Everett Hadix v. Perry M. Johnson

1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0130P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0130p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
EVERETT HADIX, et al.
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
PERRY M. JOHNSON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
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No. 03-1334
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Michigan at Kalamazoo.
No. 92-00110—Richard A. Enslen, District Judge.
Argued: February 5, 2004
Decided and Filed: May 6, 2004
Before: KENNEDY, DAUGHTREY, and COLE, Circuit
Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: A. Peter Govorchin, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL, CORRECTIONS DIVISION,
Lansing, Michigan, for Appellants. Elizabeth R. Alexander,
NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT, Washington, D.C., for
Appellees. ON BRIEF: A. Peter Govorchin, Leo H.
Friedman, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
2 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. No. 03-1334
CORRECTIONS DIVISION, Lansing, Michigan, for
Appellants. Elizabeth R. Alexander, NATIONAL PRISON
PROJECT, Washington, D.C., Michael J. Barnhart, Detroit,
Michigan, Patricia A. Streeter, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for
Appellees.
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OPINION
_________________
KENNEDY, Circuit Judge. Defendants appeal district
court’s issuance of an injunction in this long-pending case
dealing with conditions within the State Prison of Southern
Michigan, Central Complex (SPSM-CC). Defendants argue
that the district court erred when it found that the failure to
modify the long-existing structures and to take other steps to
protect prisoners from injury or death by fire resulted in a
constitutional violation. Defendants also argue that the
district court improperly exercised its jurisdiction over
facilities not subject to a Consent Decree. We reverse and
remand on the issue of constitutional violation and affirm on
the issue of jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
In 1980, Everett Hadix and other prisoners incarcerated at
the SPSM-CC brought a class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan against various state officials charged
with operation of SPSM-CC. In the complaint, the inmates
alleged that the conditions of their confinement violated their
rights under the First, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. On April 4, 1985, the parties entered into a
Consent Decree covering most aspects of health care, fire
safety, sanitation, safety and hygiene, overcrowding and
protection from harm, volunteers, food service, management,
operations, access to courts, and mail. Although the state
officials admitted no liability on the claims, the Consent

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No. 03-1334 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. 3
Decree explicitly stated that it was intended by the parties to
assure the constitutionality of the conditions under which
prisoners are incarcerated at SPSM-CC. Under the terms of
the Consent Decree, the state officials retained the ability to
apply for termination of the decree once they achieved full
compliance with all decree provisions. The district court
retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Consent
Decree until compliance was achieved. In 1992, the Eastern
District of Michigan transferred the medical and mental
health components of the Consent Decree to the Western
District of Michigan.
In April 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110
Stat. 1321-66 (1996), amending 18 U.S.C. § 3626. Section
802(a)(1) of the PLRA directs that prospective relief in prison
conditions cases “shall extend no further than necessary to
correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular
plaintiff or plaintiffs.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1). Section
802(b)(2) of the PLRA entitles the defendant “to the
immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief
was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the
court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is
the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of
the Federal right.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2). The prospective
relief, however, “shall not terminate if the court makes written
findings based on the record that prospective relief remains
necessary[, narrowly drawn, and the least intrusive means] to
correct a current and ongoing violation of the Federal right.”
18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3). Following the enactment of PLRA,
Defendants moved to terminate the Consent Decree pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2)-(3). On November 18, 1996, the
district court ruled that the immediate termination provision
of the PLRA was unconstitutional. In the same ruling, the
court denied Defendants’ motion for immediate termination
and ruled that the Plaintiffs sustained their burden by proving
the existence of constitutional violations as to sections
II.A.3.b. Transfer Medical Evaluation; II.A.4.a. Sick Call
4 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. No. 03-1334
1There are 993 cells in the three blocks that make up Eleger (Block
1 has 334, Block 2 has 3 08, and B lock 3 has 35 1). There are currently no
prisoners housed in Block 1. Block 2 houses parole violators and Block
3 house parole violators and 10 -12 general population inmates.
Access Plan; II.A.5.a. Professional Staff; II.A.7. Chronic
Disease Plan; and II.A.11. Problem Oriented Medical Record-
Health Related Disabilities of the Consent Decree. Finally,
the court also ruled that Plaintiffs failed to sustain their
burden proving the existence of current constitutional
violations as to the remaining health care provisions of the
Consent Decree. Defendants appealed the November 18,
1996 order and this Court, in a January 22, 1998 Opinion,
dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
On March 18, 1999, the Eastern District transferred
sections I.P., I.Q., and I.S. of the Consent Decree (regarding
water temperatures, housing temperatures, and ventilation,
respectively) pertaining to facility B (Southern Michigan
Correctional Facility or JMF) to the Western District. The
Eastern District also transferred to the Western District
Defendants’ proposed alternatives to Facility A (Egeler
Correctional Facility1 or SMN). On December 2-3, 1999, the
Western District conducted hearings on the medical health
care provision of the Consent Decree and other issues
transferred by the Eastern District.
On February 18, 2000, the district court issued its Order
and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The district
court reaffirmed its findings from November 18, 1996, that
(1) Plaintiffs sustained their burdens by proving the existence
of constitutional violations with regard to sections II.A.3.b.,
II.A.4.a., II.A.5.a., II.A.7., and II.A.11 and (2) Plaintiffs failed
to sustain their burden of proving the existence of
constitutional violations as to the remaining health care
provisions of the Consent Decree and terminated its
jurisdiction over those provisions. Additionally, the district
court found that the temperature, ventilation and fire safety

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No. 03-1334 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. 5
2There are between 200 and 220 inmates in Administrative
Segregation.
3The Ha dix facilities were originally defined as “all areas within
walls of the State Prison o f Southern M ichigan at the time this cause
commenced and all areas which will supply support services under the
provisions of the Consent Judgment.” Order Accep ting Consent
Judgment, May 13, 198 5. The “within walls of the State Prison of
Southern M ichigan” meant the C entral C omp lex.
conditions at JMF, Egeler, and Administrative Segregation2
support a finding of constitutional violations. The
February 18, 2000 order was not final, as the district court
reserved judgment on termination of other portions of the
Consent Decree and the entry of any remedial order.
On July 12, 2000 the Eastern District transferred to the
Western District Plaintiffs’ claims that conditions in Facility
C (State Prison of Southern Michigan–Central Complex or
SMI) with regard to water, temperature and ventilation
(Sections I.P., I.Q., and I.S., respectively), endanger the
health of prisoners. On November 15, 2000, the Eastern
District transferred to the Western District Plaintiffs’ claims
that the conditions in Facility D (Parnall Correctional Facility
or SMT) with regard to temperature and ventilation (Sections
I.Q and I.S., respectively). On November 8, 2001,
Defendants notified the district court that as a result of a
reduction in the MDOC’s general fund budget, Facility C (or
SMI), including the administrative segregation unit, would be
vacated. On January 4, 2002, SMI was emptied of all
prisoners. There are no current plans to reopen SMI, and any
reopening of SMI would be contingent upon future bed space
needs and finances.
On April 8, 2002, pursuant to a stipulation of the parties,
the Western District terminated its jurisdiction over Section
I.P. (water temperature) of the Consent Decree as to all Hadix
facilities.3 On May 3, 2002, pursuant to a stipulation of the
parties, it also terminated its jurisdiction over Section I.S.
6 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. No. 03-1334
4“Compartmentalization” means subdividing the building into
smaller units to limit the area that is affected by a fire or smoke, including
the number of people that might be in that area. T his allows peo ple to
evacuate horizontally, as well as down the stairs. It also allows them to
evacuate quicker by shortening the traveled distance to a p lace of safety.
The last dollar cost estimate for compartmentalization of Egeler was $25
million in the early 1990 s.
(ventilation) of the Consent Decree as to Blocks 1 and 3 of
the Egeler Facility, Block 7 (the Reception and Guidance
Center), Block 8 of the Parnall Facility, and SMI
administrative segregation. On May 6-8, 2002, the district
court conducted hearings on the remaining medical health
care provisions of the Consent Decree and other issues
transferred by the Eastern District. On October 29, 2002, the
district court issued its Order and Injunction and Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law. The court determined that the
existing system of health care continues to violate sections
II.A.3.b, II.A.4.a., II.A.5.a., II.A.7., II.A.11. of the Consent
Decree and the Eighth Amendment. The court further found
that Defendants’ failure to protect prisoners from heat-related
illnesses and the risk of injury from smoke and fire for
prisoners with disabilities and chronic diseases resulted in
current and ongoing violations of the Consent Decree and the
U.S. Constitution.
On the basis of those findings, the district court concluded
that termination of the remaining portions of the Consent
Decree was inappropriate, that remedies are appropriate, and
that further briefing and hearing were necessary to determine
the scope of remedies. Accordingly, the district court ordered
the parties to further brief the question of whether there is any
alternative to compartmentalization,4 consistent with Section
VIII of the Consent Decree, as a remedy for the fire safety
problems and risks. After the briefing, the district court
issued its Injunction on February 25, 2003, in which it
ordered compartmentalization of the facilities as the fire
safety remedy. The injunction applied to Facilities A (Egeler)
and D (Parnall). The court further ordered Defendants to

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No. 03-1334 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. 7
5Defendants also argue that the district court abused its discretion by
relying upon certain exhibits in violation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. W e disagree and find that any conceivable error in connection
with those exhibits is harmless.
submit by December 31, 2003, a synopsis of their intended
facilities and process modifications, detailed architectural site
plans and construction schedule for approval by the court.
ANALYSIS
Defendants on this appeal argue that the district court
abused its discretion and erred (1) by exercising its
jurisdiction over facilities not subject to the Consent Decree5
and (2) in its conclusion that the MDOC’s failure to protect
prisoners from injury or death by fire constituted a
constitutional violation. We address these contentions in turn.
I. Subject matter jurisdiction
Defendants argue that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over Blocks 1 and 2 of the Egeler
Correctional Facility, Blocks 9 and 10 of the Parnall
Correctional Facility, and Building C. Plaintiffs argue, and
we agree, that the injunction clearly states that it applies only
to Blocks 1, 2, and 3 of Egeler, Block 7 of the Reception
Complex and Block 8 of Parnall. See Injunction, Feb. 25,
2003 at 2. Accordingly, the only question is whether the
district court properly exercised jurisdiction over Blocks 1
and 2 of Egeler.
The Consent Decree stated the following:
This was an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and other applicable statutes seeking declaratory and
equitable relief with respect to the conditions of
confinement at the Central Complex of the State Prison
of Southern Michigan, including the Reception and
Guidance Center (hereinafter referred to as SPSM-CC).
8 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. No. 03-1334
6Judge Feikens of the Eastern District of Michigan was invo lved with
portions of this case prior to their transfer to the Western District of
Michigan.
7W e also no te that in order for a district court to have jurisdiction
over Blocks 1 and 2 , there must be a finding of on-going constitutional
violations taking place there. Therefore, Defendants’ concerns would
have had more substance prior to the enactment of PLRA in 1996, when
the jurisdiction was based solely on the Consent Decree. Since the PLRA
requires a continuing constitutional violation for the retention of
jurisdiction, even were we to find that the district court ab used its
discretion in exercising jurisdiction over those facilities by misconstruing
the Consent Decree, Plaintiffs could immediately file a new lawsuit
challenging the constitutionality of prison conditions in Blocks 1 and 2.
W e would like to avoid that result in the interest of judicial efficiency.
Consent Decree. At the time of the entry of the Consent
Decree, April 1985, SPSM-CC consisted of Blocks 3-6, 8, 11,
12, and Administrative Segregation. Blocks 1 and 2, on the
other hand, were part of the North Complex. Nevertheless, as
stated above, at that time, the Hadix facilities were defined as
“all areas within walls of the State Prison of Southern
Michigan at the time this cause commenced and all areas
which will supply support services under the provisions of the
Consent Judgment.” Order Accepting Consent Judgment,
May 13, 1985. The “within walls of the State Prison of
Southern Michigan” meant the Central Complex.
Accordingly, the question is whether Blocks 1 and 2 are
“areas which will supply support services.” The district court
concluded that “those facilities have been long considered by
this Court and Judge Feikens6 as Hadix facilities given the
delivery of support services. While, of course, the delivery of
support services may change over time, there is no need on
the present record to declare those facilities as non-Hadix
facilities.” Hadix v. Johnson, No. 4:92-CV-110, slip op. at 4
(W.D. Mich. Apr. 18, 2002) (ruling on the motions).
Defendants have presented us with no arguments on this
appeal as to why it was an abuse of discretion to conclude that
Blocks 1 and 2 are “areas which will supply support
services.”7 Accordingly, we find that the district court judge

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No. 03-1334 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. 9
did not abuse its discretion in exercising jurisdiction over all
of the facilities in question.
II. Constitutional violation
A. District Court Proceedings
On February 18, 2000, the district court issued its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law in which it stated:
Egeler cells cannot be remotely unlocked. Moreover, in
an emergency prisoners would be required to exit down
five stories through narrow galleries with low railings.
In a fire, water flowing over the galleries from the
affected sprinklers would make some areas more
slippery, and in some areas smoke from the fire might
also increase the hazard. This combination of
circumstances would pose an extremely great fire
hazard. . . The hazards of a fire evacuation would be even
greater for a prisoner with medical disabilities, a category
that includes much of the population. . . Fire safety
hazards are exacerbated for those persons with
significant medical disabilities, if they are
inappropriately housed on an upper tier. Defendants did
not contest Plaintiffs’ contentions that fire safety in
relation to prisoners with medical and mental health
problems is deficient. Defendants’ failures to implement
an appropriate break-up plan, or otherwise address the
dangers at the Egeler facility, have resulted in current and
ongoing constitutional violations. The current record
also supports a conclusion that there is an ongoing
constitutional violation regarding Administrative
Segregation.
Hadix v. Johnson, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21283, at *376-77
(W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2002) (citing its previous Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law). Since this order was not final,
it was not appealed. The court also set a May 2002 hearing
regarding fire safety to provide Defendants an opportunity to
10 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. No. 03-1334
prove they have taken actions that have remedied
constitutional violations previously determined and to discuss
plans to remedy these violations in Egeler and Administrative
Segregation. Defendants submitted a Report of their
Remedial Plans for Fire Safety, Temperature, Ventilation and
Facility A on June 8, 2001.
Section VIII of the original Consent Decree called for a
management study. This study concluded that SPSM was
unmanageable and should be broken into smaller facilities for
purposes of management. The parties negotiated two
stipulations, each of which was approved by the Court. The
Stipulation Regarding Implementation of Consent Decree
Provisions VIII, E, F, and G, April 7, 1989, established basic
procedures. The Stipulated Agreement Regarding Plan
Element One and the Implementation of Paragraphs VIII, E,
F, and G of the Consent Judgment, June 8, 1990, called for
the unitization and compartmentalization of each of the SPSM
cell blocks into four parts. The Agreement also stated that:
The parties agree that unitization and decentralization are
critical to the acceptance of Plan Element One.
Unitization has been recommended by the Defendants in
their binding proposals to include “dividing each
cellblock into four smaller living units which will operate
as a management unit.” Decentralization has been
recommended by Defendants in their binding proposals
to include “food service and passive recreational
programming . . . decentralized to each of the unitized
housing units.” Where Defendants condition
implementation of these proposals with expressions such
as “if possible” or “where possible” this condition relates
to architectural feasibility.
June 8, 1990 Stipulated Agreement. Our reading of the
record indicates that Defendants consented to
compartmentalization as a remedy not for the fire safety
concerns, but for the concerns over violent attacks that were
taking place in the prison complex. The concerns about

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No. 03-1334 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. 11
8The BOCA Code is issued by the International C ode Council and is
adopted by various jurisdictions. As of the date of this opinion, the Code
has been adopted by 44 states, includ ing M ichigan. It provides safety
requirements for newly-constructed or remodeled buildings, but not for
existing structures.
personal safety of the prisoners stemming from the potential
of outbreak of violence have been remedied and are not
subject of the current appeal. Accordingly, the district court
erred when it proceeded on the assumption that Defendants
had agreed on an earlier occasion to compartmentalization of
the facilities to remedy fire safety violations.
The question of architectural feasibility thus became crucial
to the proper resolution of this long-standing conflict.
Defendants retained the architectural and engineering firms of
Rosser Fabrap and Silver Ziskind to assess the physical and
functional conditions of the Hadix facilities and design the
necessary corrective actions in accordance with the Stipulated
Order to unitize and compartmentalize the facilities. Robert
Fabrap found, inter alia, that (1) all of the cell blocks at
Egeler violate the “means of egress” requirements of the code
of the Building Officials and Code Administrators,
International (“BOCA Code”);8 (2) the stairs that would be
used for evacuating the cell blocks in Egeler are inadequate in
size, enclosure, location, and discharge; and (3) the five-story
mezzanine design in the Egeler cell blocks violates the atrium
requirements of the BOCA Code. These findings were
accepted by Defendants’ mechanical engineering expert,
David Sproul.
Additionally, Defendants retained Mr. Wayne Carson as
their fire safety expert. Mr. Carson visited the Hadix facilities
on a number of occasions, both before and after issuing his
report. During those visits, Mr. Carson walked through the
facilities and interviewed the staff. Mr. Carson opined that
MDOC was conducting fire drills quarterly on each shift. The
examination of the drill reports showed that evacuation times
in Block 3 and Block 8 approached twenty minutes. The Life
12 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. No. 03-1334
9The Life Safety Code is promulgated by the National Fire Protection
Association and is adopted by various jurisdictions, including Michigan.
The purp ose o f the Life Safety Code is to establish minimum
requirements that will provide a reasonable degree of safety from fire in
existing buildings and structures.
10Mr. Carson presented the following example during his testimony:
If I bring a phone booth into this courtroom and w alk in and
close the door and set the phone boo k on fire, I’m not going to
be ab le to stay in the phone booth very long because of the heat
and smoke buildup in the booth. But if I light the same phone
book in the mid dle of the courtroom, we could stay in here and
watch it burn because we have a large volume to absorb the heat
and smo ke. The cell blocks, because they are so large, some of
them longer than a fo otball field pro vide a huge volume to
absorb heat and smoke and is also limited fuel source in the cell
block and the fuel is what drives the fire, that’s what produces
the heat and smoke is the things that burn, and there is limited
fuel in the cells and in the block to burn, so we have a limited
size fire and this huge volume, it’s a tremendous safety factor.
Ha dix, 200 2 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2128 3, at *38 2-83 (W .D. M ich. Oct. 29,
2002).
Safety Code (“LSC”)9 does not specify the maximum amount
of time to complete an evacuation. It does, however, require
that where a large atrium area (e.g. cell block) is being used
to dilute smoke as Defendants argue,10 the evacuation time
must be considered in designing a smoke management
system. Depending on the cell block, between 22 and 27
locks must be opened at Egeler. By contrast, the LSC permits
a maximum of 10 locks. Further delaying the evacuation is
the operating procedure, which mandates that a staff member
must travel to the arsenal to get the key to activate smoke
evacuation vents. Nevertheless, Mr. Carson opined at the
2002 hearing that MDOC’s evacuation procedures and fire
drills are adequate to meet the requirements of the LSC. His
opinion rested in large part on the ability of the open cell
blocks to provide a large volume for the dilution of heat and
smoke. Undermining that conclusion was Mr. Carson’s
inability to tell the court how quickly smoke would actually

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No. 03-1334 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. 13
11The LSC doe s provide examples of doing calculations for smoke
removal rates based on assumed fuel loads. The type and amo unt of fuel
load drives both how fast a fire will develop and how long the fire will
last. The LSC uses an example of a severe fuel loading of 6 pounds per
square foot. Mr. Carson testified that the approximate weight o f the cell
furnishings is 1.7 po unds per square foot. M r. DiM ascio, Plaintiffs’
expert, did not contradict that testimony through his own calculations.
Mr. DiM ascio did indicate that Mr. Carson may have underestimated the
fuel load by only taking into consideration cell furnishings, typically-
issued clothing, and b edd ing. The imp ortance of o ther co mbustible
property, such as personal and legal materials, was provid ed by Plaintiff
Ronald Kovaleski, who estimated the weight of his property at about 500
pounds and the property of a typical prisoner at about 250 pounds.
Mr. Kovaleski’s experience therefore illustrates the failure o f MD OC to
enforce its policy limiting the amount of personal property an inmate may
possess within their cell.
12Mr. Pulitzer is a planner and a licensed architect with over twenty
years experience in the planning o f correctional facilities.
disperse to fill the whole cellblock.11 Mr. Carson also did not
know in what directions the smoke would travel from a fire.
On the other hand, Mr. DiMascio opined that the most likely
path that smoke would travel would be upward, spreading out
as it rose and then traveling across the ceilings.
Mr. DiMascio’s theory was confirmed by the actual path of
the smoke from a fire in Block 8 that Mr. Kovaleski
witnessed on an earlier occasion. However, the district court
acknowledged that fire and smoke from a fire do not travel in
the same direction or have the same characteristics on every
occasion. Mr. Carson attempted to bolster his smoke dilution
theory by testifying that his research has only disclosed one
multi-tiered open cell block fire in Ohio in the 1930s, which
resulted in death or injury to prisoners when the wooden roof
collapsed. Plaintiffs countered that aspect of his testimony
with Curtiss Pulitzer’s testimony that a number of fires had
taken place in multi-tier cell blocks.12 Despite Mr. Pulitzer’s
statement regarding the loss of life due to fires in multi-tiered
correctional facilities 20-25 years ago, the court noted that the
14 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. No. 03-1334
13Mr. Carson ind icated that (1) the bed , desk and chair are metal
except for the chair’s plastic molded back; (2) the furnishings are metal;
and (3) the mattress is cotton, treated with boric acid–it is combustible but
has been treated to reduce its flamm ability.
14Mr. Carson indicated that all Blocks were “heavy concrete and
maso nry construction.”
most recent correctional facility to have a fire resulting in loss
of life was not multi-tiered.
With respect to a likelihood of a fire, Mr. Carson opined
that (1) the combustible materials in the cell blocks are
limited,13 (2) there are no combustibles stored in the
basement of the cell blocks; (3) there are metal fans in the
corners of the units and sprinklers over the metal fans; (4) the
structure is noncombustible14 and there is nothing in the
basement that is combustible; (5) there are no combustible
materials in the attic space; (6) the laundry levels at the
bulkheads referred to as the ends of the cell blocks at the
Egeler Facility are protected with sprinklers; and (7) all
buildings are protected by automatic sprinklers in each cell.
On cross-examination, Mr. Carson conceded that the dry
transformers and circuit breaker panels in Block 7 and 8 could
catch fire and that smoke from the fire could enter the cell
block. Mr. DiMascio confirmed that the dry transformers and
circuit breaker panels in Blocks 1-3, 7, 8 are “live” and pose
a serious hazard if they were to catch on fire. Mr. DiMascio
testified that “sprinkler systems fail too often.” However, he
was unable to provide the court with the failure rate, if any, of
the sprinkler system in the subject facilities.
Plaintiffs produced evidence, credited by the district court,
that there are no automatic sprinklers in the basements of
Blocks 1, 2, 3, 7, and 8 (except at either end over the fans)
and that there are no sprinklers in the pipe chases behind the
cells in Blocks 7 and 8. As a result, if smoke gets into the
pipe chases in Blocks 7 and 8, it would travel vertically
through the tiers, get to the return air vents at the top of the

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No. 03-1334 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. 15
15Mr. Carson was on the committee that drafted Section 15-3.1.3 of
the LSC . The purpose and intent of that Section was to address fire safety
in existing large multi-tiered open cell blocks.
16The LSC has an equivalency provision to allow the authority
enforcing the Code to make judgments concerning its application.
17The ceiling height in the cellblocks varies b etween 42 feet in
Egeler and 51 feet in 7 and 8 Block.
building and be exhausted. The smoke detectors in the air
handling units would shut down the unit in the event of large
volumes of smoke. At that point, the smoke would not be
recirculated in the building; nor would it be exhausted.
Mr. Carson discounted the dangers presented by the lack of
sprinklers in the pipe chases of Blocks 7 and 8 because there
is no fuel in the pipe chases. He concluded that Blocks 1, 2,
3, 7, and 8 are fully sprinkled within the intent of the LSC.15
He also opined that the Blocks provide an equivalent level of
protection intended by the Code.16
A major point of contention during the trial was whether or
not Blocks 1-3 and 7-8 are single-story or multi-storied for
the purposes of the LSC. Those Blocks are each five stories
tall and the length of a football field. Mr. Carson opined that
the Blocks are single-story for purposes of the LSC.
Mr. DiMascio, and the district court, disagreed. The district
court further found that even if the claim that these Blocks are
one-story buildings is accepted, Defendants would then be
violating a separate code provision–the requirement that
ceiling height not exceed twenty-three feet.17
Another point of contention was the applicability of BOCA
to these facilities. BOCA requires more safety precautions
than does the LSC. Mr. Carson, who is involved with BOCA
and is a member of BOCA, stated that BOCA is not
applicable to the subject facilities because BOCA only applies
to new construction and remodeling, and not to existing
structures. The district court noted that Blocks 1-5 were
16 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. No. 03-1334
18The blocks in question have five tiers. It therefo re appears to this
court that there are only four flights of stairs that an inmate must travel
unless the exit is below the first floor.
constructed in 1926. Blocks 7-8 were constructed in 1928.
Blocks 11-12 were constructed in 1944. Administrative
Segregation was constructed in 1930. The court concluded
that as a renovated facility, Egeler was subject to BOCA.
Mr. Carson also acknowledged that he did not take into
consideration the number of prisoners with medical problems.
However, he indicated that a problem of occupants with
medical problems exists in all facilities, including the private
sector and that the LSC takes this problem into consideration.
The court disagreed because it found that Hadix facilities
house a very substantial numbers of inmates who, “because
of age, physical impairment, medical or mental condition, or
medication are more at risk from smoke than a general
population and evacuate more slowly.” Hadix, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21283, at *411-12 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2002).
B. District Court Conclusions
After considering all evidence the district court found the
following specific fire safety deficiencies with respect to
various areas of concern. With regard to building evacuation
the court found that:
If inmates cannot quickly evacuate a housing block in the
event of the a serious fire, they would likely die. The
current population is at risk in a fire emergency. . .
According to Defendants’ records, a substantial number
of cell locking mechanisms do not work properly at any
given time. . . In order to exit a block, an inmate must
travel half the length of his tier to the nearest stairs,
which are at either end of each block; travel down as
many as five flights of open stairs;18 and cross the open
area on base to the exit. The distance an inmate must

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No. 03-1334 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. 17
travel in 1-3 Blocks and 7-8 Blocks to exit the block
exceeds the maximum travel distance of 150 feet
permitted by the Life Safety Code. Blocks 1, 2, 3, 7, and
8 cannot be classified as one-story buildings under the
Life Safety Code because they are not fully sprinkled.
“Fully sprinkled” is an absolute without exceptions for
unsprinkled areas. The BOCA Code would not permit a
five-tiered cell blocks such as those at Egeler and Parnall.
The primary concern associated with Blocks 1-3, 7 and
8 is that they are five-tiered open celled structures. In
addition to applying to new or renovated structures, the
BOCA code requires that unsafe structures be taken
down or made safe. Blocks 1-3, Administrative
Segregation, and Blocks 7-8 are unsafe and should be
corrected. Application of the BOCA Code to Blocks 1-3,
7 and 8 is essential if the buildings are to be made safe.
The ceiling height in Blocks 1-3, 7 and 8 is 51 feet. The
BOCA Code permits a ceiling height that does not
exceed 23 feet long, only so long as one of the exits does
not require inmates to traverse stairs from higher than the
23 feet. The BOCA ceiling height requirement serves to
reduce the number of people at risk. The intent of the
ceiling height requirement is to assure
compartmentalization, reducing the population at risk
from a fire in a particular unit and assuring that prisoners
can move horizontally to the next unit in the event of
fire, rather than being required to negotiate distances in
excess of what is permitted by the code.
Hadix, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21283, at *400-03 (W.D.
Mich. Oct. 29, 2002).
With respect to smoke removal, the district court found
that:
Notwithstanding MDOC regulations, there is a sufficient
fuel load within a cell to burn for 15 minutes. Some cells
have footlockers full of books and other papers. Smoke
caused by a fire in a cell would be most likely to rise
18 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. No. 03-1334
from the cell on fire and, as it rose from gallery to
gallery, it would gather air and expand, affecting more
cells. When the smoke reached the top of the block, it
would move horizontally through the block and then
downward into the block. The air space in a housing
block above the occupied cells will act as a reservoir for
smoke but it would be of limited use before it began
affecting inmates trying to use upper galleries to exit.
Smoke will also form eddies in areas that inmates on
other levels are trying to use as exits. Mr. DiMascio
made calculations based on Life Safety Code, indicating
that each block in Egeler would need to be able to
evacuate 150,000 cubic feet per minute (“CFM”) of
smoke from a block. The ventilation fans are rated to
evacuate 20,000 CFM . . . Accordingly, under conditions
in a fire as anticipated under the Code, the cell block
could fill with smoke at the rate of ten feet per minute.
In light of the fact that the ceiling height in Blocks 1-3,
7 and 8 is 51 feet, these calculations imply that smoke
from the bottom tier could reach the top tier in
approximately five minutes. However, the chances of
such a fire are reduced by the presence of sprinklers. The
ventilation system in 1-3, 7 and 8 Blocks is no more than
an add-on. It is not a smoke controlled system as
described in the codes. There are “live” dry transformers
and electric breaker panels in the basements of 1-3, 7 and
8 Blocks. These can catch fire and the smoke generated
can travel into the housing area. There are no sprinklers
in the basements. Mr. Carson agreed with these
statements as to 7 and 8 Blocks. Fire drill reports from
Block 3 of Egeler show evacuation times ranging from
eight minutes to eighteen minutes. The reports for Block
8 evacuation times range from three minutes to twenty
minutes. However, the codes do not specify maximum
evacuation times. It takes four minutes just to unlock all
of the cells in Blocks 7 and 8, not counting the time from
the base level through an exit door.
Id. at *403-06.

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No. 03-1334 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. 19
In addition to these general findings, the district court
identified physical problems unique to each facility in
question. With respect to Egeler, the court noted that:
A maximum of ten locks can be released to meet the Life
Safety Code. Two of the Egeler blocks have 22 locks
that must be manually opened to evacuate the building.
One block has 27 locks that must be manually opened,
because there are five top-lock cells. The smoke-purging
system in each block of Egeler is the roof exhaust fans.
To activate those fans, staff must go to the Arsenal to
retrieve the key to the lock on the exhaust fans. In the
event of a fire, staff would be expected to unlock cells
and the exit doors, travel back and forth from the Arsenal
to get the key to unlock the switch to the smoke purging
system, and assist handicapped inmates. A Block 2 cell
(which was subject to double-bunked [sic] at the time of
hearing) has a distance of 18.5 inches between the bunk
bed and the side-by-side lockers opposite the bed, 22
inches from the sink to the bunk bed and 9.5 inches from
the sink to the desk, not including the space for the chair.
Defendants did not made any changes to the ventilation
system in 2 Block after it was double-bunked, nor have
Defendants made any changes in the ventilation since the
Court made its findings of unconstitutionality, with the
exception of increasing the population by double-celling
for a time. This double-bunking placed Block 2
prisoners at risk in a fire emergency.
Id. at *406-07. With respect to Blocks 7 and 8, the court
noted that:
The quartermaster area of 7 Block contains substantial
flammable materials. Smoke could get into the housing
unit up the stairs or through the passageway used by
inmates to get into the cell block. [Plaintiff] Kovaleski
estimated that inmates have substantial weights of
flammable materials in their cells. . . Mr. Kovaleski
described a fire that was set by an inmate on the first
20 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. No. 03-1334
gallery of 8 Block. The inmate put a few papers and a
sheet in a trash can, ignited this material and placed his
mattress over the fire. Mr. Kovaleski was on the third
gallery at the time. There was so much smoke produced
by this fire that he could not see the cell opposite his on
the other side of the common area. The smoke came up
the front of the tiers and into his cells. . . There are no
sprinklers in the 7 and 8 Block pipe chases. If an inmate
in 7 or 8 block were to ignite his possessions, the smoke
from the fire could travel into the pipe chase, which does
not have sprinklers, and travel up in the chases and enter
the cells at higher levels. If transformers in the 7 and 8
Block basements caught fire, the smoke from the fire
could travel into the housing units.
Id. at 407-09. With respect to Administrative Segregation,
the court concluded that “[i]f a fire started in a basement it
could ignite the insulation at each floor” and that “Defendants
inappropriately rely on this ventilation system to exhaust
smoke in Administrative Segregation.” Id. With respect to
RGC, the court noted that “[i]nmates in RGS may never
participate in a fire drill, because of the short period of time
they are in the facility [10 days to 4 weeks], placing them at
increased risk.” Id. It further concluded that “in the Egeler
facility, Blocks 7 and 8, Administrative Segregation and
RGC, the risk of injury from smoke and fire for prisoners
with disabilities and chronic diseases continues to violate
Constitutional requirements . . .” Id. at 412-13.
C. Current Appeal
In the context of prison conditions, the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause forbids conditions that involve the
“wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain,” or are “grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime. . .” Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). To succeed in an
Eighth Amendment challenge, Plaintiff must establish that (1)
a single, identifiable necessity of civilized human existence is
being denied (objective prong) and (2) the defendant prison

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No. 03-1334 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. 21
official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. See,
e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); Brown v.
Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000).
With respect to the objective prong,“[p]risoners have the
right not to be subjected to the unreasonable threat of injury
or death by fire . . ..” Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779,
783-84 (9th Cir. 1985). The contemporary standards of
civilized decency that currently prevail in society determine
whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual. See
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 346. It is those
contemporary standards, and not courts’ own “notions of
enlighted policy” that are controlling. Tillery v. Owens, 907
F.2d 418, 426 (3rd Cir. 1990). To satisfy this prong,
“extreme deprivations are required . . .,” Hudson v. McMillan,
503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992), and only deprivations denying “the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” are grave
enough to create a violation of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. Harsh and
uncomfortable prison conditions do not automatically create
such a violation. Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 642 (7th
Cir. 1997) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)).
However, a “remedy for unsafe conditions need not await a
tragic event.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-34
(1993). See also Hill v. Marshall, 962 F.2d 1209, 1211, 1215
(6th Cir. 1992) (holding that failure to provide prophylactic
medication to prevent the possible future development of
active tuberculosis is “actual injury,” even though prisoner
did not develop active tuberculosis).
With respect to the subjective prong, there is no violation
of the Eighth Amendment unless the defendant is “aware of
the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists” and he draws “that
inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Even if the defendant
draws such an inference, he is not liable if he took reasonable
steps to avert the harm. Id. at 844. Negligent exposure to a
risk is not sufficient to create an Eighth Amendment
violation. Id. at 835-36. Rather, deliberate indifference can
22 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. No. 03-1334
best be compared to criminal law’s “subjective recklessness.”
Id. at 839-40. In Farmer, the Court, concerned with the
subjective component, explained that an “inmate seeking an
injunction on the ground that there is a contemporary
violation of a nature likely to continue must adequately plead
such a violation; to survive summary judgment, he must come
forward with evidence from which it can be inferred that the
defendant-officials were at the time suit was filed, and are at
the time of summary judgment, knowingly and unreasonably
disregarding an objectively intolerable risk of harm, and that
they will continue to do so . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845-46.
In this case, we are concerned with future conduct to correct
prison conditions. If those conditions are found to be
objectively unconstitutional, then that finding would also
satisfy the subjective prong because the same information that
would lead to the court’s conclusion was available to the
prison officials.
The district court concluded that Plaintiffs established both
the objective and the subjective prongs. The review in this
case is made difficult because the district court’s finding of a
constitutional violation with respect to fire safety was first
made in 2000, together with a number of issues which have
since been resolved. However, since no injunction was issued
at the time, no appeal was available. The present injunction
was issued after a further evidentiary hearing held in 2002,
where expert testimony was offered by each party as to
compliance with fire safety codes and current conditions with
respect to fire safety. In making its findings supporting the
injunction, the district court incorporated its principal findings
of its 2000 opinion finding fire safety conditions in the
affected buildings unconstitutional.
Defendants have not attacked any of those factual findings
as clearly erroneous. Indeed, the only fact that they appear to
be challenging is the district court’s finding that a large
percentage of the prisoners in the general prison population
have health problems that would affect their ability to deal
with smoke from possible fires. However, Defendants fail to

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No. 03-1334 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. 23
19The parties stipulated that these changes have taken place.
provide any record to support their position while Plaintiffs
direct us to various exhibits and disclosures.
Defendants do argue that their expert, Mr. Carson, is better
qualified than plaintiff’s expert, Mr. DiMascio. Mr. Carson
testified that the LSC properly applies to these existing
buildings and not the BOCA Code, and that the buildings
substantially comply with the LSC even though the distance
that must be traveled to stairs exceeds the distance permitted
under the Code and even though there is an insufficient
exhaust system. This deficiency, Mr. Carson stated, was
compensated for by the large space of the building which
would dissipate smoke from a limited fire in a prisoner’s cell.
Mr. Carson, however, gave no calculations as to what time
that would take or how much smoke could be handled. On
the other hand, Plaintiffs’ expert calculated that the space was
insufficient to dissipate the amount of smoke that could result
from a fire in a cell, considering the amount of papers a
prisoner could accumulate in his cell. Plaintiffs’ expert also
called attention to areas of the buildings which were not fully
sprinkled. However, sprinklers were installed in certain areas,
both after Plaintiffs’ expert’s inspection and since the hearing.
Furthermore, some of the hazards (e.g. unused transformers)
have been or are in the process of being removed.19 If we
were satisfied that the district court applied a proper standard
in its analysis, we would defer to its judgment about the
credibility of the conflicting witnesses.
We reserve our judgment on the battle of the experts,
however, because the district court does not, in either its 2000
or 2002 order, state the standard it is applying to find that the
conditions relating to fire prevention and fire safety are
inadequate. It does not state in what particular ways
Defendants’ deficiencies were unconstitutional in 2002,
merely reciting that it had found those conditions
unconstitutional in 2000 and that they had not been remedied.
24 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. No. 03-1334
It is unclear whether the court simply (and erroneously)
concluded that the violation of the LSC or the BOCA is
equivalent to a constitutional violation. Having reviewed the
evidence before us, we conclude that the court abused its
discretion when it found that the current prison conditions at
the facilities in question are so unsafe as to violate the
Constitution and when it issued an injunction requiring
compartmentalization.
The Fifth Circuit encountered a similar problem with fire
safety concerns in various institutions operated by the Texas
Department of Corrections (“TDC”). Ruiz v. Estelle, 679
F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982). In Ruiz, the district court found
that (1) the TDC prisons were woefully deficient in the
number of fire exits, (2) the few available exits in the housing
areas were too small and inadequately constructed to serve
effectively during an actual fire, and (3) a similar problem in
work areas created a potential for serious injury in the face of
a disaster. Concluding that these conditions violated the
Eighth Amendment, the district court ordered TDC to comply
with the current edition of the Life Safety Code of the
National Fire Protection Association. Id. at 1152-53. On the
other hand, the record contained “no evidence either of a
single fatality or a serious injury at TDC caused by fire or
smoke inhalation in the recent past. Although there is danger
from inflammable materials used inside the buildings, the
buildings themselves are built of materials that do not burn
easily.” Id. at 1153. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that
TDC had a duty to provide adequate fire safety for its
inmates. Nevertheless, it found that:
The deficiencies in fire safety found at TDC, however,
do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, either
alone or in combination with the other conditions in its
prisons. Indeed, the fire safety problems have little
connection with the other conditions found to violate the
eighth amendment. Moreover, although the standards
set by private organizations’ safety codes may be
instructive in certain cases, they simply do not establish

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No. 03-1334 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. 25
the constitutional minima; rather they establish goals
recommended by the organization in question.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In finding that
private safety codes, such as the LSC, do not establish the
constitutional minima, the Fifth Circuit relied on the
following footnote in a Supreme Court’s opinion:
Respondents and the District Court erred in assuming
that opinions of experts as to desirable prison conditions
suffice to establish contemporary standards of decency.
As we noted in [an earlier case], such opinions may be
helpful and relevant with respect to some questions, but
they simply do not establish the constitutional minima;
rather, they establish goals recommended by the
organization in question. Indeed, generalized opinions of
experts cannot weigh as heavily in determining
contemporary standards of decency as the public attitude
toward a given sanction. We could agree that double
celling is not desirable, especially in view of the size of
these cells. But there is no evidence in this case that
double celling is viewed generally as violating decency.
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 n. 13 (citations omitted). The
Supreme Court more recently reiterated its commitment to
“contemporary standards of decency” approach to claims of
alleged Eighth Amendment violations:
[D]etermining whether McKinney’s conditions of
confinement violate the Eighth Amendment requires
more than a scientific and statistical inquiry into the
seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood that
such injury to health will actually be caused by exposure
to ETS. It also requires a court to assess whether society
considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so
grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency
to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk. In other
words, the prisoner must show that the risk of which he
26 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. No. 03-1334
20The citations that follow represent this continuum. The cases are
listed in the order of the seriousness of the constitutional violations
alleged, and/or proven, therein, from the more serious (and, hence,
unconstitutional) cond itions to the less serious ones.
complains is not one that today’s society chooses to
tolerate.
Helling, 509 U.S. at 36. A review of cases dealing with fire
safety in the constitutional context illustrates a continuum of
various violations of fire safety, generally, and fire safety
codes, specifically. Some of these amounted to a
constitutional violation while others did not.20 See generally
Women Prisoners of the Dist. of Columbia Dep’t of Corr.,
877 F. Supp. 634, 669 (D.D.C. 1994) (finding that the
following living conditions, working in concert, presented a
risk of fire so serious that it violated contemporary standards
of decency where (1) the dormitories were overcrowded and
carried a heavy combustible load; (2) the walls could not
contain a fire within any room; (3) only one fire exit
consistently remained unlocked; (4) there was no fire alarm
system; (5) there was no sprinkler system; and (6) fire drills
were not regularly conducted); Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F.
Supp. 727, 737 (D.V.I. 1997) (finding a constitutional
violation where (1) the cell locking devices, manual alarm
systems, smoke dampers, and heat detectors were inoperable,
thereby creating a security risk during a fire emergency, and
(2) the building itself could not adequately protect the
occupants during a fire because of an inadequate fire alarm
system); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 597 F. Supp. 1388, 1410
(N.D. Cal. 1984) (finding an Eighth Amendment violation
where (1) lockup units at both prisons were replete with fire
hazards; (2) evacuation procedures were nonexistent or, at
best, untested; and (3) the record showed that multiple fire-
related fatalities occurred); Capps v. Atiyeh, 559 F. Supp. 894,
915 (D. Or. 1983) (finding an Eighth Amendment violation
despite the absence of evidence of a death or serious injury
cause by fire or smoke inhalation at the facility because (1)

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No. 03-1334 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. 27
the prison was a very old structure unlike solid concrete
complexes approved by Ruiz; (2) the inmates, many of whom
are older, lived in crowded dormitories; (3) the facility needed
either smoke detectors or a fire alarm system, and an
emergency exit on the north end of the building; (4) the south
emergency exit was locked and only one guard could unlock
it; and (5) the ladder did not reach the ground); Leeds v.
Watson, 630 F.2d 674, 675-76 (9th Cir. 1980) (remanding for
further hearing on the adequacy of the plan to remedy
constitutional violations where (1) “there is room for the
belief that the second floor of the facility could still be a death
trap in the event of fire” because the only exit for inmates
may be blocked by fire and the alternative means of regress
would take too much time; and (2) “[t]here is still some
possibility, moreover, that persons will be housed in ‘grave
emergencies’ in a locked cell area that has no fire exit.”);
Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1182-83 (1st Cir. 1983)
(remanding because the district court failed to adequately
address “the evidence presented to it that conditions at
Mayaquez are not as safe from the danger of fire as the
constitution requires that they be” where (1) the polyurethane
mattresses were used throughout the institution and that
polyurethane is highly inflammable, burns quickly at high
temperatures and emits extremely toxic gasses; (2) two
juveniles actually died several years ago in a fire that they set
to their mattresses; (3) fire extinguishers may not have been
properly changed; and (4) there was a need for an evacuation
plan in the event of fire); Masonoff v. DuBois, 899 F. Supp.
782, 798-99 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding that there is a triable
issue concerning the plaintiffs’ fire hazard claim where (1) it
was undisputed that the prison lacked automatic locks on the
cell doors and a functioning sprinkler system and (2) that the
state building code applicable to the prison required a
sprinkler system and encouraged the use of automatic door
locks, but (3) where the prison may have mitigated any
danger to withstand constitutional scrutiny when it
implemented rigorous fire safety procedures, including
evacuation drills, fire drills and inspections of fire safety
equipment); French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1257 (7th Cir.
28 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. No. 03-1334
21This Court has no evidence before it to explain the use of
compartmentalization as a fire safety remed y. Nor was one provided to
us by the counsel during the oral argument despite being asked by the
bench.
1986) (observing that “[t]he eighth amendment does not
constitutionalize the Indiana Fire Code. Nor does it require
complete compliance with the numerous OSHA regulations”
and remanding to the district court to order only those
remedies that are necessary to bring conditions above
constitutional minima); Miles v. Bell, 621 F. Supp. 51, 64-5
(D. Conn. 1985) (no constitutional violation even though the
laundry room door in prison was not a one-hour fire resistant
door, as required by the LSC).
In this case, the district court failed to identify the point at
which certain fire safety deficiencies ceased being mere
deficiencies and, instead, became constitutional violations.
As noted above, this Court was informed at oral argument
that Defendants have taken steps to remedy some of the
problems noted by the district court, such as removing the dry
transformers from the basement and installing additional
sprinklers. It is unclear to us whether those remedies are
sufficient to cure the constitutional violations at the Hadix
facilities.
We understand that the judicial supervision over prison
conditions is a daunting task. We cannot, however, accept the
approach taken by the district court in this case, namely,
providing a laundry list of all the things that were wrong in
the Hadix facilities, declaring a constitutional violation, and
ordering a highly expensive, and potentially ineffective,21
solution. This approach renders it impossible for this Court
to review on appeal the legal conclusions of the lower court.
We owe deference to the district court’s decision to issue an
injunction to remedy the constitutional violations. However,
we must review de novo its legal conclusion that there were
constitutional violations. Absence of a clear constitutional

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No. 03-1334 Hadix, et al. v. Johnson, et al. 29
analysis in the present case by the lower court renders this
task impossible. Accordingly, we remand this case for a more
detailed analysis of how the current conditions in the Hadix
facilities continue to be deprivations denying “the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities” rather than potentially
minor deviations that may satisfy the equivalency provisions
of the LSC. Also, we remand for a more detailed analysis of
why the steps taken by the prison officials, which the lower
court may disagree with, constitute “deliberate indifference,”
rather than a mere difference of opinion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district
court properly exercised jurisdiction over all facilities in
question. However, we remand for a more detailed
constitutional analysis on the question of fire safety
violations.

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