Gary Warner v. Commissioner of Social Security

*The Honorable Gordon J. Quist, United States District Judge for the
W estern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0214P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0214p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
GARY WARNER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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No. 03-1641
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Flint.
No. 01-40316—Paul V. Gadola, District Judge.
Submitted: June 8, 2004
Decided and Filed: July 8, 2004
Before: MARTIN and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; QUIST,
District Judge.*
2 Warner v. Comm’r of Social Security No. 03-1641
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Kerry Spencer Johnson, WEISBERG &
WALKON, Southfield, Michigan, for Appellant. David
Skidmore, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Chicago, Illinois, for Appellee.
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OPINION
_________________
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Gary Warner
appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of social security
benefits. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court.
I.
Warner, who has a twelfth-grade education and has earned
a high school equivalency diploma, worked as a production
worker for Robinson Industries. In that capacity, Warner
carved plastic parts and was required regularly to lift between
five and seventy-five pounds. On April 30, 1999, Warner
applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II and
XVI of the Social Security Act, claiming that he became
disabled as of February 12, 1998, as a result of carpal tunnel
syndrome.
Applying the sequential review process, the administrative
law judge found that although Warner had a severe
impairment, he was not disabled because he retained the
ability to perform past relevant work as a retail sales clerk.
Notably, the administrative law judge significantly discounted
the medical opinion of Warner’s treating physician, Dr. Craig
R. Sonke, who had diagnosed Warner with bilateral carpal
tunnel syndrome in 1995. Dr. Sonke noted that Warner could

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No. 03-1641 Warner v. Comm’r of Social Security 3
lift up to five pounds regularly, could sit up to four hours at
a time, could stand or walk up to two hours per day in an
eight-hour day and that Warner’s overall endurance was
affected by his chronic pain such that he would need two
hours rest per eight-hour work day. Dr. Sonke concluded that
Warner “is not capable of working an 8 hour day, 5 days a
week for any type of job secondary to his chronic pain.” The
administrative law judge found, however, that the other
medical evidence and Warner’s own testimony did not
support Dr. Sonke’s determination that Warner’s carpal
tunnel syndrome affected his walking and standing ability.
The administrative law judge also rejected Dr. Sonke’s
finding that Warner could lift only up to five pounds on a
regular basis.
Moreover, the administrative law judge found Warner’s
testimony regarding his alleged chronic pain only partially
credible. The administrative law judge then posed a
hypothetical situation to the vocational expert to determine
whether Warner retained the residual functional capacity to
perform his past relevant work or other work existing in
significant numbers in the economy. The administrative law
judge listed the following constraints in the first hypothetical:
inability to repeatedly grip or grasp with hands; ability to lift
up to twenty pounds occasionally and up to ten pounds
frequently; ability to stand, walk, or sit up to six hours in an
eight-hour workday. These constraints were consistent with
the conclusions of the state disability determination evaluator
who completed Warner’s residual functional capacity
assessment, Dr. John R. Bartone. Considering these
constraints, the vocational expert testified that Warner could
perform his past relevant work in retail sales.
The administrative law judge then asked another
hypothetical question reducing the amount of weight that
Warner could lift or carry to ten pounds occasionally and five
pounds frequently. The vocational expert testified that with
those restrictions there existed thousands of jobs that Warner
could perform. The vocational expert testified, however, that
4 Warner v. Comm’r of Social Security No. 03-1641
if the agency fully credited Warner’s assessment of his pain
symptoms, then Warner would be unable to perform any of
the thousands of jobs mentioned. Based on the credibility
determinations and this testimony, the administrative law
judge concluded that Warner was not disabled because he
retained the residual functional capacity to perform past
relevant work in retail sales. Warner appealed to the Appeals
Council, which denied review, making the administrative law
judge’s denial of disability insurance benefits the final
decision of the Social Security Administration.
Thereafter, Warner sought review of the Administration’s
decision in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan. The magistrate issued a report
recommending the reversal of the denial of disability
insurance benefits. The magistrate found that the
Administration erred in finding Warner only partially credible
because there was evidence in the record indicating that
Warner took medication prescribed to alleviate pain
symptoms. Crediting the objections of the Administration,
the district court concluded otherwise and held that
substantial evidence supported the Administration’s denial of
disability benefits. This timely appeal followed.
II.
“This Court must affirm the Commissioner’s conclusions
absent a determination that the Commissioner has failed to
apply the correct legal standards or has made findings of fact
unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.” Walters
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997).
Substantial evidence exists when a “reasonable mind might
accept” the relevant evidence “as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Kirk v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 667
F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir. 1981) (internal quotation marks
omitted). As long as substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner’s decision, we must defer to it, “‘even if there
is substantial evidence in the record that would have
supported an opposite conclusion . . . .’” Wright v.

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No. 03-1641 Warner v. Comm’r of Social Security 5
Massanari, 321 F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Key v.
Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)).
Administrative law judges employ a five-step sequential
inquiry to determine whether a claimant is disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act. Jones v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003). The claimant bears
the burden of proof through the first four steps of the inquiry,
at which point the burden shifts to the Commissioner to
“identify a significant number of jobs in the economy that
accommodate the claimant’s residual functional capacity
. . . .” Id. In this case, the administrative law judge
determined at step four of the inquiry that Warner was not
disabled within the meaning of the act because he could
perform his past relevant work in retail sales despite his
impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) (describing
step four of the sequential review process). Thus, our review
is limited to determining whether substantial evidence
supports the Commissioner’s decision that Warner could
perform his past relevant work as a retail sales clerk. See
Walters, 127 F.3d at 529.
A.
Warner argues that the administrative law judge erred in
failing to defer wholly to the opinions of his treating
physician, Dr. Sonke. Generally, the opinions of treating
physicians are given substantial, if not controlling, deference.
See King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 973 (6th Cir. 1984); 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). Treating physicians’ opinions are
only given such deference when supported by objective
medical evidence. Jones, 336 F.3d at 477. “The
determination of disability is [ultimately] the prerogative of
the [Commissioner], not the treating physician.” Harris v.
Heckler, 756 F.2d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 1985).
In this case, the administrative law judge essentially
disregarded two conclusions of Dr. Sonke–his conclusion
regarding the amount of weight that Warner could lift
6 Warner v. Comm’r of Social Security No. 03-1641
regularly and his conclusion regarding Warner’s walking and
standing limitations. We conclude that it was proper for the
administrative law judge to disregard these conclusions.
First, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner’s decision to disregard the conclusion of Dr.
Sonke regarding the limits on the amount of weight that
Warner could lift regularly. As the magistrate noted, Dr.
Sonke’s conclusion regarding the amount of weight that
Warner could lift regularly appears to be based not upon his
own medical conclusion, but upon the conclusion of a
different doctor, as well as Warner’s own assessment of his
weight-lifting limitations. Moreover, that Warner could lift
regularly up to ten pounds is consistent with Warner’s own
testimony regarding his ability to perform household
activities.
Second, the Commissioner properly rejected Dr. Sonke’s
conclusion that Warner could stand or walk for no more than
two hours in an eight-hour workday as it was inconsistent
with the substantial evidence in the record indicating
otherwise. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (noting that
treating physicians’ opinions are given controlling weight
when they are “not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence”). Dr. Sonke’s conclusion regarding Warner’s
walking and standing abilities was not based upon objective
medical evidence, as the record contains no such evidence
indicating that Walker has an impairment to his lower
extremities or that his carpal tunnel syndrome affected his
walking and standing abilities. Moreover, it is contrary to the
testimony of Warner himself, indicating that his carpal tunnel
syndrome did not typically affect his ability to stand and walk
and that the reason that he filed for disability benefits was the
chronic pain in his hands. Furthermore, the record contains
the notations of several examining physicians indicating that
Warner’s carpal tunnel syndrome did not affect his standing
and walking abilities. Specifically, Dr. Ralph Scott Lazzara
concluded from his physical examination of Warner that
“[w]alking is unimpaired”; Dr. Blake A. Bergeon noted that

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No. 03-1641 Warner v. Comm’r of Social Security 7
Warner’s “gait is normal and symmetric”; and Dr. Bartone
concluded that Warner retained the residual functional
capacity to walk or stand up to six hours in an eight hour
workday.
Finally, we note that we are unpersuaded by Warner’s
argument that the administrative law judge’s partial rejection
of Dr. Sonke’s opinion was based upon a “gross
mischaracterization of the record.” Warner argues that the
administrative law judge grossly misrepresented the evidence
in concluding that Warner did not take prescribed pain
medication because he takes Neurontin, a prescribed
medication, for pain relief. Although it does appear that
Warner took Neurontin as a pain reliever, the magistrate
judge correctly noted that: “None of the medical records
explicitly state that Dr. Sonke prescribed Neurontin for pain
relief.” Moreover, the administrative law judge’s finding was
consistent with the medical reference books indicating that
Neurontin is an anti-convulsant, not a pain reliever.
Furthermore, the administrative law judge did not completely
overlook Warner’s use of Neurontin, but noted that Warner
took it “to help with the neuropathy.” Additionally, the
administrative law judge did not overlook the fact that Warner
took other actions to relieve his pain symptoms, such as using
a transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation unit and taking
over the counter medications for pain relief.
Under these circumstances, the administrative law judge
properly rejected Dr. Sonke’s conclusions regarding Warner’s
standing, walking and weight-lifting limitations. In reaching
this conclusion, we find it significant that the administrative
law judge did not reject wholesale the conclusions of Dr.
Sonke and indeed incorporated Dr. Sonke’s conclusions
regarding Warner’s limited ability to repetitively grip or grasp
objects and Warner’s overall endurance as affected by his
impairment, in formulating hypothetical questions that he
posed to the vocational expert.
8 Warner v. Comm’r of Social Security No. 03-1641
B.
Second, Warner argues that the administrative law judge
erred in finding that he could perform past relevant work
because that finding was based upon an improper credibility
assessment. The administrative law judge found Warner’s
testimony regarding his pain symptoms only partially
credible, noting: “The claimant does not indicate he is taking
pain pills that are prescribed but over the counter pain
medications . . . . He indicates that he wears a TENS unit and
it does help and he is able to take care of all of his personal
needs and even do some cooking on occasion.” A subjective
assessment of pain symptoms is relevant to determining
whether a claimant suffers from a disability, but is not
conclusive evidence establishing a disability. Buxton v.
Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Subjective
complaints of ‘pain or other symptoms shall not alone be
conclusive evidence of disability.’”) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(5)(A)). In evaluating the claimant’s subjective
complaints of pain an administrative law judge may properly
consider the claimant’s credibility, and we accord great
deference to that credibility determination. See id.; Walters,
127 F.3d at 531 (stating that an administrative law judge’s
“findings based on the credibility of the applicant are to be
accorded great weight and deference, particularly since an
[administrative law judge] is charged with the duty of
observing a witness’s demeanor and credibility.”).
The claimant’s credibility may be properly discounted “to
a certain degree . . . where an [administrative law judge] finds
contradictions among the medical reports, claimant’s
testimony, and other evidence.” Walters, 127 F.3d at 531. In
this case, the administrative law judge found Warner’s
subjective assessment of pain only partially credible because
the record indicated that he was not taking prescribed pain
medication and because his own assessment of his daily
activities indicated that his pain was not disabling. Warner
argues that these findings were erroneous. We disagree.

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No. 03-1641 Warner v. Comm’r of Social Security 9
1Because we hold that the Commissioner’s conclusion tha t Warner
retained the residual functional capacity to perform his past relevant work
was supported by substantial evidence, we nee d not address W arner’s
argument that the Comm issioner did not meet its burden of establishing
–at step five of the sequential review process–that W arner could perform
a signficant number o f jobs in the eco nomy desp ite his impairment.
As discussed, the administrative law judge was technically
correct in observing that Warner did not take prescribed pain
medication. Rather, Warner took Neurontin–a medication
that the medical reference books describe as an anti-
convulsant, but was in this case apparently taken as a pain
reliever. Regardless of this clarification, however, we hold
that the administrative law judge’s credibility determination
was supported by substantial evidence. The record reflects
that although Warner alleged disabling pain, he also testified,
consistent with the objective medical evidence, that he could
manage his personal hygiene, pick a coin off a table, vacuum,
drive short distances, and wash spoons and forks. The
administrative law judge justifiably considered Warner’s
ability to conduct daily life activities in the face of his claim
of disabling pain. Id. at 532 (“An [administrative law judge]
may also consider household and social activities engaged in
by the claimant in evaluating a claimant’s assertions of pain
or ailments.”).
In sum, although the evidence could support the opposite
result, we hold that substantial evidence in the record supports
the Commissioner’s conclusion that Warner was not disabled
because he retained the residual functional capacity to
perform his past relevant work.1 See Buxton, 246 F.3d at
772-73 (noting that an administrative law judge’s decision
must be affirmed if there is substantial evidence in the record
to support it regardless of whether substantial evidence could
support the opposite conclusion). Thus, for the foregoing
reasons, we AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision denying
disability benefits.

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