Wendy Beahn v. C O M P U S E R V E I N T E R A C T I V Eservices, Inc.

*The Hon. Jerome Farris, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 04a0163n.06
Filed: December 16, 2004
No. 03-4631
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
WENDY BEAHN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
C O M P U S E R V E I N T E R A C T I V E
SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
Before: DAUGHTREY, COOK, and FARRIS,* Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. The plaintiff, Wendy Beahn, appeals from the district court’s grant
of summary judgment to her former employer, defendant CompuServe Interactive Services,
in an action she brought alleging discrimination based on her pregnancy, in violation of Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, Ohio Revised Code §§ 4112.02 and 4112.99, and Ohio public
policy. Beahn claimed that she was wrongfully terminated from her position as product
manager a little over a month after she reported her pregnant condition to a supervisor and
that the company then wrongfully failed to re-hire her in another position. The defendant
contended that the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of discrimination and
also introduced evidence to show that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

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No. 03-4631
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eliminating Beahn’s position during a major reduction in force and organizational restructure
following CompuServe’s purchase by AOL. The company also claimed that its human
resources manager had attempted – unsuccessfully – to place Beahn in another position
with CompuServe.
The district court held that Beahn had established a prima facie case but that she
had not rebutted the defendant’s non-discriminatory reason for her layoff and the failure to
place her in another position. Having had the benefit of oral argument, and having studied
the record on appeal and the briefs of the parties, we are not persuaded that the district
court erred in dismissing the complaint. Because the reasons why judgment should be
entered for the defendant have been fully articulated by the district court, the issuance of
a detailed opinion by this court would be duplicative and would serve no useful purpose.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court upon the reasoning set out by
that court in its order and opinion entered on September 30, 2002, and its opinion and
order entered on October 29, 2003.

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