Glynda L. Hall v. Baptist Memorial Health Care Corporation , d/b/a Baptist Memorial College of Health…

16 Hall v. Baptist Memorial
Health Care Corp.
No. 98-6761
discharged because he did not share supervisor’s Mormon
beliefs). Even if this case could be so characterized, the
evidence shows that the College president had a list of
available positions she offered to help Hall obtain if Hall
would have agreed to resign her position as a Student
Services Specialist. Hall declined this reasonable
accommodation and was terminated.
III.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court granting
defendant’s motion for summary judgment is AFFIRMED.
*The Honorable Dan Aaron Polster, United States District Judge for
the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0199P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 00a0199p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
GLYNDA L. HALL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BAPTIST M EMORIAL HEALTH
C ARE C ORPORATION , d/b/a
Baptist Memorial College of
Health Sciences,
Defendant-Appellee.
;>

1
No. 98-6761
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis.
No. 98-02035—Bernice B. Donald, District Judge.
Argued: December 10, 1999
Decided and Filed: June 13, 2000
Before: BOGGS and SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judges;
POLSTER, District Judge.*

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2 Hall v. Baptist Memorial
Health Care Corp.
No. 98-6761
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Clyde W. Keenan, KEENAN, DABBOUS &
LAZARINI, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant. Paul E.
Prather, KIESEWETTER, WISE, KAPLAN, SCHWIMMER
& PRATHER, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Clyde W. Keenan, KEENAN, DABBOUS &
LAZARINI, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant. Paul E.
Prather, KIESEWETTER, WISE, KAPLAN, SCHWIMMER
& PRATHER, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
POLSTER, District Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Glynda L.
Hall sued her former employer, Defendant-Appellee Baptist
Memorial College of Health Sciences (the “College”), under
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(5), alleging that the College
unlawfully terminated her employment based on her religion.
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the
College. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I.
Baptist Memorial Health Care Corporation (“Health Care
Corporation” or “Corporation”) is a nonprofit corporation
established with the purpose of “carrying out a health care
mission consistent with the traditional and ongoing health
care missions of the Arkansas, Mississippi and Tennessee
Baptist Conventions and their affiliated Baptist churches with
which the Corporation shares common religious bonds and
convictions.” Joint Appendix (“JA”) 284-85. It is committed
to the “threefold ministry of Christ -- preaching, teaching and
healing.” JA 308. To this end, the Corporation is authorized
to “acquire, own, lease, manage, operate, sell, construct,
finance, provide services to, generally deal with, and affiliate
No. 98-6761 Hall v. Baptist Memorial
Health Care Corp.
15
showing that she was fired for any reason other than taking a
leadership position in an organization that condones a
lifestyle the College considers antithetical to its mission.
Thus, the district court correctly found that Hall failed to
show that this reason was a pretext for religious
discrimination.
Hall endeavors to put a “reasonable accommodation” (as
opposed to disparate treatment) spin on this issue. In
reasonable accommodation religious discrimination cases, a
plaintiff must establish that it holds a sincere religious belief
that conflicts with an employment requirement, that it
informed the employer of the conflict, and that it was
discharged or disciplined for failure to comply with the
conflicting requirement. Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., 15 F.3d
1375, 1378 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Smith v. Pyro Mining Co.,
827 F.2d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
989 (1988)). That analysis is not relevant to this case, since
Hall’s employer did not direct her to do anything that
conflicted with her religious beliefs, and Hall was not
terminated over a failure to perform any duties which
conflicted with her religious beliefs. See, e.g., Cooper, 15
F.3d 1375 (Seventh Day Adventist sues employer for
requiring her to work on her Sabbath Day); Cowan v. Gilless,
No. 95-5679 , 1996 WL 145873 (6th Cir. Mar. 29, 1996);
Riselay v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., No. 90-
1779, 1991 WL 44319 (6th Cir. Apr. 2, 1991) (Christian
Scientist sues employer for failing to allow sick leave);
E.E.O.C. v. University of Detroit, 904 F.2d 331 (6th Cir.
1990) (Catholic employed by closed-shop employer refuses
to pay dues to union because of union’s affiliation with
organizations supporting abortion); Stanley v. Lawson Co.,
993 F. Supp. 1084 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (Christian sues employer
who requires her to sell adult magazines); Favero v.
Huntsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 939 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D. Tex.
1996) (Worldwide Church of God members sue employer for
failing to give them extended leaves to observe their holy
days). But see Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat’l Laboratory, 773
F. Supp. 304 (D. N.M. 1991) (employee alleges he was

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14 Hall v. Baptist Memorial
Health Care Corp.
No. 98-6761
comparison is also flawed because Hall has not alleged that
she was terminated for conducting an illicit affair, but for her
membership in Holy Trinity. The district court correctly
concluded that Hall failed to establish that a similarly-situated
co-worker received more favorable treatment than she did.
Even assuming that Hall had set forth a prima facie case,
she has failed to show that the reason for her termination was
a pretext for discrimination based on her religion. The
College contends that it terminated Hall because she assumed
a leadership position in an organization that publicly
supported homosexual lifestyles, a view that clashed with the
Southern Baptist Convention’s outspoken denunciation of
homosexuality and the College’s avowed mission. Because
she exerted influence over students and student activities at
the College, her leadership position at Holy Trinity conflicted
with her job.
The record in this case is consistent. It shows that the
College tolerated employees of different faiths or no faiths,
e.g., Methodists, Seventh Day Adventists, and atheists. It also
shows that the president of the College concluded that where
Hall went to church was her business, and that Hall suffered
no adverse consequences when it became known that she was
a member of Holy Trinity.
To show that the termination was based on her religion,
Hall must show that it was the religious aspect of her
leadership position that motivated her employer’s actions. Cf.
Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1118 (11th Cir. 1997).
There is no evidence that the religious nature of Hall’s
leadership role at Holy Trinity contributed to her termination.
Hall testified that the College would have fired her if she had
been elected president of a local gay and lesbian coalition, or
if she had made a televised speech opposing the Southern
Baptists’ position on the issue of homosexuality. The fact
that the organization in which she assumed a leadership
position is a church does not transform her dismissal into one
based on religion. Hall has made no additional evidentiary
No. 98-6761 Hall v. Baptist Memorial
Health Care Corp.
3
with or be the parent organization of separately incorporated
hospitals, clinics, home health care organizations,
rehabilitation centers, health maintenance organizations,
hospices, nursing homes, nursing and other schools,
educational organizations and institutions. . . . ” JA 285.
The chief executive officer and all directors of the Health
Care Corporation must be members of Baptist churches
affiliated with the State Baptist Convention in the states of
their residence. The Corporation submits annual reports and
certified audits to the Arkansas, Mississippi and Tennessee
Baptist Conventions. The Corporation is the parent of Baptist
Memorial Hospital which, in turn, is the parent of Baptist
Memorial College of Health Sciences. The Corporation
chooses the Hospital’s board of directors which, in turn,
appoints the board of directors for the College.
The Hospital’s charter states that it is a nonprofit
corporation organized for “charitable, educational, religious
and scientific” purposes and that its purposes include
“hospital and health care and education . . . in line with the
traditional and ongoing mission of the Baptist churches
affiliated through their State Baptist Conventions in Arkansas,
Mississippi and Tennessee with the Southern Baptist
Convention as now known and practiced among Baptists.”
JA 297. The Hospital’s bylaws state that its primary purpose
is to provide “health services, education and scientific
research in accordance with Christian principles as set out in
[its charter] in line with the mission of the [Hospital].” JA
300. In the event of the Hospital’s dissolution, all remaining
assets must be transferred to the Health Care Corporation if
that organization qualifies for tax-exempt status under Section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. If the Corporation
does not qualify for tax-exempt status, the assets must be
transferred to the Baptist Memorial Health Care System. If
the Health Care System does not qualify for tax-exempt
status, the assets must be distributed to the State Baptist
Conventions of Arkansas, Mississippi and Tennessee.

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4 Hall v. Baptist Memorial
Health Care Corp.
No. 98-6761
The College was founded by the Mississippi, Arkansas and
Tennessee Baptist Conventions. It receives financial support
from both the Hospital and the Corporation. The College
recruits students in Baptist newspapers in seven states. It also
recruits students at the State Baptist Conventions in
Mississippi, Arkansas and Tennessee.
The mission statement of the College provides that the
College “is an outgrowth of the mission of Baptist Memorial
Hospital, which is based on the three-fold ministry of Christ:
preaching, teaching, and healing.” JA 386. The motto of the
College, which is incorporated in its seal, is “higher education
with a higher purpose.” JA 391, 920. The seal displays two
hands representing service and scholarship on a Bible
adjacent to a branch representing the tree of knowledge. JA
391. The College informs students of its Christian mission
and its relationship with Baptist principles at orientations and
open houses. Students are required to take three hours of
religious studies, and to dress in a manner “that reflect[s]
Christian principles of appropriateness.” JA 408. The
College holds prayer breakfasts and plans numerous chapel
programs led by local Baptist ministers. It has served as host
for the World Changers, a mission organization sponsored by
the Southern Baptist Convention.
On August 7, 1995, the College hired Glynda Hall as a
Student Services Specialist. As a Student Services Specialist,
Hall worked with students and the administration in
organizing and planning activities of various campus student
organizations. Hall was responsible for interpreting school
policies and ensuring that all student activities were consistent
with the mission of the College. JA 1106. She was required
to work with the Christian student organization, coordinating
its involvement with the Tennessee Baptist Convention
student ministries department. This duty necessitated her
attendance at meetings of the Tennessee Baptist Convention.
It is undisputed that Hall was a good employee who
received no disciplinary actions during the term of her
No. 98-6761 Hall v. Baptist Memorial
Health Care Corp.
13
Convention’s prohibition against the ordination of women.
However, Miller was merely acting in accordance with the
permissible procedures of her faith and was thus being treated
no differently than any other non-Baptist who acted in
accordance with the tenets of her faith. Miller was thus not
similarly situated to Hall, in that she did not assume a
leadership position in an organization that publicly supported
homosexual lifestyles.
In addition, the First Amendment does not permit federal
courts to dictate to religious institutions how to carry out their
religious missions or how to enforce their religious practices.
As the district court in the instant case eloquently observed:
In essence, [Hall] is requesting this court to tell the
[College] that it must be opposed to the ordination of
women with the same degree of conviction and intensity
it has expressed in its opposition to the gay and lesbian
lifestyle, or suffer liability under Title VII. The federal
courts are not in the business of enforcing religious
orthodoxy or requiring consistency and uniformity in
religious beliefs or practices. If a particular religious
community wishes to differentiate between the severity
of violating two tenets of its faith, it is not the province
of the federal courts to say that such differentiation is
discriminatory and therefore warrants Title VII
liability. . . .
Hall, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 1039-40 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984) (citation omitted)).
Hall also contends that other similarly-situated employees
were treated more favorably than she. According to Hall, the
College took no employment action against two employees
whom it knew were having an adulterous relationship,
contrary to Southern Baptist principles. This argument is
meritless. As with Cynthia Miller, Hall has not established
that the two employees assumed leadership positions in
organizations supporting homosexual lifestyles. The

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12 Hall v. Baptist Memorial
Health Care Corp.
No. 98-6761
1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1995). If the plaintiff makes a prima
facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises. In order to
overcome this presumption, the defendant must articulate a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s
termination. Id. If the defendant can do so, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to prove that the articulated reason was
merely a pretext for the real reason, unlawful discrimination.
Id.
It is undisputed that Hall is a member of a protected class
(a member of Holy Trinity Community Church), that she was
qualified for her position as a Student Services Specialist at
the College, and that she suffered an adverse employment
decision. Hall has not alleged that she was replaced by
someone outside the protected class; thus, our de novo review
focuses on whether Hall has shown that she was treated less
favorably than similarly-situated persons not a member of the
protected class. In other words, Hall has the burden of
establishing that comparable co-workers who engaged in
substantially the same conduct as she were treated better.
Hollins v. Atlantic Co., Inc., 188 F.3d 652, 661 (6th Cir.
1999) (citing Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29
F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994)).
The district court found that Hall did not show that any
similarly-situated non-protected employee had received more
favorable treatment by the College. In the words of the
district court, Hall did not show, for example, that the College
“had ever treated an employee who assumed a leadership
position in an organization expressing public support for
homosexuals and the homosexual lifestyle any differently
than it treated her.” Hall v. Baptist Memorial Health Care
Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1038 (W.D. Tenn. 1998).
On appeal, Hall argues that another employee, Cynthia
Miller, was similarly situated to Hall but treated more
favorably. Miller became an ordained minister in the
Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, but was allowed to
continue her employment despite the Southern Baptist
No. 98-6761 Hall v. Baptist Memorial
Health Care Corp.
5
employment. On June 4, 1996, she was given a performance
evaluation with all “exemplary” and “accomplished” scores.
JA 876-85. On June 27, 1996, she received a letter extending
her contract through 1997, along with a raise.
In the spring of 1996, Hall began the process of becoming
a lay minister at Holy Trinity Community Church (“Holy
Trinity”) -- a church she had been attending since February
1995. According to Hall, Holy Trinity is a non-
denominational Christian church that reaches out to all
persons seeking a relationship with Jesus Christ. The
congregation includes many gay and lesbian members,
including Hall. Holy Trinity teaches that there is nothing
inherently inconsistent between the homosexual lifestyle and
Christianity. It solicits homosexual members through
advertisements in Second Stone, a national publication for
gay, lesbian and bisexual Christians.
The Southern Baptist Convention is outspoken against
homosexual lifestyles. Its formal resolution on the issue of
homosexuality states that the Convention “deplores
homosexuality as a perversion of divine standards and as a
violation of nature and natural affections.” JA 310.
Moreover, “while God loves the homosexual and offers
salvation, homosexuality is not a normal lifestyle and is an
abomination in the eyes of God.” Id.
In the summer of 1996, Dr. Paul Barkley, a Southern
Baptist minister and Hall’s supervisor, asked Hall where she
attended church. She informed him that she attended Holy
Trinity. Because of Barkley’s suspicion that Holy Trinity
condoned homosexual lifestyles and the Southern Baptist
Convention’s clear denunciation of such alternative lifestyles,
he informed the College president, Dr. Rose Temple, about
Hall’s attendance there. Temple told Barkley that the College
would not intervene in Hall’s choice of where to attend
church.

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6 Hall v. Baptist Memorial
Health Care Corp.
No. 98-6761
On September 15, 1996, Hall was ordained as a lay minister
at Holy Trinity. Hall did not invite Barkley to her ordination
ceremony because she feared she would be fired if Barkley
discovered she was a lesbian and that Holy Trinity welcomed
homosexual members. Shortly after her ordination, however,
she informed Barkley that she was a lesbian. Hall brought
Barkley a copy of Second Stone to show him that there were
a number of churches and denominations that welcomed and
supported the gay and lesbian community. She showed him
an advertisement in the newspaper for Holy Trinity.
Barkley relayed this information and the newspaper to
Temple. Temple testified that she perceived Hall’s position
at the College to be one of considerable influence over
students, that Holy Trinity’s views on homosexuality were
inconsistent with those of the Southern Baptist Convention
and thus the College, and that this inconsistency created a
conflict of interest. Accordingly, on November 20, 1996,
Temple asked Hall to resign. Temple told Hall that if she
would agree to resign, Temple would help her obtain another
more appropriate position within the College, the Hospital or
the Health Care Corporation for which she was qualified.
Hall refused this offer and the College terminated her for a
“conflict of interest.” The termination took place on
December 3, 1996.
Hall filed a complaint with the EEOC on January 16, 1997,
and was issued a right-to-sue letter on December 5, 1997.
She subsequently filed a complaint alleging employment
discrimination based on religious grounds in the Western
District of Tennessee on January 14, 1998. Cross motions for
summary judgment were filed by the parties. On November
23, 1998, the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the College and dismissed the case. Hall filed a
timely appeal from the district court’s decision.
Hall raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the district
court erred in finding that the College was a religious
institution entitled to an exemption from Title VII’s
No. 98-6761 Hall v. Baptist Memorial
Health Care Corp.
11
at 1345 (quoting Little, 929 F.2d at 951). Accordingly, the
court in Ward v. Hengle, 124 Ohio App. 3d 396, 400 (1997),
held that the trial court need not even determine whether a
church waived its Title VII exemption from religious
discrimination claims based on a statement in its employment
handbook that it would not discriminate against its personnel
on the basis of religion. See also Siegel, 13 F. Supp. 2d at
1344 (government funds are most likely available to all
institutions of higher learning whether or not they have a
religious affiliation).
For these reasons, the district court did not err in
determining that the College was exempt from the Title VII
prohibition against discrimination based on religion.
B.
Hall also argues that the district court erred in finding that
she failed to establish her prima facie case or that she failed
to prove that the College’s articulated reason for firing her
was pretextual. A plaintiff may prove discrimination under
Title VII through direct or circumstantial evidence. In the
absence of direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff must
establish its case under the framework first enunciated in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582-83 (6th Cir.
1992).
The McDonnell Douglas framework consists of three
stages. First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. In order to establish her prima facie case,
Hall must show that (1) she is a member of a protected group;
(2) she was subject to an adverse employment action; (3) she
was qualified for the position; and (4) she was replaced by
someone outside the protected class or was treated less
favorably than a similarly-situated employee outside the
protected class. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Texas
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53
(1981); Talley v. Bravo Pitino Restaurant, Ltd., 61 F.3d

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10 Hall v. Baptist Memorial
Health Care Corp.
No. 98-6761
Corporation. Thus, the College has a direct relationship with
the Baptist church.
The College atmosphere is permeated with religious
overtones. It recruits students in Baptist publications and at
Baptist Conventions. Prospective students are informed of
the religious mission of the College at open houses. Incoming
students are informed of this mission at orientation. The
College seal includes a picture of the Bible and the words
“higher education with a higher purpose.” All students are
required to take three hours of religious studies and must
comply with a dress code that reflects “Christian principles of
appropriateness.” JA 408. The College holds numerous
prayer breakfasts and chapel programs. It has held several
commencements at Baptist churches and hosted Baptist-
sponsored programs. The fact that the College trains its
students to be nurses and other health care professionals does
not transform the institution into one that is secular. See, e.g.,
Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (four-year co-educational
liberal arts college owned and operated by the Mississippi
Baptist Convention is a “religious educational institution”);
Siegel v. Truett-McConnell College, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1335
(N.D. Ga. 1994) (private co-educational college of liberal arts
and sciences founded by the Georgia Baptist Convention is a
“religious educational institution” under Title VII).
Hall contends that even if the College is a religious
educational institution, it waived the Title VII exemption for
such institutions because it represented itself as being an
equal opportunity employer and because it received federal
funds. However, the statutory exemptions from religious
discrimination claims under Title VII cannot be waived by
either party. Little, 929 F.2d at 951; Siegel, 13 F. Supp. 2d
at 1345. The exemptions reflect a decision by Congress that
religious organizations have a constitutional right to be free
from government intervention. Id. “Once Congress stated
that ‘[t]his title shall not apply’ to religiously-motivated
employment decisions by religious organizations,” neither
party could expand the statute’s scope. Siegel, 13 F. Supp. 2d
No. 98-6761 Hall v. Baptist Memorial
Health Care Corp.
7
prohibition against religious discrimination; (2) whether the
district court erred in finding that the statutory Title VII
exemption was not waivable; and (3) whether the district
court erred in finding that Hall did not state a prima facie case
of religious discrimination, and in finding that the College’s
proffered nondiscriminatory reason was not pretextual.
II.
Summary judgments are reviewed de novo. E.E.O.C. v.
University of Detroit, 904 F.2d 331, 334 (6th Cir. 1990). The
College has the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of
any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S 317, 327 (1986). If the College meets that
requirement, the burden shifts to Hall to present sufficient
admissible evidence on which a jury could return a verdict in
her favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
249-50 (1986).
A.
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act states that it shall be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
an individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin. . . .”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). In recognition of the
constitutionally-protected interest of religious organizations
in making religiously-motivated employment decisions,
however, Title VII has expressly exempted religious
organizations from the prohibition against discrimination on
the basis of religion:
This subchapter shall not apply to . . . a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or
society with respect to the employment of individuals of
a particular religion to perform work connected with the
carrying on by such corporation, association, educational
institution, or society of its activities.

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8 Hall v. Baptist Memorial
Health Care Corp.
No. 98-6761
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). Another, more specific exemption
applies only to religious educational organizations:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a
school, college, university, or other educational
institution or institution of learning to hire an employee
of a particular religion if such school, college, university,
or other educational institution or institution of learning
is, in whole, or in substantial part, owned, supported,
controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a
particular religious corporation, association, or society,
or if the curriculum of such school, college, university, or
other educational institution or institution of learning is
directed towards the propagation of a particular religion.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2).
The decision to employ individuals “of a particular
religion” under § 2000e-1(a) and § 2000e-2(e)(2) has been
interpreted to include the decision to terminate an employee
whose conduct or religious beliefs are inconsistent with those
of its employer. See, e.g., Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 951
(3rd Cir. 1991); Killinger v. Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196,
198 (11th Cir. 1997). In Little, for example, the court
concluded that the Title VII exemption included the decision
of a parochial school to terminate a tenured Protestant teacher
who had failed to validate her second marriage by first
seeking an annulment of her previous marriage through the
proper canonical procedures of the Catholic church. 929 F.2d
at 951. Similarly, in Killinger, the court concluded that the
Title VII exemption included the decision of a Baptist
university to remove a Baptist faculty member from his
teaching position because his religious beliefs differed from
those of the dean. 113 F.3d at 198.
Hall argues on appeal that the district court erred in finding
that the College was a “religious educational institution”
entitled to the Title VII exemption from religious
discrimination claims. There is no Sixth Circuit precedent on
No. 98-6761 Hall v. Baptist Memorial
Health Care Corp.
9
point. In determining whether the College qualifies for the
statutory exemption, the court must look at all the facts to
decide whether the College is a religious corporation or
educational institution. Killinger, 113 F.3d at 198-99. It is
appropriate to consider and weigh the religious and secular
characteristics of the institution. E.E.O.C. v. Townley Eng’g
& Mfg.Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1077 (1989); E.E.O.C. v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d
477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
In this case, the district court properly weighed the facts and
identified the specific religious and secular characteristics of
the College. Based on that analysis, the district court
concluded that the College had set forth sufficient evidence to
support its characterization of the College as a religious
educational institution. We agree.
The College qualifies for the exemption under the plain
language of § 2000e-2(e)(2) because it is a “school, college,
university, or other educational institution or institution of
learning . . . [that] . . . is, in whole, or in substantial part,
owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a . . . religious
corporation.” Id. Moreover, the record shows that the
Baptists created the Health Care Corporation with the sole
purpose of making the interrelated religious/service mission
of the Baptists a reality. It accomplished this by authorizing
the Corporation to “separately incorporate hospitals, clinics,
home health care organizations, rehabilitation centers, health
maintenance organizations, hospices, nursing homes, nursing
and other schools. . . .” JA 285. The College and the Hospital
are mere examples of those facilities.
The College was founded by three sectarian organizations:
the Mississippi, Arkansas and Tennessee Baptist
Conventions. It is a subsidiary of the Hospital which is a
subsidiary of the Health Care Corporation, and it receives
funds from both the Hospital and the Corporation. The
“preaching, teaching, and healing” mission of the College is
subsumed in the missions of the Hospital and the

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