Cora Jean Terry v. DAVID M. LAGROIS, CHRISTOPHER J. GAMBLE, and DANIEL R. GAMBLE, Third Party

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0004P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0004p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
CORA JEAN TERRY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
METROPOLITAN LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee,
Third Party Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID M. LAGROIS,
CHRISTOPHER J. GAMBLE, and
DANIEL R. GAMBLE,
Third Party
Defendants-Appellants.
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No. 02-1969
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 01-71780—Lawrence P. Zatkoff, Chief District Judge.
Argued: December 3, 2003
Decided and Filed: January 7, 2004
2 Terry, et al. v. LaGrois, et al. No. 02-1969
*The Honorable Danny C. Reeves, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
Before: GUY and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; REEVES,
District Judge.*
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Randy J. Wallace, OLSMAN, MUELLER &
JAMES, Berkley, Michigan, for Appellants. Paul M.
Stoychoff, RUSSELL & STOYCHOFF, Troy, Michigan, for
Appellees. ON BRIEF: Jules B. Olsman, OLSMAN,
MUELLER & JAMES, Berkley, Michigan, for Appellants.
Paul M. Stoychoff, RUSSELL & STOYCHOFF, Troy,
Michigan, for Appellees.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. This case arises
out of a dispute over the proceeds of a group life insurance
policy. Earline Lynn Gamble, a United States Postal Service
employee, was insured under the Federal Employees Group
Life Insurance Act (FEGLIA). She presumably intended to
designate her sister, Cora Terry, as the sole beneficiary of the
policy, but Gamble signed the designation-of-beneficiary
form with only her first name, failed to date the form, and
neglected to check a box acknowledging that she had signed
in the presence of the two witnesses. When Gamble died,
Terry and Gamble’s three sons filed competing claims for the
life insurance proceeds. The sons argued that Gamble’s
designation of Terry as the sole beneficiary was defective,
resulting in the sons becoming the proper beneficiaries under
FEGLIA’s default provisions. On cross-motions for summary
judgment, the district court ruled in favor of Terry. For the

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No. 02-1969 Terry, et al. v. LaGrois, et al. 3
reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
I. BACKGROUND
The United States Postal Service made available to Gamble
a group life insurance policy pursuant to FEGLIA, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 8701-8716. Gamble applied for the policy, issued by
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife), in May of
1994. On a separate form titled “Designation of Beneficiary,”
Gamble named her sister, Cora Terry, as the policy’s sole
beneficiary. But in making this election, Gamble signed only
her first name “Earline” in the space provided on the form for
her signature. She also neglected to date the form and to
check a box confirming that she had signed the form in the
presence of the two witnesses. Two unrelated individuals,
however, did in fact sign as witnesses in the space provided.
The Postal Service acknowledged receipt of the form in June
of 1994.
When Gamble died in March of 2001, a controversy arose
between her three sons and her sister over who was entitled to
the $197,000 in proceeds of the life insurance policy. Each
side filed claims for death benefits with the Office of Federal
Employees’ Group Life Insurance. Gamble’s sons contended
that the designation of beneficiary was defective because
Gamble had signed only her first name and had not dated the
form. They did not raise the issue of their mother’s failure to
check the “witness” box.
The statute provides that if the insured does not properly
designate a beneficiary, then FEGLIA benefits will be
distributed according to an order of precedence specified in
the statute. Gamble’s sons are the preferred individuals in the
event that Gamble failed to properly designate another
beneficiary.
In May of 2001, Terry sued MetLife for the proceeds of
Gamble’s life insurance policy. Because the rival claims
4 Terry, et al. v. LaGrois, et al. No. 02-1969
raised the possibility of multiple liability for MetLife, the
company offered to interplead the insurance proceeds and
brought a cross-claim against Gamble’s three sons. MetLife
argued that because Gamble had signed the designation-of-
beneficiary form with only her first name, rather than her full
name, it was “unable to determine the proper beneficiary to
receive the life insurance benefits.” The company thus asked
the court to take control of the $197,000 in life insurance
proceeds and to release MetLife from the conflicting claims
of Gamble’s three sons and her sister Terry. None of the rival
claimants objected to MetLife’s interpleader request.
Terry moved for summary judgment against MetLife in
December of 2001, arguing that she was entitled to the life
insurance proceeds as a matter of law. Gamble’s sons
responded by filing their own motion for summary judgment,
contending that they were entitled to the life insurance
proceeds because Gamble’s signature was allegedly
inadequate and because she had failed to date the designation
form. They again made no mention of Gamble’s failure to
check the “witness” box.
The district court granted Terry’s motion for summary
judgment in July of 2002, reasoning that
[a]lthough Ms. Gamble failed to sign her full name, two
witnesses were present to watch her authenticate the
document. Under § 8705, individuals, other than the
beneficiary, are required to witness the insured party’s
signature on the Designation of Beneficiary form. This
requirement ensures that the insured party actually and
willfully signed the document. The Court finds that Ms.
Gamble would not have summoned these witnesses nor
would the witnesses have freely signed the form had Ms.
Gamble not intended to authenticate the Designation of
Beneficiary form.
No mention was made by the district court of the sons’
argument regarding the failure of Gamble to date the form.

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No. 02-1969 Terry, et al. v. LaGrois, et al. 5
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of review
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo. Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 295 F.3d 623,
629 (6th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is proper where
there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the
district court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor
of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The central
issue is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is
so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52
(1986).
B. FEGLIA
“Congress enacted FEGLIA in 1954 to provide low-cost
group life insurance to Federal Employees.” Metro. Life Ins.
Co. v. Christ, 979 F.2d 575, 576 (7th Cir. 1992) (quotation
marks omitted). The provision of the Act relevant to the
present case is 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a), which governs the
designation of a beneficiary. If the insured does not designate
a beneficiary, the proceeds of the life insurance policy are to
be paid according to the order of precedence mandated by the
statute. Section 8705(a) provides in pertinent part as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (e), the amount of
group life insurance and group accidental death insurance
in force on an employee at the date of his death shall be
paid, on the establishment of a valid claim, to the person
or persons surviving at the date of his death, in the
following order of precedence:
6 Terry, et al. v. LaGrois, et al. No. 02-1969
First, to the beneficiary or beneficiaries designated by the
employee in a signed and witnessed writing received
before death in the employing office or, if insured
because of receipt of annuity or of benefits under
subchapter I of chapter 81 of this title as provided by
section 8706(b) of this title, in the Office of Personnel
Management. For this purpose, a designation, change, or
cancellation of beneficiary in a will or other document
not so executed and filed has no force or effect.
Second, if there is no designated beneficiary, to the
widow or widower of the employee.
Third, if none of the above, to the child or children of the
employee and descendants of deceased children by
representation.
Fourth, if none of the above, to the parents of the
employee or the survivor of them.
Fifth, if none of the above, to the duly appointed
executor or administrator of the estate of the employee.
Sixth, if none of the above, to other next of kin of the
employee entitled under the laws of the domicile of the
employee at the date of his death.
Congress amended FEGLIA in 1966 to tighten up the
requirements for designating a beneficiary. Prior to the
amendment, the statute simply required that the insured
designate a beneficiary in a “writing received in the
employing office prior to death,” S. Rep. No. 89-1064,
reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2070, 2071, rather than a
“signed and witnessed writing received before death.”
5 U.S.C. § 8705(a). (Emphasis added.) FEGLIA was
amended as a reaction to cases that looked to a decedent’s
“manifest intent,” rather than to strict compliance with civil
service regulations, in determining the proper beneficiary.
See S. Rep. No. 89-1064 at 2071.

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No. 02-1969 Terry, et al. v. LaGrois, et al. 7
One such case was the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sears v.
Austin, 292 F.2d 690 (9th Cir. 1961). Cecil Sears worked for
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and, as a federal
employee, received life insurance coverage through FEGLIA.
Id. at 690. At the time of his death, Sears had not complied
with the civil service regulations in designating a beneficiary
of his life insurance policy. The policy explained that Sears
had the option of designating a beneficiary by securing “the
proper form . . . from the U.S. Civil Service Commission,” id.
at 691, but, in the event that Sears did not designate a
beneficiary, the life insurance proceeds would be paid
according to a statutory order of preference. Although Sears
did not designate a beneficiary in writing using the U.S. Civil
Service Commission’s form, he did designate a beneficiary in
a handwritten will. The will, which was apparently neither
witnessed nor filed with the IRS prior to Sears’s death,
provided in pertinent part as follows:
In all due respect for my son and adopted daughter,
Robert Cecil and LaVonne[,] I must remember the time
and care given to me by Karen when I was very ill and
had no one to help me except her. For this I am
requesting that all my personal belongings in my
apartment . . . [including] my insurance policy with the
Federal Government . . . be given to Mrs. Karen Austin.
Id.
After Sears died, his two children and Austin filed
competing claims to Sears’s life insurance proceeds. The
Ninth Circuit held that Austin was entitled to the proceeds,
reasoning that the fact that Sears “did not make his original
designation in the exact manner set forth in the policy[]
should not prevent his definite intention, manifested by the
affirmative act of drawing up a will, from being given effect.”
Id. at 695. When Congress amended FEGLIA in 1966, it
discussed the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Sears as a primary
motivating factor for the change:
8 Terry, et al. v. LaGrois, et al. No. 02-1969
The equities in Sears may have prompted the court of
appeals to disregard the civil service regulation and the
general intent of the statute in order to comply with the
insured’s wishes, but the precedent established in that
case could, if generally followed, result in administrative
difficulties for the Civil Service Commission and the
insurance companies and, more important, seriously
delay paying insurance benefits to survivors of Federal
employees.
To clarify Congress’ intent, H.R. 432 rewrites section 4
to state clearly that the order of precedence set out in that
section shall prevail over any extraneous document
designating a beneficiary unless the designation has been
properly received in the employing office or by the Civil
Service Commission.
S. Rep. 89-1064, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2070, 2071.
This court has recognized that with the 1966 amendments to
FEGLIA, “Congress, on administrative efficiency grounds,
abolished the manifest intent test” that prevailed in Sears.
Huff v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 119, 122 (6th Cir.
1982).
C. Gamble’s designation of a beneficiary
On appeal, Gamble’s sons argue that the following three
errors in their mother’s designation-of-beneficiary form
render her designation invalid: (1) the signature of “Earline”
rather than her full name, (2) her failure to date the
designation form, and (3) her failure to check the box
acknowledging that she signed the form in the presence of the
two witnesses. The sons therefore claim entitlement to the
life insurance proceeds because, in the absence of a
designated beneficiary, they are the preferred beneficiaries
according to the order of precedence set forth in
5 U.S.C. § 8705(a).

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No. 02-1969 Terry, et al. v. LaGrois, et al. 9
Because the sons raise the issue of Gamble’s failure to
check the “witness” box for the first time on appeal, we
decline to consider this point. See United States v. Ninety-
Three (93) Firearms, 330 F.3d 414, 424 (6th Cir. 2003)
(“This court has repeatedly held that it will not consider
arguments raised for the first time on appeal unless our failure
to consider the issue will result in a plain miscarriage of
justice.”) (quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, even if the
sons had not waived this argument, we would have concluded
that it lacks merit for the same reason that their argument
concerning Gamble’s failure to date the form lacks merit, i.e.,
the statute does not impose either requirement as a condition
of making a valid designation. FEGLIA simply mandates a
“signed and witnessed writing received before death in the
employing office.” 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a). Under the present
circumstances, where the sons have not challenged what
appears on the form to be their mother’s properly witnessed
signature, we have no basis to believe that our failure to
consider the effect of the unchecked box “will result in a plain
miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 424.
This leaves us with the sons’ remaining contention that
Gamble’s incomplete signature invalidates her designation of
beneficiary. To support their position, the sons cite
Hightower v. Kirksey, 157 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 1998), Thomas
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., No. 99-1908, 1997 WL
159426 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 24, 1997) (unpublished decision), and
Ward v. Stratton, 988 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1993), to demonstrate
that other circuits have demanded strict compliance with
FEGLIA’s requirements for designating a beneficiary. All
three cases, however, are easily distinguishable on their facts.
In Hightower and Thomas, the insured employees totally
failed to sign the designation-of-beneficiary form. The
Eighth Circuit in Ward, on the other hand, held that neither of
two attempts to change the designated beneficiary had any
force or effect because the first form attempting to do so was
not witnessed and the second was received after the insured
had died.
10 Terry, et al. v. LaGrois, et al. No. 02-1969
Unlike in Hightower and Thomas, Gamble did not fail to
sign her designation-of-beneficiary form, and, unlike in Ward,
her form was properly witnessed and timely filed. Her
signature is admittedly unusual, but, as the district court
noted, FEGLIA “is silent regarding the sufficiency of an
insured’s signature on a Designation of Beneficiary form.”
Nothing in the statute requires an insured to sign her full
name; it simply requires a signed and witnessed writing. As
the district court recognized, a wide variety of “signatures” in
other contexts are considered to be legally valid:
Plaintiff also cites the Court to: MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 440.1201(39) (1979) (defining “signed” as “any
symbol executed or adopted by a party with present
intention to authenticate a writing, including a carbon
copy of his or her signature.”) RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 134 (“The signature to a memorandum
may be any signature made or adopted with an intention,
actual or apparent, to authenticate the writing as that of
the signor.”) and 2 Corbin, Contracts §§ 520-526 (1952)
(“A signature may consist of part or all of the signor’s
name, even though misspelled or abbreviated to initials
only.”).
The sons argue, however, that the law governing the
sufficiency of signatures for contract purposes is inapposite
in the context of FEGLIA. But they fail to explain their
contention and do not cite any supporting authority. They
further point out that “[i]t would stand to reason that any rule
articulated by a court to govern the provisions of FEGLIA
should conform to, and ultimately serve, the end purpose for
which Congress drafted and enacted FEGLIA.” We fully
agree. But unlike Gamble’s sons, we see no reason why the
understanding of what constitutes a signature under the UCC
and general contract law does not conform to or serve the end
purposes for which Congress drafted FEGLIA.
As reflected in the Senate Report when FEGLIA was
amended in 1966, see S. Rep. No. 89-1064, reprinted in 1966

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No. 02-1969 Terry, et al. v. LaGrois, et al. 11
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2070, 2071, the concern of Congress was to
avoid the “administrative difficulties” inherent in allowing
unspecified “extraneous document[s]” designating a
beneficiary to be considered. There was no concern
expressed about the completeness of the insured’s signature
in the space provided on the approved form.
Surely no court would declare any signature less than
“Earline Lynn Gamble” to be invalid. If “Earline L. Gamble”
would have been sufficient, or even “Earline Gamble,” then
why not simply “Earline”? Because Gamble’s abbreviated
signature appears in the proper space on the designation-of-
beneficiary form duly filed with the Postal Service, and no
one questions either the authenticity of her signature or the
fact that it was properly witnessed, we see no reason not to
give the designation its full effect. In sum, we find no
justification for distinguishing between what is a sufficient
signature under both the UCC and general contract law from
what is sufficient under FEGLIA.
D. The sons’ standing to bring this appeal
Terry argues, as an alternate basis to affirm the judgment of
the district court, that the sons lack standing to bring this
appeal for a variety of procedural reasons. A previous panel
of this court, however, denied Terry’s motion to dismiss the
appeal on this basis. Terry v. LaGrois, No. 02-1969 (6th Cir.
Nov. 5, 2002) (unpublished order). Because we have no
reason to disturb that ruling, and because we have concluded
that Terry should prevail on the merits, we have no need to
address her alternative basis for recovery.
III. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court.

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