United States of America v. Iwan Mandycz

*The Honorab le Curtis L. Collier, United States District Judge for the
Eastern D istrict of T ennessee, sitting b y designation.
1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0425P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 03a0425p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
IWAN MANDYCZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
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No. 02-1846
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Flint.
No. 00-40148—Paul V. Gadola, District Judge.
Submitted: September 25, 2003
Decided and Filed: December 4, 2003
Before: COLE and CLAY, Circuit Judges; COLLIER,
District Judge.*
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Andrew J. Haliw III, Tracy S. Thomas, Joseph
A. Siciliano, HALIW, SICILIANO & MYCHALOWYCH,
2 United States v. Mandycz No. 02-1846
Farmington Hills, Michigan, Richard P. Zipser, Southfield,
Michigan, for Appellant. Jonathan C. Drimmer, Michelle
Heyer, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, Washington, D.C., for
Appellee.
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OPINION
_________________
R. GUY COLE, JR., Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellee, the
United States, moves to dismiss the interlocutory appeal of
Defendant-Appellant, Iwan Mandycz, for lack of jurisdiction.
Because the district court’s denial of Mandycz’s motion for
summary judgment was not a “final order” of the district
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we dismiss Mandycz’s
interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
In the underlying complaint, the Government seeks
Mandycz’s denaturalization based on his alleged service at
two Nazi-run labor camps during World War II. In the
district court, Mandycz moved for summary judgment on two
grounds. First, he claimed that laches bars the
denaturalization action because the Government unreasonably
delayed filing its complaint and that the delay prejudiced
Mandycz because his mental capacity diminished in the
intervening period. Second, he claimed that the
denaturalization action should be dismissed because he is
mentally incompetent. Mandycz contends that he suffers
from Alzheimer’s disease and cannot effectively participate
in his own defense.
Initially, the district court ordered a competency hearing
and requested briefing from both parties on the applicability
of mental competency standards to denaturalization
proceedings. However, after considering the parties’ briefs,
the court ruled that incompetency to stand trial is not a
defense to a denaturalization action. The court, therefore,

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No. 02-1846 United States v. Mandycz 3
cancelled the competency hearing. The district judge also
held that laches is unavailable as a defense against the
Government in a denaturalization proceeding. Accordingly,
the district court denied Mandycz’s motion for summary
judgment. The district court later denied Mandycz’s request
to certify the competency and laches issues in an interlocutory
appeal to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The
instant uncertified interlocutory appeal followed. Although
trial was scheduled to begin on July 16, 2002, the district
court granted Mandycz’s motion for a stay of the trial’s
commencement pending our disposition of the instant appeal.
The Government now moves to dismiss the interlocutory
appeal on the ground that this Court lacks jurisdiction to
consider it because the district court’s denial of Mandycz’s
motion for summary judgment was not a final order.
Mandycz opposes the Government’s motion to dismiss,
contending that the competency and laches issues are
immediately appealable pursuant to the collateral order
doctrine set forth in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
This Court’s jurisdiction is limited to “final decisions” of
the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. However, the collateral
order doctrine establishes that a “small class” of interlocutory
appeals are immediately appealable, since they amount to
“final decisions” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. That small class of appealable
collateral orders “includes only decisions that are conclusive,
that resolve important questions separate from the merits, and
that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final
judgment in the underlying action.” Swint v. Chambers
County Com’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995) (citing Cohen, 337
U.S. at 546). “If the order at issue fails to satisfy any one of
these requirements, it is not appealable under the collateral-
order exception.” Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v.
Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 276 (1988).
4 United States v. Mandycz No. 02-1846
Even if the district court’s ruling on the mental competency
and laches issues was conclusive and separate from the merits
of the action, Mandycz cannot satisfy the third prong of the
collateral order analysis, which requires that the order be
“effectively unreviewable” on appeal from a final judgment
of the district court. Rights that are effectively unreviewable
on appeal are those that “cannot be effectively vindicated
after the trial has occurred.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 525 (1985) (“A major characteristic of the denial or
granting of a claim appealable under Cohen’s ‘collateral
order’ doctrine is that ‘unless it can be reviewed before [the
proceedings terminate], it can never be reviewed at all.’”)
(quoting Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 12 (1952) (opinion of
Jackson, J.)). Orders implicating claims of immunity – or
claims tantamount to immunity – are the most common
examples of collateral orders because immunity is “an
entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of
litigation.” Id. at 526 (district court’s denial of a claim of
absolute immunity is an order appealable before final
judgment). Pursuant to similar reasoning, the Supreme Court
has also held immediately appealable orders denying a motion
to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds, Abney
v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), and orders denying a
motion to dismiss an indictment based on immunity rooted in
the Speech and Debate Clause of the United States
Constitution, Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979).
Other effectively unreviewable orders are those that result
in a loss of liberty that cannot be corrected on appeal. For
instance, the Supreme Court has held that an order denying a
motion to reduce bail is reviewable as a collateral order
because if the appeal was not allowed, no remedy exists down
the line for the resulting loss of liberty. Stack v. Boyle, 342
U.S. 1 (1951). In addition, it is well-established that orders
of commitment for psychiatric examination are immediately
appealable. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 93 F.3d 1286
(6th Cir. 1996). In Davis, the Sixth Circuit explained:

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No. 02-1846 United States v. Mandycz 5
1Denaturalization proceed ings are technically considered suits in
equity, not crim inal actions. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490,
516 (1981). However, because at present, mental incompe tency is only
recognized as a defense to trial in criminal proceedings, our analysis is
necessarily based on the corpus of law encompassing mental
incompetency in the context of criminal cases. In civil cases, the
competency of a defendant is not irrelevant, of course. Incompetent and
infant civil defendants are entitled to the appointment of a guardian ad
litem. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c). However, a civil defendant’s mental
incompetence does not trigger an abatem ent of trial as it does in the
criminal context. The district court has never made a finding concerning
Mandycz’s competence, but it has appointed him a guardian ad litem. In
his interlocutory appeal, however, Mandycz claims that the mental
[L]oss of liberty occasioned by the commitment for
examination, and the forced intrusion of a court-ordered
psychiatric examination, are completely unreviewable by
the time of final judgment. Appellate review after final
judgment would be available only if the defendant is
found guilty, and even then, no effective relief could be
provided for her loss of liberty during the period of
commitment.
93 F.3d at 1289 (citing United States v. Weissberger, 951
F.2d 392, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The com pe te nc y and
laches issues decided by the district court in Mandycz’s case
fail the Cohen analysis and do not fall into the small class of
orders that courts have found immediately appealable. First,
both issues are fully reviewable on appeal after a decision on
the merits. Second, neither the competency nor the laches
issue is tantamount to immunity nor entails an uncorrectable
loss of liberty along the lines of psychiatric commitment or
the denial of bail.
Although Mandycz argues that his incompetency claim – if
accepted by the court as equivalent to that of a criminal
defendant’s incompetency claim – is tantamount to immunity,
a finding that a criminal defendant is incompetent merely
postpones the proceedings until such time that the defendant
is competent to stand trial.1 Unlike the protection afforded by
6 United States v. Mandycz No. 02-1846
incompetency standards and protections applicable in criminal cases
should also apply to denaturaliza tion proceedings.
absolute immunity or the Double Jeopardy Clause, the
incompetency of a criminal defendant does not implicate an
absolute right not to be tried. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525.
Accordingly, courts that have addressed this issue have
consistently ruled that competency determinations – unlike
commitment orders – are not appealable as collateral orders
because they are fully reviewable following the final
judgment of the district court. See United States v. Mattison,
904 F.2d 709, 1990 WL 75252, at *1 (6th Cir. June 6, 1990);
see also United States v. Caraza, 483 F.2d 432, 436 (11th Cir.
1988); United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146, 1150-51 (2d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1036 (1987); United States
v. Bendicks, 439 F.2d 1120, 1121 (5th Cir. 1971) (per
curiam). We therefore find that the district court’s ruling
concerning a defendant’s competency in denaturalization
proceedings is not appealable as a collateral order.
Although the Sixth Circuit has not considered the laches
defense in the context of Cohen, it routinely reviews laches
claims after decisions on the merits, indicating that these
decisions are effectively reviewable on appeal. See, e.g.,
Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imports & Exports, Inc.,
270 F.3d 298 (6th Cir. 2001); City of Wyandotte v. Consol.
Rail Corp., 262 F.3d 581 (6th Cir. 2001). Other courts have
explicitly refused to consider laches claims on an
interlocutory basis. See, e.g., Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway,
286 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2002). In addition, it is well-
settled in this circuit that an order denying a motion to
dismiss on statute of limitations grounds is not immediately
appealable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. United
States v. Pi, 174 F.3d 745, 750-51 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing
United States v. Davis, 873 F.2d 900, 908-09 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 923 (1989)); see also United States v. Weiss,
7 F.3d 1088, 1089-91 (2d Cir. 1993). This Court explained
that “[u]nlike the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy

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No. 02-1846 United States v. Mandycz 7
Clause,” a statute of limitations defense “does not . . .
encompass a ‘right not to be tried’ which must be upheld
prior to trial if it is to be enjoyed at all.” Davis, 873 F.2d at
909 (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 861
(1978)). Because laches is an equitable defense similar to a
statute of limitations, we find the same reasoning applicable.
Therefore, we hold that an order denying a motion to dismiss
or a motion for summary judgment on laches grounds is not
immediately appealable pursuant to the collateral order
doctrine.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court lacks jurisdiction to
consider Mandycz’s interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, the
appeal is DISMISSED.

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