United States of America v. Jason Eric Swanson

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0289P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 03a0289p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JASON ERIC SWANSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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No. 01-1934
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 99-80890—Patrick J. Duggan, District Judge.
Argued: December 5, 2002
Decided and Filed: August 15, 2003
Before: BOGGS, SILER, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Corbett E. O’Meara, O’MEARA & O’MEARA,
Grosse Pointe Farms, Michigan, for Appellant. Carl D.
Gilmer-Hill, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Detroit,
Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Corbett E. O’Meara,
O’MEARA & O’MEARA, Grosse Pointe Farms, Michigan,
for Appellant. Carl D. Gilmer-Hill, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.
2 United States v. Swanson No. 01-1934
_________________
OPINION
_________________
BOGGS, Circuit Judge. Jason Eric Swanson appeals his
conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). After a jury trial,
Swanson was sentenced to 90 months of imprisonment.
Swanson argues that the district court erred in failing to
suppress two pieces of evidence: (1) the firearm that was the
basis of his conviction, because it was the fruit of the
unlawful seizure of his automobile; and (2) statements
attributed to him, because they were elicited in violation of
the Miranda rule. Swanson argues that the introduction of the
firearm and the statements into evidence rendered his
conviction unsound, and that the case should be remanded for
a new trial. For the following reasons, we affirm Swanson’s
conviction.
I
Swanson was prosecuted for possession of a firearm that
was discovered in a white Pontiac Grand Am that was seized
during the execution in Warren, Michigan, of an arrest
warrant for Daniel Rick. Rick was suspected by federal
agents of having trafficked in illegal firearms. Rick was seen
driving the Grand Am on January 24 and 25, 1998 in the
Detroit, Michigan area. The car is registered to Swanson’s
mother, Sherrie Swanson. On January 25, 1998, Rick was
seen driving this vehicle in Effingham, Illinois, to and from
a motel where he met with a cooperating witness.
During the meeting, Rick delivered a fully automatic
firearm to the cooperating witness, and discussed with him
additional transactions involving silencers and weapons.
Between January 30 and February 25, 1998, Rick had
telephone conversations with the cooperating witness in
which they discussed the additional transactions. On

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No. 01-1934 United States v. Swanson 3
1The validity of the warrant is not at issue.
February 24, 1998, Rick received a Federal Express package
from the cooperating witness that contained money to be used
by Rick to buy silencers and automatic weapons.
Federal agents executed an arrest warrant, apparently
obtained one or two days earlier, for Rick on February 26,
1998 at his workplace, the Marked for Life tattoo parlor.1
Agents had been watching the shop and had confirmed Rick’s
presence. Special Agent Mark Davidson testified at the
suppression hearing in Swanson’s case that Rick had been
seen arriving at work in the same Grand Am he had been seen
driving to Illinois, although the car was driven by Swanson.
Due to the small size of the tattoo parlor, the law
enforcement officers executing the arrest warrant for Rick
ordered the seven or eight people inside the tattoo parlor to
come outside so that Rick could be identified and arrested.
The officers’ weapons were drawn, but Special Agent
William Fleming testified at the suppression hearing that the
team members were holding their weapons down at their
sides. The agents identified themselves to the group from the
tattoo parlor, explained that they were executing an arrest
warrant for Rick, and explained that the individuals aside
from Rick would not be released until they were identified
and the agents could verify there were no outstanding
warrants for their arrest. The people from inside the shop
were put up against the wall of the shop and frisked for
weapons. They were ordered to produce identification. The
agents identified Rick and arrested him. They also received
permission from the owner of the tattoo parlor to search the
inside. Agents then ran the names provided by the people
through the Law Enforcement Information Network
(“LEIN”).
Swanson was among those who left the shop. He was
approached by Agent Fleming and was interviewed while the
4 United States v. Swanson No. 01-1934
2Swanson’s counsel asked several leading questions at this point
suggesting that Swanson had indicated a desire not to answer any more
questions. Fleming initially answere d these questions in a manner that
suggested that Swanson had indicated a desire for the questioning to stop,
but, shortly thereafte r, he testified that Swanson had only said that he
didn’t want to answer the question ab out drugs.
agents were identifying the people present and searching the
shop. Fleming testified at the suppression hearing that had
anyone attempted to walk away before being identified and
cleared, the person would have been stopped. Swanson’s
name was still being run through the LEIN. The conversation
took place outside, in public view, in an area on the north side
of the shop.
Fleming testified that he advised Swanson that he was not
under arrest and did not have to speak with him. He testified
that Swanson said that he was willing to talk. Swanson then
provided Fleming with background information, and told him
that the Grand Am belonged to him. Fleming then asked
Swanson whether there were guns or drugs in the car.
Fleming’s report indicated that Swanson answered, “I don’t
mess with drugs. Drugs are for niggers.” Fleming pressed
Swanson regarding whether there were guns in the car.
Swanson answered that he didn’t want to answer that
question2. Fleming then reminded Swanson that he didn’t
have to answer any questions that he didn’t want to. Fleming
asked Swanson if there was anything in the car that would get
him in trouble. Swanson replied yes. Fleming asked
Swanson for consent to search the car. Swanson said, “If I
talk to you I’m screwed.” Swanson did not give consent to
law enforcement officers to search the Grand Am.
After agents found that Swanson did not have any
outstanding warrants, he was released. The agents seized the
Grand Am, and in a subsequent search of the vehicle found a
handgun in the front console between the front seats.

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No. 01-1934 United States v. Swanson 5
On May 10, 2000, a federal grand jury returned a one-count
indictment against Swanson charging him with being a felon
in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). Swanson filed motions to suppress the
statements and the firearm found in his car. After evidentiary
hearings, the district court denied both motions. During
Swanson’s jury trial, the evidence regarding his statements
and the weapon was introduced and admitted without
objection. The jury found Swanson guilty on the sole count
of the indictment. The district court sentenced Swanson to 90
months in prison, and a three-year term of supervised release.
Swanson filed a timely notice of appeal.
II
Swanson argues that the agents had no probable cause to
seize the Grand Am, and that the introduction of the evidence
of the firearm found in the vehicle violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. He also argues that the statements
introduced against him at trial were elicited in violation of his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because he
was in custody and received no Miranda warning.
A. The Miranda argument
Swanson argues that he was in custody at the time that he
made his statements to Fleming and was thus entitled to a
Miranda warning. He argues that the district court erred by
denying his motion to suppress these statements. When
reviewing suppression issues, we review a district court’s
factual findings for clear error, and its legal conclusions de
novo. United States v. Crossley, 224 F.3d 847, 860 (6th Cir.
2000); United States v. Salvo, 133 F.3d 943, 948 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1122, 118 S. Ct. 1805 (1998). The
question of whether a defendant was “in custody” is a mixed
question of fact and law, and is thus reviewed de novo. Salvo,
133 F.3d at 948 (citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99,
100-03, 116 S. Ct. 457, 460 (1995)).
6 United States v. Swanson No. 01-1934
A defendant may not be “compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The
Supreme Court held in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
478-79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1630 (1966) that a suspect subject to
custodial interrogation must first be given notice of his or her
right against self-incrimination. Statements obtained during
custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda may not be
admitted for certain purposes in a criminal trial. Id. at 479.
However, the obligation to administer a Miranda warning to
a suspect only arises “where there has been such a restriction
on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’” Oregon
v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S. Ct. 711, 714 (1977)
(per curiam).
As Swanson does not challenge the validity of the
investigatory stop that led to his questioning, we assume for
the purposes of this appeal that the agents conducted a lawful
detention of Swanson, analogous to a Terry stop. See Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). A Terry stop is a
“‘narrowly drawn’ exception to the probable cause
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v.
Richardson, 949 F.2d 851, 856 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 689, 105 S. Ct. 1568,
1577 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment)). An
officer may stop a person upon reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. Ibid. “The officer may ask the detainee a
moderate number of questions to determine his identity and
to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the
officer’s suspicions. But the detainee is not obliged to
respond. And, unless the encounter provides the officer with
probable cause to arrest him, he must then be released.” Ibid.
The very nature of a Terry stop means that a detainee is not
free to leave during the investigation, yet is not entitled to
Miranda rights. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-41,
104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150-51 (1984). Therefore, the pertinent
question is whether Swanson was “in custody” during the
investigatory detention for the purposes of determining
whether his Fifth Amendment rights were violated.

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No. 01-1934 United States v. Swanson 7
In determining whether a defendant was subject to custodial
interrogation we look to the totality of the circumstances “to
determine ‘how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position
would have understood the situation.’” Salvo, 133 F.3d at
948 (quoting United States v. Phillip, 948 F.2d 241, 247 (6th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 930, 112 S. Ct. 1994
(1992)). The “ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a
formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the
degree associated with a formal arrest.” United States v.
Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 291 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting California
v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S. Ct. 3517, 3520
(1983) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
After considering the totality of the circumstances of this
investigatory detention, we conclude that Swanson was not
subject to custodial interrogation. Although Swanson was not
free to leave during the questioning, the restraint exercised
never reached the level associated with “formal arrest or a
coercive context tantamount to custody.” Salvo, 133 F.3d at
953.
The first factor this court considers is whether a reasonable
person in the defendant’s position would feel free to leave.
Crossley, 224 F.3d at 861. However, as noted above, in the
context of a Terry-style investigatory detention, a person is
not free to leave, at least temporarily. Thus, the first factor in
the determination weighs in favor of defining Swanson’s
detention and questioning as a custodial interrogation. Other
factors we take into consideration include:
(1) the purpose of the questioning; (2) whether the place
of the questioning was hostile or coercive; (3) the length
of the questioning; and (4) other indicia of custody such
as whether the suspect was informed at the time that the
questioning was voluntary or that the suspect was free to
leave or to request the officers to do so; whether the
suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of movement
during questioning; and whether the suspect initiated
8 United States v. Swanson No. 01-1934
contact with the police . . . [or] acquiesced to their
requests to answer some questions.
Ibid. (quoting Salvo, 133 F.3d at 950).
The place of the questioning was not hostile or coercive.
The questioning took place outside, in a public space, with
other agents and at least seven or eight other people from
inside the shop nearby. The Supreme Court addressed
detentions in public spaces in Berkemer in the context of
detentions during traffic stops. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 438-39,
104 S. Ct. at 3149-50. The Court noted that “exposure to
public view both reduces the ability of an unscrupulous
policeman to use illegitimate means to elicit self-
incriminating statements and diminishes the [detainee’s] fear
that, if he does not cooperate, he will be subjected to abuse.”
Id. at 438, 104 S. Ct. at 3149.
The place of the questioning in the present case is
substantially less hostile or coercive than in other cases in
which this court or the Supreme Court has held that a detainee
was not entitled to a Miranda warning. See Beheler, 463 U.S.
at 1125-26, 103 S. Ct. at 3520 (detainee not “in custody”
although questioning took place in a police station);
Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495-96, 97 S. Ct. at 714 (questioning
at State Police offices behind closed doors not a custodial
interrogation where defendant was informed he was not under
arrest and was allowed to leave at the conclusion of the
interview); Mason v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d 604, 632 (6th Cir.
2003) (defendant not in custody although transported to
police station in police car as defendant voluntarily agreed to
answer questions, was told he was free to leave, and was not
under arrest during interview). Moreover, this case is
analogous to Salvo, in which this court noted that the
locations of defendant’s interviews, his dormitory computer
room and a Burger King parking lot, were not hostile or
coercive environments. Salvo, 133 F.3d at 950-51.

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No. 01-1934 United States v. Swanson 9
Swanson also possessed unrestrained freedom of movement
during the questioning by Fleming. While he was not free to
leave until his name was cleared through the LEIN, he was
not in handcuffs or in any other way restrained. Moreover, he
was not arrested at the conclusion of the interview. While it
is unclear from the testimony how long the questioning lasted,
it is clear that the questioning only lasted as long as the time
that it took to clear Swanson’s name through the LEIN. It
was not a prolonged interrogation, and Swanson was told that
he would be free to leave as soon as his name was cleared.
Most important to our analysis, though, is that Swanson
was explicitly told by Fleming that he was not under arrest
and that he did not have so speak with him if he did not
choose to. Swanson readily acquiesced, and seemed very
cooperative and willing to talk. As noted in Salvo, a
statement by a law enforcement officer to a suspect that he is
not under arrest is an important part of the analysis of whether
the suspect was “in custody.” Salvo, 133 F.3d at 951 (suspect
not in custody where he was advised he was not under arrest
and was free to leave at any time); see also Mathiason, 429
U.S. at 495, 97 S. Ct. at 713-14 (defendant who was
questioned at police station was not in custody where officer
informed him that he was not under arrest and was free to
leave at the end of the interview); United States v. Sivils, 960
F.2d 587, 598 (6th Cir. 1992) (defendant not in custody where
he was informed before questioning that he was not under
arrest); United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 951 (6th Cir.)
(record would not support finding that defendants were in
custody where told that they were not under arrest and were
free to terminate questioning at any time), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 840, 111 S. Ct. 116 (1990).
Swanson argues that the facts in his case are analogous to
the facts in United States v. Jones, 846 F.2d 358 (6th Cir.
1988). In Jones, the defendant was stopped by three police
cars after the police received a call from a citizen who
reported that he had witnessed a man place a long-barreled
rifle or gun in the front seat of his car. Id. at 359. According
10 United States v. Swanson No. 01-1934
to the witness, the man appeared to be angry or was arguing
with his female companion. Ibid. The witness gave the
police a description of the car and a license plate number.
Ibid. One unmarked and two marked police cars, all with
lights flashing, stopped Jones in a way that his car was
physically prevented from leaving the scene. Ibid. During
the brief encounter with the police, Jones, a convicted felon,
admitted that he had a gun back at his apartment. Ibid. He
then followed the police back to his apartment in his own car.
Id. at 360. After a policeman looked for the gun in the
apartment and could not find it, Jones showed them where it
was and he was arrested. Ibid.
The issue on appeal in Jones was whether Jones gave
voluntary consent to the search of his apartment. The court
held that he did not. Id. at 362. It also held, unnecessarily,
that Jones was in custody when questioned and brought back
to his apartment, because the police had deprived Jones of his
“freedom of action” in a “significant way.” Id. at 361. First,
this holding might be considered dicta in that it was not
necessary to the determination of the issue on appeal.
Second, a bare conclusion that Jones was in custody because
he had been deprived of his “freedom of action” in a
“significant way” would be in direct contradiction to the
Supreme Court’s holding in Berkemer. In Berkemer, the
Court held that a motorist temporarily detained in a traffic
stop does not have the right to a Miranda warning even
though a “traffic stop significantly curtails the ‘freedom of
action’ of the driver . . . .” Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 436, 441,
104 S. Ct. at 3148, 3150.
Therefore, the court in Jones must have concluded that the
stop at issue was something more than the routine traffic stop
addressed in Berkemer. Indeed, a routine traffic stop does not
usually involve three police cars blocking the stopped vehicle.
In comparing Jones to the present case, however, it is clear
that there are significant differences. In Jones, the
questioning took place in a coercive atmosphere because
Jones was surrounded by three police cars with lights

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No. 01-1934 United States v. Swanson 11
flashing. There is also no indication that he was told that the
questioning was voluntary, or that he would be free to leave
at the end of it, although he was told that he did not have to
let the police officers search his car. Contrary to Swanson’s
assertion, the test for whether a person is in custody for
Miranda purposes is not simply whether a reasonable person
would have felt free to leave in the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation. Although the “felt free to leave” inquiry
may be a factor for consideration, see Crossley, 224 F.3d at
861; Salvo, 133 F.3d at 949-50, the “ultimate inquiry is
simply whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom
of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.”
Knox, 839 F.2d at 291 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463
U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S. Ct. 3517, 3520 (1983) (per curiam)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
The court in Jones concluded that based on the totality of
the circumstances, there was “a restraint of movement of the
degree associated with formal arrest.” In reviewing the
totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Swanson was
not in custody for Miranda purposes, and that the district
court did not err when it denied the motion to suppress his
statements.
B. The Fourth Amendment argument
Swanson argues that the seizure of his car was without any
legal justification, as the agents did not have probable cause.
He argues that at the time of the seizure, the agents did not
have any information that Rick (the target of the agents’ arrest
warrant) had been in the car for over a month, and had no
information that there was evidence of a crime inside the car.
We review the district court's decision on Swanson’s
motion to suppress under “two complementary standards.
First, the district court's findings of fact are upheld unless
clearly erroneous. Second, the court's legal conclusion as to
the existence of probable cause is reviewed de novo.” United
12 United States v. Swanson No. 01-1934
States v. Leake, 998 F.2d 1359, 1362 (6th Cir. 1993)
(citations omitted).
A warrantless seizure of an automobile is reasonable if
there is “probable cause that an automobile contains evidence
or fruits of a crime plus ‘exigent circumstances.’” United
States v. Beck, 511 F.2d 997, 1001 (6th Cir. 1975). The
government urges us to hold that the “automobile exception”
to the warrant requirement justified the seizure and
subsequent search of Swanson’s car. However, the question
requires more than a mere invocation of the automobile
exception. The Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971), stated that
“[t]he word ‘automobile’ is not a talisman in whose presence
the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears.” Id. at
461, 91 S. Ct. at 2035. The Court in Coolidge distinguished
between the seizure of an automobile parked in the
defendant’s driveway and one that the police have stopped
and is readily mobile. Id. at 461 n.8, 91 S. Ct. at 2036.
The Supreme Court’s holding in Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925), extended only to
warrantless searches of automobiles where the searching
officer had probable cause and the car was stopped on the
highway. Id. at 156, 45 S. Ct. at 286. In Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975 (1970), the Court held
that if a warrantless search is justified under Carroll, the
police may seize the car and search it at the station house
without a warrant. Id. at 52. In Coolidge, the Court stated
that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement
extended only to circumstances in which “it is not practicable
to secure a warrant.” Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 462, 91 S. Ct. at
2036 (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153, 45 S. Ct. at 285). It
held that Carroll would not have justified a warrantless
search of Coolidge’s car at the time of his arrest, and thus, the
subsequent search at the station house was also illegal. Id. at
463, 91 S. Ct. at 2036.

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No. 01-1934 United States v. Swanson 13
The reasons the Court ultimately concluded that a
warrantless search of Coolidge’s car would not have been
justified by the automobile exception are instructive in the
analysis of the present case. The Court stated that what
distinguished the seizure of Coolidge’s car from the search in
Carroll was that there was “no alerted criminal bent on flight,
no fleeting opportunity on an open highway after a hazardous
chase, no contraband or stolen goods or weapons, no
confederates waiting to move the evidence, not even the
inconvenience of a special police detail to guard the
immobilized automobile.” Id. at 462, 91 S. Ct. at 2036. The
police knew where the car was regularly parked, they arrested
Coolidge and escorted his wife to another location, had the
premises guarded by two policemen throughout the night, and
the evidence seized consisted of vacuum sweepings. Id. at
448, 460-61, 91 S. Ct. at 2028, 2035. The Court assumed the
police had probable cause for the purposes of delineating the
automobile exception. Id. at 458, 91 S. Ct. at 2034.
We conclude that the agents had both probable cause and
justification for seizing and searching Swanson’s automobile
without a warrant. First, the agents had probable cause to
seize and search the vehicle. Rick had used the Grand Am to
deliver an automatic weapon thirty days earlier to a
confidential informant; thus the vehicle was used as an
instrumentality of the crime. The agents also had ample facts
at their disposal to support their belief that there was further
evidence of a crime inside the car. Only two days earlier,
Rick had received a Federal Express package from the
confidential informant containing money as payment for
automatic weapons and silencers that Rick was to deliver by
United Parcel Service. The agents had seen Rick arrive for
work at the tattoo parlor in the Grand Am that day. When
they searched the tattoo parlor, the empty Federal Express
package was found in the trash. They also found three
handguns, but not any automatic weapons that might be the
ones that were to be delivered to the confidential informant.
Moreover, the agents had just spoken with Swanson.
Swanson had given evasive answers only to questions about
14 United States v. Swanson No. 01-1934
guns. When asked if there was anything in the car that could
get him into trouble, he replied yes. There was “a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime” would be
found inside the automobile. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983).
There were also exigent circumstances that justified the
warrantless seizure and search. The Supreme Court has noted
that “[t]he mobility of automobiles, . . . creates circumstances
of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous
enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.”
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391, 105 S. Ct. 2066,
2069 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case,
the agents were not arresting Swanson. He would have been
free to drive the car away, and perhaps destroy or dispose of
evidence, or even the car itself. The evidence they believed
they would find in the car was contraband or weapons. See
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 460, 91 S. Ct. at 2035 (distinguishing
the objects the police expected to find in the automobile from
objects that are “stolen [or] contraband [or] dangerous”).
Indeed, the agents could have guarded both Swanson and the
car until a warrant could be obtained. However, that is no
less of an intrusion than the seizure and subsequent search of
the car. See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52, 90 S. Ct. at 1981.
While it is true that the agents had known for some time the
role the Grand Am played in their investigation of Rick, from
a review of the testimony at the suppression hearing, it
appears that the warrant to arrest Rick issued only one or two
days before it was executed and the automobile seized.
Moreover, the package containing the purchase money had
arrived only two days before the execution of the warrant. As
the agents testified, it was the belief that this money or the
automatic weapons Rick was selling would be in the car that
formed the basis of their probable cause to seize it.
The agents would have been justified in searching the car
at the scene according to Carroll. Therefore, they were
justified in seizing the car and searching it at a later time.

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No. 01-1934 United States v. Swanson 15
Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52, 90 S. Ct. at 1981; Autoworld
Specialty Cars, Inc. v. United States, 815 F.2d 385, 389 (6th
Cir. 1987) (upholding the warrantless seizure of cars out of a
showroom because the officers had probable cause and
because of the inherent mobility of cars); see also United
States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 511 (6th Cir.) (affirming
district court’s denial of motion to suppress evidence
recovered from a pickup truck because the agent had probable
cause to search the truck and the inherent mobility of the
truck), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1026 (2001).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Swanson’s
conviction.

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