Mary D’agostino v. Ver-A-Fast Corporation

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 04a0019n.06
Filed: October 12, 2004
No. 03-3847
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
MARY D’AGOSTINO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
VER-A-FAST CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
)
)
)
)
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
Before: KENNEDY, DAUGHTREY, and COOK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. The plaintiff, Mary D’Agostino, filed this action against Ver-A-Fast,
a firm that provides telemarketing services, after the company failed to hire her to be a
“verifier.” She claimed that Ver-A-Fast discriminated against her based on her disability in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Ohio state law. The district court
granted summary judgment for Ver-A-Fast, finding that verifiers were independent
contractors, not employees, and therefore were not covered by the anti-discrimination laws.
On appeal, the plaintiff first complains that the district court misapplied the summary
judgment standard required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), because the judge dismissed the
action after “[w]eighing all the above factors . . . .” “Weighing,” the plaintiff insists, “is
impermissible in the summary judgment situation.” This statement is correct, of course, but

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only as far as weighing factual matters is concerned. In this case, however, the factors
mentioned by the district court were the legal aspects of the analysis necessary to
determine whether the defendant’s “verifiers” were employees or independent contractors.
The district court decided, after applying the correct standard, that they were the latter
rather than the former and, therefore, not covered by the Act.
Having had the benefit of oral argument, and having studied the briefs and the
record on appeal, we are not convinced that the district court erred in dismissing the
complaint against the defendant. Because the reasons why summary judgment should be
granted to the defendant have been thoroughly and correctly articulated by the district
court, the issuance of a detailed opinion by this court would be superfluous. We therefore
affirm the judgment of the district court based on the reasoning set out in that court’s
memorandum of opinion dated May 15, 2003.

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