Reginald Robinson v. JIMMY STEGALL, Warden

*The Honorable David L. Bunning, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0029P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0029p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
REGINALD ROBINSON,
Petitioner-Appellee.
v.
JIMMY STEGALL, Warden,
Respondent-Appellant.
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No. 02-1898
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 97-70308—Arthur J. Tarnow, District Judge.
Argued: December 5, 2003
Decided and Filed: January 22, 2004
Before: NORRIS and GILMAN, Circuit Judges;
BUNNING, District Judge.*
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Brad H. Beaver, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, CORRECTIONS DIVISION, Lansing,
2 Robinson v. Stegall No. 02-1898
Michigan, for Appellant. Elizabeth L. Jacobs, Detroit,
Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Brad H. Beaver,
O F F IC E O F T H E A T T ORNEY GENERAL,
CORRECTIONS DIVISION, Lansing, Michigan, for
Appellant. Elizabeth L. Jacobs, Detroit, Michigan, for
Appellee.
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OPINION
_________________
ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge. The State of Michigan
appeals on behalf of Warden Jimmy Stegall from the grant of
a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, to prisoner
Reginald Robinson. On appeal, we must determine whether
the alleged violation of a consent judgment entered into by
the parties is sufficient to warrant granting the writ despite the
fact that the district court did not specify which, if any,
federal constitutional right had been violated. Because a
district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus “only on the
ground that [a state prisoner] is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), we hold that the grant of the writ under
the circumstances presented by this case was premature and
therefore remand the matter for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
I.
In 1992, petitioner was convicted of kidnaping, in violation
of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.349. During the trial, defense
counsel received a 13-day continuance to locate two
witnesses. Before court was adjourned, however, petitioner
told the judge, “Your Honor, I don’t feel I’m being
represented right so I’m going to fire my lawyer.” The court
replied, “You’re not firing your lawyer now in the middle of
a trial. We’re adjourning this case until the 26th and it’s
going to conclude at that time.”

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No. 02-1898 Robinson v. Stegall 3
When the proceedings resumed on August 26, 1992,
defense counsel reiterated that “the attorney/client
relationship has broken down” and that petitioner wanted a
different attorney. A discussion ensued, during which
petitioner told the judge “I’m going to leave and be in
contempt of court. I’m not going to trial with him, man.” He
went on to state that he wished to testify but not without a
new lawyer. The judge responded, “[W]e’re either going to
proceed with this case with your testimony at this time, or if
you refuse to testify, even with this lawyer or in representing
yourself, then this case will be concluded.” Given this choice,
the defense rested without calling any witnesses. Defendant
was convicted and received a sentence of 10 to 20 years of
imprisonment.
On appeal, petitioner raised several issues, including
whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to retain
new counsel. Although not raised explicitly in the trial court,
petitioner argued that his attorney had a conflict of interest
because an associate in the attorney’s law firm represented
petitioner’s co-defendant. The Michigan Court of Appeals
rejected this argument:
On appeal, defendant alleges only the potential for a
conflict of interest. Our review of the record indicates
that the only prosecution witness cross-examined by
codefendant’s counsel was the officer who conducted the
photo-showup, and that cocounsel elicited no testimony
damaging to defendant. Neither defendant nor his
codefendant presented a defense. Thus, our review of the
record reveals no conflict of interest actually affecting
the adequacy of defendant’s representation.
People v. Robinson, No. 158824, slip op. at 9 (Mich. App.
Jan. 5, 1996) (citations omitted). The Michigan Supreme
Court denied leave to appeal.
On January 24, 1997, petitioner initiated this habeas corpus
proceeding. Although a magistrate recommended that the
4 Robinson v. Stegall No. 02-1898
petition be denied, on December 6, 1999, the parties entered
into a consent judgment that reads in full as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for writ
of habeas corpus is conditionally granted. Unless the
state takes action to afford Petitioner a full hearing in the
trial court to determine whether Petitioner was denied the
effective assistance of counsel or his counsel had a
conflict of interest within ninety (90) days of the date of
this Order, the Court shall issue the writ ordering the
Respondent to vacate the sentence and conviction.
This hearing is to be considered as part of Petitioner’s
appeal of right. In response, the successor to the original trial
judge conducted a hearing over a two-day period in March
2000. After the hearing, the trial court denied petitioner’s
claim on the record. After judgment was pronounced, counsel
for petitioner requested appointment of appellate counsel,
which ultimately occurred on May 9, 2000.
However, the Michigan Court of Appeals issued an order
prior to briefing that dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction under the Michigan Court Rules:
The claim of appeal is DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction because a criminal defendant may only
challenge an order denying a motion for relief from
judgment under MCR 6.500 et seq. by filing an
application for leave to appeal under MCR 7.205. See
MCR 6.509(A). Even though the order in question does
not specifically state that appellant brought the motion
under the rule in question, a criminal defendant may only
petition the lower court for post-appellate relief under
this subchapter. See MCR 6.501.
People v. Robinson, No. 227154, Order (Mich. App. July 7,
2000). Defense counsel had not sought leave to appeal, but
rather had sought to appeal as of right. A motion for
rehearing was denied, as was a subsequent delayed

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No. 02-1898 Robinson v. Stegall 5
1In M ichigan, a post-trial hearing may be ordered if the record has
not been sufficiently developed with respect to an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim. See People v. Ginther, 390 M ich. 436, 212 N.W.2d 922
(1973).
application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme
Court.
Petitioner responded to these setbacks by filing a “Brief
after Remand to State Trial Court” in the district court. The
district court issued a show cause order in response to the
failure of the Michigan courts to afford appellate review to
the trial court’s disposition of the ineffective assistance
question. The order explains the following:
Review of the record indicates that Petitioner’s
attempts to obtain appellate review of the trial court’s
denial of his motion for a new trial after receiving his
Ginther1 [hearing] were not treated as a part of his appeal
of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan
Supreme Court was given the opportunity to order the
Michigan Court of Appeals to do so and comply with the
terms of the Consent Judgment voluntarily entered into
by the parties, but declined to do so.
Robinson v. Stegall, No. 97-CV-70308-DT, Order to Show
Cause, at 4 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 12, 2002) (footnote added).
After entertaining argument on the issue, the district court
entered an order enforcing its consent judgment and granting
a conditional writ of habeas corpus. Robinson v. Stegall, 206
F. Supp. 2d 859 (E.D. Mich. 2002). It reasoned as follows:
This Court finds as a matter of fact that the parties in
this case agreed that Petitioner’s Ginther hearing would
be considered as a part of Petitioner’s appeal of right in
the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Consent Judgment
stated that the writ is conditionally granted, that
Petitioner must receive a full hearing in the trial court,
that the hearing is to be considered as a part of his appeal
6 Robinson v. Stegall No. 02-1898
of right, and if the terms of the Consent Judgment are not
fulfilled, this Court shall issue the writ ordering
Respondent to vacate Petitioner’s sentence and
conviction. Nowhere does the Consent Judgment state
that Petitioner shall be entitled as of right to only a
hearing in the trial court, or that, after a hearing in the
trial court, a discretionary appeal in the Michigan Court
of Appeals would satisfy the requirements of the Consent
Judgment. On the contrary, the Consent Judgment states
that Petitioner’s Ginther hearing “is to be considered as
part of Petitioner's appeal of right.” The language of the
Consent Judgment itself, stating that Petitioner’s Ginther
hearing was to be considered part of Petitioner’s appeal
of right unambiguously indicates that Petitioner is to
receive a full evidentiary hearing, which is only a part of
his appeal of right, the remainder of which . . . must take
place in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Id. at 863. The district court then ordered that the writ be
granted unless the state retried the petitioner within 120 days.
II.
As stated at the outset of this opinion, a district court may
grant a writ of habeas corpus “only on the ground that [a state
prisoner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). In the
instant case, the district court never found a violation of
petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights, which is the only viable
constitutional claim raised in the petition. Rather, the parties
agreed that petitioner was entitled to a more fully developed
record with respect to this claim and therefore entered into a
consent judgment that provided for a Ginther hearing in state
court. The trial court found no constitutional violation,
however, and the Michigan appellate courts declined to
consider the issue on the merits.
In its order granting the writ, the district court identifies no
constitutional infirmity that justifies its action. Rather, it

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No. 02-1898 Robinson v. Stegall 7
relies on the perceived violation of the consent judgment
negotiated by the parties and approved by the court. The
consent judgment, however, did not stipulate to the
conditional finding of a Sixth Amendment violation; it simply
provided for further proceedings in the Michigan courts.
Thus, even if the district court correctly held that the
respondent violated the provisions of the consent judgment,
that does not result in the finding of a constitutional violation.
Because 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) explicitly requires such a
finding before the writ may issue, the district court’s action
was at best premature.
At this point in the proceedings, we find it inappropriate to
review the merits of petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim.
Rather, we shall remand the matter to the district court to
allow it the first opportunity to evaluate the claim in light of
the decision reached by the Michigan courts. In making this
assessment, however, the district court will be guided by the
standard of review imposed by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214. It may grant a habeas corpus petition only if
it concludes that the state adjudication of the federal claim
“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “resulted in a decision that was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A state court decision is “contrary
to” Supreme Court precedent “if the state court arrives at a
conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court
on a question of law,” or “if the state court confronts facts that
are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme
Court precedent and arrives at” an opposite result. Williams
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
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III.
The judgment of the district court is reversed and the writ
of habeas corpus withdrawn. The cause of action is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

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