Mohamed Ramiz Ali v. JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General; IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

*The Honorable H erman J. W eber, Senior United States District
Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0117P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0117p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
MOHAMED RAMIZ ALI,
Petitioner,
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney
General; IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Respondents.
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No. 02-3810
On Petition for Review of the Order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals.
No. A73 378 380.
Submitted: January 29, 2004
Decided and Filed: April 22, 2004
Before: MARTIN and MOORE, Circuit Judges; WEBER ,
Senior District Judge.*
2 Ali v. Ashcroft, et al. No. 02-3810
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Charles S. Owen, OWEN & ASSOCIATES,
Southfield, Michigan for Petitioner. Jennifer A. Parker,
Terri J. Scadron, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIGATION,
Washington, D.C., for Respondents.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Mohamed Ramiz
Ali petitions for review of a final order of removal issued by
the Board of Immigration Appeals, which affirmed the
immigration judge’s denial of his requests for asylum,
withholding of deportation and voluntary departure. For the
following reasons, Ali’s petition is DENIED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ali is a native and citizen of Bangladesh who entered the
United States in 1991 without inspection by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service. The Service commenced removal
proceedings against Ali on March 14, 1997. Ali concedes
that he is deportable, but requests relief from deportation on
several grounds. His primary claim is that he is entitled to
asylum and withholding of deportation because he was, and
fears he will be, persecuted in Bangladesh on account of his
political opinion. He also requests voluntary departure.
The deportation hearing predominantly featured Ali’s own
testimony, which the immigration judge found “incredible,”
“difficult to comprehend” and inconsistent with the
documentary evidence. The crux of Ali’s testimony was that
during the period from 1987 to 1990, he was persecuted by
Bangladesh police because of his involvement with the

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No. 02-3810 Ali v. Ashcroft, et al. 3
Jamaat political party. Ali testified that he became a member
of that party in 1985 and became the president of its local unit
in 1987. After he became president, Ali allegedly began
having problems with opposing political parties – specifically,
the Awami League, the Jantiya Party and the Bangladesh
National Party. Ali testified that he had been arrested and
detained on two different occasions as a result of his
participation in violent conflicts with members of opposing
political parties. According to Ali, these conflicts occurred
during public meetings for his party and were the result of
members of opposing parties showing up at the meetings and
causing trouble. He claimed that he was arrested because an
opposing party was in power and he was unfairly blamed. Ali
testified that he had sustained various injuries during these
conflicts and while in police custody, including being shot in
the arm, hit in the leg, cut in the finger and hit in the head.
Ali claims that some time after his release from prison
another warrant was issued for his arrest. According to Ali,
that warrant was based upon false accusations by an opposing
party. He fled Bangladesh and eventually entered Canada
using a fake passport. In 1991, Ali entered the United States
without inspection, where he later met and married a woman
named Alma Sumner.
During Ali’s deportation hearing, the Service proffered
several documents that cast doubt upon the validity of his
marriage to Sumner. One document was a sworn statement
from Sumner requesting the withdrawal of the I-130
application that she had filed on Ali’s behalf, which stated, in
pertinent part: “I think he married me to get a green card.”
Another document was a letter from the Service to Ali setting
forth various discrepancies in Ali’s and Sumner’s statements
concerning their marriage and indicating that “the Service can
only conclude that this marriage was entered into by you for
the sole purpose of obtaining permanent resident status and
evading immigration laws.” These documents were admitted
over Ali’s objection.
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At the conclusion of the hearing, the immigration judge
rendered an oral decision denying Ali’s requests for asylum,
withholding of deportation and voluntary departure. On
June 19, 2002, the Board of Immigration Appeals summarily
affirmed the immigration judge’s decision without an opinion.
Presently before this Court is Ali’s petition for review of the
final order of removal issued by the Board. Where, as here,
the Board summarily affirms an immigration judge’s decision
without issuing an opinion, the immigration judge’s decision
is considered the final agency action to be reviewed by this
Court. Denko v. INS, 351 F.3d 717, 729 (6th Cir. 2003). We
review questions of law involving immigration proceedings
de novo. Huicochea-Gomez v. INS, 237 F.3d 696, 699 (6th
Cir. 2001). The particular standards of review that apply to
Ali’s specific claims are set forth within the following
analysis.
ANALYSIS
A. Asylum and Withholding of Deportation
The Board’s determination that Ali is ineligible for asylum
or withholding of deportation must be upheld if “supported by
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
considered as a whole.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478,
481 (1992) (citation omitted); Klawitter v. INS, 970 F.2d 149,
151-52 (6th Cir. 1992). In order to reverse the Board’s
determinations, “the reviewing court must find that the
evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but indeed
compels it.” Klawitter, 970 F.2d at 152 (citing Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481).
1. Asylum
“Disposition of an application for asylum requires a two-
step inquiry: first, whether the petitioner is a ‘refugee’ within
the meaning of the [Immigration and Nationality Act], and
second, whether the petitioner merits a favorable exercise of
discretion by the Attorney General.” Perkovic v. INS, 33 F.3d

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No. 02-3810 Ali v. Ashcroft, et al. 5
615, 620 (6th Cir. 1994). A “refugee” is a person who is
unable or unwilling to return to his home country “because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
“[P]ersecution is an extreme concept that does not include
every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.”
Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations
and quotation marks omitted). “Persecution” entails
“punishment or the infliction of suffering or harm,” but
“harassment or discrimination without more does not rise to
the level of persecution.” Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384,
389-90 (6th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Meghani v. INS, 236 F.3d
843 (7th Cir. 2001), is particularly instructive on the issue of
whether Ali’s experiences in Bangladesh amount to past
persecution on account of his political opinion. In Meghani,
the petitioner, a member of a political group called the
Pakistan People’s Party, was assaulted and injured at his
office by members of a rival political party, the Mahegir
Quami Movement. The petitioner did not notify the police
about this incident because he believed they would be
ineffective at remedying the problem. He subsequently fled
the country and ultimately entered in the United States. The
petitioner conceded that he met the requirements for
deportability, but claimed that he was entitled to asylum
because he was, and feared he would be, persecuted on
account of his political opinion. The Seventh Circuit held
that “[c]onditions of political upheaval which affect the
populace as a whole or in large part are generally insufficient
to establish eligibility for asylum,” and that what the
petitioner experienced was “civil unrest between competing
political factions,” not persecution. Id. at 847 (citation
omitted).
Taking the record as a whole, we are convinced that the
immigration judge’s conclusion that Ali did not suffer
persecution, but was instead involved in civil unrest between
6 Ali v. Ashcroft, et al. No. 02-3810
competing political factions, was supported by substantial
evidence. The immigration judge found no evidence that the
police were conspiring with a rival political group, or that
they arrested Ali for any reason other than his involvement in
causing a public disturbance, and Ali points to no evidence
that would undercut that finding. We conclude that
substantial evidence supports the immigration judge’s
determination that Ali is not a refugee and is therefore not
entitled to asylum on the basis of past persecution.
Because Ali has failed to prove past persecution, he is “not
entitled to the presumption under 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)
of a well-founded fear of suffering future persecution.”
Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 390. To determine whether Ali
has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of
his political opinion, therefore, we apply the standard set forth
in Perkovic:
The Supreme Court has held that an applicant for asylum
has a well-founded fear of persecution if he can show
that “persecution is a reasonable possibility” should he
be returned to his country of origin. A well-founded fear
of persecution has both a subjective and an objective
component: an alien must actually fear that he will be
persecuted upon return to his country, and he must
present evidence establishing an “objective situation”
under which his fear can be deemed reasonable. A well-
founded fear of persecution does not require the applicant
to show that he probably will be persecuted if he is
deported; “[o]ne can certainly have a well-founded fear
of an event happening when there is less than a 50%
chance of the occurrence taking place.”
33 F.3d at 620-21 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421 (1987)). “[A]n alien is not required to produce evidence
of persecution; the alien’s own testimony can be sufficient to
support an application for asylum, where the testimony is
believable, consistent, and sufficiently detailed to provide a
plausible and coherent account of the basis for his fear.” Id.

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No. 02-3810 Ali v. Ashcroft, et al. 7
1Ali produced a d ocument during the deportation hearing that he
claimed was a copy of an outstanding warrant for his arrest issued by
authorities in Bangladesh, but the immigration judge excluded this
document because it could not be authenticated. Ali has not specifically
challenged the immigration judge’s exclusion of this document, and the
document is not part of the record evidence.
at 621 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Because a well-founded fear of persecution can be based upon
what has happened to others who are similarly situated, it is
“necessary, in considering an applicant’s asylum petition, to
weigh evidence of general conditions in the country of origin
and the foreign government’s history of treatment of others
engaged in similar activities.” Id. (citation omitted).
Ali testified at the deportation hearing that he feared that he
would suffer persecution on account of his political opinion
if he were forced to return to Bangladesh. While Ali may, in
fact, subjectively fear future persecution, we find no sufficient
basis in the record to undercut the immigration judge’s
conclusion that his fear is not objectively reasonable.
Perkovic, 33 F.3d at 620-21. Ali’s fear of future persecution
is primarily based upon events that have occurred in the past
that the immigration judge concluded, based upon substantial
evidence, do not rise to the level of persecution. There is
simply no evidence in the record to substantiate Ali’s
testimony that he fears future persecution.1 In fact, as the
immigration judge emphasized, the State Department’s 1998
asylum profile for Bangladesh reveals no information
indicating that members of the Jamaat political party have
suffered persecution on account of their political opinion,
despite the party’s ability “to mount violent demonstrations
in support of fundamentalist Muslim positions.” Bangladesh:
Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions, United
States Department of State, February 1998, at 10. Finally, in
the face of the immigration judge’s reasonable doubts about
Ali’s credibility, we are unable to say that Ali’s testimony,
standing alone, was sufficiently “believable, consistent, and
sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible and coherent
8 Ali v. Ashcroft, et al. No. 02-3810
account of the basis for his fear.” Id. at 621. We find that
substantial evidence supports the immigration judge’s
conclusion that Ali did not possess a well-founded fear of
persecution in Bangladesh on account of his political opinion.
2. Withholding of Deportation
To qualify for withholding of deportation, an applicant
must show a “clear probability of persecution,” which is a
stricter standard than the “well-founded fear” standard that
applies with respect to applications for asylum. INS v. Stevic,
467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1).
Because Ali has failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of
persecution in Bangladesh on account of his political opinion,
his request for withholding of deportation must likewise fail.
Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615, 625 (6th Cir. 2004)
(“Because substantial evidence supports the conclusion that
Petitioner is ineligible for asylum, it therefore follows that he
cannot satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of
deportation.”).
B. Voluntary Departure
The Immigration and Nationality Act grants the Attorney
General the discretionary power to allow a deportable alien to
depart voluntarily in lieu of deportation if the alien establishes
that he “has been a person of good moral character, for at
least five years preceding his application.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254(e). The immigration judge determined that Ali had
failed to demonstrate the requisite “good moral character.”
That determination was based at least in part upon the
Service’s evidence regarding the validity of his marriage to
Sumner. Ali concedes that entering into a sham marriage for
purposes of obtaining immigration benefits precludes an alien
from demonstrating the requisite good moral character.
Nevertheless, he argues that the immigration judge erred in
finding that he was not entitled to voluntary departure. He
also contends that the admission of the evidence concerning
the validity of his marriage denied him a fair hearing.

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No. 02-3810 Ali v. Ashcroft, et al. 9
The transitional rules of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 apply in this case
because Ali’s deportation proceedings commenced before
April 1, 1997, but the final administrative order of deportation
was issued on or after October 30, 1996. IIRIRA §§ 309(a),
(c)(1), (c)(4). Under the transitional rules, we lack
jurisdiction to review “any discretionary decision under
section . . . 244 of the [Immigration and Nationality Act].”
Id. at § 309(c)(4)(E). A decision denying voluntary departure
is such a discretionary decision. Id.; Lulaj v. INS, 71 Fed.
Appx. 524, 526 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublished opinion).
Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review the propriety of the
denial of Ali’s request for voluntary departure. Lulaj, 71 Fed.
Appx. at 526; Tamas-Mercea v. Reno, 222 F.3d 417, 427 (7th
Cir. 2000).
To the extent that Ali asserts a due process violation based
upon the immigration judge’s admission of the evidence
concerning the validity of his marriage, such a claim must
also fail. “Fifth Amendment guarantees of due process
extend to aliens in deportation proceedings, entitling them to
a full and fair hearing.” Huicochea-Gomez, 237 F.3d at 699
(citations omitted). However, “[t]he failure to be granted
discretionary relief [such as voluntary departure] does not
amount to a deprivation of a liberty interest.” Id. at 700
(citation omitted). Because Ali cannot demonstrate that he
has suffered a deprivation of a liberty interest, he cannot
prove a due process violation.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Ali’s petition for review of the order of
the Board of Immigration Appeals is DENIED.

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