United States of America v. David E. Henley, Jr.

*The Honorable D avid W . McKeague, United States District Judge
for the Western District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0070P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0070p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DAVID E. HENLEY, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
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No. 02-6011
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Chattanooga.
No. 01-00148—R. Allan Edgar, Chief District Judge.
Argued: December 2, 2003
Decided and Filed: March 5, 2004
Before: MARTIN and MOORE, Circuit Judges;
McKEAGUE, District Judge.*
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Martin J. Levitt, LEVITT & LEVITT,
Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellant. Perry H. Piper,
2 United States v. Henley No. 02-6011
ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Chattanooga,
Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Martin J. Levitt,
LEVITT & LEVITT, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellant.
Perry H. Piper, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. A jury convicted
David E. Henley, Jr. of several offenses related to the
distribution of methamphetamine, for which the district court
imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. Here, Henley has
a number of challenges to his trial and sentence, yet little
support for his conclusions. Thus, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
At the time of his August 28, 2001, indictment on
methamphetamine related charges, Henley was twenty-four
years old and had no prior criminal record. While several of
his co-conspirators – most notably Sophan Luy and Bryan
Sanders – pleaded guilty, Henley exercised his Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial. At Henley’s trial, Luy and
Sanders testified against him in hopes of receiving a reduction
in their respective sentences – which they did ultimately
receive. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted
Henley of possession with the intent to distribute in excess of
fifty grams of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B), conspiracy to distribute in
excess of five hundred grams of methamphetamine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), and using a
“communication facility” to facilitate his drug offenses in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).
Among the issues at sentencing was the quantity of
methamphetamine involved in the conspiracy. Under the

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No. 02-6011 United States v. Henley 3
1Luy plead ed guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 8 46. United States v. Luy,
Case No. 1:00-CR-46-1, Judgment (E.D. Tenn.). As part of the plea
agreement, six other co unts in the indictment were dismissed. Id. Luy
was originally sentenced to 136 months of imprisonment, but the United
States subsequently filed a motion for a reduction in Luy’s sentence
2001 United States Sentencing Guidelines, which govern this
case, a base offense level of thirty-six applies where the
quantity of methamphetamine attributable to the defendant is
between five and fifteen kilograms. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2).
The presentence report attributed 14.989 kilograms of
methamphetamine to Henley. The district court declined to
adopt this amount and instead undertook an independent
examination of the record. Based solely upon the trial
testimony of Sophan Luy, the district court found Henley
responsible for at least five kilograms of methamphetamine.
Therefore, despite the considerable difference between the
drug quantity estimated in the presentence report and the
quantity found by the district court, under section 2D1.1(c)(2)
of the Sentencing Guidelines the district court had no choice
but to apply the same base offense level – thirty-six – as
provided in the presentence report.
The district court also assessed several sentencing
enhancements: a two-point enhancement pursuant to section
2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a firearm; a three-point
enhancement pursuant to section 3B1.1 for Henley’s
supervisory role in the conspiracy; and a two-point
enhancement pursuant to section 3C1.1 for obstruction of
justice. These sentencing enhancements brought Henley’s
total offense level to forty-three, which carries a mandatory
life sentence.
In a striking illustration of the disparity in sentences
imposed upon similarly situated defendants depending upon
whether they exercise their Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial or waive that right in favor of a plea bargain, Luy and
Sanders received prison sentences of 87 months1 and 93
4 United States v. Henley No. 02-6011
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 (b), which the district
court granted, thereby red ucing his sentence to 87 months. United States
v. Luy, Case No. 1:00-CR -46, Order Amend ing Judgment (E.D. Tenn.).
2Sanders pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute in
excess of fifty grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 846 and 8 41(b)(1)(B), as well as possession of a firearm in furtherance
of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 92 4(c)(1)(A)(I).
United States v. San ders, Case No. 1:01-CR-98-02, Judgment (E.D.
Tenn.). As part of the plea agreement, the remaining count in the
indictment was dismissed . Id. Sanders was originally sentenced to 101
months of imprisonment – 41 months on the first count and 60 months on
the second, to be served consecutively. As in Luy’s case, however, the
United States subsequently filed a motion for a reduction in Sanders’s
sentence pursuant to Rule 35(b), which the district court granted, thereby
reducing his sentence to 93 m onths. United States v. Sanders, Case No.
1:01 -CR-98, O rder Amending Jud gment (E.D . Tenn.).
months,2 respectively. United States v. Luy, Case No. 1:00-
CR-46, Order Amending Judgment (E.D. Tenn.); United
States v. Sanders, Case No. 1:01-CR-98, Order Amending
Judgment (E.D. Tenn.).
In this timely appeal, Henley challenges his conviction and
sentence on several grounds. We address each of his
arguments in turn.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Sufficiency of Evidence Establishing Henley’s
Participation in a Conspiracy
Henley’s primary argument is that the evidence adduced at
his trial was insufficient to establish the existence of a
conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and, even if a
conspiracy existed, the evidence was insufficient to prove that
he was a participant therein. Unfortunately for Henley, our
review of the jury’s finding that he participated in a
conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine is strictly limited.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence “by

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No. 02-6011 United States v. Henley 5
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could
have found that the essential elements of the crime were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
Spearman, 186 F.3d 743, 745 (6th Cir. 1999). “A defendant
making such a challenge bears a very heavy burden.
Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to sustain a
conviction and such evidence need not remove every
reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. Furthermore, it is
well-settled that uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice
may support a conviction in federal court.” Id.
To prove a conspiracy, the following elements must be
established:
(1) An object to be accomplished. (2) A plan or scheme
embodying means to accomplish that object. (3) An
agreement or understanding between two or more of the
defendants whereby they become definitely committed to
cooperate for the accomplishment of the object by the
means embodied in the agreement, or by any effectual
means.
United States v. Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408, 420 (6th Cir. 1999)
(quoting United States v. Bostic, 480 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir.
1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Proof of a formal
agreement is not required to establish a conspiracy; “a tacit or
material understanding among the parties” is sufficient.
United States v. Pearce, 912 F.2d 159, 161 (6th Cir. 1990).
“Drug distribution conspiracies are often ‘chain’ conspiracies
such that agreement can be inferred from the interdependence
of the enterprise. One can assume that participants understand
that they are participating in a joint enterprise because success
is dependent on the success of those from whom they buy and
to whom they sell.” Spearman, 186 F.3d at 746 (citing
United States v. Bourjaily, 781 F.2d 539, 546 (6th Cir.
1986)).
6 United States v. Henley No. 02-6011
Contrary to Henley’s assertion, the evidence adduced at his
trial, construed in the light most favorable to the United
States, is sufficient to establish that a conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine existed. Henley, Sanders, Luy and an
individual named “Scott” from Atlanta apparently formed the
core of the conspiracy. According to the testimony elicited at
trial, Scott provided methamphetamine to Luy, who in turn
sold it to Henley, who then sold it to Sanders, who sold it to
others. In short, the evidence shows that Henley and one or
more co-conspirators had an “understanding” to employ this
“scheme” to accomplish the “object” of selling
methamphetamine. Gibbs, 182 F.3d at 420.
Once a conspiracy has been shown, only “slight” evidence
is needed to connect a defendant to a conspiracy. Gibbs, 182
F.3d at 422. Henley argues that the evidence presented at his
trial is insufficient to connect him to the conspiracy because,
at most, it proves only that he sold methamphetamine to
Sanders. While Henley is correct that a “buyer-seller
relationship” is not enough to make someone a participant in
a drug conspiracy, “further evidence indicating knowledge of
and participation in the conspiracy can be enough to link the
defendant to the conspiracy.” Gibbs, 182 F.3d at 421. We
have recognized that the “trust” involved in “fronting” drugs
under a delayed payment or credit arrangement “suggests
more than a buyer-seller arrangement between the parties.”
United States v. Humphrey, 287 F.3d 422, 435 (6th Cir.
2002), overruled on other grounds, United States v.
Leachman, 309 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2002). In this case,
Sanders testified that Henley “fronted” methamphetamine to
him, and Luy testified that on numerous occasions he
provided Henley with large quantities of methamphetamine.
Viewing this – and other – evidence in the light most
favorable to the United States, as we must, Spearman, 186
F.3d at 745, we conclude that sufficient evidence supported
the jury’s determination that Henley participated in a
conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.

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No. 02-6011 United States v. Henley 7
Because Sanders and Luy received downward departures as
a result of their cooperation with the United States, Henley
challenges the credibility of their testimony. It is not the
province of this Court, however, to weigh the credibility of
witnesses – particularly in the context of determining whether
sufficient evidence supports a conviction. United States v.
Hilliard, 11 F.3d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 1993) (“In addressing
sufficiency of the evidence questions, this Court has long
recognized that we do not weigh the evidence, consider the
credibility of witnesses or substitute our judgment for that of
the jury.”) (citing United States v. Evans, 883 F.2d 496, 501
(6th Cir. 1989)); United States v. King, 272 F.3d 366, 370
(6th Cir. 2001) (rejecting defendant’s challenge to the
credibility of his co-conspirators, who had benefitted from
cooperation agreements with the United States, as “challenges
to the quality of the government’s evidence and not the
sufficiency of the evidence”); see also Spearman, 186 F.3d at
745 (explaining that an accomplice’s uncorroborated
testimony may support a conviction).
We certainly recognize that the prospect of a reduced
sentence could have provided a powerful incentive for
Henley’s co-conspirators to testify against him. Whether that
incentive affected the credibility of their testimony, however,
is for the jury to decide. The jury in this case was aware that
Sanders and Luy had reason to believe that they could benefit
from a reduction in their sentences as a result of their
testimony against Henley. We simply cannot second-guess
the jury’s determinations with regard to whether and to what
extent that motive may have affected those witnesses’
credibility.
B. Quantity of Methamphetamine Attributable to Henley
Henley also challenges the district court’s determination of
the quantity of methamphetamine for which he was
responsible. The district court’s drug quantity determination
“must stand unless it is clearly erroneous.” United States v.
8 United States v. Henley No. 02-6011
Ward, 68 F.3d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 1995); see also United
States v. Owusu, 199 F.3d 329, 338 (6th Cir. 2000).
A court may hold a defendant responsible for an amount
of drugs only if the court finds that it is more likely than
not that the defendant actually was responsible for at
least that amount. An approximation by a court is not
clearly erroneous if it is supported by competent
evidence in the record. In other words, the court finding
must have some minimum indicium of reliability beyond
mere allegation.
Ward, 68 F.3d at 149 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). We must uphold the district court’s determination
in this regard if it is consistent with the factual record, even if
we would have reached a different conclusion under de novo
review. United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 663 (6th
Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S.
564, 573 (1985) (“Where there are two permissible views of
the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be
clearly erroneous.”)).
In determining whether a district court’s calculation of drug
quantity is clearly erroneous, a key issue is the extent to
which the court identified the evidence on which it relied in
making that calculation. Compare, e.g., United States v.
Baro, 15 F.3d 563, 569 (6th Cir. 1994) (vacating defendants’
sentences because the district court attributed an extra
kilogram of cocaine without making any factual findings),
United States v. Medina, 992 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1993)
(vacating sentences because the district court imputed
knowledge of the whole extent of the conspiracy to the
defendants without making a finding that it was reasonable to
do so), and United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289, 1302-03
(6th Cir. 1990) (vacating sentences because the district court
extrapolated rate of cocaine dealing without identifying
competent circumstantial evidence to support the
extrapolation), with Ward, 68 F.3d at 150 (upholding sentence
where the district court “clearly spelled out the reasons for his

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No. 02-6011 United States v. Henley 9
3Henley argues that he lac ked notice of the U nited States’ intent to
rely upon Luy’s testimony to establish the drug amounts. That notice was
provided, however, in a June 1 4, 2002 , letter from the United States to
Henley’s counsel.
4Two pounds of methamphetamine per mo nth over the course of 8
months equals sixteen pounds or app roxim ately 7.3 kilograms.
conclusion that Ward was responsible for over 3,000
kilograms of marijuana” and did not speculate as to the
quantity), and United States v. West, 948 F.2d 1042 (6th Cir.
1991) (upholding sentence where the district court’s drug
quantity determination was based upon testimony that the
defendant had been involved in many transactions, each
involving over four kilograms of cocaine).
Based upon our careful review of the record, we conclude
that the evidence supports the district court’s calculation of
the quantity of methamphetamine attributable to Henley and
that the court properly identified the particular evidence on
which it relied in making that calculation. During the
sentencing hearing, the district court referenced the testimony
of various witnesses, but – in order to avoid “double
counting” – relied exclusively upon Luy’s testimony in
making its quantity determination.3 Luy testified that over
the course of eight to ten months, he traveled to Atlanta once
a month and on each trip purchased four pounds of
methamphetamine, keeping two pounds for himself and
giving two pounds to Henley. Occasionally, Luy would make
two trips per month instead of one, in which case he would
purchase two pounds of methamphetamine on each trip,
keeping one pound for himself and giving one pound to
Henley. The district court concluded that Henley could be
held liable for over five kilograms of methamphetamine4
based upon Luy’s testimony alone. The district judge
explicitly considered Luy’s credibility and concluded: “I do
have confidence in what Luy said” because his testimony was
consistent with the testimony of other witnesses.
10 United States v. Henley No. 02-6011
5Henley also points out that Luy’s trial testimony differs in certain
respe cts from his story as recounted in the presentence report. The
presentence repo rt provides that Luy traveled to Atlanta once a month for
approximately one year (rather than the 8 to 10 months he testified to at
trial) and picked up at least one pound of methamphetamine for Henley
on each trip. This scenario would make H enley responsible for twelve
pounds of methamp hetamine, or approximately 5.4 kilograms. Under
either version of events, then, Henley would still be responsible for over
five kilograms of methamphetamine.
Henley challenges the district court’s reliance upon Luy’s
testimony. Henley emphasizes that Luy received a reduction
in his sentence as a result of his cooperation with the United
States and contends that Luy was merely approximating the
quantity of drugs that he provided to Henley.5 We find these
arguments to be unavailing. Testimonial evidence from a co-
conspirator may be sufficient to determine the amount of
drugs for which a defendant should be held accountable, even
where the co-conspirator has reason to believe that he may
receive a reduced sentence as a result of his or her testimony.
United States v. Hernandez, 227 F.3d 686, 697-98 (6th Cir.
2000); Darwich, 337 F.3d at 664. Moreover, drug quantity
may be determined by way of estimates or approximations if
exact amounts are uncertain. Hernandez, 227 F.3d at 698-99
(upholding a district court’s determination that 1,400 pounds
of marijuana were involved in the conspiracy based upon
testimony that “an accomplice made 7 trips to Saginaw,
Michigan from the Rio Grande Valley and delivered 200
pounds on each trip”).
The district court’s determination that Henley was
responsible for five kilograms or more of methamphetamine
was properly supported by Luy’s testimony and was not
clearly erroneous.
C. Sentencing Enhancement Under Section 3B1.1
Henley also challenges the district court’s imposition of a
three-level enhancement pursuant to section 3B1.1 of the

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No. 02-6011 United States v. Henley 11
Sentencing Guidelines for his supervisory role in the
conspiracy. The proper standard of review to employ in
evaluating the district court’s imposition of this enhancement
is subject to some debate. Prior to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59 (2001), “it
was clear that we reviewed a district court’s factual findings
for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.” United States
v. Solorio, 337 F.3d 580, 600 (6th Cir. 2003). In Buford,
however, the Supreme Court held that the district court’s
application of section 4B1.2 should be reviewed deferentially
rather than de novo, “in light of the fact-bound nature of the
legal decision.” 532 U.S. at 66. We reserve judgment as to
whether the district court’s application of section 3B1.1 to the
facts of this case should be reviewed deferentially or de novo,
because we would affirm using either standard of review.
Under section 3B1.1, a defendant’s base offense level
should be increased as follows:
(a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a
criminal activity that involved five or more
participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by
4 levels.
(b) If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but
not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity
involved five or more participants or was otherwise
extensive, increase by 3 levels.
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), (b).
In order to apply a three-level enhancement under section
3B1.1(b), there need only be evidence to support a finding
that the defendant was a manager or supervisor of at least one
other participant in the criminal activity, and that the criminal
activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise
extensive. United States v. Caseslorente, 220 F.3d 727 (6th
Cir. 2000). The Sentencing Guidelines direct the court to
consider factors such as “the exercise of decision-making
12 United States v. Henley No. 02-6011
authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the
offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to
a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of
participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature
and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and
authority exercised over others.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1,
comment. (n.4). The key issue is not direct control or
ultimate decision-making authority, but rather the defendant’s
“relative responsibility.” United States v. Gaitan-Acevedo,
148 F.3d 577, 595-96 (6th Cir. 1998).
The district court found that the evidence established that
five or more participants were involved in the criminal
activity – Henley, Sanders, Luy, “Scott” from Atlanta, Chad
Brown, Candiac Stanfield, Robert Walker and Christy Croy
– and that Henley “was at the center of the conspiracy.” The
court also found that:
[Henley] got this methamphetamine and he did control
the distribution of it of what he got here locally. As has
been pointed out in the presentence report and in the
evidence at trial, and here by Mr. Piper, he did employ
people, others, perhaps, at least as many as four other
persons to help him collect drug debts, enforcers, if you
will. That includes Walker and Sanders, and the two
people at the Logan’s Roadhouse. And he did recruit
those people to do this. And this was an extensive
conspiracy that involved a large amount of drugs. And
he controlled the flow of those drugs to a large amount of
people.
Sentencing Tr. JA 330.
In light of this evidence, the court concluded that Henley
was “certainly” a “manager or supervisor” because he “did
manage the distribution of the drugs” and “he managed other
people.” Sentencing Tr. JA 331. As a result, the district court
found that Henley should receive a three-level enhancement

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No. 02-6011 United States v. Henley 13
pursuant to section 3B1.1(b), but it declined to impose the
four-level enhancement urged by the United States.
Henley asserts that there is no evidence to support the
district court’s conclusion that he employed enforcers to
intimidate or assault other individuals. We disagree. Sanders
testified that Henley and Robert Walker assaulted Chad
Brown because of a drug debt. Sanders also testified that he
had assisted Henley in assaulting an individual named Brett
Oakey over a drug debt. Additionally, there was testimony
that Henley was assisted by two other men when he assaulted
Michael Williams in the restroom of Logan’s Roadhouse.
That evidence is sufficient to support the district court’s
conclusion that Henley was a “manager or supervisor” under
section 3B1.1(b).
Henley also argues that several of the individuals identified
by the court – particularly Stanfield and Croy – were not
“participants” within the meaning of section 3B1.1, but rather
were merely drug customers. A “participant” is defined as “a
person who is criminally responsible for the commission of
the offense, but need not have been convicted.” U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.1, comment. (n.1). Even excluding Stanfield and Croy,
however, we find that the evidence adduced at trial supports
the district court’s determination that five or more individuals
were criminally responsible for the offense.
D. Evidentiary Rulings
Finally, Henley challenges the district court’s admission of
a tape recorded telephone conversation that he had with
Sanders, as well as the testimony of two witnesses. Henley
claims that the district court’s admission of this evidence was
an abuse of discretion and violated Federal Rules of Evidence
401, 403 and 404. The propriety of the district court’s
admission of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Middleton, 246 F.3d 825, 835 (6th Cir.
2001). An abuse of discretion that does not affect substantial
14 United States v. Henley No. 02-6011
rights is harmless error and must be disregarded. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 52(a).
The telephone conversation between Henley and Sanders
was tape recorded by equipment at the Hamilton County Jail,
where Sanders had been incarcerated. During the
conversation, Henley told Sanders that “them fed pens are
cush, man,” apparently implying that the federal penitentiary
is not a difficult place to serve prison time. Henley and
Sanders also discussed drugs, money, informants, the charges
that Sanders was facing and other assorted topics. Henley
objected to the admission of this tape recording, arguing that
his comments implied that he had previously been convicted
of a crime for which he served time in federal prison. He also
argued that the tape recording was irrelevant. The district
court admitted this tape recording over Henley’s objection.
We find that the tape recording was relevant because it
tended to establish the relationship that he had with Sanders,
his co-conspirator. Moreover, contrary to Henley’s assertion,
we do not believe that his comments imply that he had
previously served time in federal prison. Therefore, the
admission of the tape recording did not violate the Federal
Rules of Evidence and was not an abuse of discretion.
Henley also challenges the district court’s admission of
testimony given by two witnesses: Dorothy Turner, the
mother of Sanders’s girlfriend, and Randy Hood, Sanders’s
neighbor. Turner testified that one night at her home, she
observed Chad Brown’s head bleeding. Hood testified that in
June 2001, he observed a truck that turned out to belong to
Henley at Sanders’s home approximately three or four times.
Hood further testified that on one occasion he observed a
person, whom he could not identify, leave Sanders’s home,
remove a pistol from the back of his pants and get into this
truck.
Because Henley did not object at trial to the admissibility
of either witness’s testimony, we must review the district

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No. 02-6011 United States v. Henley 15
court’s admission of this testimony for plain error. See FED.
R. CRIM. P. 51; United States v. Samour, 9 F.3d 531, 537 (6th
Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, United States v. Reed, 77
F.3d 139 (6th Cir. 1996). Under the plain error doctrine, this
Court considers (1) whether there was an error; (2) whether
the error was “plain” – i.e., clear or obvious; and (3) whether
the error affected substantial rights. United States v. Segines,
17 F.3d 847, 851-52 (6th Cir. 1994). Even if all three factors
exist, the Court must then “decide whether the plain error
affecting substantial rights seriously affected the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at
852 (citing United States v. Thomas, 11 F.3d 620, 630 (6th
Cir. 1993)).
The district court committed no error in admitting this
testimony. Turner’s testimony was relevant because it tended
to corroborate Sanders’s testimony that Henley and another
individual, Robert Walker, assaulted Chad Brown at Turner’s
home. Hood’s testimony was relevant because it tended to
establish a relationship between Sanders and Henley and it
corroborated Sanders’s testimony that Henley visited his
home. Moreover, we find neither witness’s testimony to be
violative of Rule 403 or Rule 404.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.

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