Rule 206 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0133P (6th Cir.) File Name: 04a0133p.06… v. Ronald Couch

*The Honorab le Richard D. Cudahy, Circuit Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0133P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0133p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RONALD COUCH,
Defendant-Appellant.
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No. 03-5109
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky at London.
No. 02-00006—Karen K. Caldwell, District Judge.
Submitted: March 11, 2004
Decided and Filed: May 10, 2004
Before: MARTIN, CLAY, and CUDAHY, Circuit Judges.*
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Elizabeth Ann Cure, COLMAN & CURE,
Bloomington, Indiana, for Appellant. Charles P. Wisdom, Jr.,
ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Lexington,
2 United States v. Couch No. 03-5109
Kentucky, Roger West, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, London, Kentucky, for Appellee.
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OPINION
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BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Ronald Couch
appeals his jury conviction and sentence for distribution of
Oxycontin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and possession of
a firearm during and in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). For the reasons that
follow, we AFFIRM.
I.
During 2001, the Kentucky State Police began investigating
the activities of Roy Couch (Ronald Couch’s nephew) after
learning that he was involved in the distribution of Oxycontin.
The police made controlled buys of Oxycontin from Jamie
Fields and Randall Napier. During these transactions, the
police learned that Roy Couch supplied Oxycontin to Fields
and Napier for sale. Additionally, the police made controlled
buys directly from Roy Couch as well as Vernon Todd Jelly.
The police investigation revealed that Roy Couch obtained
Oxycontin from an individual in Saul, Kentucky. Upon Roy
Couch’s arrest, Jelly began buying Oxycontin directly from
Ronald Couch (“Couch”). With Jelly’s consent, the police
searched his home and found Oxycontin. An interview with
Jelly revealed that Couch had supplied Jelly with the
Oxycontin from his home in Saul, Kentucky.
Following this interview, the police sought, received and
executed a warrant to search Couch’s home. When the police
entered the home, they found Couch in his living room
carrying six Oxycontin pills wrapped in aluminum foil and
2.295 grams of methamphetamine on his person and
immediately arrested him. Nearby, the police discovered a

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No. 03-5109 United States v. Couch 3
loaded assault rifle in plain view on top of a cabinet. In a
corner of Couch’s garage, the police discovered over $10,000
in cash and a loaded Smith & Wesson .357 caliber handgun–a
weapon that the police knew to be commonly associated with
drug trafficking crimes. Elsewhere in Couch’s garage, the
police discovered over 200 pills wrapped in aluminum
foil–including Zantac, Lorcet and other Schedule III pain
killers–as well as nine shotguns and rifles. A search of
Couch’s vehicle revealed another loaded shotgun.
On September 25, 2001, a multi-count indictment was
issued against Couch, along with Roy Couch, Jelly, Greg
Hamblin, Napier and Fields. The grand jury specifically
charged Ronald Couch with conspiring to possess with the
intent to distribute, and distributing, Oxycontin in violation of
21 U.S.C. §846, possession with the intent to distribute
Oxycontin, methamphetamine, and hydrocodone in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and possession of firearms in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Additionally, pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 853, a forfeiture charge was issued against Couch for the
$10,466 in currency and twelve firearms found in his home.
On November 21, 2001, Couch filed a motion to suppress
the evidence seized at his home, arguing that the search
warrant was unsupported by probable cause. The district
court denied the motion on April 25, 2002, after hearing
arguments on the issue and requesting additional memoranda
regarding the sufficiency of the affidavit supporting the
search warrant. On May 13, Couch made an additional
motion to suppress the evidence found at his home, which the
district court denied on May 15. On May 20, a jury found
Couch guilty on all counts contained in the indictment.
Couch was sentenced to six years imprisonment on each of
his drug convictions, to be served concurrently, as well as five
years imprisonment on his firearms conviction, to be served
consecutively–for a total of eleven years imprisonment. This
timely appeal followed.
4 United States v. Couch No. 03-5109
II.
On appeal, Couch argues that the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress the evidence found in his
home. Specifically, he contends that the police lacked
probable cause to obtain a search warrant because the
affidavit filed by the police failed to show that Jelly was a
reliable informant and the police failed to adequately and
independently corroborate the information that Jelly had
provided. Additionally, Couch argues that there was
insufficient evidence supporting his firearms conviction for
violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). We find these arguments
unpersuasive.
A.
First, we address Couch’s argument that the district court
erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. In
reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress
evidence, we employ a two-fold standard of review. That is,
we uphold the district court’s factual determinations unless
clearly erroneous, but we review the district court’s legal
conclusions, such as the existence or absence of probable
cause, de novo. United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591,
594 (6th Cir. 2004). “‘When reviewing the denial of a motion
to suppress, we must consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government.’” United States v. Rodriguez-
Suazo, 346 F.3d 637, 643 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting United
States v. Garza, 10 F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir. 1993)).
“To justify a search, the circumstances must indicate why
evidence of illegal activity will be found ‘in a particular
place.’ There must, in other words, be a ‘nexus between the
place to be searched and the evidence sought.’” Carpenter,
360 F.3d at 594 (quoting United States v. Van Shutters, 163
F.3d 331, 336-37 (6th Cir. 1998)). Consistent with the
preference that searches are conducted pursuant to a search
warrant, however, this Court affords “great deference” to the
magistrate’s probable cause determination. Rodriguez-Suazo,

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No. 03-5109 United States v. Couch 5
1Kentucky Revised Statutes § 519.040(1)(d) makes it a Class A
misdemeanor to “knowingly give[] false information to any law
enforcement officer with intent to implicate another.”
346 F.3d at 643. The relevant inquiry becomes whether “‘the
magistrate had a substantial basis for finding that the
[supporting] affidavit established probable cause to believe
that the evidence would be found at the place cited.’” Id.
(quoting United States v. Davidson, 936 F.2d 856, 859 (6th
Cir. 1991)). Probable cause, while “incapable of precise
definition or quantification into percentages,” Maryland v.
Pringle, 124 S.Ct. 795, 800 (2003), exists when from the
“totality of the circumstances” there exists a “fair probability”
that fruits of a criminal activity will be located within the
premises to be searched, Rodriguez-Suazo, 346 F.3d at 644.
In this case, the information contained in the affidavit
supporting the search warrant was not that of an
“uncorroborated tip of an unknown informant.” United States
v. Perkins, 994 F.2d 1184, 1188 (6th Cir. 1993). The
informant’s identity, Jelly, was known to the officers and
because Jelly was named in the affidavit, he could potentially
be held accountable for providing false information.1 Jelly
provided an account of Couch’s criminal activities based
upon his relationship and personal experience with Couch.
Jelly’s veracity was immediately evident in that the
information he provided coincided with what the police had
already learned from its investigation of Roy Couch. Thus,
we conclude that the magistrate had a “substantial basis for
concluding that a search of [Couch’s] home would uncover
evidence of wrongdoing,” United States v. Miller, 314 F.3d
265, 271 (6th Cir. 2002), and accordingly find Couch’s first
argument unpersuasive. Cf. Carpenter, 360 F.3d at 594-97
(finding that the affidavit supporting the search warrant did
not contain sufficient facts to support the probable cause
determination, but applying the “good faith exception” to the
exclusionary rule).
6 United States v. Couch No. 03-5109
B.
Second, we review Couch’s argument that insufficient
evidence supported his firearms conviction for violating
18 U.S.C. § 924(c). This Court, in reviewing a claim of
insufficient evidence, must examine the evidence most
favorable to the United States and determine whether “any
rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Davis,
306 F.3d 398, 408 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Section 924(c) provides:
[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime . . . for which the
person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States,
uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any
such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the
punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime - -
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less
than 5 years.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). In order to prove
that a defendant has violated section 924(c), the United States
must prove that the “‘firearm was possessed to advance or
promote the commission of the underlying crime.’” United
States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 461 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting
H.R. REP. NO. 105-344 (1997), 1997 WL 668339, at *11-12).
That is, the United States must prove a “nexus between the
gun and the crime charged.” Id. at 462. Although possession
of a firearm in the same premises as the drug trafficking
activities alone is insufficient to support a conviction under
section 924(c), a jury can reasonably infer that firearms which
are strategically located so as “to provide defense or
deterrence in furtherance of the drug trafficking” are used in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. See id. at 462-63.

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No. 03-5109 United States v. Couch 7
In this case, as discussed, a loaded assault riffle was in
plain view at the location where the officers arrested Couch.
Moreover, the police located an additional eleven guns in
Couch’s garage–the area where Couch’s drug transactions
were known to occur and where the officers located over 200
additional pills. Furthermore, the officers testified that at
least one of the particular firearms discovered–the Smith &
Wesson handgun–is commonly associated with drug
trafficking crimes. Considering the foregoing, we conclude
that any rational trier of fact could have concluded that the
United States proved the elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.

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