Frederick John Kratt v. JANE F. GARVEY, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration

*The Honorable Algenon L. Marbley, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0309P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 03a0309p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
FREDERICK JOHN KRATT,
Petitioner,
v.
JANE F. GARVEY,
Administrator, Federal
Aviation Administration,
Respondent.
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No. 02-3324
On Appeal from the National Transportation
Safety Board.
No. SE 15239.
Argued: June 17, 2003
Decided and Filed: August 28, 2003
Before: BOGGS and GILMAN, Circuit Judges;
MARBLEY, District Judge.*
2 Kratt v. Garvey No. 02-3324
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: G. Christopher Kelly, Atlanta, Georgia, for
Petitioner. Jeffrica Jenkins Lee, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIVISION,
APPELLATE SECTION, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
ON BRIEF: G. Christopher Kelly, Atlanta, Georgia, for
Petitioner. Jeffrica Jenkins Lee, John C. Hoyle, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIVISION,
APPELLATE SECTION, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
ALGENON L. MARBLEY, District Judge. Frederick John
Kratt (“Kratt” or “Petitioner”) petitions this Court to review
the decision of the National Transportation Safety Board
(“NTSB”), affirming the revocation of his pilot’s license.
Respondent, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration (the “Administrator”), revoked Kratt’s pilot’s
license because he pleaded guilty to the charge of possession
of marijuana with the intent to distribute and flew an airplane
in the commission of that crime. Kratt appealed the
Administrator’s order revoking his pilot’s license to the
NTSB, which affirmed the Administrator’s order. Kratt now
seeks review of the NTSB’s order, contending that the order
was based on insufficient evidence to revoke his license and
that he was denied due process of law. This Court has
jurisdiction over this appeal from the NTSB pursuant to 49
U.S.C. § 44710(d)(3), which specifically gives this Court
authority to review NTSB orders revoking a pilot’s license,
and 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a), which generally vests this Court
with jurisdiction over petitions for review of an order of the
Administrator of the FAA. For the following reasons, we
AFFIRM the order of the NTSB.

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No. 02-3324 Kratt v. Garvey 3
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Petitioner lives outside Memphis, Tennessee, where he has
been an automobile salesman for about twenty years.
Although his primary job is selling cars, he has a passion for
flying airplanes. To fund his interest in flying, Kratt has
frequently chartered or leased airplanes and flown people for
hire to both business and pleasure destinations. In April
1996, Kratt began to fly business trips for Andre Johnson, one
of his automobile customers. Only later did Kratt learn that
Andre Johnson was transporting marijuana from Texas to
Memphis. Kratt first flew Johnson and his brother to
McAllen, Texas, a town near the Mexican border. Kratt
believed that Johnson owned a cleaning business of some
kind and did not think to question his reasons for traveling to
Texas.
Later, Kratt flew Johnson’s brother to Harlingen, Texas,
and flew a third trip with Johnson’s brother and cousin to
Brownsville, Texas. On the third trip, the brother took a bus
home and, during the flight home with the cousin, Kratt
thought he smelled marijuana in his plane. Kratt asked the
cousin about the odor, who informed him that they had been
transporting marijuana on all three trips. Kratt became angry
and landed his plan in Texarkana, where he put Johnson’s
cousin and his bags out of the plane. Kratt did not receive
payment for the third trip.
Although Kratt planned never to fly again for Johnson, he
ultimately gave in when Johnson repeatedly telephoned him
and threatened to injure Kratt’s children. During the fourth
trip to Texas, Johnson’s cousin allegedly kept Kratt at
gunpoint during the entire trip. On the trip home, Kratt first
landed his plane at an airport in Mississippi where customs
officials were waiting for him. Johnson’s cousin ordered
Kratt to take off again immediately after they landed. Kratt
flew the plane to another airport nearby, where they
4 Kratt v. Garvey No. 02-3324
abandoned the plane. Later that night, Kratt called an
attorney, who assisted him in surrendering to customs
officers.
Kratt eventually agreed to plead guilty to possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute and to testify against
Johnson and the other men involved with the drug operation
that Kratt had been facilitating. Kratt was unaware that he
could lose his pilot’s license by pleading guilty and feared
that if he did not plead guilty, he would face greater harm to
his life and career.
On August 25, 1996, Kratt entered his plea of guilty before
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Mississippi to the charge of possessing with intent to
distribute approximately 200 pounds of marijuana. At Kratt’s
plea hearing, the United States presented the following factual
basis for Kratt’s plea:
The government would show that on or about May the
15th, 1996, Frederick John Kratt piloted a plane, to wit:
A Cessna 182 Skylane aircraft, from south Texas to the
Olive Branch, Mississippi airport, briefly stopping before
continuing onto the Holly Springs Airport in Marshall
County, Mississippi. Upon arriving at the Holly Springs
Airport, the defendant and a passenger abandoned the
airplane and attempted to escape.
The government would show that the defendant’s
aircraft was being surveilled from south Texas to the
Holly Springs Airport by a chase plane operated by the
U.S. Custom[s] Service agents utilizing a forward
looking infrared tracking system known as Fleer. When
the defendant’s plane initially arrived at the Olive
Branch, Mississippi airport, U.S. Custom[s] agents on
the ground attempted to block the runway, but were
unsuccessful, and the defendant’s plane took off headed
for the Holly Springs Airport where the plane [was]
abandoned after landing.

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No. 02-3324 Kratt v. Garvey 5
The government would show through testimony and
documentary evidence that approximately 200 pounds of
marijuana was seized from the area immediately
surrounding the airplane along with the flight log and
flight bag and other documentation linking the defendant
to the abandoned airplane.
The government would further show that the
surveilling agents witnessed the removal of the marijuana
from the airplane by one of its occupants prior to being
abandoned.
The government would show further that shortly
thereafter the defendant contacted the U.S. Custom[s]
Service and surrender[ed] to authorities. The
government would show that the defendant thereafter
fully cooperated with the U.S. Customs Service
admitting his involvement and the involvement of others
in the possession with intent to distribute marijuana
recovered from the defendant’s plane.
After the United States presented this factual basis for its
charges against Kratt, the court asked him, “Is the factual
basis essentially correct, Mr. Kratt?” Kratt responded, “Yes,
sir.”
B. Procedural History
The Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) sent Kratt a
letter on June 23, 1997, informing him that he was under
investigation because he had pled guilty to possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute. Kratt accepted the
opportunity to respond to the FAA’s letter, and wrote a
handwritten response in which he explained the circumstances
surrounding his conviction. Although he argued that he was
not a willing participant in the crime, he noted that he “felt
responsible for at least some of the crime.” The FAA sent
Kratt a Notice of Proposed Certificate Action on August 27,
1997, notifying Kratt that it intended to revoke his pilot’s
6 Kratt v. Garvey No. 02-3324
certificate because he had been convicted of possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute and had used an aircraft
and served as an airman in connection with the offense. The
FAA issued its Order of Revocation on April 29, 1998, but
only after Kratt had a telephone conference with the FAA in
February 1998. Kratt chose to appeal the FAA’s decision to
the NTSB, and the FAA filed its Complaint, consisting of a
copy of its Order of Revocation, before the NTSB on May 18,
1998. The FAA’s Complaint stated that Kratt’s pilot’s license
was revoked pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 61.15(a)(2), 49 U.S.C.
§ 44709(b), and 49 U.S.C. § 44710(b)(1).
On August 17, 1999, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
granted the Administrator partial summary judgment
affirming her revocation of Kratt’s pilot’s license pursuant to
14 C.F.R. § 61.15(a)(2). That provision permits the
revocation of a pilot’s license if the pilot is convicted of
certain drug-related offenses. See 14 C.F.R. § 61.15(a)(2)
(2003). But the ALJ denied the Administrator summary
judgment regarding revocation of Kratt’s license pursuant to
49 U.S.C. § 44710(b)(1). The ALJ determined that summary
judgment was not appropriate because revocation pursuant to
§ 44710(b)(1) requires the Administrator to establish that
Kratt was not only convicted of a drug-related offense, but
also that an aircraft was used in commission of the offense
and that Kratt served as an airman or was on the aircraft in
commission of the offense. See 49 U.S.C. § 44710(b)(1)(A),
(B) (West 2003).
On November 30, 1999, the ALJ held a hearing on the
record to consider evidence regarding the revocation of
Kratt’s pilot’s license pursuant to § 44710(b)(1). The ALJ
ultimately found that the transcript of Kratt’s plea hearing
conclusively established that the requirements of
§ 44710(b)(1) were satisfied. Nevertheless, the ALJ heard
testimony from Kratt concerning his conviction. Kratt
appealed the decision of the ALJ to the full NTSB, which
affirmed the ALJ’s ruling. Finally, the NTSB denied Kratt’s
request for reconsideration.

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No. 02-3324 Kratt v. Garvey 7
Kratt now petitions this Court for review of the NTSB’s
decision.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the NTSB’s factual findings according to the
“substantial evidence” standard of review. “Findings of fact
of the Board are conclusive if supported by substantial
evidence.” 49 U.S.C.A. § 44710(d)(3) (West 2003)
(providing for judicial review specifically for revocation of a
pilot’s license); see also § 46110(c) (providing generally for
judicial review of decisions of the Administrator).
Substantial evidence “means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 229 (1938); Blackman v. Busey, 938 F.2d 659, 661 (6th
Cir. 1991) (applying substantial evidence standard for
reviewing revocation of pilot’s license). The Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”) also requires the substantial evidence
standard of review in this case. 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(E) (West
2003). According to the APA, this Court has authority to
“hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be . . . (E) unsupported by substantial
evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title
or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing
provided by statute.” Id. The decision of the NTSB under
review in this case was made “after providing notice and an
opportunity for a hearing on the record.” 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 44710(d)(1). Therefore, the substantial evidence standard
of 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(E) is applicable in this case. See
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 141 (1973) (noting that the
“substantial evidence” test is used “when reviewing findings
made on a hearing record”).
We review questions of law on appeal from the NTSB de
novo. Watkins v. NTSB, 178 F.3d 959, 961 (8th Cir. 1999)
(“We review questions of law de novo.”); Zukas v. Hinson,
124 F.3d 1407, 1409 (11th Cir. 1997) (“We review the
interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions by the
8 Kratt v. Garvey No. 02-3324
NTSB de novo.”); Bennett v. NTSB, 66 F.3d 1130, 1136 (10th
Cir. 1995) (“[W]e review [the NTSB’s] interpretation of
constitutional or statutory provisions de novo.”); Essery v.
NTSB, 857 F.2d 1286, 1288 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that when
reviewing NTSB decisions, “[p]urely legal questions are
reviewed de novo”).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Evidence to Support Revocation
Kratt argues that the Administrator relied on insufficient
evidence when she revoked his pilot’s license pursuant to 49
U.S.C. § 44710(b)(1). He maintains that his criminal
conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute was insufficient evidence to satisfy the
requirements of § 44710(b)(1) for revocation of his pilot’s
license. The Administrator contends that Kratt’s guilty plea
provided sufficient evidence for revocation pursuant to
§ 44710(b)(1) and that the Administrator and the NTSB in
fact relied on more than just Kratt’s conviction.
The Administrator is required to revoke an individual’s
“airman certificate” if that individual
is convicted, under a law of the United States or a State
related to a controlled substance (except a law related to
simple possession of a controlled substance), of an
offense punishable by death or imprisonment for more
than one year if the Administrator finds that—
(A) an aircraft was used to commit, or facilitate the
commission of, the offense; and
(B) the individual served as an airman, or was on the
aircraft, in connection with committing, or facilitating the
commission of, the offense.
49 U.S.C.A. § 44710(b)(1). The term “airman” is defined to
include a “pilot, mechanic, or member of the crew, who

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No. 02-3324 Kratt v. Garvey 9
navigates aircraft when under way.” 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 40102(a)(8)(A). Therefore, this Court can overturn the
NTSB’s decision only if that decision was based on less than
substantial evidence that Kratt was convicted of the specified
type of crime, that an aircraft was used in the commission of
the offense, and that Kratt either “served as an airman” or
“was on the aircraft” in connection with committing the
offense.
Kratt does not dispute that he was convicted of a drug-
related crime punishable by death or imprisonment for more
than one year. He was convicted pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841,
and sentenced to two years in prison. Kratt argues that the
NTSB erred by relying solely on his conviction for evidence
that an airplane was used in commission of his offense and
that he served as an airman or was on the aircraft in
commission of the offense. In fact, the NTSB relied not only
on Kratt’s conviction, but also on the transcript of Kratt’s plea
hearing and his testimony before the ALJ.
When the Administrator moved for summary judgment
before the NTSB, the ALJ decided that Kratt’s conviction
alone was insufficient evidence to prove that an aircraft was
used in commission of the offense and that Kratt served as an
airman or was on the aircraft in connection with the offense.
Later, when presented with the transcript from Kratt’s plea
hearing, the ALJ decided that the transcript provided
sufficient evidence that Kratt served as an airman in
commission of the offense to which he pled guilty.
The facts that the United States presented established that
Kratt had served as the pilot of a plane carrying 200 pounds
of marijuana. When the judge at the plea hearing asked Kratt
whether the “factual basis” presented by the government was
“essentially correct,” Kratt responded, “Yes, sir.” The ALJ
rejected Kratt’s argument that he only meant that the facts
presented by the United States were the facts that the
government intended to prove, not that those were the actual
facts. The ALJ found that the “question asked by the court [at
10 Kratt v. Garvey No. 02-3324
Kratt’s plea hearing] was clear and unequivocal and does not
reasonably permit the construction urged by [Kratt] now.”
Therefore, we find that the ALJ relied on sufficient
evidence to uphold the Administrator’s determination that
Kratt served as an airman in commission of the offense to
which he pled guilty. Contrary to Kratt’s contention, the ALJ
relied not just on Kratt’s conviction, but also considered the
evidence in the transcript from Kratt’s guilty plea hearing.
Furthermore, although the ALJ determined that the
testimony from Kratt’s plea hearing was sufficient evidence
to support revocation of Kratt’s pilot’s license, the ALJ
nevertheless heard testimony from Kratt regarding his
conviction. Kratt admits that he piloted the aircraft in which
the marijuana was transported, and admits in his answer filed
before the NTSB that he served as the pilot in commission of
the offense, but he denies that he was a willing participant.
Kratt also argues that the term “served” as an airman
“connotes that the individual knowingly and willingly used an
airplane in the commission of a crime.” Pet’r Br. at 8.
Section 44710(b)(1), however, contains no such requirement.
Rather, the statute states that the Administrator must find that
the “individual served as an airman, or was on the aircraft, in
connection with committing, or facilitating the commission
of, the offense.” 49 U.S.C.A. § 44710(b)(1)(B). There is no
requirement, therefore, that one knowingly and willingly
serve as an airman prior to revocation of the individual’s
pilot’s license. Nor is there a requirement that one serve as an
airman at all. Rather, one need only be on the aircraft.
Despite what Kratt claims about his willingness to pilot his
airplane, he does not deny that he was on the aircraft during
commission of the offense to which he pled guilty.
To the extent that the statute requires that an individual act
knowingly or willingly prior to having his pilot’s license
revoked, that requirement is embedded in the requirement that
the individual be convicted of a drug-related offense. Indeed,

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No. 02-3324 Kratt v. Garvey 11
the crime to which Kratt pled guilty includes the requirement
that he acted “knowingly or intentionally.” 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 841(a) (West 2003). During Kratt’s guilty plea hearing, the
judge informed Kratt of these elements of the crime, and Kratt
chose to plead guilty.
Although Kratt argues that he flew Andre Johnson and his
companions only under duress, the ALJ noted that the
Administrator cannot question the validity of Kratt’s guilty
plea when deciding whether to revoke his pilot’s license. The
revocation statute expressly states that the “Administrator has
no authority . . . to review whether an airman violated a law
of the United States or a State related to a controlled
substance.” 49 U.S.C.A. § 44710(b)(3); see also Rawlins v.
NTSB, 837 F.2d 1327, 1329 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Congress
obviously determined that a harsh penalty was the only
advisable response to drug trafficking violations by FAA-
certified pilots.”). Additionally, NTSB precedent establishes
that it may not entertain a collateral attack on Kratt’s
conviction. See Hinson v. Manning, NTSB Order No. EA-
4363, Docket No. SE-13714, 1995 NTSB LEXIS 48, *3 (May
10, 1995); Hinson v. Gilliland, NTSB Order No. EA-4149,
Docket No. SE-12706, 1994 NTSB LEXIS 113, *3 n.7 (Apr.
14, 1994). Kratt’s belated defense of duress is one that he
could have raised in his criminal proceeding in lieu of a guilty
plea, but it is too late to do so now.
Finally, Kratt argues that the Administrator’s interpretation
of the revocation statute is too broad because it would require
revocation of a commercial pilot’s license if the pilot flew a
plane on which a passenger was carrying illegal drugs. This
is not true, however, because the statute requires that the pilot
be convicted of a drug-related offense before revocation of
the pilot’s license. In Kratt’s hypothetical, there is no reason
that a commercial pilot would be convicted of a drug-related
crime if unbeknownst to the pilot, a passenger carries illegal
drugs onto the plane. In this case, however, Kratt has pled
guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.
12 Kratt v. Garvey No. 02-3324
1The NT SB did not co nsider Kratt’s due process argum ent. Rather,
in its Order Denying Reconsideration, the NTSB noted that “[t]o the
extent that [Kratt] has articulated for the first time in his petition a
constitutional challenge to the Adm inistrator’s authority to use a criminal
conviction to support a certificate revocation, it is answer enough to no te
that the [N TS B] can not entertain such arguments.”
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the NTSB’s
decision affirming the Administrator’s order revoking Kratt’s
pilot’s license is supported by substantial evidence.
B. Due Process
1. Facial Challenge to 49 U.S.C. § 44710
Kratt argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right
to due process when the Administrator revoked his pilot’s
license based on his conviction for possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute.1 At oral argument, counsel for Kratt
argued that 49 U.S.C. § 44710(b) is unconstitutional on its
face because it provides for automatic revocation of a pilot’s
license when a pilot is convicted of certain drug-related
crimes.
In determining what procedural due process protections are
required, we must consider the following three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirements would entail.
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). With
respect to the first factor, the private interest at stake under 49
U.S.C. § 44710(b) is a pilot’s license. A pilot’s license is a

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No. 02-3324 Kratt v. Garvey 13
sufficiently important interest that a licensee is entitled to
some due process protections when it is revoked. See Bennett
v. NTSB, 66 F.3d 1130, 1137 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that
Fifth Amendment due process protections apply to revocation
of pilot’s license); see also Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112
(1977) (noting that due process protections are required for
deprivation of driver’s license); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,
539 (1971) (holding that due process is required for
revocation of driver’s license). Although revocation of a
pilot’s license may significantly impair the ability of a
professional pilot to earn a living, such a license is generally
not essential to a person’s survival. See Dixon, 431 U.S. at
113 (finding that driver’s license is not “so vital and essential
as are social insurance payments on which the recipient may
depend for his very subsistence”) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970)).
The second Matthews factor requires us to consider the risk
of erroneous deprivation under the procedures provided in 49
U.S.C. § 44710 and the potential value of additional
procedural safeguards. See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. The
statute in this case permits a licensee to appeal the decision of
the Administrator to the NTSB, which “shall affirm or reverse
the order after providing notice and an opportunity for a
hearing on the record.” § 44710(d)(1). Notice and an
evidentiary hearing, as provided under the statute, are the
touchstones of procedural due process. See Matthews, 424
U.S. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is
the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.’”) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 552 (1965)); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
267–68 (1970) (noting that notice and an evidentiary hearing
are the general procedures that due process affords).
In some cases, the question before courts has been whether
due process mandates a pre-revocation hearing or whether a
hearing after a license or other entitlement has been revoked
is sufficient. In Goldberg, for example, the Supreme Court
held that a person is entitled to an evidentiary hearing before
14 Kratt v. Garvey No. 02-3324
2Kratt even admits in his brief that “[t]he existing system in the
NTSB is exceptional in its attempt to pro vide notice and hearing as a
matter of course prior to revocation, unlike many system s that have only
post-revocation hearings.”
welfare benefits are revoked because such benefits may be
essential to a person’s subsistence. 397 U.S. at 264. On the
other hand, a post-revocation hearing is sufficient for
revocation of social security disability benefits. Matthews,
424 U.S. at 340–41. A post-revocation hearing is also
sufficient when a driver’s license is revoked based on
numerous traffic violations or accidents, especially where
hardship or commercial necessity would allow the licensee to
obtain a restricted license between the time of revocation and
the hearing. Dixon, 431 U.S. at 113.
In this case, however, we need not decide whether a pre-
revocation hearing is required when a pilot’s license is
revoked because the statute in fact provides for a pre-
revocation hearing.2 When a pilot appeals the
Administrator’s revocation of a license, the revocation is
stayed until the NTSB decides the appeal, except in
extraordinary circumstances where the Administrator advises
the NTSB that the safety of air transportation requires an
immediate revocation. 49 U.S.C.A. § 44710(d)(2). In cases
where the Administrator requires immediate revocation, the
NTSB must decide the appeal within sixty days. Id. This
provision permitting the Administrator to require immediate
revocation for safety reasons does not deprive a licensee of
due process because an opportunity for a hearing is
nevertheless provided and the public’s safety justifies
revocation before the hearing. See Dixon, 431 U.S. at 114
(finding that prompt removal of unsafe drivers from the road
justified use of post-revocation hearings for driver’s license
revocations based on multiple traffic violations or accidents).
In this case, Kratt was afforded a pre-revocation hearing.
He argues, however, that § 44710 on its faces deprives

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No. 02-3324 Kratt v. Garvey 15
licensees of procedural due process because it requires an
automatic revocation of a pilot’s license in the sense that the
Administrator and the NTSB may not review whether a
licensee in fact committed the drug-related crime for which he
was convicted. 49 U.S.C.A. § 44710(b)(3). The statute does
require a finding that the licensee was convicted of a drug-
related felony, that an aircraft was used in commission of the
offense, and that the licensee served as an airman or was on
the aircraft in connection with committing the offense. 49
U.S.C.A. § 44710(b)(1). Due process, however, does not
require that a licensee be permitted an opportunity to probe
the merits of his criminal conviction. Rather, the licensee
must address the merits of his conviction during the criminal
proceedings concerning the criminal charges against him. See
Dixon, 431 U.S. at 113 (finding that automatic revocation of
driver’s license based on convictions for numerous traffic
violations did not risk erroneous deprivation of license); Bell,
402 U.S. at 540 (finding that adjudication of liability for a
traffic accident was not appropriate during an administrative
hearing concerning the potential revocation of a driver’s
license). Therefore, the fact that the statute prohibits the
Administrator from reviewing the merits of a criminal
conviction does not risk erroneous deprivation of a pilot’s
license.
The third Matthews factor requires us to consider the
government’s regulatory interest and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that additional procedural safeguards
would require. See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. We need not
give this factor much consideration because no additional
procedures are required to afford due process under § 44710.
The statute already provides for notice and an evidentiary
hearing on the record before revocation of a pilot’s license.
Therefore, we find that 49 U.S.C. § 44710 provides
adequate procedural safeguards when a pilot’s license is
revoked. By providing notice and an opportunity for a pre-
revocation evidentiary hearing on the record, the statute
provides all that due process requires.
16 Kratt v. Garvey No. 02-3324
2. Application of 49 U.S.C. § 44710 in Kratt’s Case
Kratt also argues in his brief that the application of 49
U.S.C. § 44710(b) in this case denied him of due process.
Kratt essentially makes two arguments. First, he argues that
use of his conviction as grounds for revocation denied him of
due process because he had no notice when he pled guilty that
his pilot’s license would be revoked. Second, he argues that
he had no opportunity for a hearing on the issue of whether he
served as an airman in commission of the offense to which he
pled guilty because the ALJ relied solely on his conviction to
uphold the Administrator’s revocation of his pilot’s license.
The Administrator argues that due process did not require
Kratt to be informed of all possible consequences of his guilty
plea and that he was afforded due process during his
revocation proceedings before the Administrator and the
NTSB.
Kratt contends that he was deprived of due process when he
pled guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute
because he was not given notice that he could lose his pilot’s
license for pleading guilty. The Administrator argues that
there is no constitutional requirement that a criminal
defendant be informed of all possible consequences of a
guilty plea. The court accepting a criminal defendant’s guilty
plea “is under no constitutional obligation to inform the
defendant of all the possible collateral consequences of the
plea.” King v. Dutton, 17 F.3d 151, 153 (6th Cir. 1994). “A
collateral consequence is one that ‘remains beyond the control
and responsibility of the district court in which that
conviction was entered.’” El-Nobani v. United States, 287
F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002) (deciding that “deportation is
collateral to conviction”) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez,
202 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2000)). Just like deportation in El-
Nobani, revocation of Kratt’s pilot’s license is a matter
beyond the control and responsibility of the district court that
accepted Kratt’s guilty plea. Therefore, Kratt’s constitutional
rights were not violated when the district court failed to notify

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No. 02-3324 Kratt v. Garvey 17
him that his pilot’s license would be revoked if he pled guilty
to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.
In any event, the real issue before this Court is not whether
Kratt received due process during his criminal proceedings,
but rather, whether he was afforded due process in
proceedings related to the revocation of his pilot’s license.
The Administrator is not permitted to review whether Kratt in
fact committed a drug-related crime, 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 44710(b)(3); rather, the Administrator need determine only
whether Kratt was convicted of a drug-related crime, 49
U.S.C.A. § 44710(b)(1). Kratt does not deny that he was
convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.
Section 44710(b)(1) requires only that Kratt have been
convicted of such a crime before his pilot’s license is revoked.
The statute does not require, nor does it permit, the
Administrator to probe whether Kratt in fact committed the
crime. Therefore, there is no risk of erroneous deprivation of
Kratt’s license if the Administrator fails to consider evidence
mitigating Kratt’s conviction. Although Kratt may not like
the result of his pleading guilty to a crime he claims he did
not commit, whether he in fact committed the crime does not
bear on whether his pilot’s license was erroneously revoked.
Although Kratt contends that he had no opportunity for a
hearing on the issue of whether he served as an airman or was
on the aircraft in connection with the offense to which he pled
guilty, Kratt in fact did receive numerous opportunities to
present evidence regarding his participation in the crime.
Kratt first received a letter from the FAA notifying him that
he was under investigation in June 1997. He was given an
opportunity to provide the FAA with information at that time,
and he sent the FAA a seven-page handwritten letter. The
FAA next sent Kratt a Notice of Proposed Certificate Action
in August 1997, notifying Kratt that the FAA planned to
revoke his pilot’s license. Kratt was then afforded a
telephone conference with the FAA in February 1998 before
the FAA issued its Order of Revocation in April 1998. Kratt
then appealed the FAA’s order to the NTSB, and after the
18 Kratt v. Garvey No. 02-3324
FAA’s motion for summary judgment was granted in part and
denied in part, Kratt received a hearing on the record before
an ALJ in November 1999.
Therefore, we conclude that Kratt received all the process
he was due when the Administrator revoked his pilot’s license
and the NTSB affirmed the Administrator’s order.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the order of the
NTSB affirming the Administrator’s revocation of Kratt’s
pilot’s license.

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