02a0265p.06

5(&200(1'(' )25 )8//7(;7 38%/,&$7,21
3XUVXDQW WR 6L[WK &LUFXLW 5XOH
(/(&7521,& &,7$7,21 )(' $SS 3 WK &LU
)LOH 1DPH DS
81,7('67$7(6&28572)$33($/6
)257+(6,;7+&,5&8,7
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
1R
&257(= 0,//(5
3HWLWLRQHU$SSHOOHH
Y
'(11,6 0 675$8%:DUGHQ
5HVSRQGHQW$SSHOODQW
1R
.(50,7 (/'5,'*( +$<1(6
3HWLWLRQHU$SSHOOHH
Y
/8(//$ %85.(:DUGHQ
6DJLQDZ&RUUHFWLRQDO)DFLOLW\
5HVSRQGHQW$SSHOODQW
;!

1
1RV
$SSHDOIURPWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV'LVWULFW&RXUW
IRUWKH(DVWHUQ'LVWULFWRI0LFKLJDQDW'HWURLW
1RV²'HQLVH3DJH+RRG
'LVWULFW-XGJH
$UJXHG2FWREHU
'HFLGHGDQG)LOHG$XJXVW

-- 1 of 18 --

0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV
7KH +RQRUDEOH 0\URQ + %ULJKW 6HQLRU &LUFXLW -XGJH RI WKH 8QLWHG
6WDWHV &RXUW RI $SSHDOV IRU WKH (LJKWK &LUFXLW VLWWLQJ E\ GHVLJQDWLRQ
%HIRUH%2**6*,/0$1DQG%5,*+7&LUFXLW-XGJHV
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
&2816(/
$5*8(' 7KRPDV 0 &KDPEHUV 2)),&( 2) 7+(
3526(&87,1* $77251(< 'HWURLW 0LFKLJDQ IRU
$SSHOODQWV -RKQ 5 0LQRFN &5$0(5 0,12&. $QQ
$UERU0LFKLJDQ0DUOD50F&RZDQ67$7($33(//$7(
'()(1'(5 2)),&( 'HWURLW 0LFKLJDQ IRU $SSHOOHHV
21 %5,() 7KRPDV 0 &KDPEHUV 2)),&( 2) 7+(
3526(&87,1* $77251(< 'HWURLW 0LFKLJDQ IRU
$SSHOODQWV -RKQ 5 0LQRFN &5$0(5 0,12&. $QQ
$UERU0LFKLJDQ0DUOD50F&RZDQ6XVDQ00HLQEHUJ
67$7( $33(//$7( '()(1'(5 2)),&( 'HWURLW
0LFKLJDQIRU$SSHOOHHV
%5,*+7-GHOLYHUHGWKHRSLQLRQRIWKHFRXUW*,/0$1
- SS GHOLYHUHG D VHSDUDWH FRQFXUULQJ RSLQLRQ
%2**6 - SS GHOLYHUHG D VHSDUDWH GLVVHQWLQJ
RSLQLRQ
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
23,1,21
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
0<521+%5,*+7&LUFXLW-XGJH7KHZDUGHQVRIWZR
0LFKLJDQ VWDWH FRUUHFWLRQDO LQVWLWXWLRQV DSSHDO D IHGHUDO
GLVWULFWFRXUW¶VFRQGLWLRQDOJUDQWRIKDEHDVFRUSXVWRSULVRQHUV
&RUWH]0LOOHUDQG.HUPLW+D\QHVRQWKHJURXQGRILQHIIHFWLYH
DVVLVWDQFH RI FRXQVHO +D\QHV DQG 0LOOHU DUH FXUUHQWO\
VHUYLQJOLIHVHQWHQFHVZLWKRXWSDUROHDIWHUSOHDGLQJJXLOW\WR
ILUVWGHJUHHPXUGHU

-- 2 of 18 --

1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO
The Honorable Denise Page Hood, United States District Court
Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan.
The court published only one opinion. See Haynes v. Burke, 115
F.Supp.2d 813 (E.D.Mich 2000). The other opinion is unpublished, see
Miller v. Straub, No. 98-CV-74655-DT (E.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2000), but
the court analyzed the two cases similarly. ,Q ERWK FDVHV WKH GLVWULFW FRXUW
RUGHUHG WKDW XQOHVV 0LFKLJDQ WRRN DFWLRQ ZLWKLQ GD\V WR DIIRUG 0LOOHU
DQG +D\QHV QHZ WULDOV WKH\ FRXOG DSSO\ IRU ZULWV RUGHULQJ WKHLU IRUWKZLWK
UHOHDVH IURP FXVWRG\
,Q0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVZHUHILIWHHQDQGVL[WHHQ\HDUV
ROG UHVSHFWLYHO\ (DFK RQ WKH DGYLFH RI KLV RZQ GHIHQVH
FRXQVHOSOHGJXLOW\LQ0LFKLJDQVWDWHFRXUWWRILUVWGHJUHH
PXUGHU7KHLUDWWRUQH\VEHOLHYHGLWOLNHO\WKDWWKHWULDOFRXUW
ZRXOGLPSRVHMXYHQLOHVHQWHQFHV7KHWULDOFRXUWGLGVHQWHQFH
WKHPDVMXYHQLOHV,QHDFKFDVHWKHSURVHFXWLRQDSSHDOHGDQG
WKH0LFKLJDQ&RXUWRI$SSHDOVUHYHUVHG0LOOHUDQG+D\QHV
HDFKWKHQUHFHLYHGWKHRQO\DYDLODEOHDGXOWVHQWHQFHXQGHU
0LFKLJDQODZOLIHLQSULVRQZLWKRXWSRVVLELOLW\RISDUROH
1HLWKHU 0LOOHU¶V QRU +D\QHV¶ WULDO FRXQVHO FRQVLGHUHG RU
DGYLVHG WKHLU UHVSHFWLYH FOLHQWV WKDW the prosecutor could
appeal the imposition of a juvenile sentence.
Miller and Haynes petitioned for writs of habeas corpus,
and the federal district court concluded that the failure of
their defense attorneys to inform them of the prosecutor's
right to appeal, particularly in light of their youth at the time
of the pleas, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 7KH
FRXUWIXUWKHUFRQFOXGHGWKDWDFRQWUDU\GHWHUPLQDWLRQRQWKH
IDFWV DQG WKH ODZ E\ WKH 0LFKLJDQ &RXUW RI $SSHDOV
FRQVWLWXWHGDQXQUHDVRQDEOHDSSOLFDWLRQRIFOHDUO\HVWDEOLVKHG
IHGHUDOODZDVGHWHUPLQHGE\WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV6XSUHPH&RXUW
LQ:LOOLDPVY7D\ORU529 U.S. 362 (2000)+LOOY/RFNKDUW
474 U.S. 52 (1985 DQG6WULFNODQGY:DVKLQJWRQ466 U.S.
668 (1984) $FFRUGLQJO\ WKH FRXUW separately JUDQWHG
0LOOHU¶VDQG+D\QHV¶SHWLWLRQVIRUZULWVRIKDEHDVFRUSXVRQ
WKHJURXQGRILQHIIHFWLYHDVVLVWDQFHRIFRXQVHO7KHZDUGHQV
DSSHDO$IWHUDFDUHIXOUHYLHZRIWKHUHFRUGVLQWKHWZRFDVHV
ZH$)),50WKHGLVWULFWFRXUW

-- 3 of 18 --

0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV
7ZR RI WKH IRXU RWKHU ER\V IDFHG WULDO RQ FKDUJHV RI ILUVW GHJUHH
IHORQ\ PXUGHU DQG DVVDXOW ZLWK LQWHQW WR URE ZKLOH DUPHG WKH\ ZHUH
IRXQG QRW JXLOW\ 7ZR ER\V SOHG JXLOW\ WR VHFRQG GHJUHH PXUGHU DQG
DVVDXOW ZLWK LQWHQW WR URE ZKLOH DUPHG 7KH\ ZHUH VHQWHQFHG DV MXYHQLOHV
7KRVH MXYHQLOH VHQWHQFHV ZHUH XSKHOG E\ WKH 0LFKLJDQ &RXUW RI $SSHDOV
3HRSOH Y %URZQ 1:G 0LFK $SS
8QGHU 0LFKLJDQ ODZ DW WKDW WLPH WKH WULDO FRXUW KDG GLVFUHWLRQ WR
GHWHUPLQH ZKHWKHU MXYHQLOHV FRQYLFWHG RI ILUVW GHJUHH PXUGHU VKRXOG EH
VHQWHQFHG DV MXYHQLOHV RU DV DGXOWV 6HH 0LFK &RPS /DZV $QQ †
7KH 0LFKLJDQ OHJLVODWXUH DPHQGHG WKH VWDWXWH LQ WR UHPRYH
WKLV GLVFUHWLRQ 6HH 0LFK 3XE $FW 1R $OO MXYHQLOHV
FRQYLFWHG RI ILUVW GHJUHH PXUGHU DUH QRZ PDQGDWRULO\ VHQWHQFHG DV DGXOWV
6HH 0LFK &RPS /DZV $QQ † J
,%$&.*5281'
Kermit Haynes and Cortez Miller are two of six youths
FKDUJHGE\WKHVWDWHRI0LFKLJDQZLWKWKHPXUGHURI
%HQMDPLQ*UDYHO7KHVWDWHFKDUJHG+D\QHVDQG0LOOHUHDFK
ZLWK ILUVW GHJUHH IHORQ\ PXUGHU, assault with intent to rob
while armed, and possession of a firearm during commission
of a felony.
A. Miller’s Plea
On March 23, 1990, Miller pled guilty before Chief Judge
Roberson of the Recorder’s Court for the City of Detroit. He
was fifteen years old at the time. At the plea hearing, the
court questioned Miller as to whether he understood that if he
pled guilty, his "only hope" to avoid mandatory life
imprisonment lay in convincing the court to treat him as a
juvenile. Miller answered that he understood. Miller’s
mother, who was present at the plea hearing, stated that
Miller’s plea had been discussed with her and that she
understood that the judge might sentence her son as a juvenile
or as an adult. The prosecutor advised the court that his
office would request that the court sentence Miller as an adult.
The court then questioned Miller. Miller affirmed that he
was making his plea freely, understandingly, and voluntarily.
1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO
PHDQVWKDWLWGLGQRWFRUUHFWO\LGHQWLI\DQGDSSO\6WULFNODQGDV
WKHJRYHUQLQJIHGHUDOUXOH%XWHYHQLIZHZHUHWRSDUVHWKH
WZRSDUWVRI6WULFNODQGLQWKLVZD\ZHZRXOGQRWFRQGXFWD
IXOOGHQRYRUHYLHZEXWUDWKHUD³LQGHSHQGHQW´UHYLHZDVODLG
RXWLQRXUUHFHQWFDVHRI+DUULVY6WRYDOO)G
WK &LU 7KHUH ZH VDLG LQ D VLPLODU FDVH ³7KDW
LQGHSHQGHQWUHYLHZKRZHYHULVQRWDIXOOGHQRYRUHYLHZRI
WKHFODLPVEXWUHPDLQVGHIHUHQWLDOEHFDXVHWKHFRXUWFDQQRW
JUDQWUHOLHIXQOHVVWKHVWDWHFRXUW¶VUHVXOWLVQRWLQNHHSLQJ
ZLWK WKH VWULFWXUHV RI WKH $('3$´ ,ELG 7KXV HYHQ LQ
FRQGXFWLQJDQLQGHSHQGHQWUHYLHZZHPXVWGHWHUPLQHPRUH
WKDQVLPSO\WKDWZHEHOLHYHWKHVWDWHFRXUWZDVZURQJLQLWV
XOWLPDWHRXWFRPH
$VWKHDERYHDQDO\VLVRI6WULFNODQG:LOOLDPVDQG&RQH
VKRZV ZH FDQ E\ QR PHDQV WHUP WKH MXGJPHQW RI WKH
0LFKLJDQ&RXUWRI$SSHDOVXQUHDVRQDEOH7KHMXGJPHQWLV
SHUKDSV GHEDWDEOH LI ZH LJQRUH 6WULFNODQG¶V FOHDU
UHTXLUHPHQWV ZH PLJKW VD\ LW ZDV LQFRUUHFW XQGHU QR
FLUFXPVWDQFHVFDQZHVD\LWZDVXQUHDVRQDEOH

-- 4 of 18 --

0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV
SRVVLELOLW\ RI D JRYHUQPHQW DSSHDO $OO RI WKH FRXQVHO
LQYROYHG QRWHG WKDW WKH\ GLG QRW FRQWHPSODWH WKDW VXFK DQ
DSSHDO FRXOG RFFXU RU WKDW LW ZRXOG EH VXFFHVVIXO ,Q WKH
0LOOHUFDVHRQWKLVDSSHDO0LOOHU¶VFRXQVHODQGFOLHQWZHUH
LQFRXUWZKHQWKHSURVHFXWRUVDLGWKDWWKHVWDWHZRXOGDSSHDO
DQGVSHFLILFDOO\WHVWLILHGWKDWKHIHOWWKDWWKHFKDQFHVRIVXFK
DQDSSHDOVXFFHHGLQJ RQHKDGQHYHUEHHQWULHGLQ0LFKLJDQ
WRWKLVSRLQW ZHUHVXIILFLHQWO\ORZWKDWLWGLGQRWDIIHFWWKHLU
MXGJPHQW
-XGJH*LOPDQ¶VLQWHUHVWLQJPDWKHPDWLFDODQDO\VLVDWSDJH
EHJLQVWRDGGUHVVWKHFRUUHFWLQTXLU\EXWGRHVQRWJRIDU
HQRXJK7KHUHOHYDQWTXHVWLRQLVZKHWKHUWKHXOWLPDWHDGYLFH
ZDV D VWUDWHJ\ ZLWKLQ WKH EURDG ERXQGV RI SURIHVVLRQDO
FRPSHWHQFH5HODWHGO\ZHDVNZKHWKHUWKHGHFUHDVHLQWKH
SUREDELOLW\ RI D VXFFHVVIXO RXWFRPH GXH WR SURVHFXWRULDO
DSSHDOUHQGHUVFUHGLEOHSHWLWLRQHUV¶DVVHUWLRQVWKDWWKH\ZRXOG
KDYHJLYHQXSWKHLUFKDQFHDWDMXYHQLOHVHQWHQFHEHIRUH-XGJH
5REHUVRQ7KHRQHFRXQVHOZKRWHVWLILHGVSHFLILFDOO\WKRXJKW
WKDWWKHFKDQFHVRIWKHVWDWHVXFFHHGLQJRQDSSHDOZHUHIDLUO\
VPDOODQGZHKDYHQREDVLVIRUGLVFRXQWLQJWKDWMXGJPHQW
7KXVLIFRXQVHOFDOFXODWHGWKHFKDQFHVRI-XGJH5REHUVRQ¶V
VHQWHQFLQJ WKH GHIHQGDQWV DV MXYHQLOHV DW ZKHQ WKH
UHDOLW\WXUQHGRXWWREH DQGEHOLHYHGWKHFKDQFHRI
VXFFHVVRQDSSHDOE\WKHVWDWHWREHFRQWLQJHQWRQWKH
MXYHQLOH VHQWHQFLQJ EHORZ WKHQ WKH FKDQFHV RI XOWLPDWH
VXFFHVVZRXOGKDYHVKUXQNIURPWR7KLVPLJKW
VWLOO ORRN H[WUHPHO\ JRRG DV RSSRVHG WR D YHU\ ODUJH
SUREDELOLW\RIFRQYLFWLRQRIILUVWGHJUHHPXUGHUDQGDVHQWHQFH
RIOLIHZLWKRXWSDUROH
:KLOHP\DVVLJQLQJRIYDOXHVLVMXVWDVVSHFXODWLYHDV-XGJH
*LOPDQ¶V LW GRHV HPSKDVL]H WKDW WKH SURSHU LQTXLU\ IRU
HIIHFWLYHDVVLVWDQFHRIFRXQVHOVKRXOGEHWKHRYHUDOOVWUDWHJ\
HPSOR\HG,WGRHVQRWDSSHDUWRPHWKDWZHFDQSURSHUO\VD\
XQGHUWKH$('3$VWDQGDUGWKDWWKHVWDWHFRXUWVXQUHDVRQDEO\
DSSOLHG6WULFNODQG
)LQDOO\,GRQRWDJUHHZLWK-XGJH*LOPDQWKDWWKHIDLOXUHRI
WKHVWDWHFRXUWWRGLVFXVVWKHSUHMXGLFHSURQJRI6WULFNODQG
1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO
$ DPHQGPHQW WR 0LFKLJDQ VWDWXWRU\ ODZ JUDQWHG Michigan
prosecutors an appeal of right from "[a] final judgment or final order of
the . . . recorder’s court" in criminal cases. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 770.12 (as amended, Mich. Pub. Act 1988 No. 66) ,Q 1RYHPEHU
WKH 0LFKLJDQ &RXUW RI $SSHDOV SXEOLVKHG D GHFLVLRQ LQ ZKLFK LW FRQVWUXHG
WKH DPHQGPHQW WR DOORZ SURVHFXWRUV WR DSSHDO FULPLQDO VHQWHQFHV DV RI
ULJKW 3HRSOH Y 5H\QROGV 1:G 0LFK $SS
He acknowledged an understanding of the various trial rights
he was foregoing by pleading guilty. Miller affirmed his
understanding that first degree murder was punishable by a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment without parole. The
court described the situation to Miller: "the only hope that
you [have] in this plea is if I decide to treat you as a juvenile
for the purpose of disposition. You heard [the prosecutor] say
that they are going to want to hold a lengthy disposition
hearing, do you understand that?" Miller stated that he
understood, and specifically acknowledged that he was
"taking that chance."
The court then questioned Miller briefly as to the factual
basis for his plea. Miller stated that he was part of a group
that decided to steal a car. Sometime before the crime he
gave Haynes a gun knowing that Haynes planned to use it to
steal a car. Miller acknowledged knowing the inherent
danger to life when a car is taken at gunpoint.
Over the course of the next year, Chief Judge Roberson
held several hearings RQWKHGLVSRVLWLRQRI0LOOHU¶VVHQWHQFH
2Q )HEUXDU\ 0LOOHU¶V FRXQVHO PDGH FORVLQJ
DUJXPHQWVWRWKHFRXUWDWWKHILQDOKHDULQJLQ0LOOHU¶VFDVH$W
WKDW KHDULQJ WKH SURVHFXWRU DQQRXQFHG WKDW LI WKH FRXUW
VHQWHQFHG0LOOHUDVDMXYHQLOHWKHSURVHFXWLRQZRXOGDSSHDO
On June 17, 1991, the court sentenced Miller to confinement
in a juvenile institution until age twenty-one.
B. Haynes’ Plea
On March 27, 1990, Haynes pled guilty to all charges
against him, also before Chief Judge Roberson. He was

-- 5 of 18 --

0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV
sixteen years old at the time. At the plea hearing, his counsel,
Wilfred Rice, stated that he had discussed the matter with
Haynes and his family and that Haynes, with the acquiescence
of his father, wanted to enter a plea of guilty as charged. Rice
stated that Haynes understood that the court could sentence
him as an adult or as a juvenile, and affirmed that Haynes
understood that the prosecutor would attempt to convince
Chief Judge Roberson that Haynes should be sentenced as an
adult.
The court questioned Haynes directly about whether he
understood that, if he pled guilty, "the only option you have
in this case, the only escape you have in terms of mandatory
life, [is] if the prosecution can’t convince me to treat you as
an adult." Haynes stated that he understood.
Haynes stated that he had talked to his parents about his
guilty plea. He affirmed that he was not being coerced into
his plea and that he made his plea freely, understandingly, and
voluntarily. He also affirmed an awareness of the various
trial rights he was foregoing by pleading guilty.
The court then questioned Haynes briefly about the factual
basis for his plea. Haynes stated that other boys in the group
pulled a tree branch into the street to force cars to stop. When
the victim, Gravel, stopped his car in front of the tree branch,
Haynes ran out to the car intending to steal it. He was
carrying a handgun Miller had given him. As Haynes
approached the car, it pulled away and he fired at the car.
Haynes specifically admitted that he shot at the car as part of
his attempt to steal it.
Over the course of the next year, Chief Judge Roberson
held several hearings on the disposition of Haynes’ sentence.
On August 28, 1991, the court sentenced Haynes to
confinement in a juvenile institution until age twenty-one.
1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO
0RUHRYHU$('3$LPSRVHVDGGLWLRQDOFRQVWUDLQWVRQWKH
DELOLW\RIIHGHUDOFRXUWVWRJUDQWDZULWRIKDEHDVFRUSXV,Q
RUGHUWRPHHWWKHJDWHNHHSHUVWDQGDUGVVHWIRUWKE\$('3$
86& † G IRU WKH LVVXDQFH RI ZULWV RI KDEHDV
FRUSXV WKH VWDWH FRXUW DGMXGLFDWLRQ RI WKH FODLP WKDW LV
FKDOOHQJHG RQ FROODWHUDO DSSHDO PXVW KDYH UHVXOWHG LQ D
GHFLVLRQWKDWZDV³FRQWUDU\WRRULQYROYHGDQXQUHDVRQDEOH
DSSOLFDWLRQRIFOHDUO\HVWDEOLVKHG)HGHUDOODZDVGHWHUPLQHG
E\WKH6XSUHPH&RXUWRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´,ELG&RQH
6&WDW
7KH6XSUHPH&RXUWKHOGLQ:LOOLDPVY7D\ORU86
WKDW ³>W@KH PRVW LPSRUWDQW SRLQW LV WKDW DQ
XQUHDVRQDEOHDSSOLFDWLRQRIIHGHUDOODZLVGLIIHUHQWIURPDQ
LQFRUUHFWDSSOLFDWLRQRIIHGHUDOODZ´,GDW HPSKDVLVLQ
RULJLQDO $VWDWHFRXUWGHFLVLRQFDQLQYROYHDQXQUHDVRQDEOH
DSSOLFDWLRQRI8QLWHG6WDWHV6XSUHPH&RXUWSUHFHGHQWLQRQO\
WZRZD\V)LUVWDVWDWHFRXUWPLJKWLGHQWLI\WKHFRUUHFWOHJDO
UXOHEXWXQUHDVRQDEO\DSSO\LWWRWKHIDFWV6HFRQGDVWDWH
FRXUWGHFLVLRQPLJKWXQUHDVRQDEO\H[WHQGD6XSUHPH&RXUW
OHJDOSUHFHGHQWWRDQHZFRQWH[WZKHUHLWVKRXOGQRWDSSO\RU
XQUHDVRQDEO\UHIXVHWRH[WHQGWKDWSULQFLSOHWRDQHZFRQWH[W
ZKHUH LW VKRXOG DSSO\ ,G DW 7KH 6XSUHPH &RXUW
UHFHQWO\ UHLWHUDWHG WKDW WKH :LOOLDPV REMHFWLYH
XQUHDVRQDEOHQHVV VWDQGDUG DSSOLHV WR WKH LQHIIHFWLYH
DVVLVWDQFHRIFRXQVHOVHWWLQJ&RQH6&WDW,Q
&RQH WKH &RXUW KHOG WKDW ZKHQ D VWDWH FRXUW FRUUHFWO\
LGHQWLILHVWKH6WULFNODQGVWDQGDUGDVDSSOLFDEOHDQGPDNHVD
UHDVRQDEOH MXGJPHQW UHJDUGLQJ DWWRUQH\ SHUIRUPDQFH DQG
SUHMXGLFHXQGHUWKHFRUUHFWVWDQGDUGDIHGHUDOFRXUWODFNVWKH
SRZHU WR JUDQW D ZULW RI KDEHDV FRUSXV FRQWUDYHQLQJ WKDW
GHWHUPLQDWLRQ ,G DW , ZRXOG QRW KROG WKDW WKH
0LFKLJDQFRXUWZDVREMHFWLYHO\XQUHDVRQDEOHLQLWVMXGJPHQW
HYHQZHUH,WRGLVDJUHHZLWKLWDVWKHPDMRULW\GRHV
-XGJH*LOPDQ¶VFRQFXUUHQFHPDNHVDQXPEHURILQWHUHVWLQJ
SRLQWVWKDWGHVHUYHDEULHIUHVSRQVH&RQWUDU\WRWKHVWDWHPHQW
DWSDJH,KDGWKRXJKWWKDW,GLGQRWHLQWKHILUVWSDUDJUDSK
RIWKLVGLVVHQWDQGGLGQRWGLVSXWHWKHREYLRXVIDFWVLQWKH
UHFRUG WKDW FRXQVHO GLG QRW LQIRUP WKHLU FOLHQWV RI WKH

-- 6 of 18 --

0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV
$VIRUWKHSUHMXGLFHHOHPHQWRI6WULFNODQGLWVHHPVFOHDU
WKDWHYHQZLWKNQRZOHGJHRIWKHSRVVLELOLW\RISURVHFXWRULDO
DSSHDOSHWLWLRQHUVZRXOGVWLOOKDYHSOHGJXLOW\0LOOHUZDV
H[SUHVVO\LQIRUPHGDWKLVVHQWHQFLQJKHDULQJRQ)HEUXDU\
WKDWWKHSURVHFXWLRQLQWHQGHGWRDSSHDOKLVVHQWHQFHDV
DMXYHQLOH0LOOHUDQGKLVDWWRUQH\QRWLFHGDQGGLVFXVVHGWKH
SURVHFXWLRQ¶V FODLP WKDW LW FRXOG DSSHDO EXW IHOW WKDW WKH
SURVHFXWLRQZRXOGEHXQVXFFHVVIXORQDSSHDODMXGJPHQWWKDW
ZDVQRWREYLRXVO\XQUHDVRQDEOHJLYHQWKHVWDWHRIWKHODZDW
WKDWWLPH0LOOHUGLGQRWDWWHPSWWRZLWKGUDZKLVJXLOW\SOHD
DVRIWKHVHQWHQFLQJKHDULQJ+D\QHVGHVSLWHWKHIDFWWKDWKLV
FRGHIHQGDQW KDG EHHQ ZDUQHG RI WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI
SURVHFXWRULDO DSSHDO DV RI )HEUXDU\ GLG QRW PRYH WR
ZLWKGUDZ KLV SOHD GXULQJ WKH ILYH PRQWKV EHIRUH KLV RZQ
VHQWHQFLQJRQ$XJXVW1HLWKHUSHWLWLRQHUDWWHPSWHG
WR ZLWKGUDZ KLV JXLOW\ SOHD DIWHU WKH SURVHFXWLRQ DFWXDOO\
DSSHDOHGUDWKHUWKH\DUJXHGWKHLUFDVHRQWKHPHULWVEHIRUH
WKH &RXUW RI $SSHDOV 7KLV PDNHV VHQVH HYHQ ZLWK WKH
SRVVLELOLW\RISURVHFXWRULDODSSHDOWKHFKDQFHWREHVHQWHQFHG
DVDMXYHQLOHZDVWKHLURQO\RSWLRQVKRUWRIWULDO3HWLWLRQHUV
ZDQWHG D MXYHQLOH VHQWHQFH QRW D QHZ WULDO 3HWLWLRQHUV
WKURXJK FRXQVHO JDPHG WKH V\VWHP DQG DWWHPSWHG WR
ZLWKGUDZWKHLUJXLOW\SOHDVRQO\DIWHUWKHLUMXYHQLOHVHQWHQFHV
ZHUHUHMHFWHGE\WKH&RXUWRI$SSHDOV7KLVSRVWFRQYLFWLRQ
VWUDWHJ\JDYHSHWLWLRQHUVWZRELWHVDWWKHDSSOHWKDWWKH\QRZ
DUJXHWKH\ZRXOGKDYHJLYHQXSWKHLUILUVW DQGH[DQWHPRUH
OLNHO\ ELWHEHFDXVHRIWKHSRVVLELOLW\RISURVHFXWRULDODSSHDO
GHILHVFUHGHQFH
3HWLWLRQHUVZHUHYHU\DZDUHRIWKHSRVVLEOHFRQVHTXHQFHV
RISOHDGLQJJXLOW\WRILUVWGHJUHHPXUGHU-XGJH5REHUVRQ
WROG WKHP EHIRUH WKH\ SOHG WKDW WKH\ FRXOG SRVVLEO\ EH
VHQWHQFHGDVDGXOWVDQGWKHUHIRUHEHVXEMHFWWRDPDQGDWRU\
OLIHVHQWHQFHDVDUHVXOWRIWKHLUJXLOW\SOHDV7KDWLVH[DFWO\
ZKDW KDSSHQHG DIWHU WKH SURVHFXWRULDO DSSHDO 3HWLWLRQHUV
NQHZWKHULVNDQGWRRNWKHLUFKDQFHV7KHIDFWWKDWWKH\GLG
QRWFRUUHFWO\ DVVHVVZKHWKHURUQRWWKH\DFWXDOO\ZRXOGEH
VHQWHQFHGDVDGXOWVLVZKROO\LUUHOHYDQW7KHSOHDZDVPDGH
YROXQWDULO\ DQG ZLWK IXOO NQRZOHGJH RI WKH SRVVLEOH
FRQVHTXHQFHV
1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO
7KH SURVHFXWRU DSSHDOHG +D\QHV¶ VHQWHQFH E\ ULJKW 7KH DSSHDO LQ
0LOOHU¶V FDVH ZDV QRW DV D PDWWHU RI ULJKW EHFDXVH WKH SURVHFXWRU GLG QRW
WLPHO\ ILOH WKH DSSHDO +RZHYHU WKH 0LFKLJDQ &RXUW RI $SSHDOV JUDQWHG
WKH SURVHFXWRU¶V DSSOLFDWLRQ IRU OHDYH WR DSSHDO
C. Post-plea Events
After Chief Judge Roberson ordered that Miller and Haynes
be sentenced as juveniles, the prosecutor appealed each
sentence. The state court of appeals reversed on each
defendant and remanded for imposition of the adult sentence:
mandatory life imprisonment without parole on the first
degree murder charge. People v. Miller, 503 N.W.2d 89
(Mich. App. 1993); People v. Haynes, 502 N.W.2d 758
(Mich. App. 1993). The state supreme court denied the
defendants’ applications for leave to appeal those results.
On remand before Chief Judge Roberson, the defendants
moved to withdraw their guilty pleas and for evidentiary
hearings on those motions. Haynes and Miller each alleged
that their guilty pleas had been involuntary due to ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. They asserted, among other
things, that their attorneys’ failure to inform them that the
prosecutor could appeal the imposition of a juvenile sentence
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The court
granted the motions for evidentiary hearings.
The prosecutor applied to the state court of appeals for
leave to file an interlocutory appeal of the orders granting
evidentiary hearings. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied
the application. The Michigan Supreme Court, in lieu of
granting leave to appeal, vacated the trial court’s orders
granting the evidentiary hearings and directed that Haynes
and Miller be sentenced "forthwith" as adults "without
prejudice to subsequent consideration of the motion[s] to
withdraw the plea[s] of guilty." People v. Miller, 527
N.W.2d 513 (Mich. 1994); People v. Haynes, 527 N.W.2d
512-13 (Mich. 1994).

-- 7 of 18 --

0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV
+D\QHV¶ WULDO FRXQVHO :LOIUHG 5LFH GLHG EHIRUH +D\QHV PRYHG WR
ZLWKGUDZ KLV SOHD
On December 19, 1994, Chief Judge Roberson imposed
sentences of life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
The court subsequently held separate evidentiary hearings on
Miller’s and Haynes’ motions to withdraw their guilty pleas.
Haynes was the only witness at his evidentiary hearing.
+D\QHVWHVWLILHGWKDWKHWDONHGZLWKKLVFRXQVHO:LOIUHG5LFH
WZLFHLQWKHWKUHHZHHNVEHIRUHKLVJXLOW\SOHD(DFKYLVLW
ODVWHGOHVVWKDQWKLUW\PLQXWHVDQGHDFKFHQWHUHGRQ5LFH¶V
DGYLFHWKDW+D\QHVSOHDGJXLOW\EHIRUH&KLHI-XGJH5REHUVRQ
+D\QHVWHVWLILHGWKDWKHZDVKHVLWDQWWRSOHDGJXLOW\EXWWKDW
5LFHUHSHDWHGO\WROGKLPWKDW it was in his interest to plead
before Chief Judge Roberson, where he would "have great
chances of being sentenced as a juvenile."
Haynes testified that Rice never told him that, even if Chief
Judge Roberson sentenced him as a juvenile, the prosecutor
could still appeal that sentence and an appellate court could
impose an adult sentence of life without parole. Haynes
stated that he would not have pled guilty had he known this.
Q So what is your understanding if you plead
guilty and you made it through the sentencing
hearing and you could convince the judge to
sentence you as a juvenile, did you think
there was anything after that?
[Haynes] No. Besides the fact that I’d be going to [a
juvenile facility].
. . . .
Q Did you have any idea that the prosection
[sic] had any other option besides that
hearing that they had in front of the Judge?
1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO
BBBBBBBBBBBBB
',66(17
BBBBBBBBBBBBB
%2**6 &LUFXLW -XGJH GLVVHQWLQJ , GLVDJUHH ZLWK WKH
PDMRULW\¶V DQDO\VLV DQG ZRXOG UHYHUVH WKH JUDQW RI KDEHDV
FRUSXV,WKHUHIRUHUHVSHFWIXOO\GLVVHQW7KH0LFKLJDQ&RXUW
RI$SSHDOV GHFLGHGWKDWLQWKLVFDVHDIDLOXUHWRLQIRUPD
FULPLQDOGHIHQGDQWEHIRUHDJXLOW\SOHDWKDWWKHSURVHFXWLRQ
PD\KDYHDULJKWWRDSSHDOKLVEHLQJVHQWHQFHGDVDMXYHQLOH
GRHV QRW FRQVWLWXWH LQHIIHFWLYH DVVLVWDQFH RI FRXQVHO 7R
VXFFHHGRQDFODLPRILQHIIHFWLYHDVVLVWDQFHRIFRXQVHOWKH
SHWLWLRQHU PXVW VKRZ GHILFLHQW SHUIRUPDQFH E\ WKH
DWWRUQH\DQG SUHMXGLFH6WULFNODQGY:DVKLQJWRQ
86 /HJLWLPDWH WULDO WDFWLFV DUH H[SUHVVO\
H[FOXGHGIURPWKHGHILQLWLRQRIGHILFLHQWSHUIRUPDQFH%HOO
Y&RQH6&W 7RHVWDEOLVKSUHMXGLFH
DIWHUKDYLQJSOHGJXLOW\WKHSOHDGHUPXVWVKRZDUHDVRQDEOH
SUREDELOLW\ WKDW KH ZRXOG QRW KDYH SOHG KDG KH UHFHLYHG
FRPSHWHQWDGYLFH+LOOY/RFNKDUW86 ,Q
WKLV FDVH SHWLWLRQHUV KDYH HVWDEOLVKHG QHLWKHU HOHPHQW RI
6WULFNODQG
$W WULDO SHWLWLRQHUV IDFHG QHDUFHUWDLQ FRQYLFWLRQ 7KH
GHIHQVHV WKDW WKH\ ZRXOG KDYH DVVHUWHG DW WULDO ZHUH LQ
HVVHQFH YDJXH KRSHV IRU MXU\ QXOOLILFDWLRQ 7KHLU GHIHQVH
FRXQVHONQHZKRZHYHUWKDWWKHUHZDVDYHU\UHDOKRSHWKDW
WKH\ FRXOG EH VHQWHQFHG DV MXYHQLOHV LI WKH\ SOHG JXLOW\
EHFDXVHRIWKHVHQWHQFLQJKDELWVRIWKHSDUWLFXODUMXGJHLQWKH
FDVH&RXQVHOV¶SHUIRUPDQFHZDVQRWGHILFLHQWLQGHHGWKH
LGHDIRUWKHJDPEOHVSUDQJIURPGHIHQVHFRXQVHOV¶VXSHULRU
DQG LQWLPDWH NQRZOHGJH RI WKH FRXUW 7KHLU DWWRUQH\V
H[SODLQHGWKHUDPLILFDWLRQVRIWKHGHFLVLRQWRSHWLWLRQHUVYHU\
FDUHIXOO\ 3HWLWLRQHUV¶ SDUHQWV ZHUH LQYROYHG LQ WKH
GHFLVLRQPDNLQJ SURFHVV 7KH GHFLVLRQ WR SOHDG ZDV
FDOFXODWHGYROXQWDU\DQGLQIRUPHGWKLVLVSUHFLVHO\WKHVRUW
RI FRPSHWHQW UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ WKDW LV H[FOXGHG IURP WKH
6WULFNODQGGHILQLWLRQRIGHILFLHQWSHUIRUPDQFH6WULFNODQG
86DW&RQH6&WDW

-- 8 of 18 --

0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV
WKDW EXW IRU FRXQVHO¶V HUURUV KH ZRXOG QRW KDYH SOHDGHG
JXLOW\DQGZRXOGKDYHLQVLVWHGRQJRLQJWRWULDO´ 6WULFNODQG
86DW ³$UHDVRQDEOHSUREDELOLW\LVDSUREDELOLW\
VXIILFLHQWWRXQGHUPLQHFRQILGHQFHLQWKHRXWFRPH´
1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO
[Haynes] No.
Haynes J.A. at 176-77.
Haynes also stated that he was innocent of first degree
murder because he did not intend to harm anyone. Contrary
to his testimony at the original plea hearing, Haynes denied
shooting at the car. He claimed that at the plea hearing he
was "under advisement" of his attorney to say that he shot at
the car.
We turn to Miller’s further proceedings. At the evidentiary
hearing on Miller’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
Miller’s trial counsel, Charles Lusby, testified. He stated that
he only did trial work and never handled appeals. Lusby
testified that he considered abandonment to be a possible
defense for Miller because when Miller gave the gun to
Haynes he was deferring to the older boys in the group. He
testified that Miller "practically totally rel[ied]" on his advice,
and that he convinced Miller’s parents, who also relied on
him, that pleading guilty was in Miller’s best interest.
Lusby stated that Miller was "reluctant" to plead guilty, but
that he "prevailed upon him," by telling him he likely would
be sentenced as a juvenile. Lusby testified that, based upon
his familiarity with the juvenile sentencing process, he
believed Chief Judge Roberson would sentence Miller as a
juvenile. Lusby considered his advice that Miller plead guilty
to first degree murder to be "extraordinary."
Lusby admitted that his considerations in formulating this
advice did not include any factor beyond what the trial court
would do.
Q In formulating your advice to Mr. Miller, did
you take into account the fact [that] the
prosecutor had since I believe 1988 the right
to appeal a sentence?
[Lusby] No, I did not.

-- 9 of 18 --

0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV
Q Did you stop to consider that, did it occur to
you?
[Lusby] That didn’t occur to me at all.
Q Did you discuss that possible risk with Mr.
Miller?
[Lusby] I discussed a lot of things with him, but that
was not one of them. It didn’t occur to me
that the prosecutor would do it, nor that the
appellate court would reverse that decision.
Miller J.A. at 254-55.
Lusby also testified that he recalled the prosecutor stating
in his closing argument at the sentencing hearing that he
would appeal if Miller received a juvenile sentence. Lusby
explained that Miller "was struck" by the prosecutor’s
statement, but "I think I told him I didn’t think [the
prosecutor] would be successful."
Miller also testified. He stated that when Lusby advised
him to plead guilty, Lusby did not tell him that the prosecutor
could appeal and that the court of appeals had the authority to
overturn Chief Judge Roberson’s decision. Miller stated that,
had he known, he would not have pled guilty.
Regarding the factual basis for his plea, Miller stated that
the version of the facts he gave at the plea hearing was
inaccurate: "I was speaking upon the elements that my lawyer
told me to speak on as far as first degree murder." Miller
stated that when Gravel was killed he was seventy-five yards
from the car and running away. Contrary to the statements he
made at his plea hearing, Miller stated that there had been no
plan to take a car and that he did not know what Haynes was
planning to do when he gave him the gun. He did not intend
to take part in a robbery.
1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO
GLVVHQWXQGHUHVWLPDWHVWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRIDSRVVLEOHDSSHDOLQ
DQ\ FDOFXODWLRQ WKDW WKH SHWLWLRQHUV RU WKHLU FRXQVHO PDGH
0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVPLJKWKDYHEHOLHYHGWKDWWKH\KDGVD\DQ
FKDQFHRIEHLQJVHQWHQFHGDVMXYHQLOHVE\WKHSDUWLFXODU
WULDOMXGJHEHIRUHZKRPWKH\SOHGJXLOW\,IWKH\KDGEHHQ
DGYLVHGWKDWWKHVWDWHFRXOGDSSHDOKRZHYHUWKH\PLJKWKDYH
HYDOXDWHGWKHRGGVRIWKHWULDOMXGJH¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQVEHLQJ
VXVWDLQHG RQ DSSHDO DV RQO\ 7KH ULVN RI WKH WULDO
MXGJH¶VVHQWHQFLQJGHFLVLRQVEHLQJUHYHUVHGRQDSSHDOZRXOG
LQWKLVH[DPSOHUHGXFHWKHXOWLPDWHOLNHOLKRRGRI0LOOHUDQG
+D\QHVEHLQJVHQWHQFHGDVMXYHQLOHVIURPWRRQO\
:HDUHXQDEOHRIFRXUVHWRGHWHUPLQHWKHH[DFWRGGVWKDW
0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVEHOLHYHGWKDWWKH\IDFHGSULRUWRSOHDGLQJ
JXLOW\EXWWKHDERYHH[DPSOHLOOXVWUDWHVWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRI
IDLOLQJWRFRQVLGHUWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIWKHVWDWHDSSHDOLQJ7KH
IDFW WKDW 0LOOHU DQG +D\QHV ZHUH DZDUH RI WKH PD[LPXP
SHQDOW\ WKDW WKH\ IDFHG GRHV QRW WKHUHIRUH QHJDWH WKH
VLJQLILFDQFH RI WKH LQIRUPDWLRQ WKDW QHLWKHU WKH\ QRU WKHLU
FRXQVHOFRQVLGHUHG3HUKDSV0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVZRXOGKDYH
SOHG JXLOW\ HYHQ LI WKH\ KDG NQRZQ WKDW WKH WULDO MXGJH¶V
VHQWHQFLQJGHFLVLRQVZHUHQRWWKHRQO\KXUGOHWKDWWKH\KDGWR
RYHUFRPH LQ RUGHU WR EH VHQWHQFHG DV MXYHQLOHV %XW WKH\
ZHUH HQWLWOHG WR EH DGYLVHG RI DOO WKH ULVNV WKDW WKH\ IDFHG
EHIRUHFKRRVLQJWRSOHDGJXLOW\DQGIRUHJRLQJWKHLUULJKWVWR
MXU\WULDOV
%HFDXVH,DPQRWFRQILGHQWWKDW0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVZRXOG
KDYH SOHG JXLOW\ LI WKHLU FRXQVHO KDG LQIRUPHG WKDW WKHLU
VHQWHQFHVFRXOGEHDSSHDOHG,FRQFXUZLWKWKHOHDGRSLQLRQ
LQ FRQFOXGLQJ WKDW WKH GHFLVLRQ RI WKH 0LFKLJDQ &RXUW RI
$SSHDOVZDVDQXQUHDVRQDEOHDSSOLFDWLRQRI6WULFNODQG
86&† G SURYLGLQJWKDWDZULWRIKDEHDVFRUSXVLV
DYDLODEOH IRU D SHUVRQ LQ VWDWH FXVWRG\ LI WKH VWDWH FRXUW¶V
DGMXGLFDWLRQRIWKHSHWLWLRQHU¶VFODLP³UHVXOWHGLQDGHFLVLRQ
WKDWLQYROYHGDQXQUHDVRQDEOHDSSOLFDWLRQRIFOHDUO\
HVWDEOLVKHG)HGHUDOODZDVGHWHUPLQHGE\WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW
RI WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV´ +LOO Y /RFNKDUW 86
³>,@QRUGHUWRVDWLVI\WKHμSUHMXGLFH¶UHTXLUHPHQWWKH
GHIHQGDQWPXVWVKRZWKDWWKHUHLVDUHDVRQDEOHSUREDELOLW\

-- 10 of 18 --

0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV
³SUHMXGLFH´SURQJZHDUHQRWERXQGE\$('3$¶VGHIHUHQWLDO
VWDQGDUGRIUHYLHZEHFDXVHWKH0LFKLJDQ&RXUWRI$SSHDOV
QHYHUUHDFKHGWKHLVVXHRISUHMXGLFHZKHQLWGHWHUPLQHGWKDW
FRXQVHOV¶SHUIRUPDQFH ZDVQRWGHILFLHQW 6HH*RQ]DOHVY
0F.XQH )G WK &LU
H[SODLQLQJWKDWEHFDXVHWKHVWDWHFRXUWFRQVLGHUHGRQO\WZR
RI WKUHH UHTXLUHPHQWV QHFHVVDU\ WR HVWDEOLVK D YLRODWLRQ RI
%UDG\Y0DU\ODQG86 DGHQRYRVWDQGDUG
RIUHYLHZDSSOLHGWRWKHWKLUGHOHPHQW ,WKHUHIRUHEHOLHYH
WKDW WKH GLVVHQW¶V DSSOLFDWLRQ RI $('3$¶V ³REMHFWLYHO\
XQUHDVRQDEOH´WHVWWRWKHSUHMXGLFHFRPSRQHQWRI6WULFNODQG
LVQRWDSSURSULDWH :LOOLDPVY7D\ORU86
FODULI\LQJ WKH PHDQLQJ RI DQ ³XQUHDVRQDEOH
DSSOLFDWLRQ´RIODZXQGHU86&† G
7KHGLVVHQWFRQFOXGHVWKDW0LOOHU¶VDQG+D\QHV¶VHIIRUWVWR
ZLWKGUDZ WKHLU JXLOW\ SOHDV FRQVWLWXWHG DWWHPSWV WR JHW ³D
VHFRQGELWHDWWKHDSSOH´DQGWKDWWKHSHWLWLRQHUVHQWHUHGWKHLU
JXLOW\ SOHDV YROXQWDULO\ DQG ZLWK IXOO NQRZOHGJH RI WKH
SRVVLEOHVHQWHQFHVWKDWWKH\IDFHG,UHVSHFWIXOO\GLVDJUHH
$OWKRXJK0LOOHUKHDUGWKHSURVHFXWRULQIRUPWKHWULDOMXGJH
WKDW WKH VWDWH ZRXOG DSSHDO LI 0LOOHU ZHUH VHQWHQFHG DV D
MXYHQLOHWKLVVWDWHPHQWFDPHHOHYHQPRQWKVDIWHUKLVJXLOW\
SOHDDQGZDVLPPHGLDWHO\QHXWUDOL]HGE\KLVFRXQVHOWHOOLQJ
KLPQRWWRZRUU\DERXWDQ\DSSHDO7KLVDGYLFHRQFHPRUH
GLVJXLVHGWKHDGGLWLRQDOULVNRIDQDSSHDOWKDW0LOOHUIDFHG
0RUHRYHU WKH UHFRUG VXSSRUWV D ILQGLQJ WKDW 0LOOHU¶V DQG
+D\QHV¶VFRXQVHOQRWWKHSHWLWLRQHUVPDGHWKHGHFLVLRQVWR
SXUVXHWKHDSSHDOVIRUWKHLUUHVSHFWLYHFOLHQWV7KHUHLVQR
LQGLFDWLRQ WKDW DQ\RQH LQIRUPHG 0LOOHU RU +D\QHV RI WKH
SRVVLELOLW\ RI ZLWKGUDZLQJ WKHLU JXLOW\ SOHDV SULRU WR
VHQWHQFLQJRUGXULQJWKHVWDWH¶VDSSHDORIWKHLUVHQWHQFHV,GR
QRWEHOLHYHWKDW0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVVKRXOGEHSHQDOL]HGIRU
ZKDWDSSHDUVWREHWKHGHFLVLRQVRIWKHLUFRXQVHOWRSXUVXHWKH
VWDWHFRXUWDSSHDOV7KXVWKHGLVVHQW¶VLQIHUHQFHWKDW0LOOHU
DQG +D\QHV ZHUH ³JDPLQJ WKH V\VWHP´ LV LQ P\ RSLQLRQ
XQZDUUDQWHGXQGHUWKHVHFLUFXPVWDQFHV
:LWKUHVSHFWWRZKHWKHU0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVHQWHUHGWKHLU
JXLOW\ SOHDV NQRZLQJO\ DQG LQWHOOLJHQWO\ , EHOLHYH WKDW WKH
1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO
/\RQV DOVR SHWLWLRQHG IRU D ZULW RI KDEHDV FRUSXV LQ IHGHUDO GLVWULFW
FRXUW ,Q DQ RSLQLRQ ILOHG FRQWHPSRUDQHRXVO\ ZLWK WKLV RSLQLRQ ZH KDYH
DIILUPHG WKH JUDQW RI KDEHDV FRUSXV UHOLHI WR /\RQV E\ WKH GLVWULFW FRXUW
6HH /\RQV Y -DFNVRQ BBB )G BBB WK &LU
In October, 1995, the trial court determined that Miller’s
and Haynes’ guilty pleas had not been voluntary, knowing,
and intelligent due to ineffectiveness of trial counsel. The
court granted each his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
The Michigan Court of Appeals granted leave to the
prosecutor to appeal those orders.
In a consolidated decision addressing Miller’s and Haynes’
cases along with another similarly situated appellant,
Dashawn Lyons,the appeals court reversed the trial court.
People v. Haynes (After Remand), 562 N.W.2d 241 (Mich.
App. 1997). The court determined that the record showed
Miller and Haynes were aware at the time they pled guilty
that they might be sentenced as adults to mandatory terms of
life imprisonment without possibility of parole. In addition,
Miller knew from the prosecutor’s closing argument at his
final sentencing disposition hearing that the prosecution could
appeal if Miller received a juvenile sentence from the trial
court. Despite the knowledge each had, Miller and Haynes
pled guilty and did not move to withdraw their pleas until
after the conclusion of the appeal regarding their sentences.
Therefore, the court concluded, Miller and Haynes understood
the consequences of their pleas, and the pleas were
knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily made. Haynes
(After Remand), 562 N.W.2d at 246, 248. The Michigan
Supreme Court denied Miller and Haynes leave to appeal.
Miller and Haynes petitioned the federal district court for
writs of habeas corpus. The court granted the writs, ordering
that Miller and Haynes be released unless they were given
trials. The district court concluded that Miller’s and Haynes’
trial counsel were ineffective in failing to advise them of the

-- 11 of 18 --

0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV
,Q IHGHUDO GLVWULFW FRXUW +D\QHV DOOHJHG RWKHU JURXQGV IRU
LQHIIHFWLYHQHVV RI FRXQVHO 7KDW FRXUW KDYLQJ JUDQWHG UHOLHI EDVHG RQ
+D\QHV¶ FRXQVHO¶V IDLOXUH WR DGYLVH KLP RI WKH SURVHFXWRU¶V ULJKW WR
DSSHDO GLG QRW DGGUHVV WKRVH FODLPV +D\QHV Y %XUNH )6XSSG
(' 0LFK
prosecutor’s right to appeal. As a result, Miller and Haynes
had not pled guilty voluntarily or knowingly. The wardens
appealed to this court.
,,',6&866,21
$ +DEHDV&RUSXV5HYLHZ
Provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA) codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) govern our
reviewRIWKHVWDWHFRXUWGHFLVLRQVLQWKLVKDEHDVFRUSXVFDVH
G $Q DSSOLFDWLRQ IRU D ZULW RI KDEHDV FRUSXV RQ
EHKDOIRIDSHUVRQLQFXVWRG\SXUVXDQWWRWKHMXGJPHQWRI
D 6WDWH FRXUW VKDOO QRW EH JUDQWHG ZLWK UHVSHFW WR DQ\
FODLPWKDWZDVDGMXGLFDWHGRQWKHPHULWVLQ6WDWHFRXUW
SURFHHGLQJVXQOHVVWKHDGMXGLFDWLRQRIWKHFODLP²
UHVXOWHG LQ D GHFLVLRQ that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States[.]
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
The federal district court considered Miller’s and Haynes’
petitions for habeas corpus under the "unreasonable
application" prong of this statute. None of the parties argue
that the federal district court should have inquired whether
the Michigan Court of Appeals decision was "contrary to"
clearly established federal law. We proceed, therefore, under
the "unreasonable application" prong of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1).
1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO
DQG IDFWV UHOHYDQW WR SODXVLEOH RSWLRQV DUH YLUWXDOO\
XQFKDOOHQJHDEOHDQGVWUDWHJLFFKRLFHVPDGHDIWHUOHVVWKDQ
FRPSOHWHLQYHVWLJDWLRQDUHUHDVRQDEOHSUHFLVHO\WRWKHH[WHQW
WKDWUHDVRQDEOHSURIHVVLRQDOMXGJPHQWVVXSSRUWWKHOLPLWDWLRQV
RQLQYHVWLJDWLRQ´ $VWKHOHDGRSLQLRQQRWHVDUHDVRQDEOH
DWWRUQH\ZRXOGKDYHFRQVLGHUHGWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIDQDSSHDO
EHIRUHDGYLVLQJ0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVWRSOHDGJXLOW\XQGHUWKH
FLUFXPVWDQFHVRIWKHSUHVHQWFDVH
)LQDOO\ , EHOLHYH WKDW WKH GLVVHQW¶V FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI WKH
VWUHQJWKRIWKHVWDWH¶VFDVHDJDLQVWWKHSHWLWLRQHUVLQDVVHVVLQJ
ZKHWKHUFRXQVHOSURYLGHGFRPSHWHQWUHSUHVHQWDWLRQLQFOXGLQJ
WKHVXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKHLURQO\DYDLODEOHGHIHQVHZDVDKRSHIRU
MXU\ QXOOLILFDWLRQ IRFXVHV RQ WKH ZURQJ LVVXH 7KH
SHWLWLRQHUVLQP\RSLQLRQZHUHHQWLWOHGWREHDGYLVHGRIWKH
SRVVLELOLW\ RI DQ DSSHDO EHIRUH GHFLGLQJ ZKHWKHU WR SOHDG
JXLOW\EHFDXVHZLWKRXWWKDWNQRZOHGJHWKHLUGHFLVLRQVZHUH
QRW EDVHG XSRQ DOO RI WKH UHOHYDQW IDFWV $OWKRXJK WKH
6XSUHPH&RXUWKDVKHOGWKDWWKH6L[WK$PHQGPHQWGRHVQRW
UHTXLUH D FRUUHFW DVVHVVPHQW RI WKH ULVNV DQG EHQHILWV RI
SOHDGLQJJXLOW\DVRSSRVHGWRSURFHHGLQJWRWULDOLWUHFRJQL]HV
WKDWFRXQVHOPXVWDWOHDVWEHDZDUHRIVXFKULVNVHVSHFLDOO\
ZKHUHWKHODFNRIDZDUHQHVVGLUHFWO\LPSDFWVWKHUHDVRQLQJ
EHKLQG ZKDWHYHU DGYLFH LV SURYLGHG 6HH 0F0DQQ Y
5LFKDUGVRQ86 ³4XHVWLRQVOLNHWKHVH
>UHODWLQJ WR WKH ULVNV RI WULDO@ FDQQRW EH DQVZHUHG ZLWK
FHUWLWXGH\HWDGHFLVLRQWRSOHDGJXLOW\PXVWQHFHVVDULO\UHVW
XSRQFRXQVHO¶VDQVZHUVXQFHUWDLQDVWKH\PD\EH´ 8QLWHG
6WDWHV Y +DQOH\ )G WK &LU
UHFRJQL]LQJWKDW³DUHYHUVDOIRULQHIIHFWLYHDVVLVWDQFHZRXOG
EHLQRUGHU´LIWKHGHIHQGDQWKDGSOHGJXLOW\VROHO\LQUHOLDQFH
XSRQ KLV FRXQVHO¶V HUURQHRXV DGYLFH ³WKDW KH ZRXOG EH
HOLJLEOH IRU SDUROH LQ RQHWKLUG WKH WLPH KH UHFHLYHG IRU
VHQWHQFH´
, DOVR DJUHH ZLWK WKH OHDG RSLQLRQ WKDW LI FRXQVHO KDG
LQIRUPHG0LOOHUDQG+D\QHVWKDWWKHVWDWHFRXOGDSSHDOWKH
WULDO MXGJH¶V VHQWHQFLQJ GHFLVLRQV D UHDVRQDEOH SUREDELOLW\
H[LVWV WKDW ERWK SHWLWLRQHUV ZRXOG KDYH SURFHHGHG WR WULDO
UDWKHU WKDQ SOHDG JXLOW\ ,Q FRQVLGHULQJ 6WULFNODQG¶V

-- 12 of 18 --

0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
&21&855(1&(
BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
521$/'/((*,/0$1&LUFXLW-XGJHFRQFXUULQJ,IXOO\
FRQFXUZLWKWKHOHDGRSLQLRQ¶VFRQFOXVLRQWKDW0LOOHU¶VDQG
+D\QHV¶VFRXQVHOZHUHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\LQHIIHFWLYHEHFDXVHRI
WKHLUODZ\HUV¶IDLOXUHWRLQIRUPWKHSHWLWLRQHUVWKDWWKHVWDWH
FRXOGDSSHDOWKHGHFLVLRQRIWKHWULDOMXGJHWRVHQWHQFHWKHP
DVMXYHQLOHV0\UHDVRQIRUZULWLQJVHSDUDWHO\LVWRH[SODLQ
LQZKDW,UHJDUGDVDQH[WUHPHO\FORVHFDVHZK\,ILQGWKH
ZHOOZULWWHQGLVVHQWLQJRSLQLRQOHVVSHUVXDVLYHWKDQWKHOHDG
RSLQLRQ
/LNHWKHOHDGRSLQLRQ,EHOLHYHWKDWWKH0LFKLJDQ&RXUWRI
$SSHDOV¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQWKDW0LOOHU¶VDQG+D\QHV¶VFRXQVHO
SHUIRUPHGFRPSHWHQWO\ZDVDQXQUHDVRQDEOHDSSOLFDWLRQRI
6WULFNODQGY:DVKLQJWRQ86 7KHGLVVHQW
LQFRQWUDVWILQGVFRXQVHOV¶SHUIRUPDQFHWREHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\
FRPSHWHQW D FRQFOXVLRQ ZLWK ZKLFK , GLVDJUHH IRU VHYHUDO
UHDVRQV
)LUVW LQ UHDFKLQJ WKH FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW WKH SHWLWLRQHUV¶
FRXQVHOSURYLGHGFRPSHWHQWUHSUHVHQWDWLRQWKHGLVVHQWGRHV
QRWDGGUHVVWKHIDLOXUHRIFRXQVHOWRLQIRUP0LOOHUDQG+D\QHV
WKDW WKH VWDWH FRXOG DSSHDO WKH WULDO MXGJH¶V VHQWHQFLQJ
GHFLVLRQV 7KH GLVVHQW LQVWHDG IRFXVHV VROHO\ RQ ZKHWKHU
FRXQVHOV¶VWUDWHJ\ZDVUHDVRQDEOHLQOLJKWRIWKHLUNQRZOHGJH
RIWKHWULDOMXGJH¶VVHQWHQFLQJWHQGHQFLHVWKHUHE\RYHUORRNLQJ
WKH YHU\ RPLVVLRQ WKDW LQ P\ RSLQLRQ UHQGHUHG WKH
SHUIRUPDQFHRIWKHSHWLWLRQHUV¶FRXQVHOGHILFLHQW
6HFRQG EHFDXVH 0LOOHU¶V DQG +D\QHV¶V FRXQVHO QHYHU
FRQVLGHUHG WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI WKH VWDWH DSSHDOLQJ WKH WULDO
MXGJH¶VVHQWHQFLQJGHFLVLRQVWKHLUDGYLVLQJWKHSHWLWLRQHUVWR
SOHDG JXLOW\ WR ILUVWGHJUHH PXUGHU FDQQRW EH FRQVLGHUHG D
UHDVRQDEOHVWUDWHJLFGHFLVLRQWRZKLFKGHIHUHQFHVKRXOGEH
DFFRUGHG 6WULFNODQG 86 DW H[SODLQLQJ WKDW
³VWUDWHJLFFKRLFHVPDGHDIWHUWKRURXJKLQYHVWLJDWLRQRIODZ
1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO
7KH 6XSUHPH &RXUW LQ :LOOLDPV DFNQRZOHGJHG WKH GLIILFXOW\ LQ
GHILQLQJ WKH WHUP ³XQUHDVRQDEOH´ EXW H[SODLQHG WKDW ³LW LV D FRPPRQ WHUP
LQ WKH OHJDO ZRUOG DQG DFFRUGLQJO\ IHGHUDO MXGJHV DUH IDPLOLDU ZLWK LWV
PHDQLQJ´ 86 DW 7KLV FLUFXLW KDV VWDWHG WKDW ZH ³UHO\ VROHO\ RQ
WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ LQ :LOOLDPV IRU WKH DSSURSULDWH VWDQGDUG
XQGHU † G ´ Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir. 2000);
accord 0LOOHU Y )UDQFLV )G Q WK &LU 2WKHU
FLUFXLW FRXUWV WKDW KDYH DWWHPSWHG JUHDWHU FODULILFDWLRQ KDYH FRPH WR
ZLGHO\ GLYHUJHQW YLHZV RQ WKH PHDQLQJ RI ³XQUHDVRQDEOH´ &RPSDUH
)UDQFLV 6 Y 6WRQH )G G &LU VWDWLQJ WKDW DQ
³XQUHDVRQDEOH DSSOLFDWLRQ´ UHTXLUHV ³>V@RPH LQFUHPHQW RI LQFRUUHFWQHVV
EH\RQG HUURU´ EXW ³WKH LQFUHPHQW QHHG QRW EH JUHDW RWKHUZLVH KDEHDV
UHOLHI ZRXOG EH OLPLWHG WR VWDWH FRXUW GHFLVLRQV μVR IDU RII WKH PDUN DV WR
VXJJHVW MXGLFLDO LQFRPSHWHQFH¶´ TXRWLQJ 0DWWHR Y 6XSHULQWHQGHQW 6&,
$OELRQ )G G &LU ZLWK .LEEH Y 'XERLV
)G VW &LU ³>$@ VWDWH FRXUW GHFLVLRQ LV REMHFWLYHO\
XQUHDVRQDEOH XQGHU $('3$ RQO\ LI LW LV VR RIIHQVLYH WR H[LVWLQJ
SUHFHGHQW VR GHYRLG RI UHFRUG VXSSRUW RU VR DUELWUDU\ DV WR LQGLFDWH WKDW
LW LV RXWVLGH WKH XQLYHUVH RI SODXVLEOH FUHGLEOH RXWFRPHV´ LQWHUQDO
TXRWDWLRQ PDUNV UHPRYHG DQG ZLWK 'HOJDGR Y /HZLV )G
WK &LU HTXDWLQJ DQ ³XQUHDVRQDEOH DSSOLFDWLRQ´ ZLWK ³FOHDU
HUURU´ LH ³D GHILQLWH DQG ILUP FRQYLFWLRQ WKDW DQ HUURU KDV EHHQ
FRPPLWWHG´
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the Supreme
Court elucidated the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). First,
the Court explained that "clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court" refers to the Court’s
holdings, as opposed to dicta, at the time of the relevant state
court decision. Id. at 412. Second, the Court explained that
a state court decision unreasonably applies Supreme Court
precedent by either: (1) identifying the correct governing
legal rule from Supreme Court precedent but unreasonably
applying it to the facts; or (2) unreasonably extending a legal
principle from Supreme Court precedent to a new context
where it should not apply or unreasonably refusing to extend
that principle to a new context where it should apply. Id. at
407. Finally, the Court declared that the application of law
must be objectively unreasonable, id. at 409, and not merely
incorrect or erroneous. Id. at 411.

-- 13 of 18 --

0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV
7KH FRXUW RI DSSHDOV UHFRJQL]HG WKDW D GHWHUPLQDWLRQ RI ZKHWKHU
0LOOHU¶V DQG +D\QHV¶ JXLOW\ SOHDV ZHUH PDGH NQRZLQJO\ DQG YROXQWDULO\
WXUQHG RQ ZKHWKHU WKHLU DWWRUQH\V¶ DGYLFH ZDV ³ZLWKLQ WKH UDQJH RI
FRPSHWHQFH GHPDQGHG RI DWWRUQH\V LQ FULPLQDO FDVHV´ +D\QHV $IWHU
5HPDQG 1:G DW 7KLV LV WKH HTXLYDOHQW RI WKH
SHUIRUPDQFH LQTXLU\ LQ 6WULFNODQG 6HH +LOO 86 DW HTXDWLQJ
6WULFNODQG¶V SHUIRUPDQFH LQTXLU\ ZLWK FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI ZKHWKHU FRXQVHO¶V
DGYLFH ZDV ³ZLWKLQ WKH UDQJH RI FRPSHWHQFH GHPDQGHG RI DWWRUQH\V LQ
FULPLQDO FDVHV´ Because WKH 0LFKLJDQ &RXUW RI $SSHDOV GHWHUPLQHG
0LOOHU¶V DQG +D\QHV¶ WULDO FRXQVHO SHUIRUPHG DGHTXDWHO\ LW GLG QRW UHDFK
WKH TXHVWLRQV ZKHWKHU 0LOOHU DQG +D\QHV HDFK ZHUH SUHMXGLFHG E\
GHILFLHQW SHUIRUPDQFH
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) and Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court set out
the law applicable to an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim such as that made by Miller and Haynes. Both Hill and
Strickland were clearly established federal law as determined
by the Supreme Court at the time of the final Michigan Court
of Appeals decision in 1997. 6HH:LOOLDPV86DW
UHIHUULQJWR6WULFNODQGDV³FOHDUO\HVWDEOLVKHGSUHFHGHQW´
DWWKHWLPHRID9LUJLQLDVWDWHFRXUW¶VGHFLVLRQ
Under Strickland, a defendant claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel must show both deficient performance
by counsel and prejudice to the defendant resulting from that
deficient performance. 466 U.S. at 687. To be deficient,
counsel’s performance must fall below an objective standard
of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88; Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59. In
Hill, which applied Strickland to the guilty plea context, the
Court explained that a defendant shows prejudice by
demonstrating "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial." Id. at 59.
Although the Michigan Court of Appeals did not mention
either Hill or Strickland by name, it did apply the law of those
cases. Thus, we must examine whether that court applied
Hill and Strickland unreasonably.
1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO
III. CONCLUSION
We conclude that Miller and Haynes each received
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. We further
conclude that decisions to the contrary on the facts of each
case are unreasonable applications of clearly established
federal law. We WKHUHIRUH $)),50 WKH IHGHUDO GLVWULFW
FRXUW¶V FRQGLWLRQDO JUDQW RI KDEHDV FRUSXV VHSDUDWHO\ IRU
0LOOHUDQG+D\QHV

-- 14 of 18 --

0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV
Miller puts forth additional evidence that, with competent
assistance, he would have pled not guilty. Lusby testified that
Miller pled guilty only reluctantly. The fact that Lusby had
to prevail upon Miller to plead guilty tends to corroborate
Miller’s testimony that he would have pled not guilty had he
known of the prosecutor’s right to appeal. Lusby convinced
Miller to plead, but did so without advising him of the full
risk he faced of receiving a life sentence. This evidence
shows that Miller would have been less likely to plead guilty
had he been competently advised of all the risks.
Warden Straub argues that Miller actually knew before he
was sentenced that the prosecutor could appeal. The
prosecutor did state in his closing argument at Miller’s final
sentencing hearing that he would appeal if Miller was
sentenced as a juvenile. However, tKHGLHKDGDOUHDG\EHHQ
FDVW0LOOHU¶VILQDOVHQWHQFLQJKHDULQJFDPHHOHYHQPRQWKV
DIWHU KLV SOHD KDG EHHQ DFFHSWHG DQG /XVE\ GLVPLVVHG WKH
FRQFHUQV 0LOOHU H[SUHVVHG WR KLP DERXW WKH SURVHFXWRU V
VWDWHPHQWEHFDXVH/XVE\FRQVLGHUHGWKHSURVHFXWRUXQOLNHO\
WRVXFFHHG0LOOHU¶VIDLOXUHVXGGHQO\WRUHMHFWKLVFRXQVHO¶V
DGYLFHXSRQZKLFKKHUHOLHGKHDYLO\DQGSUHVVWRZLWKGUDZ
KLVJXLOW\SOHDD\HDUDIWHUKHPDGHLWGRHVQRWVKRZ0LOOHU
ZDVXQSUHMXGLFHGE\/XVE\¶VLQFRPSHWHQFH
We conclude that Miller’s and Lusby’s testimony, along
with reasonable inferences from the facts and circumstances
of this case, are sufficient to demonstrate not only a
reasonable probability that Miller would have decided to
plead not guilty but also that a contrary conclusion is
objectively unreasonable.
The untimely death of Haynes’ trial counsel prevents him
from offering any corroborative testimony that Haynes would
have pled not guilty. In these special circumstances, we
conclude that Haynes’ claim and the absence of any evidence
or tenable argument to the contrary is sufficient to establish
not only a reasonable likelihood that he would have pled not
guilty, but also that any contrary conclusion is objectively
unreasonable.
1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO
We emphasize that Hill and Strickland state the relevant
law in this case. Relying on a string of circuit court cases, the
wardens argue that defense counsels’ failure to inform Miller
and Haynes of the prosecution's right to appeal the imposition
of a juvenile sentence does not comprise ineffective
assistance because the prosecutor’s right of appeal represents
a collateral, as opposed to a direct, consequence of the plea.
We reject this argument on two grounds.
First, the wardens’ reliance on circuit court cases is
improper. The AEDPA prohibits use of lower court decisions
in determining whether the state court decision is contrary to,
or is an unreasonable application of, clearly established
federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412 (defining "clearly
established law as determined by the Supreme Court" to mean
holdings of Supreme Court decisions); Harris, 212 F.3d at
944 (holding district court erred in "rely[ing] on authority
other than that of the Supreme Court of the United States in
its analysis under § 2254(d)").
Second, the wardens’ argument is incompatible with
Supreme Court case law. The Court does not use a
direct/collateral consequence categorization scheme to decide
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Indeed, in Hill, the
Supreme Court reviewed an Eighth Circuit decision holding
that parole eligibility was not a "direct consequence" of a
guilty plea. See Hill v. Lockhart, 731 F.2d 568, 570-73 (8th
Cir. 1984). The Court noted this holding, but eschewed any
such characterization in favor of directly applying Strickland
to the plea context. Hill, 474 U.S. at 55, 57-60. As the Court
stated in Williams: "the Strickland test provides sufficient
guidance for resolving virtually all ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims." 529 U.S. at 391.
C. Analysis
The federal district court concluded that the Michigan
Court of Appeals decision was an unreasonable application of
Hill and Strickland. We review de novo a district court’s
legal conclusions in a habeas corpus proceeding. Miller v.

-- 15 of 18 --

0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV
Francis, 269 F.3d 609, 613 (6th Cir. 2001). Where, as here,
the district court’s factual findings are based on a transcript
from the state court proceedings and the district court makes
no credibility determination, we also review those findings de
novo. Id. We must determine whether it is an unreasonable
application of Hill and Strickland to hold either: (1) that the
petitioners’ trial counsel provided them with objectively
reasonable assistance; or (2) that even if the petitioners had
been reasonably advised, they stillZRXOGKDYHSOHGJXLOW\
3HUIRUPDQFHRI&RXQVHO
The proper measure of attorney performance is whether
counsel’s assistance was reasonable "under prevailing
professional norms" and "considering all the circumstances."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. We make a case-by-case
examination of the evidence, Williams, 529 U.S. at 391, and
"indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
The professional norms that guide us rest upon defense
counsel’s fundamental duties "to bring to bear such skill and
knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing
process" and "to consult with the defendant on important
decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important
developments in the course of the prosecution." Id. at 688.
The federal district court articulated the circumstances
relevant to the performance inquiry in this case:
[T]rial counsel’s performance was deficient within the
meaning of the Strickland standard where he failed to
advise petitioner that the prosecutor could appeal a
juvenile sentence to a Michigan appellate court with the
very real possibility that a higher court would order
petitioner resentenced as an adult. Because of
petitioner’s young age, petitioner was particularly reliant
on his attorney’s advice to plead guilty to the offenses in
this case. In light of what amounted to extraordinary
1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO
WHVWLILHG WKDW KLV DSSHOODWH FRXQVHO DGYLVHG KLP WKHUH ZHUH RWKHU VWHSV WR
EH WDNHQ EHIRUH WKH\ VKRXOG FRQVLGHU ZLWKGUDZLQJ WKH SOHD
[Miller and Haynes] might not have been told that the
prosecution could appeal [the juvenile] sentence [they were]
never assured of receiving in the first place should be of no
consequence."
The wardens maintain that if a defendant is aware of the
maximum possible sentence he cannot be prejudiced by his
counsel's failure to inform him of the prosecutor's right to
appeal. We decline to adopt the wardens’ argument. An
awareness of the sentencing range available to the trial judge
is not the same as an informed understanding that a
sentencing judge's decision is subject to reversal. The rule
suggested by the warden would preclude courts from finding
prejudice in any situation where the defendant knew the range
of penalties to which he was subject.
Furthermore, the circumstances of these cases illustrate the
failings of the wardens’ argument. Miller and Haynes pled
guilty in hopes of avoiding life imprisonment without parole.
A reduced likelihood of being sentenced as an adult was the
sole benefit of their guilty pleas before Chief Judge Roberson.
In reality, the risk of being sentenced as an adult came in two
parts: (1) being sentenced as an adult by Chief Judge
Roberson; and (2) having received a juvenile sentence from
Chief Judge Roberson, being subject to a successful appeal by
the prosecutor. Miller and Haynes, however, each received
from his attorney information of only the first risk. Defense
counsel's failure to assess all the risks and inform Miller and
Haynes left each of them to make the most important decision
of his life without essential information. Presented with all
the risks, Haynes and Miller might well have decided to plead
not guilty and to take their chances at trial. To meet the
prejudice requirement under Hill and Strickland, Haynes and
Miller need only show a reasonable probability that they
would have pled not guilty had their attorneys competently
advised them.

-- 16 of 18 --

0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV
:DUGHQ %XUNH DOVR DUJXHV WKDW +D\QHV FDQQRW VKRZ SUHMXGLFH
EHFDXVH DIWHU OHDUQLQJ WKDW WKH SURVHFXWLRQ KDG DSSHDOHG KLV MXYHQLOH
VHQWHQFH +D\QHV IDLOHG WR UHTXHVW WKDW WKH FDVH EH UHPDQGHG WR WKH WULDO
FRXUW VR WKDW KH FRXOG ZLWKGUDZ KLV SOHD $ GHIHQGDQW¶V GHFLVLRQ QRW WR
DEDQGRQ WKH DSSHOODWH SURFHVV LQ DQ HIIRUW WR ZLWKGUDZ KLV JXLOW\ SOHD GRHV
QRW REYLDWH SUHMXGLFH WR WKH GHIHQGDQW LQ SOHDGLQJ JXLOW\ DV WKH GHFLVLRQ
WR SOHDG KDG DOUHDG\ EHHQ PDGH 0RUHRYHU WKH ZDUGHQ¶V FRQWHQWLRQ LV
ZHDNHQHG EHFDXVH WKH FDVH UHPDLQHG LQ WKH DSSHDOV FRXUW QRW WKH WULDO
FRXUW ZKHUH ZLWKGUDZDO SOHDV PXVW EH PDGH $GGLWLRQDOO\ +D\QHV
2. Prejudice
To determine whether the petitioners were prejudiced by
their attorneys’ deficient performance, we ask whether there
is a reasonable probability that, had they been advised of the
prosecutor’s right of appeal, they would have pled not guilty.
A "reasonable probability" is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome; it is less than a
preponderance of the evidence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Both Miller and Haynes testified similarly at the
evidentiary hearings on their plea withdrawal motions that
each was initially hesitant to plead guilty, and that each would
have pled not guilty had each known the prosecutor could
appeal. This testimony, though self-serving, may be enough
by itself to satisfy the prejudice prong under the
circumstances here. See Magana v. Hofbauer, 263 F.3d 542,
547 n.1 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that, unlike the Seventh and
Second Circuits, this Circuit has not explicitly adopted a
requirement that in order to establish prejudice a defendant
must come forward with objective evidence in addition to his
post-conviction claim that he would have changed his mind
about pleading guilty). The circumstances of these cases do
not require that we resolve this issue today.
The wardens argue that Miller and Haynes could not have
been prejudiced by any deficiency on the part of their trial
counsel because they acknowledged at their March 1990 plea
hearings that they could be sentenced to life imprisonment
without parole.$FFRUGLQJWRWKHZDUGHQV"the fact that
1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO
7KH IHGHUDO GLVWULFW FRXUW¶V RSLQLRQ LQ 0LOOHU¶V FDVH contains almost
precisely the same wording. 0LOOHU Y 6WUDXE 1R &9'7 6OLS
2S DW (' 0LFK $XJ
,Q DGGLWLRQ /XVE\ HQWLUHO\ IDLOHG WR FRQVLGHU WKDW DQ DSSHDOV FRXUW
IDFHG ZLWK WKH VDPH WZR UDGLFDOO\ GLIIHUHQW VHQWHQFLQJ SRVVLELOLWLHV DV
&KLHI -XGJH 5REHUVRQ PLJKW ZHOO UHYHUVH WKH WULDO FRXUW LQ IDYRU RI WKH
advice by counsel that petitioner plead guilty to an
offense which carried a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment without parole, counsel had a duty both to
consider and to advise petitioner of the prosecutor’s right
to appeal any sentence to the Michigan appellate courts,
with the possibility that petitioner’s juvenile sentence
would be overturned on appeal and he would then have
to serve a nonparolable life sentence.
Haynes v. Burke, 115 F.Supp.2d 813, 819 (E.D. Mich.
2000).
0LOOHU¶VWULDOFRXQVHO/XVE\EURXJKWWREHDURQWKLVFDVH
KLVNQRZOHGJHRIWKHMXYHQLOHVHQWHQFLQJSURFHVVDQG&KLHI
-XGJH5REHUVRQ VVHQWHQFLQJSUDFWLFHV7KHUHLVQRGRXEWWKDW
LQWKLVUHJDUG0LOOHULQLWLDOO\EHQHILWWHGIURP/XVE\ VDGYLFH
)XUWKHUPRUH/XVE\DGHTXDWHO\LQIRUPHG0LOOHUUHJDUGLQJWKH
ULVN UHODWHG WR &KLHI -XGJH 5REHUVRQ¶V VHQWHQFLQJ
GHWHUPLQDWLRQ0LOOHUunderstood that if he pled guilty &KLHI
-XGJH 5REHUVRQ FRXOG RSW WR LPSRVH HLWKHU D VHYHUH DGXOW
VHQWHQFHRIOLIHLPSULVRQPHQWRUDOHQLHQWMXYHQLOHVHQWHQFH
+RZHYHU/XVE\DFWHGLQFRPSHWHQWO\LQIDLOLQJWRFRQVLGHU
WKHOLNHOLKRRGWKDWWKHSURVHFXWRUZRXOGH[HUFLVHKLVULJKWWR
DSSHDOWKHGLVWULFWFRXUW VLPSRVLWLRQRIDMXYHQLOHVHQWHQFH
$Q\MXYHQLOHVHQWHQFHLPSRVHGRQ0LOOHUZRXOGEHOHVVWKDQ
VL[\HDUVLQDMXYHQLOHIDFLOLW\*LYHQVXFKDOHQLHQWVHQWHQFH
IRUILUVWGHJUHHPXUGHULWZDVXQUHDVRQDEOHIRU/XVE\QRWWR
KDYH FRQVLGHUHG WKDW WKH SURVHFXWRU FRXOG DSSHDO DQG WKH
MXYHQLOHVHQWHQFHFRXOGEHUHYHUVHG<HW/XVE\did not factor
this scenario into his advice to Miller that pleading guilty was
in Miller’s best interest.Thus, Miller did not know that the

-- 17 of 18 --

0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO 1RV
PRUH VHYHUH VHQWHQFH
&LWLQJ WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V UHFHQW GHFLVLRQ LQ %HOO Y &RQH
6&W WKH GLVVHQW VWDWHV WKDW DQ DWWRUQH\¶V OHJLWLPDWH WULDO
WDFWLFV GR QRW FRQVWLWXWH GHILFLHQW SHUIRUPDQFH $ GHIHQVH FRXQVHO¶V
IDLOXUH WR FRQVLGHU D SURVHFXWRU¶V ULJKW WR DSSHDO LV QRW D WDFWLF RU VWUDWHJ\
$ GHIHQVH FRXQVHO¶V IDLOXUH WR LQIRUP RU DGYLVH WKH GHIHQGDQW UHJDUGLQJ
WKH VWDWH¶V ULJKW RI DSSHDO DQG WKH DWWHQGDQW FKDQFHV RI UHYHUVDO LV QRW D
WDFWLF RU VWUDWHJ\ 6XFK RPLVVLRQV RI OHJDO SUDFWLFH DQG OHJDO FRXQVHOLQJ
prosecutor could appeal and that the juvenile sentence could
be reversed, and, if so, Miller would serve a life sentence
without possibility of parole.
Lusby should have considered these possibilities, informed
Miller about them, and incorporated them into his risk
assessment when he advised Miller about pleading guilty. He
failed to do so. Rather, he advised Miller to plead guilty
based solely upon his assessment of the relative risks in going
to trial versus pleading guilty before Chief Judge Roberson.
As a result, Lusby misinformed Miller regarding the
likelihood he would receive an adult sentence. Miller was not
fully apprised of the risks he faced.
The duty of defense counsel to consult is paramount when
a client has to decide whether or not to waive a constitutional
right, such as the right to trial. Because the decision whether
or not to plead guilty ultimately rests with the client, see
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) ("the accused has
the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions
regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury,
testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal");
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.1 (1977) (Burger,
C.J., concurring) ("[o]nly such basic decisions as whether to
plead guilty, waive a jury, or testify in one's own behalf are
ultimately for the accused to make"), counsel must ensure that
the client's decision is as informed as possible. Failing even
to consider, let alone notify the client of, a factor that could
negate the entire benefit of the guilty plea is not within the
range of professional norms.
1RV 0LOOHUHWDOY6WUDXEHWDO
FDQ QHYHU EH D OHJLWLPDWH GHIHQVH WDFWLF RU VWUDWHJ\
Miller’s age and his heavy reliance on Lusby, a reliance
Lusby acknowledged was "practically total[]," enhanced
Lusby’s duty to make certain that Miller understood all the
risks associated with his guilty plea. Miller was fifteen years
old and a year behind in school. His parents, according to
Lusby, were themselves reliant on Lusby for advice. This
case epitomizes the criminal defendant's need for what the
Supreme Court has called the "guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceeding against him." Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
We conclude that Miller’s trial counsel was incompetent.
It is an objectively unreasonable application of Hill and
Strickland for the Michigan Court of Appeals to hold
otherwise.
Haynes testified that his trial counsel, Rice, similarly failed
to inform him of the prosecutor’s right to appeal the trial
court’s imposition of a juvenile sentence. Due to Rice’s
death, Haynes was unable to offer any testimony which might
corroborate this assertion. TKH0LFKLJDQ&RXUWRI$SSHDOV
DVVXPHGWKDW+D\QHV¶GHIHQVHFRXQVHOGLGQRWLQIRUPKLPWKDW
WKH SURVHFXWRU FRXOG DSSHDO WKH WULDO FRXUW¶V VHQWHQFLQJ
GHFLVLRQ+D\QHV $IWHU5HPDQG 1:GDWQ
7KHIHGHUDOGLVWULFWFRXUWDFFHSWHGWKDWDVVXPSWLRQHaynes
v. Burke, 115 F.Supp.2d at 818. ,QKHUDSSHDOWRWKLVFRXUW
:DUGHQ%XUNHGRHVQRWFKDOOHQJHWKHIDFWWKDW5LFHGLGQRW
LQIRUP +D\QHV RI WKH SURVHFXWRU¶V ULJKW WR DSSHDO 7KHUH
EHLQJQRWKLQJLQWKHUHFRUGWRFRQWUDGLFWWKH0LFKLJDQFRXUW¶V
DVVXPSWLRQZHDGRSWLW
With this assumption made, the reasoning from Miller’s
case applies. Like Miller, Haynes should have been fully
apprised of the risks he faced, but was not. We conclude that
Haynes’ trial counsel was incompetent and that it is an
objectively unreasonable application of Hill and Strickland
for the Michigan Court of Appeals to hold otherwise.

-- 18 of 18 --