United States of America v. Joan Marie Anderson (02-1662)

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0455P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 03a0455p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOAN MARIE ANDERSON
(02-1662); FRANCIS ALBERT
SAGORSKI (02-1673); RODGER
BRUCE YATES (02-1700);
ARTHUR HENRY
MODDERMAN (02-1703);
SUSAN ELAINE SLOBODA
(02-1736); ROBERT LEE
GOODWIN, JR. (02-1769);
RUTH ELAINE SHRIVER
(02-1771),
Defendants-Appellants.
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Nos. 02-1662/
1673/1700/1703/
1736/1769/1771
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.
No. 01-00175—Robert Holmes Bell, Chief District Judge.
Argued and Submitted: December 2, 2003
Decided and Filed: December 23, 2003
2 United States v.
Anderson, et al.
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*The Honorable Danny C. Reeves, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
Before: GUY and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; REEVES,
District Judge.*
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Lawrence J. Phelan, HAEHNEL & PHELAN,
Grand Rapids, Michigan, Kevin M. Schad, SCHAD &
COOK, Indian Springs, Ohio, Richard E. Zambon,
MITCHELL & ZAMBON, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Daniel
R. Fagan, DANIEL R. FAGAN & ASSOCIATES, Grand
Rapids, Michigan, John M. Karafa, Grand Haven, Michigan,
for Appellants. Donald A. Davis, ASSISTANT UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: Lawrence J. Phelan, HAEHNEL &
PHELAN, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Kevin M. Schad,
SCHAD & COOK, Indian Springs, Ohio, Richard E.
Zambon, MITCHELL & ZAMBON, Grand Rapids,
Michigan, Daniel R. Fagan, DANIEL R. FAGAN &
ASSOCIATES, Grand Rapids, Michigan, John M. Karafa,
Grand Haven, Michigan, Anthony J. Valentine, TWOHEY
MAGGINI, PLC, Grand Rapids, Michigan, Keith W. Turpel,
Kalamazoo, Michigan, for Appellants. Donald A. Davis,
ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Grand
Rapids, Michigan, for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
PER CURIAM. These seven consolidated appeals by
defendants Joan Marie Anderson, Arthur Henry Modderman,

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1A bank representative, Paul Wegener, contrasted a check with a
sight draft. A check is payable on demand when presented to a bank,
while the maker or drawer of a sight draft instructs the drawee to pay a
third party. A sight draft is not deposited in an account like a check, but
must be pro cessed through the collection de partm ent.
Rodger Bruce Yates, Francis Albert Sagorski, Ruth Elaine
Shriver, Susan Elaine Sloboda, and Robert Lee Goodwin, Jr.,
raise various challenges to their respective convictions and/or
sentences. The 73-count Superceding Indictment in this case
charged 14 defendants with conspiracy both to defraud and to
commit offenses against the United States in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 371 (count 1); substantive offenses relating to the
making and offering of fictitious “sight drafts” purporting to
be actual financial instruments issued under the authority of
the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 514(a)(2) (counts
2-24); and substantive offenses involving the making and
subscribing, or aiding, assisting or counseling the making and
subscribing of false reports of cash transactions to the IRS on
Form 8300 in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) and
(2) (counts 25-73). Two defendants pleaded guilty and the
remaining twelve defendants were convicted by a jury on all
charges following a joint trial. After review of the record and
the defendants’ respective challenges to their convictions
and/or sentences, we affirm in all respects.
I.
The indictment alleged that beginning in late 1998 and
continuing through July 2001, the defendants joined in a
single conspiracy with multiple objectives: namely, to defraud
the United States by impeding, impairing, obstructing, and
defeating the lawful government functions of the IRS and
other federal agencies; and to commit offenses against the
United States with respect to both the fictitious sight drafts
and the false reports of cash transactions to the IRS.1 The
indictment described the “means and methods” of the
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conspiracy to include the creation and offering of 193
fictitious sight drafts purporting to be drawn on the United
States Treasury with an aggregate face value of more than
$550 million and the use of IRS Form 8300 to falsely report
that 113 transactions occurred with third parties with an
aggregate value of more than $490 million. In addition,
defendants refused to appear before or cooperate with the
grand jury, its subpoenas, or the federal district court.
Defendants also filed frivolous “notices” (including criminal
complaints) against prosecutors, law enforcement and judicial
officers involved in the investigation and prosecution of this
case.
In 1998, defendant Rodger Yates was serving a sentence in
federal prison for activities involving the “Montana Freemen”
at the same time that defendant Jerry Allen Chase was serving
a sentence for violating income tax laws. Chase testified that
Yates told him that he and Roger Elvick were perfecting a
scheme using false financial instruments that appeared to be
drawn on the United States. Yates enlisted the aid of
individuals outside prison; namely, Joan Anderson, her
common law husband Arthur Modderman, and Phillip Leroy
(a.k.a. PJ) Hammond (who has not appealed). Yates, who
was in prison for having used earlier forms of fictitious
instruments, told Chase that the new “sight draft” theory was
“more sound” than earlier schemes.
During that same time frame, defendants Ruth Shriver
(Shriver) and her husband Jack Shriver (who has not
appealed) were in financial trouble with the IRS. The
Shrivers communicated with Elvick and his partner, Roger
Knutt, both of whom had recently been released from prison
and claimed to have recovered their farm using false sight
drafts. In late summer 1998, PJ Hammond ordered thousands
of blank sight drafts from a commercial printing company.
The drafts were paid for by someone named “Ruth.” On
September 9, 1998, the Shrivers sent the IRS a sight draft
appearing to be drawn on the United States Treasury in the

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amount of $1.75 million. Although the IRS initially credited
the Shrivers in that amount, the credit was reversed. Within
a week of the first sight draft, six other codefendants each
wrote similar sight drafts to the IRS (including appellants
Sagorski, Hammond, Anderson, and Modderman).
Sight drafts made payable to the IRS were written by all but
two defendants, Sloboda and Goodwin, and formed the basis
for the substantive charges in counts 2 through 24. As
referenced earlier, numerous other sight drafts were presented
to state and local governments, credit card companies, banks
and credit unions, brokerages, and were also used for personal
expenses. Part of the scheme was the hope that some
financial institutions had such sloppy computer systems that
at least some sight drafts would be accepted and the credits
could be spent or used to eliminate other debts.
Another aspect of the conspiracy involved the filing of false
returns with the IRS that reported cash transactions of over
$10,000, when no transaction had in fact occurred, in order to
intimidate and harass the individual identified as having
participated in the nonexistent transaction. Under federal law,
a return, Form 8300, must be filed with the IRS when a
person engaged in a trade or business receives over $10,000
in a cash transaction. 26 U.S.C. § 6050I. Form 8300 includes
a jurat, stating that: “Under penalties of perjury, I declare that
to the best of my knowledge the information I have furnished
above is true, correct, and complete.”
Targets of the false 8300s included individuals who
rejected sight drafts and both public officials and private
individuals against whom a defendant bore a grievance. For
example, four members of the Westveld family were targeted
because one of them had purchased property that had once
6 United States v.
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2An employee o f a cred it union was targeted by Hammond, and a
disabled worker in the mailroom of a credit card company was targeted
after op ening an app lication fro m defendant Carney.
belonged to Modderman.2 Most of the false 8300s reported
nonexistent transactions involving a number of judges,
prosecutors, attorneys, public officials, and law enforcement
and corrections officers. The forms were filled out to indicate
that the target had refused to give his or her social security
number, which automatically caused the IRS to send a stern
form letter to the target demanding compliance with the law.
A total of eight defendants were charged with making false
declarations under penalty of perjury by signing a false IRS
Form 8300, in violation of § 7206(1); including appellants
Modderman (counts 37-45), Sagorski (counts 46-47), Sloboda
(counts 48-49), and Goodwin (counts 28-30). The remaining
charges for aiding, assisting, counseling, or advising others to
make false declarations on the 8300s in violation of § 7206(2)
were brought against Yates (counts 50-53) and Anderson
(counts 50-73).
The evidence showed that Anderson and Modderman
explained the “redemption theory” and instructed others how
to write the sight drafts and fill out the false 8300s. One
witness, Diana Arndt-Mammen (Arndt), testified that
Anderson and Modderman offered the sight-draft scheme as
a way for her to resolve her severe financial problems,
showed her how to fill out the sight drafts and false 8300s,
and asked if she had filed false 8300s against those who
rejected the sight drafts. Another coconspirator, Herbert
Lawrence, testified that Anderson and Modderman instructed
him on how to use the false 8300s to “bring the IRS down” on
officials and other individuals to harass them. Anderson and
Modderman also told Lawrence to avoid lawyers, that he did

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3The mantra consisted of the following three questions and demand:
“What is your name ? Do you have a claim against me? Do you know of
any others that have a claim against me? I request the order of the Court
be released to me immediately.”
4Ruth Shriver also rose and stepped toward someone near the
podium, but was intercepted by security and removed from the courtroom.
not have to obey the corrupt court system, and that he would
be protected if he recited their “shield” or “mantra.”3
Use of the mantra was taught as part of the scheme and was
recited by various defendants through all stages of the
proceedings. It was part of the refusal to cooperate with the
grand jury and in contempt proceedings, which resulted in
obstruction of justice enhancements at sentencing.
Handwriting exemplars were ultimately provided to the grand
jury, but not until after defendants were held in contempt of
court. At trial, each of the defendants—except for Sagorski,
Dewey Metcalf, Sr., and Dewey Metcalf, Jr.—disrupted the
trial by standing and reciting the mantra.
This disruption involved several defendants rising together,
repeatedly reciting the mantra and being removed from the
courtroom. The first time, seven defendants were removed.
The next day, a total of nine defendants were removed.4 With
that, the district court decided, after consulting with counsel,
that the nine defendants would be allowed to return only if
they gave assurances that they would not disrupt the
proceedings any further. Unwilling to give any assurances,
none of the nine were present in the courtroom for the rest of
the trial. Although the defendants do not challenge the
district court’s handling of the situation, it was the basis for
upward departures at sentencing as well as Sagorski’s motion
for severance or mistrial.
Defendants were convicted on all counts and, after
sentencing, timely notices of appeal were filed on behalf of
8 United States v.
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Nos. 02-1662/1673/1700/1703/
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Anderson, Modderman, Yates, Sagorski, Sloboda, Goodwin
and Shriver.
II.
With the exception of Sloboda and Shriver, defendants
appeal from the denial of judgment of acquittal with respect
to some or all of their convictions. On appeal, “the relevant
question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979). This standard applies to both direct and
circumstantial evidence, and all reasonable inferences must be
drawn in favor of the government. United States v. Searan,
259 F.3d 434, 441 (6th Cir. 2001).
A. Form 8300
Challenging their convictions for violations of 26 U.S.C.
§ 7206(1) and (2), as well as the portion of the conspiracy
charge relating to these offenses, Anderson, Yates,
Modderman, Sagorski, and Goodwin argue first that these
convictions must be reversed because there is no duty to file
Form 8300 for nonexistent transactions. Defendants reason
that if there is no duty to file a return, there can be no
prosecution for filing a form containing false information
either because it cannot be a “willful” violation or because the
falsity cannot be “material.” While there are apparently no
cases addressing this argument, we are satisfied that it is the
novelty of the defendants’ conduct that accounts for this fact
and not the inapplicability of § 7206 to this situation.
Defendants emphasize that most cases involving the
currency transaction report required by 26 U.S.C. § 6050I are
prosecutions for willful failure to file the return under 26
U.S.C. § 7203. That may be, and, in those cases, proof of a
duty to file a return may be required for conviction since

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5Although Anderson claims error in the failure to give a requested
instruction on willfulness, the record shows that the jury was instructed
concerning “willfulness.” The district court denied a request that
“willfully” be added to the verdict form.
§ 7203 refers to any person “required to make a return.” We
have no difficulty concluding, however, that proof of a duty
to file a return is not required to establish a violation of
§ 7206(1) or (2) for filing reports of nonexistent transactions.
See United States v. Tarwater, 308 F.3d 494, 504 (6th Cir.
2002) (describing § 7206 as a perjury statute criminalizing
lying on any document filed with the IRS).
“Willfulness” for purposes of the tax laws connotes “‘a
voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.’”
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991) (citation
omitted). The relevant duty for purposes of willfulness is the
duty imposed by the provision of the statute or regulation the
defendant is accused of violating. Id. at 201-02. Under
§ 7206(1), the government must show the defendant willfully
made and subscribed “any return, statement, or other
document, which contains or is verified by a written
declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and
which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every
material matter.” The companion section, § 7206(2), makes
it a felony for any person to willfully aid, assist, procure,
counsel, or advise the preparation or presentation under the
internal revenue laws a return, affidavit, claim or other
document which is fraudulent or false as to any material
matter. The clear import of these provisions is that when one
makes and subscribes a return, or aids and counsels the
preparation and presentation of a return, an obligation arises
that the return not be false as to any material matter. This
duty arises with the making of the return, without regard to
whether there was an obligation to file one in the first place.5
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6Anderson does not appeal her convictions for violation of
§ 514(a)(2) (counts 2-3), or her conviction on the conspiracy charge
(count 1).
Taking a slightly different tack, Modderman argues that the
falsity of the information on the 8300s was not “material”
because in the absence of any reportable transaction there was
no duty to file the 8300s and no tax to be computed by the
IRS. Of course, the failure to report income or other items
necessary to the computation of tax is material. Tarwater,
308 F.3d at 505. In general, however, “a false statement is
material if it has ‘a natural tendency to influence, or [is]
capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking
body to which it was addressed.’” Neder v. United States,
527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted). We reject defendants’ contention that it is
immaterial as a matter of law to falsely report a transaction on
Form 8300 when no transaction has in fact occurred.
B. Sight Drafts
The convictions for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 514(a)(2), as
well as the portion of the conspiracy charge relating to those
offenses, are challenged on appeal by Modderman (counts 1,
15-17), Yates (counts 1 and 24), Sagorski (counts 1, 18-22),
and Goodwin (count 1).6 Defendants make three main claims:
that the sight drafts are not “fictitious” obligations; that they
do not appear to be “actual” financial instruments; and that
there was no evidence of an intent to defraud because they did
not attempt to get a refund from the IRS. None of these
claims have merit.
Added in 1996, § 514(a)(2) makes it a felony to pass,
present, offer, issue, attempt or cause the same, or possess,
with intent to defraud,

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any false or fictitious instrument, document, or other
item appearing, representing, purporting, or contriving
through scheme or artifice, to be an actual security or
other financial instrument issued under the authority of
the United States, a foreign government, a State or other
political subdivision of the United States, or an
organization[.]
The legislative history of this provision indicates that it was
intended to cover “fictitious” instruments, as opposed to
“counterfeit” instruments, in order to close a loophole in the
criminal statutes. United States v. Howick, 263 F.3d 1056,
1066-67 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 946 (2002).
The court in Howick articulated the distinction between
counterfeit and fictitious documents as follows, id. at 1067:
A “counterfeit” obligation is a bogus document contrived
to appear similar to an existing financial instrument; a
“fictitious” obligation is a bogus document contrived to
appear to be a financial instrument, where there is in fact
no such genuine instrument, and where the fact of the
genuine instrument’s nonexistence is presumably
unknown by, and not revealed to, the intended recipient
of the document.
In this case, there was testimony that although there is a
legitimate financial instrument known as a sight draft, the
United States Treasury has not used sight drafts in modern
history. Moreover, the United States Treasury maintains no
depository accounts against which an individual could draw
a check, draft, or any other financial instrument. The sight
drafts at issue here were properly charged as fictitious
instruments under § 514(a)(2).
Yates asserts, without elaboration or citation to authority,
that it was obvious from the face of the sight draft that it was
not an “actual” financial instrument within the meaning of
§ 514(a)(2). While the sight drafts were not in fact accepted
12 United States v.
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Nos. 02-1662/1673/1700/1703/
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7In contra st with counterfeit statutes, § 514(a)(2) cannot be
interpreted to includ e a “similitude” requirement; that is, that the
document bear such likeness to genuine currency as is calculated to
deceive an honest unsuspecting person of ordinary observation.
by any of the recipients, we agree with the court in Howick
that because the “very purpose of the statute is to supplement
the preexisting counterfeit laws by criminalizing bogus
obligations that are not copies of any actual obligation” the
term “actual” in § 514(a)(2) cannot be given its most natural
meaning. 263 F.3d at 1067 (emphasis in original). Instead,
it should be interpreted to encompass the idea of
“verisimilitude”—the quality of appearing to be true or real.
Id.7
Recognizing the infinite range of financial instruments,
both genuine and fictitious, the court in Howick interpreted
the phrase “‘actual security or other financial instrument’” to
mean “one that appears to be ‘actual’ in the sense that it bears
a family resemblance to genuine financial instruments” or, in
other words, “include[s] enough of the various hallmarks and
indicia of financial obligations so as to appear to be within
that class.” 263 F.3d at 1068. In this case, the government
presented testimony from William Kerr of the Office of the
Comptroller describing the sight drafts as having good
physical quality (including microencoding, microprinting, a
colored background, and an artificial watermark), and noting
that their invalidity would not necessarily be apparent just
from looking at them.
Finally, defendants assert that there was insufficient
evidence of an intent to defraud because they made no
attempt to obtain a refund from the IRS. As the government
points out, however, it was not necessary to prove defendants
requested a refund in order to establish that the sight drafts
were presented with intent to defraud. Intent may be proven
through circumstantial evidence, and there was evidence from

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which the jury could infer that defendants knowingly sent
worthless sight drafts drawn on the United States Treasury
with the intention that they be accepted for value.
C. Sufficiency
Defendants Goodwin and Sagorski argue that the evidence
was insufficient to support their convictions under 26 U.S.C.
§ 7206(1) (counts 28-30 and 46-47). Sagorski specifically
relies on the fact that the document examiner was unable to
identify him as having signed the 8300s that bore his name.
The witness did testify, however, that Sagorski authored all
other entries on the form and that no conclusion could be
made about the signatures because Sagorski’s handwriting
exemplar was “very quickly executed and partially illegible.”
Goodwin, on the other hand, relies on the fact that the
document examiner could only identify him as the “probable
preparer” of the 8300s bearing his name.
In addition to the expert witness testimony, the jury was
entitled to consider both circumstantial evidence as well as
the rebuttable presumption afforded by 26 U.S.C. § 6064,
which provides that the fact that an individual’s name is
signed to the return is prima facie evidence that the return was
signed by him. We have no difficulty finding that when the
evidence and inferences are viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence
from which a rational trier of fact could conclude that
Sagorski and Goodwin signed the false 8300s that bore their
names.
Next, defendants Sagorski and Goodwin challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence tying them to the charged
conspiracy. Both defendants argue first that they never joined
the conspiracy to defraud the United States by obstructing the
IRS. Not only does this ignore that the conspiracy had
multiple objectives, but also disregards the evidence
concerning their participation. Goodwin’s name was signed
14 United States v.
Anderson, et al.
Nos. 02-1662/1673/1700/1703/
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8Sago rski, a customer in Lawrence’s muffler shop, heard Lawrence’s
anger at police and the court system and arranged for him to meet with
Anderson and M odderman at their home. Sagorski also gave Lawrence
some audio tapes that included anti-government rhetoric. Under
And erson’s direction, Lawrence signed false 83 00s that were filed with
the IRS reporting transactions with individuals against whom Lawrence
bore grievances. Arndt, who worked for Sagorski, had severe financial
problems arising from her son’s use of her credit cards. Sagorski referred
her to Anderson and Modderman and provided her with sight drafts on
one occasion. Arndt sent more than 50 sight drafts and filed false 830 0s.
She introduced her son and sister to the schem e and they, in turn, also
wrote worthless sight drafts.
on 11 false 8300s directed at judicial officers, police, and
attorneys that collectively reported over $140 million in
financial transactions which never occurred. Goodwin also
refused to cooperate with the grand jury, sent notices to court
officers, and joined with those who acted to disrupt the trial.
Sagorski signed 34 false sight drafts totaling $49 million
and filed 16 false 8300s reporting nonexistent transactions
with employees of financial institutions, as well as judges,
lawyers, and court officers. Special Agent Robert Walker
testified that Sagorski admitted to having prepared the 8300s
and sight drafts bearing his name and insisted that the IRS
was a fictitious entity with no right to collect taxes. In
addition, Sagorski was responsible for bringing Lawrence and
Arndt into the conspiracy.8
Finally, Goodwin argues that it was error to have admitted
another piece of evidence, the only sight draft purportedly
written by him, because it preceded the conspiracy. To the
contrary, the sight draft was dated May 21, 1999, and was
endorsed on the reverse side to Jerry M. Beurkens on July 13,
1999; well within the period of the conspiracy. Beurkens, a
city attorney, testified that he had prosecuted Goodwin on a
traffic ticket several years earlier; received several documents

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9Go odw in also argues that this sight draft was neither the subject of
a substantive charge nor listed as an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy. The government may offer proof of overt acts not listed in
the indictment. United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1 374 (6th Cir. 1988).
The government also notes that this exhibit was admitted twice without
objection from Goo dwin.
10At trial, counsel for Sagorski agreed with the district court’s
characterization that the motio n was in essence one fo r mistrial.
from Goodwin, including the sight draft; and was the target of
a false Form 8300 filed with the IRS.9
III.
Sagorski claims error in the denial of his motion for
severance or mistrial on the grounds that he was prejudiced
by the disruptive behavior of his codefendants. Whether
properly articulated as a question of prejudicial joinder
requiring severance, or a motion for mistrial resulting from
prejudicial joinder, the record reflects that the district court
addressed the appropriate considerations for determining
whether the defendant could demonstrate he was prejudiced.
See United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 215, 220 (6th Cir.
1990). Our review of a district court’s decision on a motion
for severance or for mistrial is for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Lloyd, 10 F.3d 1197, 1215 (6th Cir. 1993)
(prejudicial joinder); United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d
1253, 1263 (6th Cir. 1991) (mistrial).10
Relief from prejudicial joinder is required “only if there is
a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific
trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from
making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.” Zafiro
v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993). A trial court’s
limiting instructions may “cure” such prejudice. Id. The
defendant bears the burden of making a “strong showing of
factually specific and compelling prejudice resulting from a
16 United States v.
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Nos. 02-1662/1673/1700/1703/
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joint trial.” Moore, 917 F.2d at 221. We adhere to the view
that the jury must be presumed capable of sorting out the
evidence against each defendant separately. Id. at 220.
In denying Sagorski’s motion, the district court observed at
the outset that there had been a noticeable difference in the
appearance, demeanor, and attentiveness of the three
defendants who did not disrupt the proceedings (who were
also on bond) as compared to the nine defendants who
engaged in the disruptive behavior. The three nondisruptive
defendants were also physically separated from the others,
due to the configuration of the tables in the small courtroom.
In addition, the court noted that much of the evidence related
to the sight drafts or 8300s allegedly prepared by the various
individuals.
Finally, in considering the impact of the disruptive
behavior, the court indicated that the outbursts were short and
the defendants were quickly escorted out of the courtroom.
In fact, the court suggested that Sagorski’s good behavior
may have served to impress the jury and differentiate him
from the disruptive defendants. No further disruptions
occurred, as the nine defendants were unwilling to give the
necessary assurances. Moreover, the jury was properly
instructed to separately consider the evidence as to each
defendant. United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439, 447 (6th Cir.
1984). We find no abuse of discretion in the denial of
Sagorski’s motion for severance or mistrial.
IV.
Several evidentiary claims are raised by defendants
Anderson, Modderman, Sagorski, and Goodwin. We review
the district court’s decisions concerning the admission of
evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Middleton,
246 F.3d 825, 836 (6th Cir. 2001). Even if an abuse of
discretion has occurred, “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or

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Nos. 02-1662/1673/1700/1703/
1736/1769/1771
United States v.
Anderson, et al.
17
variance that does not affect substantial rights must be
disregarded.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
Anderson, joined by Modderman, claims error occurred
when Agent Jon Street was allowed to testify concerning a
box of documents which consisted of correspondence
received from the defendants and addressed to individuals
including judges, prosecutors, and IRS investigators (the
“Gateway” box). The essence of Anderson’s claim on appeal
is twofold: that it was an abuse of discretion to allow
testimony concerning the entire collection of documents
without admitting all of the documents; and that it was
unfairly prejudicial because it allowed the jury to speculate
about the voluminous “collective misdeeds” of the
defendants. We reject these contentions as meritless.
The record reflects that Street testified generally concerning
the contents of the box to explain how the documents were
accumulated and organized, but did not include specifics
about documents that were not admitted into evidence. In
addition, the box was present so that it would be available for
defense counsel to use in cross-examination. From the box,
Street selected documents sent by various defendants that
contained the same or very similar captions or verbiage.
Those selected documents were offered as exhibits to show
the existence of and participation in the conspiracy. To the
extent that the voluminous number of documents reflected
badly on defendants, it was not unfairly prejudicial. There
was no claim that the box did not contain the kind of
documents that the exhibits represented. At least one
defendant was able to clarify on cross-examination that none
of the selected documents were sent by him.
Anderson and Modderman contend that it was an improper
plea for sympathy to mention that defendants directed notices
and other harassing correspondence to the prosecutor
personally. In overruling objections to such evidence, the
district court observed that to exclude the evidence would
18 United States v.
Anderson, et al.
Nos. 02-1662/1673/1700/1703/
1736/1769/1771
11In a related argum ent, Good win asserts that do cuments received by
the government during trial, including a letter prepared by Goodwin from
the holding cell and handed to a Deputy United States Marshal, were
irrelevant, outside the scope of the conspiracy, and unduly prejudicial.
The documents, and especially Goodwin’s letter, were relevant to the
alleged conspiracy as they supported the contention that there was
concerted action by the defendants.
allow a defendant to thwart prosecution by sending damaging
material to the prosecutor. This is an unusual case in that the
letters and notices were relevant to the conspiracy charge and
were not themselves of an inflammatory nature. Moreover,
defendants have not identified any questioning or argument
by the prosecutor relating to the correspondence that would
tend to inflame the jury.11
Sagorski claims that the district court erred in allowing
Agent Steven Baker to testify concerning items seized from
the Anderson-Modderman residence. Specifically, defendant
points to testimony about a letter from a bank in response to
correspondence from Sagorski; a copy of the alert from the
Comptroller’s Office to financial institutions about the
fictitious sight drafts; excerpts from a book called “Accepted
for Value”; portions of pamphlets outlining the use of the
mantra; and literature referencing the “Kingdom of Heaven”
group and other teachings. Defendant argues that the
evidence was hearsay, and claims it was irrelevant and highly
prejudicial because it branded the defendants as “anti-
government” and because some of the references might have
called to mind similarly named cults. There is no indication,
however, that an objection was made on either basis. As
such, our review is for plain error. United States v. Thomas,
11 F.3d 620, 629-30 (6th Cir. 1993).
This evidence was relevant to the question of the
defendants’ knowledge and intent and would not have been
offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Moreover, this
was hardly the only evidence of “anti-government” sentiment

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Nos. 02-1662/1673/1700/1703/
1736/1769/1771
United States v.
Anderson, et al.
19
12USSG § 2F1.1 was repealed and amende d provisions were
consolidated in USSG § 2B1.1, effective November 1, 2001. See USSG
§ App. C, amendment 617. Although defendants were sentenced after the
effective d ate, the o ld provision was used in order to avoid ex po st facto
problems.
on the part of the defendants. Finally, it would be pure
speculation to conclude that references to the “Kingdom of
Heaven” group might have led the jurors to associate
defendants, specifically Anderson and Modderman, with a
cult known by a similar name. We find no reversible error.
V.
Five defendants—Anderson, Shriver, Sloboda, Goodwin,
and Sagorski—appeal from certain aspects of the district
court’s calculation of their adjusted offense level under
United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 2F1.1
(2000). This guideline applies to both the group of offenses
relating to the sight drafts and those relating to the false
8300s, and provides for a base offense level of 6. USSG
§ 2F1.1(a). The guideline applicable to the conspiracy
charge, USSG § 2X1.1(a), incorporates this base offense level
and any specific offense characteristics for intended conduct
that can be established with reasonable certainty. Because a
broad range of offenses are covered by USSG § 2F1.1, the
guidelines include a number of specific offense characteristics
– the most significant of which is the incremental increase of
up to 18 levels based on the value of the loss or intended loss.
USSG § 2F1.1(b)(1).12
Although the probation department recommended that the
offense level be increased based on the face value of all the
sight drafts and 8300s attributable to each defendant, the
district court rejected that approach as inconsistent with this
court’s precedent concerning the calculation of intended
losses. United States v. Watkins, 994 F.2d 1194 (6th Cir.
1993); United States v. Khan, 969 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1992).
20 United States v.
Anderson, et al.
Nos. 02-1662/1673/1700/1703/
1736/1769/1771
This determination is not challenged on appeal. To be
included as an intended loss, the district court must find the
defendant intended the loss; it was possible for the defendant
to cause the loss; and the defendant completed or was about
to complete, but for interruption, all of the acts necessary to
bring about the loss. Watkins, 994 F.2d at 1196.
Consequently, the district court categorically excluded the
value of all the 8300s, leaving a base offense level of 6 for the
§ 7206 offenses. The court then discriminated between sight
drafts that would be counted as intended losses, excluding
those for more than $100,000 and including those that related
to an existing debt or an attempt to obtain credit. In this way,
the district court determined that Anderson and Sagorski
would each receive a 12-level increase in the offense level
relating to their convictions under § 514(a)(2) for intended
losses of more than $1.5 million and less than $2.5 million
under § 2F1.1(b)(1)(M). Anderson and Sagorski claim that
this was error.
A. Intended Loss and § 514(a)(2) Offenses
At the outset, Anderson argues that no sight drafts should
have been included as intended losses because they were so
obviously bogus that it was impossible for the scheme to
succeed in causing a loss. In Khan, we explained that the
incremental increases for intended losses “assume a
fraudulent scheme that would have created some actual loss
but for the interruption of the scheme by detection or failure
to carry out all the steps necessary to succeed.” 969 F.2d at
221. This limitation applies when the impossibility of
pecuniary loss is “entirely unrelated to the fraud or its
discovery.” Id. at 220. See United States v. Ly, No. 98-3783,
1999 WL 196573 (6th Cir. Mar. 29, 1999) (unpublished

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Nos. 02-1662/1673/1700/1703/
1736/1769/1771
United States v.
Anderson, et al.
21
13The amendments abandon this circuit’s interpretation of intended
loss and clarify that intended loss “includes intended pecuniary harm that
would have b een impossible or unlikely to occur.” USSG § 2B1.1,
comment. (n.2) (eff. Nov. 1, 2001 ).
14The addition of these amounts to the defendant’s intended losses
“bum ps” the increase in the base offense level from 11 levels (for losses
of more than $800,000) to 12 levels (for losses of more than $1.5 million).
decision). While no sight drafts were accepted for value in
this case, it is because the fraud was detected.13
Anderson and Sagorski both claim the district court erred
by holding them accountable for sight drafts written by
others. To be considered “relevant conduct,” the conduct
must have been (1) reasonably foreseeable to the defendant
and (2) undertaken in furtherance of the jointly undertaken
criminal activity. USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) and comment.
(n.2) (2000); United States v. Orlando, 281 F.3d 586, 600
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 947 (2002). The district
court must make individualized findings regarding these
requirements in order to differentiate between coconspirators.
281 F.3d at 600.
Sagorski does not contest the amount of losses representing
sight drafts he wrote himself, to the tune of about $820,000,
but only disputes the inclusion of sight drafts written by
Arndt and her son, Chad Boerma, on the grounds that the
court failed to make particularized findings concerning the
foreseeability of their conduct and the scope of the joint
activity. The record shows, however, that the district court
made the requisite findings.14
The district court found that Sagorski recommended the
scheme to Arndt, and arranged for Anderson and Modderman
to teach her. Arndt explained the theory to her son, who, with
prompting from Sagorski, wrote a series of sight drafts. The
district court concluded that Sagorski should be found
22 United States v.
Anderson, et al.
Nos. 02-1662/1673/1700/1703/
1736/1769/1771
culpable for the conduct of Arndt and Boerma because “one
can say without a shadow of a question that he knew what
[Arndt] and her son Boerma were doing, and the amounts that
they defrauded and intended to defraud are culpable to him as
a co-conspirator because it was clearly foreseeable within that
portion of the conspiracy.” Because Sagorski has not
demonstrated that the district court’s findings were either
inadequately individualized or clearly erroneous, we find no
error in the 12-level adjustment in the offense level under
§ 2F1.1.
Anderson was held accountable for intended losses of
$2,205,749, of which only $31,000 was attributable to sight
drafts she wrote herself. This resulted in a 12-level increase
in the offense level for the § 514(a)(2) convictions. Anderson
argues, as she did at sentencing, that it was not reasonably
foreseeable that her “students” would write these sight drafts.
She claims she merely explained the redemption theory and
the use of the sight drafts and could not control what her
“students” did with that “knowledge.” The issue, however, is
not control but foreseeability.
We find no error in the finding that it was reasonably
foreseeable to Anderson that her coconspirators would write
the sight drafts in question. She explained how the sight
drafts could be used to escape debts and secure credit, showed
them how to fill out the sight drafts, and encouraged the filing
of false 8300s against those who rejected the sight drafts. The
only coconspirator Anderson did not personally instruct was
Boerma. Not only did Anderson fail to object to those sight
drafts, but any error in the inclusion of the $156,000 in sight
drafts written by Boerma would be harmless because even

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Nos. 02-1662/1673/1700/1703/
1736/1769/1771
United States v.
Anderson, et al.
23
15Anderson also questions the accuracy of some of the figures
included by the district court and complains that the adding machine tape
referenced by the district court is not part of the record. Inviting this court
to remand to expand the record, Anderson asserts that there are
discrepancies in the totals of the sight drafts written by Arndt and Boerma.
Anderson did not object to or ask for clarification concerning the amounts
that were being included in the loss calculation, and we find no plain
error.
without it the intended losses would still greatly exceed $1.5
million.15
B. Enhancements under USSG § 3B1.1 and § 3A1.2
Shriver received a two-level enhancement under USSG
§ 3B1.1(c) for her role in the offense as “an organizer, leader,
manager, or supervisor” of the criminal activity. To qualify
for this adjustment, the defendant must have exerted control
over at least one other participant in a supervisory,
managerial, leadership, or organizational capacity. United
States v. Caseslorente, 220 F.3d 727, 734-35 (6th Cir. 2000).
Although the district court did not identify an individual over
whom Shriver exerted control, we can infer the necessary
finding from the district court’s explanation that she had a
leadership role in that she secured the sight drafts, met with
and connected people, and had a leadership role both pretrial
and at trial. United States v. Dupree, 323 F.3d 480, 494 (6th
Cir. 2003); see also Caseslorente, 220 F.3d at 736 (although
preferable, it is not required that the district court state the
specific facts relied on in applying § 3B1.1 enhancement).
The record indicates that Shriver was an organizer in the
conspiracy and an instigator among the defendants at trial.
The government notes that there can be little doubt that she
exerted control with respect to the participation of her
husband. It was not clearly erroneous for the district court to
find the enhancement applied to Ruth Shriver.
24 United States v.
Anderson, et al.
Nos. 02-1662/1673/1700/1703/
1736/1769/1771
16In a novel claim, Anderson argues that although proper notice was
sent regarding possible departure under § 5K2.7, the district court had an
obligation to amend that notice to advise her regarding the possibility of
departure under § 5K2.0. We find no error, however, because the
gove rnment’s prehearing motio n for departure ad equately disclosed that
departure under § 5K 2.0 was at issue. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S.
129, 138 (1991) (notice is required before the district court may depart
upward “on a ground not identified as a ground for departure in the
presentence report or in a prehearing submission by the Government”).
Anderson appeals from the 3-level enhancement imposed
under USSG § 3A1.2(a), which applies if “the victim was a
government officer or employee . . . and the offense of
conviction was motivated by such status.” This enhancement
was added to the offense level for the § 7206(2) offenses
relating to the false 8300s. Although Anderson challenges the
enhancement on the grounds that the target was really the
government, rather than government officials, the district
court did not clearly err in finding that the targets of the false
8300s covered individual government officials who were
targeted because of their positions. For example, individuals
targeted included an officer who issued a ticket to a defendant
and a judge who presided over a court matter involving a
defendant. Conceding that about half of the 8300s that were
the subject of her convictions under § 7206(2) targeted federal
or state employees, Anderson argues that it was error to apply
the enhancement to all of those counts. However, the § 7206
convictions were grouped together without objection.
C. Upward Departures under USSG § 5K2.0 and
§ 5K2.716
We have reviewed a district court’s decision to depart
upward or downward from the sentencing guideline range
under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v.
Chance, 306 F.3d 356, 393 (6th Cir. 2002). Recent
amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) require de novo review
of whether a departure was based on proper factors, but

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Nos. 02-1662/1673/1700/1703/
1736/1769/1771
United States v.
Anderson, et al.
25
review of the extent of such a departure continues to be for
abuse of discretion. See PROTECT Act of 2003, § 401(d),
Publ. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). Because we
would affirm the upward departures under either standard, we
need not decide whether this modification applies to appeals
pending as of the effective date of the PROTECT Act.
The applicable guidelines allow for upward departures
when “there exists an aggravating . . . circumstance of a kind,
or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines.”
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b); see USSG § 5K2.0 (2000). When a
factor being considered is an encouraged factor, the court may
depart if the applicable guideline does not already take the
factor into consideration, or, if already taken into account, it
is present to a degree that makes the case different from the
ordinary case in which it is present. Koon v. United States,
518 U.S. 81, 95-96 (1996).
Once the district court excluded all of the false 8300s and
many of the sight drafts from the loss calculations, the offense
level could not be increased under USSG § 2F1.1(b)(1) for
any of the convictions under § 7206, or for Ruth Shriver’s
conviction under § 514(a)(2). Granting the government’s
motion for upward departures under USSG § 5K2.0, the
district court found that without additional increases the
offense level would not reflect the seriousness of the
defendants’ conduct. As the commentary to USSG § 2F1.1
explains: “In cases in which the loss determined under
subsection (b)(1) does not fully capture the harmfulness and
seriousness of the conduct, an upward departure may be
warranted.” USSG § 2F1.1, comment. (n.11). Shriver,
Anderson, Sloboda, and Goodwin challenge these departures.
In addition, the district court provided defendants with
notice of its intention to consider upward departure under
USSG § 5K2.7, which provides, in part, that “[i]f the
defendant’s conduct resulted in a significant disruption of
26 United States v.
Anderson, et al.
Nos. 02-1662/1673/1700/1703/
1736/1769/1771
17The court later rejected the government’s request for further
enhancement for more than minimal planning under USSG § 2F1.1(c)
because Shriver’s overall participation in the conspiracy was factored into
the USSG § 5K2 .0 departure.
governmental function, the court may increase the sentence
above the authorized guideline range to reflect the nature and
extent of the disruption and the importance of the
governmental function affected.” The district court found that
the disruptions during trial represented significant disruption
of a governmental function for which upward departures
would be warranted in calculating the offense levels for both
the § 514(a)(2) and § 7206 offenses. Anderson, Sloboda, and
Shriver appeal from these departures.
1. Shriver
Convicted of one count each of conspiracy and violating
§ 514(a)(2), Shriver had an adjusted offense level of 10 prior
to any departure. The district court found this offense level
did not accurately reflect the seriousness of her conduct and
granted an 8-level upward departure under USSG § 5K2.0. In
explaining the reasons for this departure, the court noted that
the one sight draft at issue for $1.75 million was sent to the
IRS at a time when Ruth and Jack Shriver had a tax obligation
of $114,000. Given the amount of the sight draft, however,
the district court did not increase the base offense level to
account for intended losses. Nonetheless, the court found that
the sight draft sent to the IRS was obviously designed to
commit fraud and the tax liability related to her own anti-
government animus. The district court also found that, in
addition to the enhancement under USSG § 3B1.1(c), the
extent of her participation in the larger conspiracy had not
been taken into account. In deciding to upwardly depart 8
levels, the district court observed that a loss of $114,000
would alone result in a 6-level increase in the offense level
under USSG § 2F1.1(b)(1).17

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Nos. 02-1662/1673/1700/1703/
1736/1769/1771
United States v.
Anderson, et al.
27
18W ith a total offense level of 24 and a criminal history score of 0,
the guideline range was 51 to 60 months. Shriver was sentenced to 60
months’ imprisonment on each count, to run co ncurrently.
19Anderson was sentenced to 60 mo nths on the conspiracy cou nt,
120 months on the § 514(a)(2) convictions, and 36 months on the § 7206
convictions, to run concurrently.
Turning then to the question of departure under USSG
§ 5K2.7, the district court explained that additional upward
departure was “absolutely necessary” because Shriver was
one of the leaders of the disruptive behavior and because she
repeatedly engaged in the disruptive behavior, all of which
demonstrated contempt for the process and everyone from
judge to jury. As a result, the district court found Shriver’s
conduct warranted an additional 6-level increase in the
offense level. She contends that this departure was an abuse
of discretion because her behavior during trial was adequately
taken into account by the 2-level enhancement for obstruction
of justice. The district court found otherwise, emphasizing
that the significant disruption of the trial was separate from
the obstruction of the grand jury and contempt proceedings.
We agree.18
2. Anderson
The district court granted a 6-level upward departure under
USSG § 5K2.0 with respect to Anderson’s § 7206 offenses
only, after finding that the base offense level of 6 did not
account for the seriousness of her conduct. In addition, she
received a 4-level upward departure in the offense level for
both the § 514(a)(2) offenses (counts 2-3) and the § 7206(2)
offenses (counts 50-73) under USSG § 5K2.7.19
Taking issue with the USSG § 5K2.0 departure, Anderson
mistakenly asserts that such a departure must relate to a
financial loss. This assertion is refuted by the earlier quoted
commentary to USSG § 2F1.1 authorizing departure when the
28 United States v.
Anderson, et al.
Nos. 02-1662/1673/1700/1703/
1736/1769/1771
20Sloboda was sentenced to concurre nt terms of 37 m onths’
imprisonment on the conspiracy count and 36 months on each of the two
§ 720 6 conviction s. Goodw in received concurrent terms o f 46 months’
imprisonment on the conspiracy count and 36 months each on his two
§ 7206 co nvictions.
loss calculation does not reflect the harmfulness and
seriousness of the conduct. Anderson also argues that this
departure resulted in double counting when combined with
the official-victim enhancement under USSG § 3A1.2. In
particular, she emphasizes that more than half of the targets
of the false 8300s were government officials. However, the
district court explained the departure as warranted because the
base offense level of 6 did not take into account the large
number of false 8300s that Anderson had aided, assisted, or
counseled others to file. This is distinct from the
enhancement based on the status of the targets themselves.
The USSG § 5K2.0 departure did not result in double
counting of the same factor. Sloboda and Goodwin, who join
in this argument, also received a 6-level departure under
USSG § 5K2.0 based on the number of false 8300s they each
filed in an attempt to subvert the IRS and harass the targets
(in each case a dozen).20
Appealing the 4-level upward departures under USSG
§ 5K2.7, Anderson argues, as she did at sentencing, that they
constituted double counting of the same conduct addressed by
the 2-level enhancement for obstruction of justice. As with
Shriver, however, it is clear that these departures addressed
separate conduct from the obstruction of justice enhancement.
Alternatively, Anderson suggests the USSG § 5K2.7
departures were error because the trial court could have
exercised its contempt powers during trial.
The district court considered this possibility, but found it
inappropriate because to bring criminal contempt charges at
trial could have “anointed these people with martyrdom.”

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Nos. 02-1662/1673/1700/1703/
1736/1769/1771
United States v.
Anderson, et al.
29
21Sloboda, who adopts And erson’s arguments on this issue, also
received a 4-level upward departure under USSG § 5K2.7 for the same
reasons.
The district court also explained that “this is not all about
contempt. This whole trial, this whole issue, redemption
theory, . . . was illustrative of contempt for all authority. Not
just judicial authority, but all authority. This contempt for
judicial authority was just one aspect of the contempt for
governmental authority within a democracy.” We find no
error in the determination that upward departures were
appropriate under USSG § 5K2.7.
In a related “piling on” argument, Anderson suggests the
departures were not necessary because removing her and the
others from the trial was punishment enough. That was a
question of courtroom management, with defendants being
invited to return to the courtroom twice every day, and was
not adequately reflected in the sentencing calculations absent
the departure. Finally, Anderson challenges the extent of the
departures as unreasonable. We cannot say that the 4-level
departures under USSG § 5K2.7 represent an abuse of
discretion. In particular, the district court emphasized that the
conduct involved multiple incidents of disruptive conduct that
significantly disrupted an important judicial function.21
AFFIRMED.

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