Dianna Ferguson Weaver, individually v. Warren Shadoan

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0282P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 03a0282p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
DIANNA FERGUSON WEAVER,
individually and as
Administratrix of the Estate of
Stephen Lamont Weaver,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
WARREN SHADOAN and
VICTOR OWEN, in their
individual and official
capacities as officers of the
City of Oliver Springs,
Tennessee Police Department,
Defendants-Appellants.
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No. 01-5656
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville.
No. 98-00631—James H. Jarvis, District Judge.
Argued: October 31, 2002
Decided and Filed: August 13, 2003
2 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. No. 01-5656
*The Honorab le Ann Aldrich, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
Before: SILER and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges;
ALDRICH, District Judge.*
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: John C. Duffy, WATSON, HOLLOW &
REEVES, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellants. Herbert S.
Moncier, LAW OFFICES OF HERBERT S. MONCIER,
Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John C.
Duffy, WATSON, HOLLOW & REEVES, Knoxville,
Tennessee, for Appellants. Herbert S. Moncier, Ursula
Bailey, LAW OFFICES OF HERBERT S. MONCIER,
Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee.
SILER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which
ALDRICH, D. J., joined. DAUGHTREY, J. (pp. 26-29),
delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
SILER, Circuit Judge. Defendants, Officers Warren
Shadoan and Victor Owen (collectively, the “Officers”),
appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity on claims brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dianna Ferguson Weaver
(“Plaintiff”), Administratrix of the Estate of her son, Stephen
Lamont Weaver (“Weaver”), filed a civil rights action
alleging that Weaver was arrested without probable cause,
and that the Officers were deliberately indifferent to the
serious medical needs of Weaver, who died in police custody

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No. 01-5656 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. 3
after voluntarily ingesting a lethal dose of cocaine and then
repeatedly denying his ingestion of the drugs and refusing
medical treatment. The district court found that questions of
material fact remained to be determined. After carefully
reviewing the record, and drawing all reasonable inferences
in favor of Plaintiff, we find that Weaver’s Fourth and Eighth
Amendment rights were not violated. Therefore, we
REVERSE the ruling by the district court and REMAND for
the court to grant summary judgment to the Officers in their
individual capacities.
BACKGROUND
On October 18, 1997, Shadoan, an officer with over
fourteen years of police experience, was on patrol in Oliver
Springs, Tennessee, when he observed an unfamiliar vehicle
at the residence of David Futtrell, an individual who
cooperated with Shadoan during a burglary investigation at
Futtrell’s residence a few months earlier. Shadoan was aware
that Futtrell was having trouble with some black men.
Because Shadoan had just seen Futtrell at the Town and
Country Market, and thus knew that Futtrell was not at home,
he became suspicious of the unfamiliar vehicle. He then
observed a black man walking out of the front door of
Futtrell’s residence and enter into the vehicle in question.
Shadoan approached the vehicle to get the license plate
number, but the vehicle did not have a license plate. It did,
however, have dark tinted windows with a temporary tag
behind the rear window. Shadoan allegedly had difficulty
reading the temporary tag because of the dark window tint.
Nonetheless, Shadoan thought the temporary tag was expired,
bearing the date 10-17-97. The vehicle then turned into and
stopped at the Town and Country Market. Believing that the
tag was expired, that the window tint was too dark, and that
there may have been criminal activity at the Futtrell
residence, Shadoan drove his cruiser into the Town and
Country Market and turned on his blue lights behind the
stopped vehicle.
4 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. No. 01-5656
1Owen, also on patrol for the Oliver Springs Police Department,
heard Shadoan announce his traffic stop over the police radio and decided
to assist Shadoan. Apparently, it is customary for Oliver Springs police
officers to assist one another if not busy.
Weaver exited his vehicle and met Shadoan at the rear of
the car. Weaver inquired as to why he was being stopped and
Shadoan indicated it was because of the car’s expired tag.
Weaver responded that his tag was not expired, pointing out
that the alleged 7 was in fact a 9. Upon closer examination,
Shadoan confirmed that the tag had not expired. Shadoan
then asked why Weaver and his passenger, William Booker,
were at the Futtrell residence. Weaver first stated that he had
picked up Booker from nearby Oak Ridge, Tennessee, had
gone to Clinton, Tennessee, and that the two were now on
their way back to Oak Ridge. Shadoan pointed out, however,
that the location of Futtrell’s residence was inconsistent with
this story. Weaver then stated that he did not know what
Booker and he were doing at Futtrell’s residence. During this
questioning, Weaver was allegedly becoming increasingly
nervous. Shadoan claims that Weaver was rubbing his hands
together, clutching his arms and shuffling his feet. Weaver’s
behavior, in conjunction with his responses, raised suspicions
for Shadoan. According to Shadoan, even though the
temporary tag had not expired, he did not consider the traffic
stop over. It was his view that the temporary tag was not
lawfully displayed due to the dark tinted windows.
Some time during this questioning, Owen arrived on the
scene.1 Weaver then left the Officers’ presence and went into
the Town and Country Market. During this time, Shadoan
questioned Booker, who explained that the reason he was at
the Futtrell residence was to collect some money from David
Cooper. Cooper was known by Shadoan to be engaged in the
distribution of marijuana and cocaine out of his home, which
was located near the Futtrell residence. Booker also provided
Shadoan with information that was not entirely consistent

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No. 01-5656 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. 5
2Plaintiff asserts that Shadoan had no basis to believe that Futtrell
was a reliable inform ant or that Futtrell’s suspicion was reliable. This
point is factually inaccurate. The record sh ows that Futtrell had
cooperated with the police in a prior police investigation of a burglary at
his residence, and had cooperated in an investigation of a drive-by
shooting.
3Plaintiff alleges that Booker’s affidavit indicates that Shad oan did
not request permission to search W eaver. Booker’s affidavit, however,
only states that “[a]t no time did I hear either of the officers ask La monte
W eaver to search either Lamonte W eaver or the car.” Therefore, contrary
to Plaintiff’s position, Booker’s statement does not create a factual
dispute--it eliminates it. In effect, Booker merely alleges that he has no
knowledge of the Officers’ conversation with W eaver regarding consent.
Thus, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to refute Shadoan’s
assertions that he received W eaver’s consent to search his person and
automobile.
with that provided by Weaver. He also presented the Officers
with false identification.
Coincidentally, during this questioning, Futtrell came out
of the Town and Country Market. The Officers asked Futtrell
what he knew regarding either Weaver or Booker. Futtrell
told the Officers that neither Weaver nor Booker had any
business being at his residence and that they were probably
looking for the Cooper residence to sell cocaine. Futtrell’s
statements, in addition to Weaver’s inability to explain his
presence at Futtrell’s residence, raised Shadoan’s suspicion
that Weaver was involved in drug activity.2
Approximately ten to fifteen minutes into the stop, Shadoan
asked Weaver for permission to search his automobile and
person.3 It appears that Weaver consented to the search.
According to Shadoan, at this point, Weaver began clenching
and unclenching his fists and acting very nervous.
Shadoan conducted a pat-down search of Weaver and
noticed a lump in one of Weaver’s pockets, which he believed
6 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. No. 01-5656
4Plaintiff supplies an affidavit from Fermin De La Torre, a former
Oliver Springs dispatcher, which states that later on in the evening, after
the entire facts of this case had played out, Grant Lowe, Police Chief of
the Oliver Springs Police Department, stated that “Shadoan could not
have known what the lump was in W eaver’s poc ket because Officer
Shadoan had no way to tell what was in Mr. W eaver’s pocket.” This
conclusory statement, even assuming it was made, does not support an
inference that Shad oan did no t identify rocks of crack coca ine in
W eaver’s pocket. Chief Lowe was not present at the scene of the Weaver
arrest. Also, Plaintiff has not directed this court to any evidence that
Shadoan made a statement to Chief Lowe indicating he had fabricated his
suspicion as to the presence of crack cocaine. Therefore, Chief Lowe
cannot possibly know what Shad oan felt and what conclusions Shadoan
drew from his pat down of W eaver.
to be the size of five or six rocks of crack cocaine.4
According to Shadoan, when asked about the lump, Weaver
stated that it was a “wad of paper.” At this point, Shadoan
considered Weaver to be under arrest--although he did not
state so. Shadoan then asked Weaver to empty his pockets, at
which time Weaver suddenly began running from the scene.
The Officers chased Weaver and, with the help of a bystander,
took him into custody. The Oliver Springs Police Department
radio log reflects that the traffic stop of Weaver and Booker
occurred at 4:54 p.m., with the foot pursuit occurring at 4:58
p.m.
After handcuffing Weaver, the Officers then checked
Weaver’s pockets but found no drugs. Shadoan asked
Weaver where the drugs were, but Weaver did not respond.
As the Officers began walking Weaver back to the cruiser,
they noticed that Weaver appeared to have something in his
mouth. Neither Officer saw Weaver place anything in his
mouth. Weaver then refused Shadoan’s request to open his
mouth. Shadoan tried to get his fingers in Weaver’s mouth,
while simultaneously telling him not to swallow whatever it
was he had. Weaver then appeared to swallow something.
Weaver was placed in the back of Owen’s cruiser. He was
reported in custody at 5:10 p.m. After retracing the path of

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No. 01-5656 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. 7
5Plaintiff asserts, however, that according to an affidavit provided by
James N. Ramsey, District Attorney General for the Seventh Judicial
District, Weaver and Booker should not have gone to the Morgan Co unty
jail, but instead, should have been transferred to the Anderson C ounty Jail
and appeared before an Anderson County Magistrate. The district court
addressed this alleged due process violation and granted summary
judgement to all defendants on the issue. The district court found that
even assuming a due proc ess violation, “there is no proximate cause
between the alleged denial of due process and the decedent’s death. Even
if M r. W eaver had gone to another jail but refused to go to the ho spital,
he would no doubt have still died.” The court also found as “speculative”
Plaintiff’s claim that W eaver would not have died had he been sent to the
Anderson County Jail. This issue is not properly before us during this
interlocutory ap peal. Acco rdingly, we decline to address it.
the chase, the Officers discovered a piece of cellophane
wrapper, which they believed contained a residue with the
appearance of crack cocaine. Later lab tests conducted by the
Tennessee Bureau of Investigation did not identify the
substance as crack cocaine.
Booker stayed in the car during the chase and capture. He
was charged with public intoxication. Weaver was charged
with evading arrest and drug possession. Both men were
transported in Owen’s cruiser to the Oliver Springs Police
Department, where Weaver was placed in a holding cell.
There is no evidence to suggest that during the approximately
forty-five minutes to one hour that Weaver was at the station,
the Officers noticed any change in Weaver’s condition.
According to Police Chief Lowe, an agreement between the
Oliver Springs Police Department and Morgan County
required both men to be transported to the Morgan County
Jail.5 Therefore, Weaver and Booker were again placed in
Owen’s cruiser for transportation to the Morgan County Jail.
As Owen began pulling out of the station, Weaver asked what
the Officers were going to do with the piece of cellophane
that had been found at the arrest scene. Owen replied that the
evidence would be sent to the lab, and that if the results came
back positive, charges would likely be filed. According to
8 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. No. 01-5656
6The record is absent of physician testimony regarding what
treatment would have been availab le to W eaver had he been willing to
accept it. Plaintiff’s only medical evidence is from a pharmacist, who
stated that he would expect seizures with a cocaine overdose, and that
common treatment would include a gastric lavage or stomach pump,
which typically must be performed in a hospital emergency room.
Owen, “[a]t that point he immediately started shaking
violently” as if he was having a “seizure,” and then he became
“slumped over in the seat.” This testimony was later
supported by Booker, who stated in his affidavit that
“Lamonte [Weaver] began to get sick and was jerking in the
back seat of the police cruiser.” At 6:42 p.m., approximately
one hour and thirty-two minutes after Weaver was in custody,
Owen requested an ambulance to come to the police station
to examine Weaver. While waiting for the ambulance,
Shadoan checked on Weaver’s condition. Although Weaver’s
eyes were closed and he was not responding to questions, he
had a strong heartbeat and he appeared to be breathing
normally.
The Emergency Medical Technicians/paramedics arrived at
the Oliver Springs Police Department and examined Weaver.
One paramedic had twelve years of experience; the other had
ten years. Although the Officers had not seen Weaver ingest
any drugs, Shadoan requested that Weaver be assessed for
“possible drug reaction and/or overdose.” It appears that
neither of the paramedics called to the scene had experience
with treating someone who had swallowed cocaine. Also,
apparently, there is no paramedic protocol for responding to
the situation. Generally, paramedics would not be expected
to know how to treat someone who had ingested cocaine other
than to contact medical control and perhaps help induce the
individual to vomit.6
Despite numerous attempts by paramedics, Weaver refused
treatment. When asked if he wanted to go to the hospital,
Weaver responded, “No, I want to go to jail, and I haven’t
taken nothing. Leave me alone.” Weaver also insisted, in

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No. 01-5656 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. 9
7W eaver also had good vital signs. His pupils were equal and
reactive to light. He was not post-dictal, meaning he exhibited no signs
or symptoms of a seizure. He had normal jugular vein distentions,
thereby indicating an absence of severe heart abnormalities. He had clear
breath sounds, good skin color and a normal temperature. H e had good
capillary refill, which m eans tha t good/normal b lood change was taking
place. He also had a normal midline trachea, which normally gets
misaligned on severe lung difficulties from trauma. Furthermore, Weaver
had mo vement and sensation in all four extremities.
front of the presence of the Officers, that he had not
swallowed any drugs. For instance, one paramedic stated that
Weaver repeatedly said “‘no,’ ‘no,’ ‘no,’” to being asked if he
had ingested drugs. Booker’s affidavit confirms Weaver’s
responses.
Weaver was assessed separately by both paramedics, who
found that there was no need for emergency treatment.
According to the paramedic report, Weaver was conscious,
alert, and oriented as to person, place and time.7 Despite his
apparently good physical condition, the paramedics explained
to Weaver that there were serious consequences to
swallowing drugs, including death.
The paramedics then relayed their assessment to the
Officers. The paramedics told them that “[i]f you see any
other problems or anything at all, changes, call us back.”
According to one paramedic, he told the Officers to monitor
Weaver, and immediately contact for help if they noticed any
changes in Weaver. Although the paramedics were informed
that Weaver was going to be transported to the jail, there is no
indication that the paramedics objected to this course of
10 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. No. 01-5656
8There is another ambulance service in the small community of
W artburg, which is where the jail is located. There is also a medical
center located approximately fifteen miles from the Morgan County Jail.
Plaintiff points out, however, that at the time of these facts, the jail had
been found by a Department of Justice investigation to be unconstitutional
due to lack of necessary and ad equate me dical facilities and perso nnel.
Plaintiff does not allege, though, that the Officers had any knowledge of
the Department’s finding.
9Plaintiff alleges that the reason (or at least one of the main rea sons)
W eaver was transported to the Morgan County Jail was so that Owen
could meet Ham by, his girlfriend. T he record does not sup port this
allegation. The record shows, instead, that Oliver Springs police officers
were required by Chief Lowe to transp ort arrestees to the M organ Co unty
Jail.
action, or recommended otherwise.8 Unable to force
treatment upon Weaver, the paramedics left.
At 7:00 p.m., Owen alone proceeded to transport Weaver
and Booker to the jail. At this point, Weaver had been in
custody for one hour and fifty minutes. The jail is
approximately twenty to twenty-five minutes from the Oliver
Springs Police Department.
According to Booker, Weaver began to get sick and throw
up within five minutes of leaving for the jail. Booker asserts
that although he told Owen at least three times that Weaver
needed to be taken to the hospital, Owen ignored his requests
and continued to drive. Booker claims that by the time the
cruiser arrived at the jail, Weaver was mumbling, could not
walk, had to be carried into the jail, and was generally almost
“out of it.” Two jailers assisted Weaver out of the car and
into the jail. Owen, however, declined ambulatory services
for Weaver. Apparently, Owen believed that Weaver was
“faking” his illness, a belief that he shared with some of the
jailers. Weaver and Booker were then placed into a jail cell.
Shortly thereafter, Teresa Hamby, the chief jailer and a
certified EMT, was paged by Owen, who was then her
boyfriend and now her husband.9 According to Hamby, she

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No. 01-5656 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. 11
looked at Weaver and noticed that his chest was rising and
falling and thus believed that Weaver was breathing.
Booker estimates that Weaver was in the jail cell for fifteen
to twenty minutes before anyone checked on him. The record
log indicates that it was approximately 7:39 p.m. when Owen
requested the jailers to summon another ambulance for
Weaver. This request was thirty-nine minutes after Weaver
had first refused treatment from the paramedics at the Oliver
Springs Police Department. The ambulance arrived thirteen
minutes later, by which time Weaver had lost consciousness
and was not breathing. Upon arrival, the paramedics began to
administer CPR on Weaver. Weaver was then transported to
the Roane Medical Center, approximately fifteen miles from
the Morgan County Jail, where he was pronounced dead. An
autopsy performed on Weaver indicated that the cause of
death was ingestion of a lethal amount of cocaine.
Plaintiff sued Shadoan and Owen in their individual and
official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. At
issue in this appeal are Plaintiff’s claims that Weaver was
arrested without probable cause and that the Officers were
deliberately indifferent to Weaver’s serious medical needs.
The district court denied summary judgment to the Officers
on Plaintiff’s Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo. Terry Barr Sales Agency, Inc. v. All-Lock Co., 96 F.3d
174, 178 (6th Cir. 1996). In deciding a summary judgment
motion, we cannot weigh the evidence, judge the credibility
of witnesses, or determine the truth of the matter asserted.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
We must, however, view the evidence and draw all
“justifiable inferences” in the light most favorable to the non-
movant. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate where “there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
12 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. No. 01-5656
Civ. P. 56(c). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual
dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment . . . .”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in original).
Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo.
Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 689 (1999) (en banc). A
district court’s findings of ultimate facts, based upon the
application of legal principles to subsidiary facts, are also
subject to de novo review. Id.
JURISDICTION
In a separate motion, Plaintiff has moved this court to
dismiss the Officers’ interlocutory appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. Plaintiff argues that the district court’s
memorandum opinion establishes the existence of genuine
issues of material fact. The district court found that “there is
a question of material fact with respect to whether the officers
had probable cause to arrest Mr. Weaver for [possession of
cocaine or evading a lawful arrest].” With regard to the
Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference, the
district court found that “[q]uestions of material fact remain
to be determined with respect to whether, under the
circumstances, those two defendants showed deliberate
indifference to their prisoner’s serious medical needs by
failing to take further steps to insure his safety and whether
that failure may have been a proximate cause of the prisoner’s
death.” On appeal, however, the Officers have asked us to
assume as true Plaintiff’s version of any disputed facts.
Because we accept Plaintiff’s version of any disputed
subsidiary facts, we hold that jurisdiction is proper pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 we have jurisdiction to hear an
appeal only from a district court’s “final decision.” The
Supreme Court has held that “a district court’s denial of a
claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an
issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the

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No. 01-5656 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. 13
meaning of . . . § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final
judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).
It is well recognized that a defendant’s “right to appeal the
denial of qualified immunity does not turn on the phrasing of
the district court’s order.” Christophel v. Kukulinsky, 61 F.3d
479, 485 (6th Cir. 1995). Therefore, “regardless of the
district court’s reasons for denying qualified immunity, we
may exercise jurisdiction over the appeal . . . to the extent it
raises questions of law.” Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d
1151, 1157 (6th Cir. 1996).
As we have explained in our en banc decision in Williams,
there is a distinction between an ultimate fact and a subsidiary
or basic fact. 186 F.3d at 690. An ultimate fact is a mixed
issue of law and fact. Id. Mixed questions are treated as legal
questions, not factual questions. Id. Questions concerning a
defendant’s conduct or the existence or non-existence of
certain evidence are questions of subsidiary or basic facts. Id.
In this case, examples of questions of basic facts would
include: Was Weaver’s temporary license plate placed behind
his vehicle’s tinted rear window? Did the Officers know that
Weaver had ingested cocaine? Did Weaver deny having
ingested cocaine? Was Weaver offered the opportunity to
receive treatment? Dispute as to these material basic facts
would divest this court of interlocutory appellate jurisdiction.
For purposes of this appeal, however, the Officers have not
disputed the Plaintiff’s version of the basic facts.
The questions at issue in this case, namely, whether certain
facts gave rise to probable cause for an arrest, and whether the
Officers’ specific actions, as alleged by the Plaintiff, could
constitute deliberate indifference, are mixed questions of law
and fact. Therefore, because the subsidiary facts are not in
dispute for purposes of this appeal, this court’s “decision
turns on a question of law: whether the alleged facts,
admitted for this purpose, show a violation of clearly
established law.” Id. Seen in this light, the district court’s
denial of qualified immunity is a final order as required by 28
14 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. No. 01-5656
U.S.C. § 1291. We, therefore, have jurisdiction to decide this
case on the merits.
ANALYSIS
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields public officials
acting within the scope of their official duties from civil
liability. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a
mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is
effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to
trial.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (emphasis in original). The
Supreme Court has emphasized that questions of qualified
immunity should be resolved “at the earliest possible stage in
the litigation.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)
(quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per
curiam)). The Supreme Court has recently set forth a two-
prong test that must be applied to a qualified immunity
analysis. Id.
The first prong is a threshold question, namely: “Taken in
the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do
the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a
constitutional right?” Id. If the answer is in the negative,
then the inquiry ends. If a violation could be established, the
second prong requires an examination of whether “the right
was clearly established” at the time of the events at issue. Id.
In order for a right to be clearly established, the “[t]he
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right.” Id. at 202. The inquiry “must be
undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as
a broad general proposition.” Id. at 201. As the Court
explained, “[t]he relevant dispositive inquiry in determining
whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be
clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in
the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202.

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No. 01-5656 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. 15
1. Fourth Amendment Claim
The district court concluded that because the Officers did
not find any cocaine after Weaver was captured following his
attempted escape, probable cause to arrest did not exist. The
district court also concluded that, irrespective of Shadoan’s
subjective belief regarding Weaver’s arrest, objectively,
Weaver was not aware that he was under arrest at the time
that he fled from the Officers, and, therefore, probable cause
did not exist to arrest him for evading a lawful arrest. The
Officers argue that Weaver’s Fourth Amendment rights were
not violated because the traffic stop was supported by
reasonable suspicion, and information developed during the
course of the stop provided probable cause to support an
arrest. We find that although the Officers lacked probable
cause to arrest Weaver for evading arrest, the Officers had
probable cause to arrest Weaver for drug possession.
Accordingly, Weaver’s Fourth Amendment rights were not
violated.
Police officers may briefly stop an individual for
investigation if they have reasonable suspicion that the person
has committed a crime. Houston v. Clark County Sheriff
Deputy John Does 1-5, 174 F.3d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 1999).
An ordinary traffic stop is more “akin to an investigative
detention rather than a custodial arrest.” United States v. Hill,
195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
1176 (2000). Reasonable suspicion is “more than an ill-
defined hunch; it must be based upon a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the particular person . . . of
criminal activity.” Houston, 174 F.3d at 813 (alterations in
original) (internal quotations and citation omitted). It requires
“‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ an
investigatory stop.” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
21 (1968)). Moreover, reasonable suspicion “can arise from
evidence that is less reliable than what might be required to
show probable cause.” Id.
16 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. No. 01-5656
The existence of reasonable suspicion must be viewed in
the “totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Erwin,
155 F.3d 818, 822 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert denied, 525
U.S. 1123 (1999). This means that a court “must determine
whether the individual factors, taken as a whole, give rise to
reasonable suspicion, even if each individual factor is entirely
consistent with innocent behavior when examined
separately.” United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 588 (6th
Cir. 2001). Moreover, it is well-settled that the legality of a
traffic stop is not dependent upon an officer’s subjective
intentions. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
In the instant case, it is clear that Shadoan had reasonable
suspicion to stop Weaver. The record clearly indicates that
Shadoan believed that Weaver’s registration was either
invalid or improperly displayed behind darkly tinted
windows, violations of Tennessee’s vehicle registration and
window tinting laws. T.C.A. §§ 55-4-110, 55-9-107(a).
Shadoan, therefore, was justified in conducting an ordinary
traffic stop of Weaver’s automobile.
Once the “purpose of the traffic stop is completed, a
motorist cannot be further detained unless something that
occurred during the stop caused the officer to have a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was
afoot.” Hill, 195 F.3d at 264. The Supreme Court has
recognized that “nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent
factor in determining reasonable suspicion.” Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). See also United States
v. Mesa, 62 F.3d 159, 162 (6th Cir. 1995) (explaining that
“nervousness is generally included as one of several grounds
for finding reasonable suspicion”). Lying about travel plans
can also form a basis for reasonable suspicion. Hill, 195 F.3d
at 272. An officer’s doubt regarding expressed travel plans or
the purpose of a trip can also be bolstered by a passenger’s
inconsistent statements. Id.; United States v. Johnson, 58
F.3d 356, 357-58 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 936
(1995).

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No. 01-5656 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. 17
In the instant case, the record clearly shows that Shadoan,
and later, Owen, had reasonable suspicion to continue to
detain Weaver after Shadoan determined that Weaver’s car
tag was not expired. The following factors support a finding
of reasonable suspicion: (i) Shadoan’s observation that
Weaver’s automobile was at Futtrell’s residence at a time
when Shadoan knew Futtrell was not home; (ii) an awareness
that Futtrell’s residence had been burglarized, and that he was
having trouble with some black men; (iii) Shadoan’s
observation of a black man leaving Futtrell’s residence and
entering into an unfamiliar vehicle; (iv) Weaver’s inability to
explain his presence at Futtrell’s residence; (v) Weaver’s
alleged travel plans, which were inconsistent with his current
location; (vi) Futtrell’s corroboration that Weaver and Booker
had no reason to be at his home; (vii) Futtrell’s suggestion
that Weaver and Booker were probably looking for the
Cooper residence to sell cocaine; and (viii) Weaver’s
nervousness and demeanor. When viewed in the totality of
circumstances, the Officers were justified in detaining Weaver
and Booker to continue to conduct an investigative stop.
An investigative Terry stop may ripen into a de facto arrest
through the passage of time or the use of force. Houston, 174
F.3d at 814. When this occurs, a suspect’s continued
detention must be based upon probable cause. Id. Although
a bright-line test has not been formulated to distinguish
between an investigative stop and a de facto arrest, “the
length and manner of an investigative stop should be
reasonably related to the basis for the initial intrusion.” Id.
In the present case, it is clear that Weaver’s detention did not
ripen into a de facto arrest. First, the duration of the
investigative detention from the moment of the initial stop
until Weaver fled on foot lasted four minutes according to the
police log and approximately ten to fifteen minutes by
Booker’s estimate. See, e.g., United States v. Wellman, 185
F.3d 651, 656-57 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that a fifteen to
twenty minute traffic stop was a lawful detention); Houston,
174 F.3d at 815 (finding that in certain circumstances, such as
when officer safety is a serious concern, a detention of thirty-
18 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. No. 01-5656
five minutes or even an hour was reasonable). Second,
Weaver was free to leave the presence of the officers to enter
into the Town and Country Market. See California v.
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1121 (1977) (per curiam) (holding
that a person is not in custody if “the suspect is not placed
under arrest, voluntarily comes to the police station, and is
allowed to leave unhindered by police after a brief
interview”); cf. Houston, 174 F.3d at 815 (finding that when
officer safety is at issue, handcuffs and detention in a cruiser
do not exceed the bounds of a Terry stop). Given these
undisputed facts, Weaver’s detention prior to the search of his
person did not amount to an arrest or an otherwise unlawful
detention.
In the chronology of events, next came Shadoan’s search of
Weaver. The district court concluded that Weaver was not
yet under arrest at the point that Shadoan allegedly felt the
contours of crack cocaine in Weaver’s pocket. Although
Shadoan may have believed that Weaver was under arrest, the
district court found that Shadoan did not convey this to
Weaver. Then, the district court reasoned that Weaver could
not properly be charged with evading a lawful arrest when he
fled from the police. The Officers themselves do not dispute
this logic. In fact, they insist that Weaver was not under
arrest at the time of the search. Therefore, as there is no
dispute that Weaver was not under arrest at any time prior to
his flight, the Officers lacked probable cause to arrest Weaver
for evading a lawful arrest. However, they had probable
cause to arrest Weaver for possession of cocaine.
We have held that “[a] law enforcement officer does not
violate the Fourth Amendment merely by approaching an
individual, even when there is no reasonable suspicion that a
crime has been committed, and . . . request[s] for consent to
search the individual’s vehicle.” Erwin, 155 F.3d at 823.
Before an officer turns his back on a suspect, an officer may,
during a lawful Terry stop, conduct a limited pat-down search
for concealed weapons if the officer reasonably believes that
a suspect may be dangerous. See United States v. Walker,

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No. 01-5656 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. 19
181 F.3d 774, 778 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 980
(1999). “If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s
outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass
makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no
invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already
authorized by the officer’s search for weapons . . . .”
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993).
Moreover, “if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure
would be justified by the same practical considerations that
inhere in the plain-view context.” Id. at 375-76. Thus in
Walker, when a pat-down search indicated that a person had
crack cocaine concealed under his pants, a subsequent strip
search was lawful. 181 F.3d at 778-79. Walker is highly
analogous to the facts of this case.
In the instant case, Shadoan conducted a pat-down of
Weaver. During his pat-down, Shadoan felt something that
led him to believe was crack cocaine. When Shadoan asked
Weaver to empty his pockets, Weaver fled. The Supreme
Court has recognized that headlong flight from police
presence is the consummate act of evasion and suggestive of
wrongdoing. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (stating that
“[h]eadlong flight--wherever it occurs--is the consummate act
of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but
it is certainly suggestive of such”); see also United States v.
Dotson, 49 F.3d 227, 231 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
848 (1995) (finding that a defendant’s efforts to flee, coupled
with a detective’s reasonable suspicion of defendant’s
involvement in wrongdoing, established probable cause to
arrest). Therefore, Shadoan’s discovery of what appeared to
be crack cocaine during the lawful Terry stop, coupled with
Weaver’s headlong flight from the scene, established
probable cause for Weaver’s arrest. Accordingly, the Officers
did not violate Weaver’s Fourth Amendment rights. Because
Plaintiff did not satisfy the first prong of the qualified
immunity analysis, we need not address whether the right was
clearly established. The district court is thereby reversed on
the issue of qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment
claim.
20 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. No. 01-5656
2. Eighth Amendment Claim
The Eighth Amendment does not apply to pretrial
detainees. Roberts v. City of Troy, 773 F.2d 720, 723 (6th
Cir. 1985). The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, however, affords pretrial detainees a right to adequate
medical treatment that is analogous to the Eighth Amendment
rights of prisoners. Id. In the context of medical care for
prisoners and detainees, it is well established that “deliberate
indifference to a prisoner’s [or detainee’s] serious illness or
injury states a cause of action under § 1983. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).
The Supreme Court has equated deliberate indifference
with “criminal recklessness.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 837 (1994). That is, a defendant must know of and
disregard a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. The inquiry
is subjective: “[T]he official must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Id. It is insufficient for a plaintiff to allege that
there existed a danger that an officer should have been aware
of. Id. at 838. Deliberate indifference is something more
than negligence. Id. at 835. Also, “prison officials who
actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety
may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably
to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Id.
at 844.
Very recently, a panel of this court decided a case squarely
on point with the facts and issues presented by Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment claim. See Watkins v. City of Battle
Creek, 273 F.3d 682 (6th Cir. 2002). In Watkins, officers
executed a search warrant at the apartment of a suspected
mid-level drug dealer. Upon entry, they found the suspect
exiting a walk-in closet. Inside the closet was a torn plastic
bag with white crumbs sprinkled around it and nearby was a
larger piece of white substance, which was later identified as
crack cocaine. Officers saw the subject licking his lips and a

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No. 01-5656 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. 21
10The dissent noted that the “only” possible means for destroying the
drugs under the circumstances was for the suspect to ingest the drugs
while in the closet. 273 F.3d at 688 (Moore, J., dissenting). The facts of
Watkins clearly present a closer case for an E ighth Amendment violation
than the facts of the instant case. In Watkins, stronger facts suggested that
the suspect had ingested cocaine. Also, in Watkins, the officers and jailers
never summ oned the p aramedics to assess the susp ect while he was still
conscious. The officers simply took the suspect’s denials of ingesting
drugs at face value. In the instant case, the arrest of Weaver took place
outside, after he had fled from the police and was out of sight for several
second s. The most logical means for Weaver to have discarded the drugs
would have been for Weaver to toss the drugs on the ground as he was
fleeing. W hen the Officers retraced the path o f Weaver’s attemp ted
escape, they found a cellophane wrapper with a drug-like residue, which
they believed belonged to W eaver. Although it is unclear whether the
wrapper belonged to W eaver, their recovery of the wrapper supports an
inference that the Officers believed that Weaver had discarded the drugs
along with the wrapper. Also, there is no evidence to suggest that the
Officers observed a white substance in the area of W eaver’s mouth.
W eaver also exhibited no signs--such as a pink ish frothy drool--of drug
pink foamy drool coming from his mouth. The officers also
observed a white speck near his mouth. The officers,
however, did not see the suspect place drugs into his mouth.
The officers warned the suspect that he could die if he had
swallowed cocaine and they offered to take him to the
hospital. The suspect, however, repeatedly denied
swallowing any drugs and refused medical treatment. The
officers failed to inform the jailers or their supervisors of
what they observed and of their suspicion that the suspect
may have swallowed cocaine. Once at the jail, the suspect
complained of an upset stomach and appeared to be
intoxicated. The suspect was again offered medical
treatment, which he continued to reject. At no time while he
was conscious did the officers or jailers summon paramedics
to examine the individual. Later, the suspect was found dead
in his cell.
Based on these facts, this court found that it was not enough
for the plaintiff to demonstrate that the police officers should
have known that the suspect had ingested cocaine.10 Id. at
22 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. No. 01-5656
ingestion. Moreo ver, unlike the officers in Watkins, the Officers
summoned paramedics to examine Weaver, who was cleared for
transportation.
686. Because the officers did not see the suspect ingest any
cocaine, the court found that there was insufficient evidence
to lead a rational trier of fact to conclude that the officers or
jailers knew the suspect needed medical attention for drug
ingestion. Id. The situation did “not involve an incapacitated
detainee or one who asked for but was refused medical
treatment.” Id. We found no fault in the officers’ “not
forcing medical treatment on [the suspect] in the face of his
repeated denials and plausible explanations.” Id.
Consequently, there was no Eighth Amendment violation.
In the instant case, the Officers did not see, or otherwise
have knowledge, that Weaver ingested cocaine. It is also
undisputed that Weaver repeatedly denied swallowing any
drugs. When Weaver appeared to become ill, the Officers
immediately summoned the paramedics. The paramedics
were requested approximately one hour and thirty-two
minutes after Weaver was placed in custody. Plaintiff does
not dispute Shadoan’s assertions that while waiting for the
ambulance, he checked Weaver’s heartbeat and breathing,
both of which appeared normal--and an indication that
Shadoan was concerned for Weaver’s health. The
paramedics’ report clearly indicates that Weaver did not
exhibit any symptoms of drug ingestion. It is also undisputed
that Weaver refused to be taken to a hospital. Given these
facts, it can hardly be said that the Officers acted with
deliberate indifference.
Plaintiff’s contention that the Officers “believed” or
“should have known” that Weaver had swallowed drugs does
not give rise to a deliberate indifference claim. It is equally
plausible that the Officers “believed” that Weaver had tossed
out the drugs as he fled from the police. When dealing with

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No. 01-5656 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. 23
11The dissent’s analysis is premised on an assumption that Owen had
knowledge that Weaver ingested drug s. According to the dissent,
“Owen’s failure to seek prompt medical assistance or advic e when
W eaver’s condition deteriorated constitutes deliberate indifference
because it was an unreasonable response to a known risk of serious harm.”
(Emphasis added). Ho wever, the dissent points to nothing, and we have
been unable to find anything, that supports such an inference of
knowledge. In fact, earlier in its analysis, the dissent acknowledges that
“[t]he record reveals that neither officer saw nor otherwise had knowledge
that Weaver had ingested coca ine.” (E mphasis added ). At best, the record
supp orts an inference that Owen should have known (i.e., that he
medical care for detainees, negligence does not state a cause
of action under § 1983.
Shadoan’s last dealings with Weaver was at the Oliver
Springs Police Station when the paramedics were first
summoned to assess Weaver. When Shadoan last saw
Weaver, Weaver was alive and did not show any signs of
illness. Based on these undisputed facts, and our decision in
Watkins, we reverse the district court’s denial of qualified
immunity for Officer Shadoan on Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment claim.
With regard to Owen, Plaintiff asserts that Owen exhibited
deliberate indifference toward Weaver when during his
transportation of Weaver to the jail, he failed to call the
paramedics a second time, and failed to turn back when
Weaver began falling over and throwing up. Plaintiff also
asserts that Owen acted with deliberate indifference when he
told the jailers that he believed Weaver was “faking.” We
disagree.
When the paramedics were first called to the police station
Weaver went from exhibiting seizure-like symptoms to being
alert, oriented, coherent, and medically cleared for
transportation to jail. Based on this first episode, it would not
be unreasonable for Owen to discount the significance of
Weaver’s second set of symptoms during his transportation to
the jail.11 Also, earlier, Weaver had fled on foot at the arrest
24 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. No. 01-5656
suspected) that Weaver consumed d rugs. To this, the dissent apparently
conced es, “[w]hen Weaver became ill, the officers immediately
summoned the paramedics, indicating that they did indeed suspect that he
had swallowed the drugs.” (Emphasis added ). W ithout more, the mere
suspicion of a risk of harm is insufficient as a matter o f law to give rise to
liability for deliberate indifference.
12The dissent rejects that Owen had a belief that Weaver was
“faking” his illness. In the dissent’s view, if Owen “truly believed
W eaver was ‘faking,’ he could have called ahead so that paramedics
would be waiting for him, called an ambulance as soon as he arrived at
the jail, or returned to the police department and sought medical
assistance there.” W e believe the opposite is true. U nder normal
circum stances, one who truly b elieves that an ind ividual is faking illness
will not go through the trouble of summoning help for the perceived
actor. For instance, common experience teaches that a parent who
believes that her child is feigning illness to avo id school will not rush the
child to the emergency room. Thus, based on the facts of this case, and
without record evidence to the contra ry, Owen’s failure to retake steps to
aid W eaver supp orts only the inference that he did not draw the subjective
belief that Weaver was in need of medical assistance.
scene. Owen’s fear that Weaver could feign illness and then
flee again is not deliberate indifference. Further, the fact that
Owen believed that Weaver was faking his illness does not
support an inference that Owen acted with deliberate
indifference. To the contrary, Owen’s “faking” statements
suggest that he did not draw an inference or have the
subjective belief that Weaver was in a substantial risk of
serious harm.12 Finally, Owen’s request for a second
ambulance for Weaver thirty-nine minutes after the first team
of paramedics had finished examining him suggests that
Owen was concerned for Weaver’s health. Although Owen
could have called an ambulance earlier in the process, he did
request that Chief Jailer Hamby, a certified EMT, check on
Weaver. In short, we find that Owen did not know and
disregard a substantial risk of serious harm to Weaver.
Accordingly, we hold that Owen did not violate Weaver’s
Eighth Amendment rights. Because Weaver’s constitutional
rights were not violated, it is unnecessary to address whether
the right was clearly established. The district court is

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No. 01-5656 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. 25
therefore reversed on the issue of qualified immunity with
regard to Weaver’s Eighth Amendment claim.
CONCLUSION
Weaver’s Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights were not
violated. Therefore, we REVERSE the ruling by the district
court and REMAND for the court to grant summary
judgment to the Officers in their individual capacities.
26 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. No. 01-5656
_____________________________________________
CONCURRING IN PART, DISSENTING IN PART
_____________________________________________
MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part. Because I agree that
Officer Shadoan should have been granted qualified immunity
in this case, I would reverse the district court’s decision on
that issue. However, I cannot agree with the majority’s
conclusion that Stephen Lamont Weaver’s constitutional
rights were not violated, and I would therefore affirm the
district court’s judgment with regard to Officer Owen.
The record reveals that neither officer saw nor otherwise
had knowledge that Weaver had ingested cocaine. It is also
undisputed that Weaver repeatedly denied swallowing any
drugs. However, when Weaver became ill, the officers
immediately summoned the paramedics, indicating that they
did indeed suspect that he had swallowed the drugs. Officer
Shadoan conceded that while waiting for the ambulance, he
checked Weaver’s heartbeat and breathing – another
indication that Shadoan was concerned about Weaver’s
condition.
The record further reveals that Officer Shadoan’s last
dealings with Weaver were at the Oliver Springs Police
Department after paramedics had been summoned to evaluate
Weaver’s medical condition. When Shadoan last saw
Weaver, Weaver was alive and did not show any signs of
illness. Based on these undisputed facts, I would reverse the
district court’s denial of qualified immunity for Officer
Shadoan on the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim.
Officer Owen’s actions require a different analysis,
however, because he alone transported Weaver to the Morgan
County Jail in Wartburg, some distance from Oliver Springs.
Taking the plaintiff’s allegations as true, it appears that
Weaver began to get sick and throw up within five minutes of

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No. 01-5656 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. 27
1It simply is not reasonable to believe that W eaver could be “faking”
these symptoms in an attempt at escape despite the fact that he had tried
to flee the police earlier at the arrest scene. Police officers may in some
situations reasonab ly deduce that a p risoner is feigning symptoms and
wait to provide medical assistance until they have brought the priso ner to
a secure location. That is not the case here. In re sponse to W eaver’s
physical distress, Owen did not simply make an initial decision not to seek
imme diate medical assistance, but instead deliberately ignored medical
advice that he ha d already been given regarding W eaver. Add itionally,
if he truly believed We aver was “faking,” he could have called ahead so
that paramedics would be waiting for him, called an ambulance as soon
as he arrived at the jail, or returned to the police department and sought
medical assistance there. Any of these actions would have secured
leaving the police station in Oliver Springs. Despite having
just been told by the paramedics, “If you see any other
problems or anything at all changes, call us back,” Owen
continued on the 20-25 minute drive to Wartburg. He could
have, but did not, call ahead for medical assistance; he could
have, but did not, return the short distance to the Oliver
Springs police department; he could have, but did not, drive
Weaver directly to an area hospital. As a result, by the time
they arrived at the Morgan County Jail, Weaver was in such
distress that he had to be carried from the car. Still, Owen did
not request medical assistance for Weaver for another 15
minutes or more. Instead, he requested that one of the jailers,
a certified EMT who was then his girlfriend and was later his
wife, check on Weaver. She did so only by looking through
the cell bars to see whether he was breathing. Owen did not
call paramedics again for some 40 or 45 minutes after Weaver
had first been seen by the paramedics in Oliver Springs.
Owen’s failure to seek prompt medical assistance or advice
when Weaver’s condition deteriorated constitutes deliberate
indifference because it was an unreasonable response to a
known risk of serious harm. Owen asserts that he believed
Weaver was “faking” his illness, but surely police officers are
not free to substitute their own judgment for that of medical
professionals when there is already reason to believe that
there is cause for concern.1
28 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. No. 01-5656
medical assistance for Weaver without creating an undue flight risk, yet
Owen pursued none of them.
2Fitzke was arrested following an automobile accident and was
incarcerated in the local jail. He was held from about 1:30 a.m. until 6:30
p.m. the same day -- a period of about 17 hours -- before he received
requested medical treatment. During that time he suffered from a serious
brain injury and complained of pain and numbness in various parts of his
bod y. 468 F.2d at 1074-7 5. Fitzke alleged that the delay in receiving
medical treatment increased the severity of his b rain da mage. Id. This
court found that there was precedent for Fitzke’s claim that his treatment
constituted a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, holding that “under
exceptional circum stances the failure to provide o r perm it access to
medical care may give rise to a violation of one’s Fourteenth Amendment
rights [since] such refusal could well result in the deprivation of life
itself.” Id. at 1076 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Furthermore, there can be no question that such “deliberate
indifference to [Weaver’s] serious medical needs” was a
violation of his constitutional right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05
(1976). While this right is often expressed as a matter of
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the protection it affords is
not limited to those who are incarcerated after conviction, but
also applies pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to pre-
trial detainees. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t. of
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198 n.5 (1989); Roberts v. City of
Troy, 773 F.2d 720, 723 (6th Cir. 1985). Moreover, in this
case, the requirement that the right must have been clearly
established in a particularized sense has also been satisfied.
See Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072, 1076 (6th Cir. 1972)
(“where the circumstances are clearly sufficient to indicate the
need of medical attention for injury or illness [to one who is
incarcerated], the denial of such aid constitutes the
deprivation of constitutional due process”) (citations
omitted).2
The fact that Weaver initially refused medical treatment
does not alter this analysis. In Scharfenberger v. Wingo, 542
F.3d 328, 330 (6th Cir. 1976), we held that “a prisoner’s

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No. 01-5656 Weaver v. Shadoan, et al. 29
custodians cannot lawfully deny . . . adequate medical care
even in instances of deliberate self injury.” The right, then,
does not turn on whether the incarcerated individual
affirmatively seeks medical treatment but, rather, on the
officers’ awareness that medical treatment is necessary.
Hence, in Rich v. City of Mayfield Heights, 955 F.2d 1092,
1096-97 (6th Cir. 1992), we explicitly found that an
incarcerated individual did not have a clearly established right
“to be screened correctly for suicidal tendencies and . . . to
have steps taken which would have prevented suicide,” but
we reiterated our prior holding that detainees do have a
clearly established right “to adequate medical care . . . where
the circumstances are clearly sufficient to indicate the need of
medical attention for injury or illness.” Id. at 1096 (quoting
Fitzke, 468 F.2d at 1076).
The officers here, and Officer Owen in particular, were on
notice that if Weaver developed additional symptoms, they
should notify medical authorities immediately. In failing to
do so, Officer Owen forfeited his right to the qualified
immunity to which he would otherwise be entitled. I
therefore conclude that the district court was correct in
denying qualified immunity to Officer Owen on Weaver’s
Fourteenth Amendment claim and would affirm that portion
of the district court’s judgment.

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