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02-3962•Cathy I. Anthony v. United States District Court, Northern District United Telephone Company, of Ohio of…
02-3962Court of Appeals for the Sixth CircuitOct 12, 2004
*The Honorable Peter Beer, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana, sitting by
designation.
1Altho ugh the complaint contained num erous other claims, they have all either been dismisse d voluntarily
or aba ndoned on ap peal.
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 04a0020n.06
Filed: October 12, 2004
Case No. 02-3962
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
CATHY I. ANTHONY, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT
UNITED TELEPHONE COMPANY, ) OF OHIO
OF OHIO (aka SPRINT), )
)
Defendant-Appellee. )
)
__________________________________________
BEFORE: BATCHELDER and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges; BEER*, District Judge.
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Cathy Anthony appeals the order of the
district court granting summary judgment to United Telephone Co. of Ohio (“Sprint”) on Anthony’s
claims that Sprint violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
(“ADA”) and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (“FMLA”).1 The matter
was initially heard by a magistrate judge who issued a report and recommendation finding that
summary judgment should be granted to Sprint on Anthony’s ADA claims because Anthony had
failed to present evidence that she requested an accommodation and failed to present either direct
evidence of discrimination under the ADA or circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish a prima
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facie case of such discrimination. The magistrate judge recommended that summary judgment be
granted to Sprint on the FMLA claims because Anthony had failed to present evidence sufficient
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and, even if such evidence had been presented,
Anthony presented no evidence to demonstrate that Sprint’s legitimate reason for terminating
Anthony’s employment was pretextual.
Anthony timely filed objections to the Report and Recommendation, and the district court
issued a lengthy opinion reflecting exhaustive de novo review of those objections, which the district
court characterized as “unclear and confused.” Noting that Anthony had not objected to the
magistrate judge’s recommendation regarding the FMLA claims, the district court held that the
objections were without merit, and that Sprint was entitled to summary judgment on the ADA
claims.
Anthony urges on appeal that the district court erred in its disposition of the ADA claims and
in its conclusion that Anthony did not object to the magistrate judge’s disposition of the FMLA
claims. After carefully reviewing the record, the applicable law, the parties’ briefs and counsels’
arguments, we find no reversible error in the district court’s opinion and order. We agree that
Anthony failed to preserve any objection to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that summary
judgment be granted to Sprint on the FMLA claims, and, in any event, we find no error in that
recommendation. As the opinion of the district court and the report and recommendation of the
magistrate judge carefully and correctly set out the law governing the issues raised, and clearly
articulate the reasons underlying the decisions, issuance of a full written opinion by this court would
serve no useful purpose. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the district court’s opinion and the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, we AFFIRM.
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