Rick Stokes v. Hamilton County, Tennessee

*The Honorable John R. Adams, United States District Judge for the Northern District of
Ohio, sitting by designation.
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 04a0049n.06
Filed: October 28, 2004
No. 03-5751
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
RICK STOKES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HAMILTON COUNTY,
TENNESSEE,
Defendant-Appellee.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
O P I N I O N
Before: MOORE, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges, and ADAMS, * District Judge.
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Rick Stokes (“Stokes”)
appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Defendant-Appellee Hamilton County,
Tennessee (“Hamilton County”). Stokes filed a complaint against his employer, Hamilton County,
in August of 2001 alleging discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Stokes claimed that he was disabled for the purposes of the
ADA because of job-related injuries as well as past treatment for kidney cancer and that Hamilton
County discriminated against him on the basis of these disabilities by refusing to offer him
reasonable accommodations. Hamilton County moved alternatively for dismissal of the complaint
or for summary judgment, claiming that Stokes was not disabled as his injuries did not substantially

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limit any of his major life activities nor did Hamilton County mistakenly believe that they did. The
district court granted Hamilton County’s motion for summary judgment in part and its motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) as to the remainder of Stokes’s complaint.
Because we conclude that Stokes did not sufficiently allege or provide evidence suggesting
that he qualifies as disabled for purposes of the ADA, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Stokes became employed by the Hamilton County Medical Services as an emergency
medical technician (“EMT”) in January 1993. In August 1997, he was diagnosed with kidney cancer
and took a medical leave of absence in order to obtain treatment. Stokes returned to work in
November 1997 and worked three shifts that month on November 24th, November 27th, and
November 30th. During his shift on November 30th, Stokes suffered injuries to his left knee and
stomach while attempting to pick up a stretcher holding a patient.
Following these injuries, Hamilton County enrolled Stokes in a work-hardening program
which was intended to provide Stokes with physical therapy and enable him to return to work as an
EMT. Stokes alleges that, because of improper exercises that he was required to perform during the
program, he developed carpal tunnel syndrome in one of his wrists and a back injury. Stokes later
underwent surgery to correct the injury to his wrist. In total these injuries left Stokes with an
estimated 6% permanent partial impairment consisting of a 1% partial impairment to his knee and
a 5% partial impairment to his back. Additionally, Stokes alleges that the injury to his stomach
primarily prevents him from doing heavy lifting, likely as a result of an abdominal hernia.
During his participation in the work-hardening program, Stokes requested as an
accommodation to be reassigned as an EMT dispatcher. While Stokes’s supervisor thought this

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might be a possibility, Stokes was never reassigned nor did he formally apply for the dispatcher job.
Stokes believes that he was not given the position because a County doctor reviewed the
requirements for the job and informed the County’s Risk Management Department that Stokes’s
wrist injury would preclude him from being a dispatcher. Stokes’s employment was then terminated
by the County on August 12, 1999. Stokes alleges he was terminated for two reasons: first, that his
injury left him unable to lift heavy objects such as patients and stretchers; second, that Hamilton
County was concerned about having to pay for his medical costs if he suffered a recurrence of
cancer.
On August 10, 2001, Stokes filed a complaint against Hamilton County in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. In his complaint, Stokes alleged that his injuries
and past battle with cancer constituted a disability under the ADA and that Hamilton County’s
refusal to provide him with a position as a dispatcher or a position as an EMT on a three-person
ambulance violated the ADA. Hamilton County then moved to dismiss the complaint or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment, claiming that Stokes’s physical impairments did not constitute
a disability under the ADA. The parties having consented to final disposition by a magistrate judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), on May 6, 2003, a magistrate judge issued an order granting
Hamilton County’s motion. In his accompanying opinion, the magistrate judge determined that
Stokes’s claim of discrimination on the basis of an actual disability should be dismissed on summary
judgment as Stokes’s impairment did not amount to an actual disability under the ADA. The
magistrate judge granted Hamilton County’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) as to
Stokes’s claim of discrimination on the basis of a perceived disability because Stokes failed even

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to allege that Hamilton County mistakenly believed his impairment would substantially limit his
ability to work. Stokes timely appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
This court reviews de novo a district court’s dismissal of a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Mahoning Nat’l Bank, 112 F.3d 252,
255 (6th Cir. 1997). A claim should be dismissed only if, accepting all of the plaintiff’s allegations
in the complaint as true, “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Wright v. MetroHealth Med. Ctr., 58 F.3d
1130, 1138 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1158 (1996) (citation omitted).
Similarly, we review de novo district court orders granting summary judgment. Burns v.
Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 222 F.3d 247, 252 (6th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is proper “if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED . R. CIV . P. 56(c). We view all evidence at
this stage in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Black v. Roadway Express, Inc., 297
F.3d 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2002).
B. Elements of a Prima Facie Case of Disability Discrimination Under the ADA
“A person seeking relief under the ADA for termination must establish (1) that [he] is a
disabled person within the meaning of the Act, (2) that [he] is qualified to perform the essential
functions of [his] job with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) that [he] suffered an
adverse employment decision because of [his] disability.” Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760,

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762 (6th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Thus, the threshold issue is whether Stokes qualifies as
disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Burns, 222 F.3d at 253. Under the ADA, an individual
is disabled if he: (1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of his
major life activities; (2) has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an
impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). In this case, Stokes alleges both that he has a physical
impairment that substantially limits his major life activity of working and that he is regarded by
Hamilton County as having an impairment because of his past kidney-cancer treatment.
C. Claim of Discrimination Based on Actual Disability
In determining that Stokes is not disabled, the magistrate judge conceded that Stokes had a
physical impairment as a result of injuries to his back, stomach, wrist, and knee but concluded that
there was no evidence that this physical impairment “substantially limits one or more of [his] major
life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). A major life activity is one which is “of central
importance to daily life.” Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002). “Substantially
limits” means either that an individual is “unable to perform” or “significantly restricted” in his
performance of a major life activity. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999); 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1).
Stokes claims that his physical ailments substantially limit his ability to work, namely, that
his injuries prevent him from comfortably lifting heavy objects. In order to succeed on such a claim,
Stokes must provide evidence that, “at a minimum,” indicates that he is “unable to work in a broad
class of jobs.” Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). It is insufficient for
Stokes to claim he can no longer work as an EMT because “[t]he inability to perform a single,

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particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.” Id.,
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)).
Stokes has provided no evidence that his injuries prevent him from engaging in a wide range
of jobs. On the contrary, Stokes stated that he is physically qualified to perform a variety of jobs
including working as a reserve police officer, a highway patrolman, and a H.E.L.P. (Highway
Emergency Lane Patrol) truck driver. Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 61, 71, 98 (Stokes Dep.). Stokes
has also failed to demonstrate that his “limited impairment . . . will have a long term impact” on his
ability to seek work. Minnix v. City of Chillicothe, No. 98-4285, 2000 WL 191828, at *2 (6th Cir.
2000) (affirming grant of summary judgment for employer where employee stated he could still
work). Therefore, Stokes has failed to produce evidence indicating that his injuries substantially
limited his ability to work. The district judge properly granted summary judgment on this ground.
D. Claim of Discrimination Based on Perceived Disability
The magistrate judge dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) Stokes’s claim of discrimination
based on a perceived disability because the complaint failed to identify any link between the
perceived disability, in this case cancer, and Hamilton County’s mistaken belief as to Stokes’s
ability to perform as an EMT. In order to assert discrimination based upon a perceived disability,
Stokes must allege that Hamilton County “entertain[ed] misperceptions” about Stokes’s past battle
with cancer which related to his ability to perform his job. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.
Stokes’s complaint fails to meet this threshold standard. The complaint alleges that Stokes
was discharged because Hamilton County was concerned that his cancer would relapse and result
in future expenses for the County. J.A. at 8 (Compl.). This allegation does not suggest that Stokes
was fired because Hamilton County mistakenly perceived that his history of cancer would

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substantially limit his ability to work as an EMT. Instead, the complaint asserts that Hamilton
County’s decision was based on fiscal concerns. These allegations fail to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted under the ADA because they do not assert that Stokes was terminated because
Hamilton County “mistakenly regarded him as disabled.” Mahon v. Crowell, 295 F.3d 585, 593 (6th
Cir. 2002) (no perceived disability where employee alleged he was discriminated against so that
employer could reduce its worker compensation payments).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment dismissing Stokes’s
action.

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