Stamtec, Inc. v. Anson Stamping Company, LLC

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0358P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 03a0358p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
STAMTEC, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee,
v.
ANSON STAMPING COMPANY,
LLC,
Defendant-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant.
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Nos. 01-6541/6582
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
No. 98-00308—William J. Haynes, Jr., District Judge.
Argued: July 31, 2003
Decided and Filed: October 7, 2003
Before: KENNEDY, GILMAN, and GIBBONS, Circuit
Judges.
2 Stamtec, Inc. v.
Anson Stamping Co.
Nos. 01-6541/6582
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Winston S. Evans, EVANS, JONES &
REYNOLDS, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Kenneth
L. Sales, SALES, TILLMAN & WALLBAUM, Louisville,
Kentucky, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Winston S. Evans,
EVANS, JONES & REYNOLDS, Nashville, Tennessee, for
Appellant. Kenneth L. Sales, SALES, TILLMAN &
WALLBAUM, Louisville, Kentucky, Michael G. Mason,
NEAL & HARWELL, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
KENNEDY, Circuit Judge. This case presents an appeal
and a cross-appeal from the district court’s order granting
partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellant and
Cross-Appellee Stamtec, Inc. Stamtec argues that the district
court erred when it failed to include various payments made
to a third party as an element of Stamtec’s total damage award
and when it failed to award prejudgment interest on the
damages award. Stamtec also argues that the district court
abused its discretion when it failed to enter a default judgment
against Anson Stamping Company (ASCO). Defendant-
Appellee and Cross-Appellant ASCO argues that the district
court erred when it determined that the issue of Stamtec’s lost
profits did not present a genuine issue of material fact that
precluded summary judgment and awarded Stamtec damages
for estimated delivery costs. We REVERSE in part,
AFFIRM in part, and REMAND in part.

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Nos. 01-6541/6582 Stamtec, Inc. v.
Anson Stamping Co.
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I.
ASCO is engaged in the manufacture of stamped metal
products. Stamtec is engaged in the sale, service, and
engineering of large-scale mechanical presses for industrial
applications. Chin Fong Machine Industrial Co. (Chin Fong)
is a manufacturer of large-scale presses. Stamtec is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Chin Fong.
On April 8, 1996, Stamtec prepared a proposal for the sale
of a mechanical press to ASCO for $1,989,000. Stamtec’s
proposal included the following payment terms: (1) thirty
percent payment with the purchase order; (2) thirty percent
payment upon sign off at manufacturer; (3) thirty percent
payment upon delivery; and (4) ten percent payment upon the
completion of press installation. On April 25, 1996, ASCO
placed purchase orders for two presses. The ASCO purchase
orders included the following revisions to Stamtec’s sales
proposal: (1) minor changes in the press specifications; (2) a
reduction in the purchase price to $1,900,000; (3) a change in
the delivery location; and (4) a reduction in the down
payment from $570,000 to $200,000 per press. ASCO did
not make the required down payment at the time it placed its
order. Though Stamtec never waived the down payment
requirement, it acted on ASCO’s purchase orders.
Stamtec entered into a contract with Chin Fong on April 26,
1996. Chin Fong immediately commenced production of the
presses, which were to be specially manufactured for ASCO.
The Stamtec-Chin Fong contract provided that Chin Fong
would sell Stamtec the presses for $1,600,000 each, or a total
of $3,200,000. Stamtec did not make a down payment to
Chin Fong presumably because it had not received a down
payment from ASCO.
On August 30, 1996, Chin Fong notified ASCO that it
would discontinue manufacturing the presses until and unless
a down payment was made. At the time, Chin Fong had
4 Stamtec, Inc. v.
Anson Stamping Co.
Nos. 01-6541/6582
substantially completed one press and had begun work on the
second press.
On October 18, 1996, Chin Fong advised Stamtec that
Stamtec would be charged interest and held responsible for
any losses if ASCO cancelled its order. Chin Fong further
demanded that Stamtec pay a non-refundable $100,000
deposit to Chin Fong, which was to be applied to the purchase
price of the first ASCO press. On December 10, 1996,
Stamtec paid Chin Fong $80,000 toward the deposit and paid
the $20,000 balance on January 3, 1997.
On or about January 9, 1997, Chin Fong issued its first
invoice to Stamtec demanding full payment for the first press
($1,600,000) and partial payment for the second press
($640,000 based on forty percent completion). Stamtec did
not make any payment.
On November 30, 1997, Chin Fong invoiced Stamtec
$213,996 for interest charges on the cancelled orders and
$560,000 in storage fees. Stamtec paid the1997 storage fees
on January 23, 1998 and the 1997 interest charge on March 2,
1999. On December 31, 1998, Chin Fong invoiced Stamtec
$213,996 in interest charges and $240,000 in storage fees that
accrued during 1998. Stamtec paid Chin Fong’s interest and
storage fee invoices. Stamtec paid the 1998 storage fee on
March 2, 1999 and the 1998 interest charge on May 20, 1999.
In October 1998, Stamtec received an order for two presses
from Precision Machine & Tool. Stamtec contracted with
Chin Fong to manufacture the presses. Chin Fong was able
to use many, but not all, of the parts that had been fabricated
for the ASCO presses. Chin Fong then forgave Stamtec’s
obligation to pay the purchase price for the ASCO presses
and, instead, required Stamtec to pay a $272,000 salvage loss
charge. Chin Fong invoiced Stamtec a $272,000 salvage loss
charge on November 10, 1999, and Stamtec paid the charge
on March 17, 2000.

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Nos. 01-6541/6582 Stamtec, Inc. v.
Anson Stamping Co.
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1ASC O’s notice of appeal, filed December 7, 2001, included an
appeal of the district court’s Decemb er 18, 1998 o rder, as we ll as the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, on the issue of contract
liability. ASCO did not file any written o bjection to the magistrate’s
finding of contra ct liability and, therefore, is barred from raising that issue
on ap peal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
On December 18, 1998, the district court granted summary
judgment on the issue of liability in favor of Stamtec,
adopting the magistrate judge’s finding that the parties’
conduct subsequent to April 25, 1996 evidenced their intent
to be bound by the reasonably certain terms of Stamtec’s sales
proposal and ASCO’s purchase orders. Neither party
objected to the magistrate judge’s finding of contract liability.
On August 23, 2001, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Stamtec on the issue of damages. The
parties timely appealed the district court’s order regarding
Stamtec’s damages.1 The district court did not determine the
date of ASCO’s breach and the parties dispute the date that
the breach occurred.
II.
The district court’s disposition of a summary judgment
motion is reviewed de novo. Hunter v. Caliber Sys., Inc., 220
F.3d 702, 709 (6th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is
appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those facts
defined by the substantive law and that are necessary to apply
it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
While a court must draw all inferences in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party, it may grant summary
judgment if the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for that party. Matusushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
6 Stamtec, Inc. v.
Anson Stamping Co.
Nos. 01-6541/6582
A.
ASCO argues that the district court’s determination that
Stamtec was entitled to $264,880 in damages due to lost
profits resulting from ASCO’s breach was error because the
district court did not make any findings as to whether Stamtec
actually experienced any lost profits. ASCO further argues
that the lost profits figure is hypothetical and, therefore,
presents a genuine issue of material fact that precludes
summary judgment. The following facts are not in dispute:
ASCO contracted with Stamtec to deliver two presses F.O.B.
Louisville for $3.8 million ($1.9 million per press). Stamtec
placed a purchase order with Chin Fong for the manufacture
of the two presses according to Stamtec’s specifications for
$3.2 million ($1.6 million per press). The fee paid to Chin
Fong did not include any delivery costs; Stamtec bore
responsibility for shipping the presses from Taiwan to
Louisville. The $600,000 difference between Stamtec’s
contract with Chin Fong and its contract with ASCO included
$264,880 in expected profit and $335,120 in expected
delivery, installation and warranty costs. In light in of these
uncontested facts, the amount of Stamtec’s lost profits does
not pose a genuine issue of material fact that precludes
summary judgment and the district court was not required to
make any specific findings with respect to Stamtec’s actual
losses. Consequently, we affirm the district court’s award of
$264,880 in lost profits.
B.
ASCO argues that the district court erred when it
determined that Stamtec’s $335,120 estimated delivery costs
qualified as overhead and could be awarded as damages under
Tennessee Code § 47-2-708(2). Stamtec concedes that the
estimated delivery costs are not overhead expenses and that
the expenses should not have been awarded as damages under
§ 47-2-708(2). The district court held that Stamtec was
entitled to the estimated delivery costs as overhead under the

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2The district court applied the damages measure provided in § 47-2-
708(2) because it found that Stamtec acted as a jobber in this transaction,
citing Ellis. The parties do not dispute that Stam tec meets the Ellis test
for a jobber.
rule established in Mid-South Materials Co. v. Ellis, 1988 WL
23914 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 1988).2 The Ellis court
interpreted the meaning of profit under Tennessee Code
Annotated § 47-2-708(2) when the non-breaching party is a
seller acting as a jobber. Section 47-2-708(2) states:
If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is
inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as
performance would have done then the measure of
damages is the profit (including reasonable overhead)
which the seller would have made from full performance
by the buyer, together with incidental damages provided
in this chapter (§ 47-2-710), due allowance for costs
reasonably incurred and due credit for payments or
proceeds of resale.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-708 (2003).
The Ellis court concluded that the section intended “to
compensate the seller for losses incurred and gains prevented
in excess of savings made possible by the breach.” Id. at *3.
“In the case of a middleman or a jobber where there is no cost
of delivery that measure usually equals what we call gross
profits: the jobber’s mark-up, or, in the case of a middleman,
the contract price less the middleman’s costs of acquiring the
goods.” Id. Further, the court held that overhead savings are
not deducted under § 47-2-708(2). Id. The Ellis court
awarded the seller “the difference between the contract price
and the cost to the seller of acquiring the goods ‘F.O.B.
jobsite.’” Id. Thus, in Ellis, the measure of the seller’s lost
profits was not adjusted to reflect the seller’s saved delivery
8 Stamtec, Inc. v.
Anson Stamping Co.
Nos. 01-6541/6582
costs because the manufacturer, not the seller, was
responsible for the cost of delivering the goods to the buyer.
The district court erred by not deducting for Stamtec’s
saved delivery costs from the measure of Stamtec’s lost
profits. Ellis makes clear that where there is no delivery cost,
a jobber’s measure of damages under § 47-2-708(2) is gross
profits, without any reduction for saved overhead. But where
a jobber’s contract price includes saved delivery costs, the
measure of damages under § 47-2-708(2) is gross profits (no
reduction for overhead) less the saved delivery cost. Thus,
under Ellis, the measure of Stamtec’s damages under § 47-2-
708(2) is the contract price ($3.9 million) less Stamtec’s cost
of acquiring the presses ($3.2 million) less the saved delivery
costs ($335,120), or $264,880. Consequently, we reverse the
district court’s award of delivery costs as an element of
Stamtec’s measure of lost profits.
Stamtec next argues that the district court erred when it
refused to include the $100,000 deposit and $272,000 salvage
loss charge paid to Chin Fong as “costs reasonably incurred”
under § 47-2-708(2) or, in the alternative, as an element of
incidental damages under § 47-2-710. The district court
determined that the deposit was a transaction-specific
payment and, as such, did not qualify as a recoverable
overhead expense. The district court determined that the
salvage loss charge fell within the definition of consequential
damages, which are not recoverable by a seller. ASCO
contends that the district court properly excluded these costs
as consequential damages. ASCO does not contend that it
was commercially unreasonable for Stamtec to pay the
charges.
Though a deposit paid by a jobber to a manufacturer may
be recovered as a cost reasonably incurred, Stamtec’s
payment of the $100,000 deposit was commercially
unreasonable. Under the “due allowance for costs reasonably
incurred” provision of § 47-2-708(2), those costs reasonably

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Nos. 01-6541/6582 Stamtec, Inc. v.
Anson Stamping Co.
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incurred by a seller or jobber prior to the buyer’s breach, such
as a jobber’s payment of a non-refundable deposit to a
manufacturer, are recoverable. Giantonio’s Pastry Shop v.
Champagne & Co., Inc., 1986 WL 3704, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
Mar. 25, 1986) (holding that a jobber is entitled to recover
non-refundable deposit paid to manufacturer as cost
reasonably incurred prior to buyer’s breach under R.C.
1302.82(B), the Ohio version of Tennessee Code § 47-2-
708(2)). Stamtec’s conduct, however, was not commercially
reasonable. Stamtec’s payment consumed a large proportion
(almost forty percent) of the profit it expected to earn on its
contract with ASCO. Stamtec’s payment of the deposit was
commercially unreasonable for several reasons. First, when
Stamtec paid the deposit for the first ASCO press in
December 1996 and January 1997, the press was substantially
complete. At that time, ASCO had not only breached the
contract downpayment term but had arguably breached the
contract term that required ASCO to inspect the completed
press and make an additional payment against the purchase
price. Given ASCO’s failure to meet any of its obligations
under the contract, it was commercially unreasonable for
Stamtec to advance nearly forty percent of its expected profits
from the ASCO contract. Stamtec’s conduct did nothing to
preserve its position relative to the measure of its lost profits
owed as damages; rather it inflated ASCO’s potential
damages liability by almost forty percent. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s refusal to include the $100,000
deposit as an element of Stamtec’s damages because the cost
was not reasonably incurred.
Next, Stamtec argues that the $272,000 salvage loss charge
assessed by Chin Fong in March 2000 is recoverable as a
“cost reasonably incurred” under § 47-2-708(2) or, in the
alternative, an element of incidental damages under § 47-2-
710. The district court refused to award Stamtec recovery on
the ground that the salvage loss payment constituted
consequential damages, which are not available to an
aggrieved seller. ASCO, again, contends that the district
10 Stamtec, Inc. v.
Anson Stamping Co.
Nos. 01-6541/6582
3Though the parties dispute the exact date of ASCO ’s breach, the
salvage loss charge was levied at a point in time when the parties do not
dispute that ASCO was in breach.
court properly excluded these costs as consequential damages.
ASCO does not contend that the charges were commercially
unreasonable.
The $272,000 salvage loss charge is not recoverable under
§ 47-2-708(2) as a cost reasonably incurred because the
charge occurred after ASCO’s breach.3 Nor may the charge
be recoverable as an element of incidental damages.
Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-2-710 states:
Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller include any
commercially reasonable charges, expenses, or
commissions incurred in stopping delivery, in the
transportation, care and custody of goods after the
buyer’s breach, in connection with the return or resale of
the goods or otherwise resulting from the breach.
TENN. CODE ANN. 47-2-710 (2003).
Although the record is not totally clear on this matter, it
appears Chin Fong presumably imposed the salvage-loss
charge on Stamtec because Stamtec breached its contract with
Chin Fong. All parties agree that ASCO was not a party to
the Stamtec-Chin Fong contract, and the Stamtec-Chin Fong
contract did not expressly incorporate the Stamtec-ASCO
contract. ASCO’s breach of its contract with Stamtec was
therefore neither necessary nor sufficient for Stamtec to
breach its contract with Chin Fong. As a practical matter, of
course, Stamtec breached its contract with Chin Fong because
ASCO would not fulfill its payment obligations to Stamtec.
But that means that the salvage-loss charge imposed by Chin
Fong on Stamtec was a consequence of ASCO’s breach,
rather than a direct result of ASCO’s breach. Regardless of

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Anson Stamping Co.
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4As discussed above, costs incurred prior to a breach may be
recoverab le as costs reasonably incurred under § 47-2 -708 (2), while costs
incurred following a breach may be recoverable as incidental damages
under § 47-2-710.
5The only evidence with respect to the reasonableness of the amount
of the storage charge was testimony given by Don Chi, who served at the
time as both an officer of Stamtec and an officer of Chin Fong.
the date of ASCO’s breach, therefore, the salvage-loss charge
is an element of consequential, not incidental, damages.
Firwood Mfg. Co. v. Gen. Tire, Inc., 96 F.3d 163, 169-71 (6th
Cir. 1996) (distinguishing between incidental and
consequential damages under the Uniform Commercial Code,
as adopted by Michigan.) Thus, we affirm the district court’s
refusal to permit Stamtec to recover the salvage cost as an
element of incidental damages.
Finally, Stamtec argues that the district court erred when it
refused to include the $800,000 storage charge paid to Chin
Fong as an element of its incidental damages under § 47-2-
710. Stamtec paid Chin Fong a total of $800,000 in storage
charges; a $560,000 storage charge was assessed for the
period from November 1, 1996 through December 31, 1997
and a $240,000 storage charge was assessed for the period
from January 1, 1998 through December 31, 1998. Though
the district court found that storage charges may be
recoverable as incidental damages, the court denied recovery
because it found that Stamtec had failed to prove the storage
cost losses with reasonable certainty. While we find that the
district court erred in treating the total amount of storage
charges as incidental damages,4 we agree with the district
court that Stamtec cannot recover any of its storage costs
because it failed to prove the commercial reasonableness of
the amount.5 Nashland Assocs. v. Shumate, 730 S.W.2d 332,
334 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that Tennessee law does
not permit the recovery of speculative or uncertain damages).
12 Stamtec, Inc. v.
Anson Stamping Co.
Nos. 01-6541/6582
C.
Stamtec argues that it is entitled to recover prejudgment
interest as an element of its damages arising from ASCO’s
breach. First, Stamtec argues the $427,992 interest charge
payments made to Chin Fong are recoverable as an element
of incidental damages under § 47-2-710. Second, Stamtec
argues that it is entitled to recover interest based on the one
percent penalty term Stamtec claims was included in its
contract with ASCO. In the alternative, Stamtec argues that
it is entitled to interest based on its lost use of money under
§ 47-2-710. The district court refused to permit Stamtec to
recover either the Chin Fong interest charges or interest based
on its loss use of money under § 47-2-710 because the court
concluded that such interest costs are consequential damages
that are not available to an aggrieved seller, citing Firwood
Mfg. Co., 96 F.3d at 169. The district court also refused to
permit Stamtec to recover interest under the one percent
penalty term because that term was not a part of the parties’
contract.
As an initial matter, the district court’s finding that the
penalty term was not a part of the Stamtec-ASCO contract is
supported by the record. Stamtec’s vice president testified
“he was not sure the page of the contract dealing with that
subject was included in ASCO’s copy of the contract nor was
the item billed to defendant before the action was filed.
Nor did the district court err when it concluded that Stamtec
could not recover either the interest charges paid to Chin
Fong or interest based on its lost use of money because these
costs are consequential damages, which are not available to
an aggrieved seller. Like the district court, we find the
reasoning in Firwood persuasive. The Firwood court
considered whether an aggrieved seller could collect the cost
of its lost use of money (interest) as an element of its
incidental damages. The Firwood court began by noting that
the Uniform Commercial Code entitles sellers to collect

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incidental, but not consequential damages. Id. at 169.
Focusing on the issue of how Michigan had defined incidental
damages, the court found that Michigan courts had not
permitted an aggrieved seller to collect interest payments on
a loan secured to maintain a business after a buyer’s breach
on the ground that such interest payments fell within the
definition of consequential damages. Id. at 170. Because the
Michigan courts had not addressed the specific issue of
incidental damages arising from the lost use of money, the
Firwood court considered the competing positions taken by
the Seventh and Second Circuits. In doing so, the Firwood
court looked to the general structure of the Uniform
Commercial Code for guidance. The Firwood court “agree[d]
with the Seventh Circuit’s view that sellers are not entitled to
[lost use of money] as an element of the damage award”
because “a foregone profit from exploiting a valuable
opportunity that the breach of contract denied to the victim of
the breach fits more comfortably under the heading of
consequential damages than of incidental damages.” Id. at
171 (quoting Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps,
S.A., 772 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1985)). The Firwood court
“decline[d] to follow the Second Circuit’s embrace of an
expansive definition of incidental damages because “[that]
Court appeared to conflate the definition of consequential
damages with that of incidental damages” when it determined
that recovery depended on whether the interest payments were
foreseeable, an element of the test for consequential damages.
Id. at 170 n.2. Thus, it was the considered opinion of the
Firwood court that the general structure of the Uniform
Commercial Code precluded the award of interest, whether
claimed as charges arising from a bank loan or the buyer’s
lost use of money, as incidental damages because such costs
fell outside the immediate buyer-seller transaction.
We believe that the Firwood court was correct in its
analysis of recoverability of interest costs as an element of
incidental damages. We do not see a meaningful distinction
between costs incurred due to the lost use of money and
14 Stamtec, Inc. v.
Anson Stamping Co.
Nos. 01-6541/6582
interest paid on a commercial loan. Each involves a financial
transaction that falls outside the immediate scope of the
buyer-seller transaction at issue: the first involves a bank
transaction necessary to maintain an entity’s financial
viability and the second involves a transaction with an
unspecified party that would produce uncertain results. Thus,
we conclude that the Tennessee Uniform Commercial Code,
which adopted the relevant Uniform Commercial Code
provisions without modification, does not permit a seller’s
claim for damages based on either lost use of money or
interest paid to a third party (which is analogous to interest
paid on a commercial loan) because these costs represent
consequential damages. Given that a seller is not entitled to
consequential damages, and the Commercial Code portion of
the Tennessee law precludes the award of consequential
damages except as specifically provided by statute, TENN.
CODE ANN. § 47-1-106(1), Stamtec cannot recover the
interest-charge payments made to Chin Fong nor the cost of
its lost use of money as an element of incidental damages
under § 47-2-710.
Prejudgment interest may, however, be awarded under
Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-14-123, which provides, in
relevant part,
Prejudgment interest, i.e., interest as an element of, or in
the nature of, damages, as permitted by the statutory and
common laws of the state as of April 1, 1979, may be
awarded by courts or juries in accordance with the
principles of equity at any rate not in excess of a
maximum effective rate of ten percent (10%) per
annum. . . . In addition, contracts may expressly provide
for the imposition of the same or a different rate of
interest to be paid after breach or default within the limits
set by § 47-14-123.
TENN. CODE ANN. 47-14-123 (2003). Section 47-14-123
permits an aggrieved seller’s damage award to include an

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Anson Stamping Co.
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amount for prejudgment interest as a matter of equity, rather
than as a form of incidental damages.
Stamtec argues that it is entitled to prejudgment interest
under § 47-14-123 because fairness requires a plaintiff to be
fully compensated by a defendant for losses incurred,
including the lost of use of money. The Tennessee Supreme
Court has held that, under § 47-12-123, “the court must
decide whether the award of prejudgment interest is fair,
given the particular circumstances of the case.” Myint v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 920, 927 (Tenn. 1998). In
reaching an equitable decision, “a court must keep in mind
that the purpose of awarding the interest is to fully
compensate a plaintiff for the loss of the use of funds to
which he or she was legally entitled, not to penalize a
defendant for wrongdoing.” Id. Though courts traditionally
have awarded interest in cases where the amount of the
obligation is certain and the existence of the obligation is not
disputed on reasonable grounds, “[t]he uncertainty of either
the existence or the amount of an obligation does not mandate
denial of prejudgment interest.” Id. at 928. The Tennessee
Court of Appeals found that Myint “shifted the balance to
favor awarding prejudgment interest whenever doing so will
more fully compensate plaintiffs for the loss of use of their
funds,” and concluded that “[f]airness will, in almost all
cases, require that a successful plaintiff be fully compensated
by the defendant for all losses caused by the defendant,
including the loss of use of money the plaintiff should have
received.” Scholz v. S.B. Int’l, Inc., 40 S.W.3d 78, 83 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2000).
The district court stated that its conclusion that interest
charges were not recoverable as incidental damages under
§ 47-2-710 did not bar an award of prejudgment interest
under Tennessee law. The district court, however, did not
grant Stamtec’s request for prejudgment interest under § 47-
14-123. Stamtec filed a motion to alter or amend again
seeking prejudgment interest under the statute, which the
16 Stamtec, Inc. v.
Anson Stamping Co.
Nos. 01-6541/6582
district court summarily denied. In light of the Tennessee
Supreme Court’s presumption in favor of granting
prejudgment interest under the statute, we remand the
question so that the district court can provide a reasoned
decision on this issue.
D.
Stamtec argues that the district court erred when it did not
grant its motion for entry of a default judgment. Stamtec
urged the district court to enter a default judgment against
ASCO on the ground that an ASCO represenative’s
deposition testimony in this case conflicted with the
testimony given by that same person in another lawsuit. We
agree with the district court that its finding of liability on the
part of ASCO moots the conflicting testimony issue.
III.
In sum, we reverse the district court’s decision to include
Stamtec’s estimated delivery costs in its damages award. We
affirm the district court’s decision to award Stamtec $264,880
in lost profits and to exclude Stamtec’s payment of the Chin
Fong storage, salvage loss, and interest charges from the
damages award, as well as its decision to deny damages based
on the interest term allegedly included in the contract. We
also affirm the district court’s decision to deny Stamtec’s
motion for default judgment. Finally, we remand Stamtec’s
claim for prejudgment interest under § 47-14-123 for
additional proceedings.

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