Home Rule Statutes. Because Mr. Williams was hired
after the passage of the Home Rule Statutes, Ordinance 344

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was void, and the Commission did not have the power to
make this contract; only the Mayor held such power.
The London Utility Commission was not authorized by
statute to operate independently. Mr. Williams argues
extensively that, as a matter of agency law, the Utility
Commission, and not the City of London, was his employer.
We do not find his arguments persuasive. Although factually
it appears that the Utility Commission controlled Mr.
Williams's activities and acted as his employer, if the Utility
Commission does not have the statutory power to employ Mr.
Williams in view of section 83A.130(9) of the Kentucky
Revised Statutes, then he must be an employee of the City of
London. Because Mayor Smith has ultimate authority over
city employees, Mayor Smith had the power to terminate Mr.
Williams.
If Mr. Williams has no contract, he is an employee-at-will,
has no property interest in his employment and can be fired
for any reason or no reason at all (except for a discriminatory
reason). Because we hold that Mr. Williams's contract was
void and no party raises the issue of ratification of the
contract, we think that Mr. Williams was an employee-at-will
and that his termination was proper. Therefore, we affirm the
district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on
Mr. Williams's contract-related and due process claims.
III.
A prima facie case of disability discrimination requires the
plaintiff to prove that: "(1) he is an individual with a
disability; (2) he is 'otherwise qualified' to perform the job
requirements, with or without reasonable accommodations;
and (3) he was discharged solely by reason of his handicap."
Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., 287 F.3d 593, 598 (6th Cir. 2002). If
the plaintiff can prove a prima facie case, then the burden
shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the termination. Then, the burden
8 Williams v. London
Utility Comm’n, et al.
No. 03-5573
shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the stated reasons are
pretext. See Martin v. Barnesville Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ., 209 F.3d 931, 934 (6th Cir. 2000).
The district court assumed without deciding that Mr.
Williams could prove a prima facie case of discrimination and
that Mayor Smith could demonstrate legitimate non-
discriminatory reasons for the discharge. However, the
district court concluded that Mr. Williams was unable to
prove that the Mayor's reasons were pretext. We do not have
to reach the issue of pretext to resolve this claim because we
do not believe that Mr. Williams can prove a prima facie case
of disability discrimination.
A prima facie case of disability discrimination requires that
the plaintiff prove he was qualified to perform his job
requirements with or without reasonable accommodation.
Mr. Williams's employment was terminated on February 28,
2001, and Mr. Williams applied for disability benefits under
the Kentucky Retirement System on March 1, 2001, claiming
that he was totally disabled. It is incongruous that Mr.
Williams was able to perform his job requirements when he
was terminated on February 28, but he was unable to perform
the same work as of March 1.
The Supreme Court has explained that
[a]n ADA plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she
is a "qualified individual with a disability" — that is, a
person "who with or without reasonable accommodation,
can perform the essential functions" of her job.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). And a plaintiff's sworn assertion
in an application for disability benefits that she is, for
example, "unable to work" will appear to negate an
essential element of her ADA case — at least if she does
not offer a sufficient explanation. For that reason, we
hold that an ADA plaintiff cannot simply ignore the
apparent contradiction that arises out of the earlier []

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No. 03-5573 Williams v. London
Utility Comm’n, et al.
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disability claim. Rather, she must proffer a sufficient
explanation.
Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806
(1999). This means that in order to survive a motion for
summary judgment, the plaintiff's "explanation must be
sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's concluding that . . .
the plaintiff could nonetheless 'perform the essential
functions' of her job, with or without 'reasonable
accommodation.' " Id. at 807.
Mr. Williams was terminated on February 28, and he
applied for disability benefits the very next day. Mr.
Williams subsequently filed suit, alleging that he was able to
perform his job requirements as of the date of his termination.
Mr. Williams has failed to offer sufficient evidence to explain
these contradictory statements. Mr. Williams argues that the
affidavit of Bobby Turner, M.D. explains the contradiction.
This affidavit states that "Mr. Williams' termination of
employment at or near the end of February 2001 had a
devastating effect upon him emotionally, which, in my
opinion, worsened his physical conditions." Furthermore, Dr.
Turner opined that "the termination and its emotionally
devastating effects upon Mr. Williams rendered him unable
to work when combined with his pre-existing physical
conditions." Accepting this statement as true, we do not think
that it provides a sufficient explanation for the contradictory
statements. Dr. Turner's statement was signed on April 25,
2001. While Mr. Williams's health may have declined to the
point where he became unable to work during this two-month
period, he provides no explanation for how his health
declined to the point of being unable to work on March 1,
2001, the date on which he filed for disability benefits and
one day after his termination. Because we hold that Mr.
Williams’s explanation of these contradictory statements was
insufficient, we affirm the district court's grant of summary
judgment.
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Utility Comm’n, et al.
No. 03-5573
For the reasons stated herein, we AFFIRM the judgment of
the district court.

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