United States of America v. Alfredo Rodriguez-Suazo

1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0354P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 03a0354p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ALFREDO RODRIGUEZ-SUAZO,
Defendant-Appellant.
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No. 01-2590
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 00-80790—Arthur J. Tarnow, District Judge.
Argued: July 31, 2003
Decided and Filed: October 6, 2003
Before: DAUGHTREY, MOORE, and SUTTON, Circuit
Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Francisco J. Villarruel, Detroit, Michigan, for
Appellant. Kathleen Moro Nesi, ASSISTANT UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Francisco J. Villarruel, Detroit, Michigan, for
Appellant. Kathleen Moro Nesi, ASSISTANT UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.
2 United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo No. 01-2590
_________________
OPINION
_________________
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Defendant-
Appellant Alfredo Rodriguez-Suazo (“Rodriguez-Suazo”)
appeals from the judgment entered against him after he
entered a conditional guilty plea to the following offenses:
reentry of deported alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326,
fraud and related activity in connection with identification
documents and information in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028,
and fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546. On appeal, Rodriguez-
Suazo argues that the search of his residence was unlawful
because the search warrant was not based on probable cause
to believe that the items listed in the warrant would be found
at the place to be searched. Rodriguez-Suazo also argues that
the stop of his vehicle, the search of his vehicle, and his
subsequent detention violated the Constitution because the
officers lacked probable cause, and they did not have a
warrant. Moreover, Rodriguez-Suazo contends that the
officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Rodriguez-
Suazo once the traffic stop failed to uncover any evidence of
criminal activity. Finally, Rodriguez-Suazo argues that the
search warrant affidavit contained intentionally or recklessly
false information. Thus, Rodriguez-Suazo contends that
anything he said during the search of his home and the search
of his person and effects should be suppressed as the fruit of
the poisonous tree. We now AFFIRM the district court’s
denial of Rodriguez-Suazo’s motions to suppress.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 31, 2000, the Detroit Police Department arrived
at 5492 Florida to execute a search warrant at Rodriguez-
Suazo’s residence. According to the police, they arrived

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No. 01-2590 United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo 3
1The time of the search is a disputed factual issue. At the hearing on
the motion to suppress, counsel for Rodriguez-Suazo argued that
Rodriguez-Suazo was stopp ed by the Detroit police somewhere between
9:30 and 10:00 a.m. As a matter of deduction, then, counsel for
Rodriguez-Suazo argues that at the time Rodriguez-Suazo was stopped,
searched, and arre sted, the police did not have the necessary pro bab le
cause because they did not obtain the search warrant until sometime later
that afternoon. Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 121 (Tr. of Mo t. Hr’g). We do
not consider the timing to be critical because we agree with the district
court’s conclusion that as long as the officers knew the information
contained in the warrant at the time of the searches then they had the
necessary probable cause, even without affirmation from the magistrate
in the form of a warrant.
2Specifically, the search warrant stated the following:
THEREFORE, IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE OF THE
STATE OF MICHIGAN, I command that you search . . . [t]he
entire premises known as, 5492 Florida, located in the City of
Detroit, County of W ayne, State of M ichigan. . . . The entire
premises known as 6071 P roctor, located in the City of D etroit,
County of Wayne, State of Michigan. . . . Also to be searched:
#1 Raymie Baraza, Hispanic male, DOB 6-2-65, 5'-10", and
medium build, large nose
#2 Hispanic male, 5'-9", 170 pounds, black hair, olive
complexion, AKA “Alfredo”
#3 Comelio Hernandez, Hispanic, male, 32 years of age, 5'-10",
190-200 pounds, medium olive comp lexion, black hair, hazel
eyes. AKA “Hector”
Also to be searched:
1997 Ford, Crown Victoria, 2001 Michigan plate 7EBP97,
brown in color, being driven by either #1 or #3 , this vehicle is
equipped with aftermarket hidden compartm ents
1989 GMC , Sierra, pick-up, 2001 Michigan plate 2615HR, gray
in color with red trim, cap on rear, being driven by either #1 or
#3.
sometime around 1:00 p.m.1 The search warrant identified
5492 Florida as one of two places to be searched; expressly
permitted the search of a 1989 Gray GMC Sierra pickup truck
bearing the Michigan license plate number 2615HR; and also
authorized the search of a five-foot nine-inch Hispanic male
weighing 170 pounds, with black hair and an olive
complexion, and going by the name “Alfredo.”2 Thus, when
4 United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo No. 01-2590
1990 Subaru, Legacy, go ld in color, hatch back, 2001 M ichigan
plate RRX464
1998 Mercury, Marquis, white in co lor, 20 01 M ichigan plate
RGJ072
J.A. at 21 (Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Suppress, App. A, Search W arrant).
3Rodriguez-Suazo contends that he was kept under police guard for
over an hour and a half while the police searched the Proctor addre ss.
After that search was complete and he was interrogated, he was taken to
the Florid a add ress and was mad e to wait while law enforcement
conducted the search of that residence.
the officers arrived at 5492 Florida and observed a man,
fitting the warrant’s description for individual #2 and driving
the GMC truck mentioned therein, the officers followed the
truck and stopped it three blocks from that address.
Rodriguez-Suazo produced a Michigan driver’s license
bearing the name Reynaldo Michel Figueroa and admitted
that he was an illegal Mexican immigrant. At this point the
officers seized Rodriguez-Suazo, seized his wallet and its
contents, searched the truck, and confiscated his vehicle.
According to Rodriguez-Suazo, he was handcuffed and in
police custody for a significant amount of time.3 Rodriguez-
Suazo was never read his rights, never shown a warrant, and
never told the reason for his detention.
After an unspecified amount of time, the officers returned
Rodriguez-Suazo to 5492 Florida where they conducted a
search of the premises. The officers possessed a search
warrant that was issued in an effort to uncover a drug
operation, thus the search warrant included a long list of items
to be seized including: all items used in connection with drug
offenses, proceeds in connection with drug offenses,
passports, vehicle registrations and titles, and records
reflecting residences. The home search uncovered a Mexican
passport and United States visa with Rodriguez-Suazo’s
picture and the name Abel Izai Ledezma-Garcia. Eventually,
Rodriguez-Suazo admitted that he bought these documents in

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No. 01-2590 United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo 5
4McN amara was a member of the De troit police force for twenty-
eight years, serving the most recent fourteen years in the narc otics
division. McNamara justifiably relied on this informant because he had
used this same informant on more than three different occasions which
resulted in over three arrests and over three convictions.
Mexico for $2,000 and then used them to gain illegal entry
intro the United States.
The factual basis for the search warrant came from a
confidential informant. On October 30, 2000, the confidential
informant told the affiant, Lieutenant Arthur McNamara
(“McNamara”)4, that based on his observations, a man named
Raymie Baraza (“Baraza”) used the Proctor address to store
his drugs. This same informant told the officers that based on
“past observations,” Baraza stores a “large amount of narcotic
proceeds” at the 5492 Florida location. J.A. at 23-24 (Br. in
Supp. of Mot. to Suppress, App. A, Search Warrant-
Affidavit). According to the informant, Baraza stored the
proceeds where he lived at 5492 Florida. In addition, the
confidential informant stated that only the three individuals
listed in the search warrant were allowed to enter these
premises to conduct narcotic sales. A mere forty-eight hours
before the signing of the affidavit and search warrant, the
informant accompanied Baraza to the Proctor address so that
Baraza could pick up a large amount of cocaine to distribute
to another individual.
On November 8, 2000, Rodriguez-Suazo was indicted on
three counts: reentry of deported alien, fraud and related
activity in connection with identification documents and
information, and fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other
documents. Rodriguez-Suazo filed three motions to suppress.
Rodriguez-Suazo’s first motion sought to suppress the
evidence retrieved from the 5492 Florida address and the
statements he made during and after the search because the
search warrant was not based on probable cause to search him
and his home when the issuing magistrate relied on an
affidavit with falsified information. Rodriguez-Suazo argued
6 United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo No. 01-2590
5Rodriguez-Suazo’s appellate brief changes this to “no person” could
have seen d rug proceeds in storage at the Florida ad dress.
then, and on appeal, that the information relayed by the
informant and incorporated into the affidavit was either
falsified by the informant or by the affiant, and thus the
affiant was not truthful or was reckless in his disregard for the
truth by relying on the informant in the affidavit. In an
attempt to refute the confidential informant’s statements,
Rodriguez-Suazo submitted his own affidavit stating that no
male individual5 has been to the Florida address who could
have possibly observed Rodriguez-Suazo in possession of
illegal drugs or large sums of money. The defendant’s
affidavit also contains a sworn statement that Rodriguez-
Suazo does not know anyone named Raymie Baraza. A
subsequent motion to suppress argued that the stop of
Rodriguez-Suazo while driving in his vehicle and his eventual
arrest were unlawful because the police did not have probable
cause to search the vehicle or reasonable suspicion to detain
Rodriguez-Suazo. That motion aimed to suppress any
evidence seized from the vehicle or Rodriguez-Suazo and any
statements made by Rodriguez-Suazo to the police. The final
motion to suppress focused on the invalidity of the search
warrant as it pertained to 5492 Florida. Rodriguez-Suazo
claimed that the search warrant was issued without probable
cause to believe that the items contained in the warrant would
be found at the location named therein. Thus, Rodriguez-
Suazo contends that the issuing magistrate abandoned his role
as a neutral and detached judicial officer by issuing this
entirely unsupported warrant. In the alternative, defendant
argues that, despite the magistrate’s authorization, no
reasonable police officer would have relied on this
unsubstantiated warrant.
Rodriguez-Suazo requested an evidentiary hearing to
pursue these arguments further. The district court denied his
request for an evidentiary hearing and suppression motions
but preserved its right to reevaluate its decision if Rodriguez-

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No. 01-2590 United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo 7
6At the motion hearing, the district court asked Rodriguez-Suazo to
identify the time when the search warrant was issued. Rodriguez-Suazo
responded that he was unable to verify that information from the 36th
District Court.
7Specifically, the district court stated:
[I]f you can pro vide m e with some kind of authority that says,
assuming the officers had in some form the same information
that was ultimately put before the magistrate judge, that absent
a search warrant did not constitute proba ble cause to sto p this
defendant, that might affect my decision on an evidentiary
hearing as well, but I am operating from the assumption, from
which I could be disabused of if that isn’t the law, that the same
information that the magistrate judge acted on if in the
possession of the officers who arrested this de fendant would
have constituted probable ca use even without a magistrate judge
agreeing with them.
J.A. at 144 (Tr. of Mo t. Hr’g).
Suazo could make a proffer that the police officers did not
have a warrant at the time of their stop and search of
Rodriguez-Suazo.6 The district court also suggested that even
if Rodriguez-Suazo could show that the officers did not have
a warrant at the time of these events, the government
nonetheless could satisfy the probable cause requirement if
the officers knew of the warrant’s contents when they
searched Rodriguez-Suazo and his home.7
After he was unsuccessful in his motions to suppress
evidence, Rodriguez-Suazo, pursuant to a conditional Rule 11
Plea Agreement, pleaded guilty to all three counts in the
indictment. Ultimately, Rodriguez-Suazo was adjudicated
guilty on each count, and on November 14, 2001, he was
sentenced to twenty months’ imprisonment on each count, to
run concurrently. Rodriguez-Suazo now timely appeals from
the district court’s judgment and its order denying his motions
to suppress.
8 United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo No. 01-2590
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to
suppress evidence, we review the factual findings for clear
error and the legal conclusions as to the existence of probable
cause de novo. United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1176 (2000). “It is well
settled that in seeking suppression of evidence the burden of
proof is upon the defendant to display a violation of some
constitutional or statutory right justifying suppression.”
United States v. Feldman, 606 F.2d 673, 679 n.11 (6th Cir.
1979). “When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress
evidence, we must consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government.” United States v. Garza, 10
F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir. 1993).
The standard of review for determining the sufficiency of
the affidavit “is whether the magistrate had a substantial basis
for finding that the affidavit established probable cause to
believe that the evidence would be found at the place cited.”
United States v. Davidson, 936 F.2d 856, 859 (6th Cir. 1991).
We do not engage in de novo review of the affidavit, but
“[r]ather the magistrate’s probable cause determination
should be afforded great deference.” Id.; see also United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (“[T]he preference
for warrants is most appropriately effectuated by according
‘great deference’ to a magistrate’s determination.”). This
deferential review is consistent with “the Fourth
Amendment’s strong preference for searches conducted
pursuant to a warrant.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236
(1983). Our determination of whether the information
supporting the affidavit is stale utilizes the same standard of
review as used to determine the sufficiency of an affidavit.
United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 958-59 (6th Cir. 1995).

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No. 01-2590 United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo 9
B. The Searches
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides for the issuance of warrants based on probable cause
and supported by oath or affirmation. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
The Fourth Amendment requires that the warrant “particularly
describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.” Id. Probable cause to search is described as a
“fair probability” that evidence of the crime will be found at
the location to be searched. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238; see also
Davidson, 936 F.2d at 860 (holding that the affidavit
established a substantial basis for a probable cause finding
“[b]ecause only the probability, and not a prima facie
showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable
cause”). The inquiry requires that the magistrate or judge
review the totality of the circumstances “to make a practical,
common-sense” determination of whether probable cause is
present. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. “The issuing judge or
magistrate ‘may give considerable weight to the conclusion
of experienced law enforcement officers regarding where
evidence of a crime is likely to be found and is entitled to
draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to
be kept.’” United States v. Caicedo, 85 F.3d 1184, 1192
(1996) (quoting United States v. Lawson, 999 F.2d 985, 987
(6th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation omitted)). On review, the
district court will not have a basis for overturning the
conclusion of the magistrate unless the magistrate did not
have a “substantial basis” for determining that probable cause
was present. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
The Fourth Amendment’s primary purpose is to protect
“[t]he right of people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “‘The critical element in
a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is
suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to
believe that the specific things to be searched for and seized
are located on the property to which entry is sought.’” United
States v. Savoca, 761 F.2d 292, 297 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting
10 United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo No. 01-2590
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978) (internal
quotation omitted)). When law enforcement officials have
acted unreasonably, the exclusionary rule exists to suppress
evidence gained through unconstitutional means. United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984) (“[T]he way to ensure
[constitutional and statutory] protections is to exclude
evidence seized as a result of such violations notwithstanding
the high social cost of letting persons obviously guilty go
unpunished for their crimes.”). This exclusion applies equally
“to the fruits of the illegally seized evidence.” Calandra, 414
U.S. at 347. The purpose behind exclusion is not to remedy
the harm suffered by the victim of the illegal search, but
rather “to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby
effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” Id. Thus, evidence
procured through an illegal search or seizure is not
automatically suppressed, but rather the applicability of
certain exceptions to exclusion first are considered. See Leon,
468 U.S. at 906.
In Leon, the Supreme Court explained that the exclusionary
rule “operates as ‘a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of
the person aggrieved.’” Id. at 906 (internal quotation
omitted). The Court reasoned that because the rule was
designed to deter police misconduct, the benefits from
excluding evidence procured by objectively reasonable
reliance on a later invalidated search warrant were
insignificant compared to the costs of such exclusion. Id. at
907-08. The Court encouraged lower courts to consider the
totality of the circumstances using an objective measure when
assessing “whether a reasonably well trained officer would
have known that the search was illegal despite the
magistrate’s authorization.” Id. at 923 n.23. Thus, the Court
stated that the “evidence obtained from a search should be
suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement
officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with

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No. 01-2590 United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo 11
knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 919 (quoting United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975)).
The Leon Court identified three situations in which the
fruits of an illegal search could be suppressed regardless of
law enforcement’s reliance on a warrant issued by a
magistrate. Id. at 923. These situations include when: (1) a
warrant is based on a knowing or reckless falsity contained in
the affidavit, Leon, 468 U.S. at 914; (2) a warrant is issued by
a magistrate who abandons his judicial role by failing to be
neutral and detached, instead serving as a “rubber stamp” for
law enforcement, id.; and (3) a warrant is “so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its
existence entirely unreasonable.” Id. at 923 (quotation
omitted). The first situation involves police misconduct
appropriate for deterrence, while the second two situations are
proper for exclusion because “no reasonably well-trained
officer should rely on the warrant.” Savoca, 761 F.2d at 296
(quotation omitted).
1. Search of 5492 Florida
Rodriguez-Suazo argues that the search of his residence
violated the Fourth Amendment because the search warrant
affidavit lacked sufficient facts to establish the necessary
probable cause. Rodriguez-Suazo argues that the affidavit
failed to establish a nexus between the items contained in the
warrant and the place to be searched. He asserts that the
confidential informant’s statements create probable cause to
search only the Proctor residence, not the Florida residence.
Specifically, he raises the fact that the informant neither
stated that he entered the Florida address nor described with
particularity the location of the money, the way in which it
was stored, or the amount he observed being stored. The
informant also failed to provide a timeframe for when he saw
proceeds stored at this address, thus the tip was insufficient
and stale as it pertains to the Florida address. Moreover,
Rodriguez-Suazo argues that even if the officers relied on a
12 United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo No. 01-2590
facially-valid search warrant, the evidence should have been
excluded because: (1) the warrant was based on a knowing or
reckless falsehood contained in the affidavit, (2) the
magistrate abandoned his role as a neutral and detached
judicial officer because there were not sufficient facts to
conclude that evidence of the crime would be found at 5492
Florida; and (3) the warrant was so lacking in probable cause
that a reasonable officer would not have relied on it.
When reviewing the affidavit for evidence establishing
probable cause, we ask whether there was a “fair probability”
that any evidence would be found at the location to be
searched. Davidson, 936 F.2d at 859 (quotation omitted); see
also Mays v. City of Dayton, 134 F.3d 809, 814 (6th Cir.
1998) (“A determination of probable cause simply requires
consideration of whether there were reasonable grounds to
believe at the time of the affidavit that the law was being
violated on the premises to be searched.”). As the Court
stated in Gates, we approach the question using a totality of
the circumstances test, to arrive at “a practical, common-
sense” conclusion as to whether probable cause existed.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. When the probable cause for a search
warrant is based upon information provided by a confidential
informant, we must consider the informant’s veracity,
reliability, and “basis of knowledge.” United States v. Smith,
182 F.3d 473, 477 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Gates, 462 U.S.
at 230 (noting that “an informant’s ‘veracity,’ ‘reliability’ and
‘basis of knowledge’ are all highly relevant in determining the
value of his report”). Only by evaluating these factors under
the fluid totality of circumstances approach, can we “ensure
that the magistrate was informed of some of the underlying
circumstances from which the informant concluded evidence
of a crime is where he claimed it would be found, and some
of the underlying circumstances from which the officer
concluded that the informant . . . was reliable.” Smith, 182
F.3d at 478. Another factor to consider is law enforcement’s
corroboration of the informant’s tip. Id. The Supreme Court
has stated that information provided by a proven and reliable
informant, along with police corroboration of the tip, is

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No. 01-2590 United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo 13
sufficient to establish the necessary probable cause. McCray
v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 304 (1967).
In the instant case, McNamara, the affiant, was a twenty-
eight-year-veteran officer with fourteen years of service in the
narcotics division. In the search warrant affidavit itself,
McNamara attested to the confidential informant’s reliability
and credibility, citing more than three occasions when the
confidential informant assisted law enforcement with
information leading to more than three arrests and more than
three convictions. McNamara also stated that information
provided by this informant in the past has proven to be both
reliable and accurate. According to McNamara, the informant
stated that he or she previously had observed Baraza and
Hernandez selling large quantities of cocaine. The informant
also revealed that he or she had personal knowledge that
Baraza stored large amounts of drug proceeds at the Florida
residence on previous occasions because Baraza did not trust
anyone with his money. In addition, the informant noted that
only three individuals (one who fit the description of
Rodriguez-Suazo) were permitted access to the Florida house,
and that all of the vehicles listed in the warrant transport
drugs. Most pertinently, the informant stated that, within the
past forty-eight hours, the informant was at the Proctor
address with Baraza, when Baraza picked up a large amount
of cocaine for the purpose of selling it to another individual.
McNamara further corroborated the informant’s tip by
acknowledging that McNamara previously had arrested
Baraza for possession of three kilograms of cocaine and that
a warrant was outstanding for Baraza’s arrest.
Assessing the contents of the affidavit under the totality of
the circumstances, we conclude that the information
contained therein provided a “substantial basis” from which
the magistrate could conclude that probable cause was present
to search the Florida premises. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
While it is true that the informant did not offer a specific
timeframe for when he saw drug proceeds stored at the
Florida address, the informant did state that on previous
14 United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo No. 01-2590
occasions Baraza stored drug proceeds at his Florida address
and that within forty-eight hours a big sale had taken place
with drugs Baraza obtained from the Proctor address. From
these facts, the magistrate could infer that there existed a fair
probability that the proceeds from that very recent sale would
be stored once again at the Florida address. See id. (“The task
of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical,
common-sense decision whether . . . there is a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.”); Mays, 134 F.3d at 814 (noting that the
magistrate’s determination is not overturned on appeal
“unless arbitrarily exercised”). This remains true, even if the
informant’s tip contained erroneous information, that is, even
if Baraza did not actually reside or if no drug proceeds were
found at the Florida address. Moreover, Rodriguez-Suazo’s
staleness claim is defeated by the pattern of drug activity
observed by the informant on more than one occasion. See
generally United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1382 (6th
Cir. 1988) (“[R]elated events covering a broad span of time
continuing to the current period may furnish a most reliable
indicia of present activity, thereby clearly demonstrating that
probable cause exists.”); see also United States v. Greene,
250 F.3d 471, 481 (6th Cir. 2001) (concluding that evidence
of ongoing criminal activity generally can defeat a staleness
claim). And while the police failed independently to
corroborate the informant’s tip through surveillance or other
means, corroboration is not always required. See generally
United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 976 (6th Cir) (en banc),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 907 (2000) (holding that when the
informant is known to the affiant, named to the magistrate,
has proven reliability, and directly observed the criminal
activity in the recent past, independent police corroboration
is not required for a magistrate to determine that a probability
exists that evidence of a crime will be uncovered). Based on
the foregoing, we conclude that the search warrant permitting
the search of the Florida residence was supported by probable
cause, and thus Rodriguez-Suazo’s constitutional rights were
not infringed when the police searched 5492 Florida.

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No. 01-2590 United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo 15
Even if we reached the opposite conclusion in our probable
cause review — determining that the affidavit and resulting
search warrant did not contain a sufficient nexus to justify the
search of 5492 Florida — we nonetheless would conclude that
the evidence was properly admitted pursuant to Leon’s good-
faith-reliance exception to the exclusionary rule. In Leon, the
Supreme Court stated that evidence generally will not be
excluded where officers reasonably rely on a facially valid
search warrant. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. Although Rodriguez-
Suazo contends otherwise, the exceptions to the Leon good-
faith doctrine do not apply in this case.
Rodriguez-Suazo attacks the statements made by the
confidential informant which secured the search warrant,
arguing that no one could have observed Baraza store any
drugs or money at 5492 Florida and thus that the warrant was
based on intentionally or recklessly false information.
Rodriguez-Suazo also contends that either the informant does
not exist or McNamara falsified the information about the
informant in the affidavit. Thus, McNamara either was not
truthful or was reckless in his disregard for the truth by
relying on the informant to swear out a warrant.
When a defendant attempts to show that an affidavit for a
search warrant contained false information, the defendant
must make a “substantial preliminary showing that a false
statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless
disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the
warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is
necessary to the finding of probable cause,” the court must
conduct a hearing on the issue upon the defendant’s request.
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). If at the
hearing, the defendant can show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the affiant either knowingly or with reckless
disregard included a false statement in the affidavit, then any
evidence and fruits of the search would be excluded. Id. at
156. This substantial showing is necessary because a
challenge to the veracity of the search warrant affidavit must
overcome the presumption that the affidavit is valid. Id. at
16 United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo No. 01-2590
171. The intentionally or recklessly false statement must be
made by the affiant herself, not the non-governmental
informant. Id.; Mays, 134 F.3d at 816 (“Franks recognizes
that information an affiant reports may not ultimately be
accurate, and is willing to tolerate such a result at that early
stage of the process, so long as the affiant believed the
accuracy of the statement at the time it was made.”).
Thus, even if we determined that probable cause did not
exist to search 5492 Florida, Rodriguez-Suazo’s attack on the
veracity of the confidential informant’s statements would be
insufficient to meet his burden for a Franks evidentiary
hearing without a substantial showing that the affiant’s
statements were intentionally or recklessly false. See United
States v. Giacalone, 853 F.2d 470, 477 (6th Cir. 1988)
(holding that the defendants’ affidavits did not amount to a
substantial showing that the government affiant, and not the
informants, made intentionally or recklessly false statements).
Rodriguez-Suazo’s affidavit stating that he never stored drug
proceeds at 5492 Florida and that he did not know anyone
named Raymie Baraza is hardly the “substantial preliminary
showing” required under Franks. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155.
Even if some of the information contained in the search
warrant ultimately could be shown to be false, Rodriguez-
Suazo provided no evidence that Officer McNamara
intentionally or recklessly misrepresented facts in order to
secure the search warrant. Rodriguez-Suazo’s statement in
his affidavit that no one had entered 5492 Florida within the
forty-eight hours preceding the signing of the search warrant,
even if believed, does not equate to proof that the affiant lied
or was recklessly indifferent to the truth. The warrant
affidavit does not suggest that the confidential informant
personally saw anyone enter 5492 Florida after he witnessed
the drug deal with Baraza, rather his information suggests that
based on past conduct, the proceeds of the recent sale likely
would be stored at the Florida address. Under these
circumstances it cannot be said that the district court clearly

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No. 01-2590 United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo 17
8W e also do not find persuasive Rodriguez-Suazo’s argument that the
district court erroneously denied his request for an in-camera examination
of the confidential informant. We have previously decided that we will
not mand ate a preliminary in camera examination of the informant simp ly
because the defendant alleges that the affidavit co ntains falsehoods. See
Giacalone, 853 F.2d at 476.
erred in determining that the affiant neither lied nor recklessly
falsified the affidavit in order to secure a search warrant.8
Rodriguez-Suazo’s belief that the magistrate was not
neutral and detached does not require suppression of the
evidence because Rodriguez-Suazo fails to offer any evidence
to support this claim. See Feldman, 606 F.2d at 679 n.11
(stating that the defendant has the burden of proof to show
that evidence should be excluded). Moreover, the
exclusionary rule is designed to prevent police, not
magistrate, misconduct and thus, as the Court stated in Leon:
To the extent that proponents of exclusion rely on its
behavioral effects on judges and magistrates in these
areas, their reliance is misplaced. . . . [T]here exists no
evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates are
inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or
that lawlessness among these actors requires application
of the extreme sanction of exclusion. . . . [M]ost
important, we discern no basis, and are offered none, for
believing that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a
warrant will have a significant deterrent effect on the
issuing judge or magistrate.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 (footnotes omitted). Because the focus
of this rule is to prevent police misconduct, exclusion should
be ordered only if the police officer knew or should “be
charged with knowledge that the search was unconstitutional
under the Fourth Amendment” or that the magistrate
abandoned his or her neutral and detached function. Id. at
919 (internal quotation omitted). In light of the extensive
affidavit containing specific information personally observed
18 United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo No. 01-2590
by the reliable confidential informant, there is no evidence
from which we could conclude that the magistrate merely
acted as a “rubber stamp” for the police officers’ misconduct.
Id. at 914.
As for his final attempt to show that the search warrant’s
issuance was unconstitutional, Rodriguez-Suazo contends that
this situation falls within another exception to the Leon good-
faith doctrine, that the police officers’ reliance on the warrant
was unreasonable because the warrant obviously was not
supported by probable cause. Having concluded that the
affidavit established probable cause, we do not need to reach
this argument. See Davidson, 936 F.2d at 860.
2. Search of the GMC Truck and Rodriguez-Suazo
In a motion to suppress evidence and on appeal, Rodriguez-
Suazo argues that his traffic stop and subsequent arrest were
warrantless seizures without probable cause in violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights. Rodriguez-Suazo argues that at
the time of the traffic stop, the officers did not have a search
warrant and that they lacked probable cause to make the stop
because Rodriguez-Suazo had not violated any traffic laws.
Moreover, he contends that the search of his vehicle was
unlawful because he had not given the officers consent to
search it. Rodriguez-Suazo continues his argument, asserting
that even if the officers were permitted to make the initial
stop, they did not have the necessary reasonable suspicion to
detain Rodriguez-Suazo after their search failed to uncover
any drugs. Because the search warrant was limited in scope
to evidence of drug trafficking, once the officers failed to find
any incriminating evidence of drug activity, Rodriguez-Suazo
argues that they were obligated to release him.
Whether the officers had a search warrant at the time of the
stop is disputed by the parties. At the hearing on the
suppression motion, Rodriguez-Suazo argued that during the
morning traffic stop, the officers did not yet have a search
warrant and did not know the information that would be

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No. 01-2590 United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo 19
9Rodriguez-Suazo’s own affidavit fails to substantiate his argume nt.
His affidavit fails to state either that the vehicle search took place in the
morning or that the search transpired witho ut a warrant.
contained therein. However, when Rodriguez-Suazo was
asked by the district court whether he had any evidence to
substantiate his claim, Rodriguez-Suazo admitted that he had
none. Rodriguez-Suazo then explained that he needed an
evidentiary hearing to pursue this claim further. In denying
the motion to suppress, the district court indicated that it
would reconsider the issue of whether suppression of the
vehicle search was warranted if Rodriguez-Suazo could come
forth with some evidence tending to show that the officers
lacked a warrant at the time of the search. To date,
Rodriguez-Suazo has not proffered any evidence tending to
show that the officers did not have a warrant at the time of the
traffic stop.9
Rodriguez-Suazo’s arguments that this court should treat
the traffic stop as a warrantless search are unpersuasive.
While Rodriguez-Suazo attempts to show a constitutional
violation by asserting that there was no warrant at the time of
the traffic stop, he has no evidence in support of his
contention, and thus, fails to meet his burden for suppression
of the evidence. See Feldman, 606 F.2d at 679 n.11. Without
any evidence to support such a claim, we cannot say that it
was clear error for the district court to conclude that the
officers had a search warrant at the time of the stop and search
of Rodriguez-Suazo and his vehicle. See Garza, 10 F.3d at
1245 (noting that the court “must accept the findings of fact
upon which the district court relied in dealing with
suppression of evidence unless those findings are clearly
erroneous”).
Even if Rodriguez-Suazo were able to show that the
officers searched him without a warrant, he has not offered
any evidence to show that when the officers stopped
Rodriguez-Suazo in his truck, they were not aware of all the
20 United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo No. 01-2590
information that ultimately was included in the affidavit and
the warrant. Armed with the information contained in the
affidavit and warrant, the officers would have had the
necessary probable cause to insulate the search from a
successful suppression motion. See generally Hill, 195 F.3d
at 273 (“One of the exceptions to the requirement that the
government obtain a warrant before searching private
property is the ‘automobile exception,’ which excuses the
police from obtaining a warrant when they have probable
cause to believe that a vehicle they have stopped contains
evidence of a crime.”). In the search warrant affidavit,
McNamara claims that the informant relayed to McNamara
the information regarding the recent drug sale by October 30,
2000, at the latest, which necessarily means that on the day of
the search, October 31, 2000, at least McNamara was aware
of its contents. See generally United States v. Woods, 544
F.2d 242, 260 (6th Cir. 1976) (noting that for assessing
whether probable cause exists, this court “mutually impute[s]
the knowledge of all the agents working together on the scene
and in communication with each other”). Based on
McNamara’s knowledge, it would not be clear error for the
district court to conclude that the officers conducting the
search were apprised of the warrant’s contents when they
stopped Rodriguez-Suazo.
As of result of our conclusion that the district court was not
clearly erroneous in its determination that the police had a
warrant, Rodriguez-Suazo’s arguments that his detention was
unlawful once the stop failed to reveal evidence of drug
trafficking must also fail. The warrant specifically permitted
the seizure of documents, including passports and records
identifying his address. After turning over his driver’s license
with the name Reynaldo Michel Figueroa, Rodriguez-Suazo
admitted that he was an illegal Mexican immigrant. Once the
police had this confession, the police had probable cause to
detain and arrest Rodriguez-Suazo, albeit for a different crime
than originally expected under the search warrant.

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No. 01-2590 United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo 21
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the
district court denying Rodriguez-Suazo’s motions to suppress
evidence.

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