Donald Mannix v. Count Yof Monroe

*The Hono rable Walter Herbert Rice, Chief United States District
Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0390P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 03a0390p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
DONALD MANNIX,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
COUNT Y OF MONROE,
Defendant-Appellant.
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No. 02-1001
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 00-71627—Julian A. Cook, Jr., District Judge.
Submitted: August 7, 2003
Decided and Filed: November 3, 2003
Before: BOGGS, Chief Circuit Judge; SILER, Circuit
Judge; and RICE, Chief District Judge.*
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Rosemary G. Schikora, DYKEMA GOSSETT,
Detroit, Michigan, Daniel J. Stephenson, DYKEMA
2 Mannix v. County of Monroe No. 02-1001
GOSSETT, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellant. Leslie J.
Nearpass, Gerald J. Briskin, Shannon M. Meechan,
NEARPASS & ASSOCIATES, Temperance, Michigan, for
Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
BOGGS, Chief Circuit Judge. The County of Monroe
(“County”) appeals the district court’s denial of its motion for
judgment as a matter of law in the action for discharge
without just cause brought by its former employee, Donald
Mannix. Michigan state law presumes that employment is at
will, Mannix’s employment contract expressly provided for
employment at will, and numerous County policies stated that
employment could be terminated by either party without
cause. However, Mannix claimed that he failed to receive,
read, or understand any of these statements. Instead, because
a County policy he did read set specific levels of discipline
for specific infractions, Mannix argued that he had a
legitimate expectation of just-cause employment. The court
denied the County’s motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim and for summary judgment. A jury rendered a verdict
in favor of Mannix and the district court rejected the County’s
subsequent motion for judgment as a matter of law. We
reverse for several reasons.
I
Mannix accepted an offer of employment as a network
administrator for the County contained in an October 9, 1998
letter. This letter expressly described the position as “an ‘at
will’ non-union position.” Mannix admits reading the letter
and understanding all of its content except the term “at will,”
which was not defined in the letter. The letter recommended
that Mannix contact the County’s Human Resources
Supervisor if he had any questions or concerns, but he did not

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No. 02-1001 Mannix v. County of Monroe 3
do so. Instead, Mannix accepted the offer by signing the
letter and returning it to the County.
When Mannix began work, he received a copy of the
Personnel Policies of Monroe County (“Personnel Policies”),
first enacted in 1977 and most recently amended in 1989.
The Personnel Policies indicated that “[a]pplicants are to
understand that their employment with Monroe County is not
for any definite term and may be terminated at any time with
or without cause and without advance notice.” The Personnel
Policies also provided a list of twenty-three different offenses,
including gambling, wasting time, parking in the wrong spot,
insubordination, and theft, and the resulting discipline ranging
from verbal warnings through discharge. However, the
Personnel Policies contained no explicit statement that
discipline could not be imposed for other infractions.
Furthermore, the Personnel Policies made clear that the
disciplinary “rules and regulations may be changed by the
[County] Board of Commissioners by action taken in
accordance with the Board’s rules of procedure. Employees
will be notified of such changes as they occur.” In addition
to the Personnel Policies, Mannix also received and signed for
a copy of the County Work Rules and Regulations, most
recently amended in 1997. The work rules set out three
groups of offenses of declining severity. Notably, offenses in
the first group were deemed to warrant immediate dismissal,
in contradiction to a three-day waiting period in the Personnel
Policies. Mannix admits to reading both the Personnel
Policies and the work rules.
During the course of Mannix’s employment with the
County, the County Board of Commissioners updated its
employment policies by means of posting to an internal
database. Policy 101, adopted on March 23, 1999, set the
procedures for such updates and stated that “[n]o person or
representative of the [County, except the County Board of
Commissioners] has any authority to enter into any agreement
for employment for any specific period of time, or to make
any agreement contrary to the provision contained herein.”
4 Mannix v. County of Monroe No. 02-1001
Policy 423, adopted on the same day as, and pursuant to,
Policy 101, was entitled “Separation from Employment” and
reiterated that “[e]mployment with the [County] is not for any
definite term and may be terminated at any time with or
without cause and without advance notice.” Policy 423 also
listed specific reasons for termination, but again did not
indicate that this list was exhaustive. As a County
administrator later testified, both policies were posted to the
database in August 1999 and “were put on the computer email
system so that all employees would have access to them at
any time.” Mannix admits that he, as network administrator,
knew about the posting of the new policies, but denies
reading them.
Mannix reported to Jeffrey W. Katke, the Information
Systems Director. Katke in turn reported to Charles Londo,
the County’s Chief Administrative Officer. While working as
a network administrator, Mannix became aware of what he
regarded as financial improprieties involving Katke and
Londo. In particular, Mannix was concerned that a private
company operated by Katke performed work for several local
municipalities, and as a favor to Katke was provided with
County employees to accomplish some of these tasks. On
February 1, 1999, Mannix expressed his concerns about
potential conflicts of interests to several County
commissioners. Thereafter Mannix’s relationship with Londo
and Katke deteriorated. On June 25, Mannix had a private
conversation with Londo in which Londo “use[d] very violent
language” and “wound up telling [Mannix that] if he found
out who was spreading rumors around the county that he
would take them to court and sue them for everything that
they had.” This conversation greatly upset Mannix, who was
worried not only about lawsuits but also about losing his job.
The following week, Mannix began using his privileges as
network administrator to monitor Londo’s email
correspondence with Katke, County commissioners, and
others. One of the letters from Katke to Londo that Mannix
obtained over the following months indicated that Katke
wished to fire Mannix. Mannix printed that letter and showed

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No. 02-1001 Mannix v. County of Monroe 5
1Mannix did not raise any co nstitutional argument, such as those
available against state employers under the Due Process Clause.
it to several County commissioners, which eventually led to
Londo’s discovery that Mannix had been tapping his email.
On January 7, 2000, in a letter signed by Katke, the County
terminated Mannix.
On April 4, 2000, Mannix filed a six-count complaint
against the County, Katke, and Londo in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. In it he
claimed that he had been discharged wrongfully, that he had
been discharged against public policy, that he could recover
under a theory of promissory estoppel, that the defendants had
intentionally inflicted emotional distress on him, that the
defendants had defamed him, and that the defendants had
violated the Michigan Whistleblower’s Protection Act.1 The
federal court had diversity jurisdiction because Mannix was
a citizen of Ohio, all defendants were either citizens of
Michigan or Michigan entities, and the amount in controversy
exceeded the jurisdictional amount. The defendants filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The court granted the motion in
part, dismissing the emotional distress, defamation, and
promissory estoppel claims against all defendants and the
discharge against public policy claim against the County.
The surviving claims were tried to a jury. At the close of
Mannix’s case, the court denied the defendants’ motion for
judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. The
jury returned a verdict for Mannix on the wrongful discharge
claim and for the defendants on all other claims. While the
jury declared all defendants to be liable for the wrongful
discharge, it imposed damages in the amount of $80,000 on
6 Mannix v. County of Monroe No. 02-1001
2The jury appeared to be confused about the legal nature o f Ma nnix’s
claim. In a note to the distric t judge, the jury stated that “it was the lack
of application of the personnel policies that [it] found in violation of the
law.” In gene ral, a violation of perso nnel policies not contractua lly
agreed to, even if proven and related to a discharge, is not actionable. In
cases like the present one the relevant legal question is not whether the
policies were abided by, but whether they created a legitimate expectation
of just-cause em ploym ent.
the County and no damages on Londo and Katke.2 The court
reconciled these apparent inconsistencies by entering
judgment for the full amount in favor of Mannix against the
County and against Mannix with respect to the other
defendants. On November 13, the court denied the County’s
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. Before this
court now is the County’s timely appeal of the denial of this
motion.
II
The County appeals the denial of its post-verdict motion for
judgment as a matter of law. “If during a trial by jury a party
has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally
sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for
that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue
against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a
matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or
defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained
or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). “In federal court diversity cases, this
circuit adheres to the minority rule that state law governs the
standard for granting motions for directed verdicts and
judgments notwithstanding the verdict.” J.C. Wyckoff &
Assoc. v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 936 F.2d 1474, 1482 (6th
Cir. 1991) (citing Fitzgerald v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 842 F.2d
157, 159 (6th Cir. 1988), and Lewis Refrigeration Co. v.
Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable & Cold Storage Co., 709 F.2d 427,
430 n.3 (6th Cir. 1983)); cf. Orth v. Emerson Elec. Co., 980
F.2d 632, 635 (10th Cir. 1992) (federal law governs standard

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No. 02-1001 Mannix v. County of Monroe 7
for granting of j.n.o.v., even in diversity cases);Miles v. Tenn.
River Pulp & Paper Co., 862 F.2d 1525, 1527-28 (11th Cir.
1989) (same); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 585
F.2d 1289, 1292 (5th Cir. 1978) (same). In Michigan courts,
“[t]he standard of review for judgments notwithstanding the
verdict requires review of the evidence and all legitimate
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.” Orzel v. Scott Drug Co., 537 N.W.2d 208, 212 (Mich.
1995). “Only if the evidence so viewed fails to establish a
claim as a matter of law, should a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict be granted.” Ibid. Hence, we
review the denial of judgment as a matter of law under a
standard akin to the federal summary judgment standard.
Under Michigan law, employment contracts without
“distinguishing features or provisions” are “terminable at the
will of either party.” Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 273 N.W.
315, 316 (Mich. 1937). This rule remains the default
principle. “It is black letter law in Michigan that when an
employment agreement is silent regarding the type of
employment relationship, at-will employment, not just-cause
employment, is presumed.” Franzel v. Kerr Mfg. Co., 600
N.W.2d 66, 73 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Rowe v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 473 N.W.2d 268, 276 (Mich.
1991)). However, in Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980), the Michigan
Supreme Court established a significant exception to this rule.
See Brocklehurst v. PPG Indus., 836 F. Supp. 1354, 1359
(E.D. Mich. 1993) (recognizing modification of Lynas by
Toussaint). The Toussaint court held that “a provision of an
employment contract providing that an employee shall not be
discharged except for cause is legally enforceable . . . [and
that] such a provision may become part of the contract either
by express agreement, oral or written, or as a result of an
employee’s legitimate expectations grounded in an
employer’s policy statements.” 292 N.W.2d at 885.
Toussaint establishes two separate theories on which just-
cause employment may be found. The express-contract
theory “is grounded solely on contract principles relative to
8 Mannix v. County of Monroe No. 02-1001
the employment setting.” Rood v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 507
N.W.2d 591, 598 (Mich. 1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The legitimate-expectations theory “is grounded
solely on public policy considerations” and “was founded on
the [Michigan Supreme] Court’s common-law authority to
recognize enforceable obligations that arise outside the
operation of normal contract principles.” Ibid. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Such a claim, if successful, creates
a contractual provision implied in law. Lytle v. Malady, 579
N.W.2d 906, 911 (Mich. 1998).
Mannix was discharged by the County. As the County does
not here make the argument that the verdict must be
overturned because it had just cause, the wrongful-discharge
verdict must be affirmed unless Mannix was an at-will
employee. As at-will employment is the default rule under
Michigan law and there is no evidence of an express
provision creating a just-cause employment relationship, the
sole remaining question before this court is whether the
County’s statements created in Mannix a legitimate
expectation of just-cause employment. Toussaint, 292
N.W.2d at 885.
Initially we note that Mannix entered an express at-will
employment relationship with the County. The letter offering
employment so provided and became a binding contract when
Mannix accepted by signing it. Mannix replies that the
question whether he understood the term “at will” as used in
the contract was a jury issue. While this may have been a
genuine issue, it was not a material issue. Absent
circumstances not present here, Mannix was bound by the at-
will language regardless of whether he knew its legal
meaning. “One who signs a contract cannot seek to avoid it
on the basis that he did not read it or that he supposed that it
was different in its terms.” Nieves v. Bell Indus., 517 N.W.2d
235, 238 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994). The employee “had an
obligation to seek assistance before she signed if she felt she
did not understand the application.” Reid v. Sears, Roebuck

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No. 02-1001 Mannix v. County of Monroe 9
& Co., 790 F.2d 453, 461 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Sponseller
v. Kimball, 224 N.W. 359 (Mich. 1929)).
Mannix cites no precedent, nor have we discovered any,
that an expressly at-will employment relationship may be
turned into a just-cause relationship by no more than a
legitimate expectation on the part of the employee. In all
cases where courts have found a Toussaint just-cause
relationship created by legitimate expectations, the initial
employment contract was silent on the question of whether it
could be terminated at will. The Toussaint court repeatedly
recognized that express at-will contracts would not be
affected by its holding. “Employers are most assuredly free
to enter into employment contracts terminable at will without
assigning cause.” Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 890. “Where the
employer has not agreed to job security, it can protect itself
by entering into a written contract which explicitly provides
that the employee serves at the pleasure or at the will of the
employer or as long as his services are satisfactory to the
employer.” Id. at 891 n.24. “[N]o employer is obliged to
enter into . . . a contract [requiring cause for discharge].” Id.
at 896-97. Later courts interpreting Toussaint reached the
same conclusion. “The ‘implied contract’ theory of Toussaint
may not be relied upon in Michigan when there is an express
contract covering the same subject matter.” Bracco v. Mich.
Tech. Univ., 588 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998)
(citing Scholz v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 468 N.W.2d 845
(Mich. 1991), and Wallace v. Recorder’s Court, 525 N.W.2d
481 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994)). “It is well settled in Michigan
that there cannot be an implied contract covering the same
subject as an express one.” Reid, 790 F.2d at 462 (citing
Steele v. Cold Heading Co., 336 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. Ct. App.
1983), and In re DeHaan’s Estate, 134 N.W. 983 (Mich.
1912)). “Toussaint held that employers can avoid
misunderstanding over the term of employment by requiring
prospective employees to acknowledge that they serve[] at the
will or pleasure of the company.” Reid, 790 F.2d at 462
(internal citations omitted). Obtaining such an
acknowledgment is “all that was required to create contracts
10 Mannix v. County of Monroe No. 02-1001
3Novak is not to the contrary, because the court there found it
necessary to inquire into the contra ctual limitation on modification
because the plaintiff argued that there had been an express novation by
oral agreem ent.
for employment at will.” Ibid. “When an employment
contract expressly provides for employment at will, a
plaintiff, by signing the contract, assents to employment at
will and cannot maintain an action based on a prior oral
agreement for just-cause employment.” Nieves, 517 N.W.2d
at 238 (emphasis added); accord Novak v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 599 N.W.2d 546, 550 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
Mannix counters this conclusion by contending that his
receipt of the Personnel Policies constituted a novation of the
employment contract. Mannix rightly notes that his
employment contract did not contain an integration clause or
any language indicating that it could not be modified. Cf.
Novak, 599 N.W.2d at 550 (rejecting discharged employee’s
claim that defendant had orally modified the express at-will
provision of the employment contract which “contained a
provision requiring that modifications of the contract be in
writing and be signed by a company representative”). Under
these circumstances, Mannix and the County could have
agreed to replace their express at-will employment contract
with an express just-cause contract. However, the novation
of a contract must meet the same formal requirements as a
new contract. See Univ. Leaseway Sys. v. Herrud & Co., 115
N.W.2d 294, 297 (Mich. 1962). Mannix does not even
contend that the receipt of the Personnel Policies satisfies the
general requirements of contract formation. Instead, Mannix
solely argues the issue of legitimate-expectations. But, as
Toussaint taught, legitimate expectations may only imply a
just-cause clause in an express contract otherwise silent on the
issue. Such expectations cannot themselves establish an
express contract, or novate one.3 To hold otherwise would
reverse the holding not only of Toussaint but most of its

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No. 02-1001 Mannix v. County of Monroe 11
progeny. Therefore, Mannix’s claim can be rejected without
further inquiry.
But even if Mannix’s employment contract had been silent
on the question whether it created an at-will relationship,
there still would not have been a just-cause contract under the
Toussaint legitimate-expectations test, because the Personnel
Policies did not create any such expectations. In general, a
jury can find the existence of a legitimate expectation based
on the “employer’s written policy statements set forth in the
manual of personnel policies.” Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at
885. Where the plaintiff argues a legitimate-expectations
theory, the trial court should only allow the case to proceed if
the “policies are reasonably capable of being interpreted as
promises of just-cause employment.” Rood, 507 N.W.2d at
606; see also Nieves, 517 N.W.2d at 238. A “contract to
discharge only for cause may not be based on ‘a mere
subjective expectancy.’” Reid, 790 F.2d at 460 (citing
Schwartz v. Mich. Sugar Co., 308 N.W.2d 459 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1981)); accord Nieves, 517 N.W.2d at 238.
Here, Mannix argues that the list of specific offenses and
associated levels of discipline in the Personnel Policies
created a legitimate expectation of just-cause employment.
See Murphy v. Birchtree Dental, 964 F. Supp. 245, 248 (E.D.
Mich. 1997) (“Even if the policy statement does not contain
an express just cause statement, it can create legitimate
expectations if it sets forth disciplinary procedures and
sanctions and does not retain the right to discharge at will.”).
However, while a “a specific list of disciplinary violations
and the penalties for each along with an optional grievance
procedure” may help establish a legitimate expectation of
just-cause employment, see Rood, 507 N.W.2d at 607 (citing
Renny v. Port Huron Hosp., 398 N.W.2d 327 (Mich. 1986)),
it is not by itself sufficient to create such an expectation. See
Rood, 507 N.W.2d at 608 (“A nonexclusive list of
common-sense rules of behavior that can lead to disciplinary
action or discharge . . . clearly reserves the right of an
employer to discharge an employee at will.”); Biggs v. Hilton
12 Mannix v. County of Monroe No. 02-1001
Hotel Corp., 486 N.W.2d 61, 62 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992)
(“Plaintiff’s reliance in this case on the disciplinary scheme
established in the employment manual does not establish a
promise of termination for just cause only. Nothing in the
employment manual states that an employee would not be
terminated except for one of the reasons listed in the
disciplinary section.”); Ozuruigbo v. Ogden Martin Sys., 173
F.3d 429, 1999 WL 96849, at *3 (6th Cir. 1999) (table).
“Neither the adoption of systematic procedures for dealing
with employees nor the creation of disciplinary guidelines
transforms an at-will relationship into one prohibiting
discharge except for just-cause.” Mitchell v. White Castle
Sys., 86 F.2d 1156, 1996 WL 279863, at *5 (6th Cir. 1996)
(table). “If such documents were sufficient, no employer
could ever establish policies informing its employees of
reasons why they could be fired without creating a
‘just-cause’ labor force.” Ibid.
This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the same
Personnel Policies explicitly stated that all County
employment was terminable at-will by either party. See Reid,
790 F.2d at 460 (“[T]he listing of causes that ‘may result in
the termination of your employment’ in the [employer’s]
handbook [did not] detract[] in any way from the language in
the application [stating that employees agreed that
employment and compensation could be terminated with or
without cause at option of employer] or provide[] a
reasonable basis for the conclusion that the plaintiffs were
employed under a ‘for cause’ contract.”). See also Lytle, 579
N.W.2d at 913 (holding “that provisions in a handbook will
not create enforceable rights when the handbook expressly
states that such provisions are not intended to create an
employment contract” (citing Heurtebise v. Reliable Bus.
Computers, 550 N.W.2d 243 (Mich. 1996))). Therefore, there
was no legitimate expectation of just-cause employment, and
hence no just-cause clause implied-in-law under Toussaint.
Mannix attempts to distinguish these binding precedents on
the basis that the Personnel Policies failed to state that they

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No. 02-1001 Mannix v. County of Monroe 13
did not imply a just-cause employment relationship. But the
Personnel Policies go further than the materials considered in
our precedents. The Personnel Policies do not merely
disclaim an implication of just-cause employment; they
expressly state that employment was terminable at will. In
law, no document taken as a whole can be construed to imply
what it expressly disavows. Mannix also points to the fact
that the Personnel Policies merely state that employment may
be “terminated at any time with or without cause and without
advance notice,” without using the words “at will.”
Considering the considerable effort that Mannix expended in
an attempt to demonstrate that he did not know what “at will”
meant, it is difficult to see what the inclusion of that phrase
would have accomplished.
Finally, even if Mannix’s employment contract had not
expressly created an at-will relationship and the Personnel
Policies had not failed to give rise to a legitimate expectation
of just-cause employment, Mannix still could not prevail
because the County amended its employment policies before
his discharge. “[A] company’s written policy statements,
which created legitimate expectations in the employee of
discharge for cause only, [can] be unilaterally modified by the
employer.” Rowe, 473 N.W.2d at 277 (citing In re Certified
Question, 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. 1989)). “To effectively
add [the at-will] provision and bind employees to this specific
just-cause disclaimer . . . , the employer needed to give
reasonable notice to all affected employees.” Lytle, 579
N.W.2d at 912.
Distribution of a new employee handbook constitutes
reasonable notice, regardless of whether the affected
employee actually reads it. See Rowe, 473 N.W.2d at 276
(holding that “that plaintiff cannot maintain an action for
breach of contract on the basis of the disciplinary guidelines
because the last handbook which plaintiff received clearly set
forth an employment-at-will policy”). We most recently
addressed the question of whether electronic posting of an
14 Mannix v. County of Monroe No. 02-1001
updated manual constitutes reasonable notice in Highstone v.
Westin Engineering, 187 F.3d 548, 552-53 (6th Cir. 1999):
During Highstone’s employment Westin revised its
manual . . . . The revisions to the manual were . . .
published on-line . . . one month before Westin
terminated Highstone. At that time, Westin sent an
e-mail message to all employees advising them of the
changes. Notice was also given during staff meetings,
which employees often attend. . . . The record shows that
Westin sent two e-mails notifying its employees of
changes to the policy manual and published the manual
on-line so all employees could have easy access to the
manual. Westin satisfied its burden by reasonably
notifying affected employees of the changes to the
manual.
We reach the same conclusion here. The County revised its
policies more than nine months before Mannix’s termination
and posted the revised version at least four months before the
termination. These revised policies made clear that County
employees could be terminated with or without cause or
notice. These revised policies were posted on an internal
database available to employees. To spread the word of the
revised policies, the County held meetings between
department heads and employees and put the policies on the
County’s email system. This was reasonable notice.
Mannix responds that he never received actual notice of the
revised policies. Under the electronic distribution system, in
contrast to the older hard copy distribution of revised policies,
no proof of actual receipt was collected. While Mannix, as
network administrator, was aware of the existence of the
revised policies, he claims not to have read them. This,
Mannix argues, creates a genuine issue of fact whether he
received actual notice properly to be resolved by the jury and
not judges. However, actual notice to Mannix, while
arguably a genuine issue, is not material. The material issue
is reasonable notice to the workforce in general because a

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No. 02-1001 Mannix v. County of Monroe 15
“claim based on legitimate expectations rests on the
employer’s promises to the work force in general rather than
to an individual employee.” Nieves, 517 N.W.2d at 238
(citing In re Certified Question). Uncontradicted evidence
establishes that the County did provide reasonable notice, in
that it undertook steps reasonably calculated to reach the
affected employees. Considering the advancement and
ubiquity of electronic corporate communications, we will not
induce a return to older practices by imposing a paper receipt
requirement.
III
Given the express contract, the lack of legitimate
expectation of just-cause employment, and the amendment to
the employment policy once again disclaiming just-cause
employment, “[i]t is difficult to imagine what more the
defendant might have done to make it crystal clear to [the
plaintiff] that . . . employees are employees ‘at will’ who may
be discharged with or without cause.” Dell v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 811 F.2d 970, 974 (6th Cir. 1987). Therefore,
we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and direct the
district court to DISMISS the underlying action.

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