United States of America v. Marlon Reed

*The Honorable Joseph M. Hood, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0171P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 00a0171p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
UNITED S TATES OF AMERICA ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
M ARLON R EED ,
Defendant-Appellant.
;>

1
No. 99-3394
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati.
No. 98-00097—Herman J. Weber, District Judge.
Argued: April 27, 2000
Decided and Filed: May 23, 2000
Before: NORRIS and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; HOOD,
District Judge.*
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Richard W. Smith-Monahan, OFFICE OF THE
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Cincinnati, Ohio, for
Appellant. Timothy D. Oakley, UNITED STATES

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2 United States v. Reed No. 99-3394
ATTORNEY, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
Richard W. Smith-Monahan, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant.
Timothy D. Oakley, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee.
HOOD, D. J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which
NORRIS, J., joined. GILMAN, J. (pp. 7-17), delivered a
separate dissenting opinion.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
JOSEPH M. HOOD, District Judge. On December 14,
1998, Marlon Reed entered a conditional guilty plea to one
count of possession with the intent to distribute crack cocaine
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). As a result of his plea, the
district court sentenced Reed to ninety-two months
incarceration with a three year period of supervised release,
and a fine of $3,500 with a special assessment of $100.
Having reserved his right to appeal the search and seizure
issue in his case, Reed filed a timely appeal of the district
court’s decision to deny his motion to suppress the nineteen
individually wrapped crack cocaine rocks found in a Frito-Lay
bag on Reed’s person. This appeal specifically challenges the
district court’s finding that probable cause for his arrest
existed.
I. Factual Background
The events leading up to Reed’s arrest are as follows:
Officers Joey Thompson and Robert Horton observed Reed
on the sidewalk premises of a housing development known as
the Butler Metropolitan Housing Authority (hereinafter
“BMHA”). The officers knew Reed by sight from prior
contact with him. Officer Thompson had personally warned
Reed to stay away from the BMHA property on a previous
occasion as Reed was not a resident of the housing
development. Since BMHA’s premises contained twenty-six

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No. 99-3394 United States v. Reed 3
“No Trespassing” signs, the officers approached Reed for the
purpose of arresting him for criminal trespass pursuant to a
Hamilton, Ohio ordinance.
When Reed attempted to quickly walk away, the officers
subdued him. Officer Thompson then began a “pat down” of
Reed who started to turn his body away. Reed then removed
the Frito-Lay bag containing the crack cocaine, and attempted
to toss it toward a friend standing nearby while
simultaneously stating that he did not want to give up his
“weed.” A female picked up the bag, whereupon Officer
Thompson immediately retrieved it from her. Reed was then
taken to the Hamilton Police Department for booking.
Prior to trial, Reed filed a motion to suppress the crack
cocaine. The district court determined that probable cause
existed in Reed’s arrest, and denied said motion on the basis
that the evidence was subsequently obtained by the officers
incidental to the arrest. In his appeal, Reed argues that
probable cause was lacking, thereby rendering his arrest
unlawful. Reed further argues that all evidence obtained as a
result of this unlawful arrest should have been suppressed by
the district court.
II. Analysis
“In reviewing a district court’s determinations on
suppression questions, a district court’s factual findings are
accepted unless they are clearly erroneous; however, the
district court’s application of law to the facts, such as a
finding of probable cause, is reviewed de novo.” United
States v. Thomas, 11 F.3d 620, 627 (6th Cir. 1993).
The threshold for probable cause is based upon “`factual
and practical considerations of every day life’ [that] could
lead a reasonable person to believe that there is a probability
that an illegal act has occurred or is about to occur.” United
States v. Strickland, 144 F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir.
1998)(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983).
Officers are not required to rule out every possible
explanation other than a suspect’s illegal conduct before

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4 United States v. Reed No. 99-3394
making an arrest. See Strickland, 144 F.3d at 416. However,
an arresting officer must be able to articulate “concrete facts”
from which the “totality of the circumstances” indicates that
an arrest is warranted. Id. at 415; Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
The denial of Reed’s suppression motion was based on the
district court’s finding of probable cause in Reed’s arrest.
Reed argues that probable cause for criminal trespass was
lacking under Hamilton city ordinance § 541.05. Said
ordinance provides in pertinent part:
(a) No person, without privilege to do so, shall do of the
following:
(1) Knowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of
another;
(2) Knowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of
another, the use of which is lawfully restricted to certain
persons, purposes, modes or hours, when the offender
knows he is in violation of any such restriction or is
reckless in that regard;
(3) Recklessly enter or remain on the land or premises of
another, as to which notice against unauthorized access
or presence is given by actual communication to the
offender, or in a manner prescribed by law, or by posting
in a manner reasonably calculated to come to the
attention of potential intruders, or by fencing or other
enclosure manifestly designed to restrict access;
(4) Being on the land or premises of another, negligently
fail or refuse to leave upon being notified to do so by the
owner or occupant, or the agent or servant of either.
. . .
(d) Whoever violated this section is guilty of criminal
trespass, a misdemeanor of the fourth degree.
The officers based their finding of probable cause to arrest
Reed for criminal trespass on the following factors: (1) Reed
was given prior warning not to enter BMHA property by
Officer Thompson; (2) Reed was observed on BMHA
property; (3) Reed was not a resident of the BMHA housing
project; (4) there were twenty-six “No Trespassing” signs
No. 99-3394 United States v. Reed 17
probable cause. Consequently, the officers had the right to
stop Reed under Terry and ask him whether he lived on the
property or was visiting a resident. But the officers had no
right to immediately arrest him for criminal trespass.
I would therefore suppress the evidence of the crack
cocaine and reverse the judgment of the district court.

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16 United States v. Reed No. 99-3394
Moreover, I believe that my view is consistent with the
spirit of the Supreme Court’s recent unanimous holding in
Florida v. J.L., __ U.S. __ , 120 S.Ct. 1375 (2000). In J.L.,
an anonymous caller telephoned the police to inform them
that they should watch for a black youth in a plaid shirt at a
particular bus stop because he was carrying a gun. Six
minutes later, officers went to that particular bus stop and
found a youth meeting the caller’s description. The officers
stopped and frisked the suspect, uncovering a firearm. In
concluding that the officers did not have a reasonable
suspicion to stop the youth, and that evidence of the firearm
should be suppressed, the Supreme Court commented that
“the Fourth Amendment is not so easily satisfied.” Id. at
1380. If the officers in J.L. did not have a reasonable basis to
conduct even a Terry stop under the circumstances of that
case, then I cannot fathom how the officers in the present case
have satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s higher probable cause
standard in arresting Reed.
Finally, I note the government’s alternative arguments that
the crack cocaine should not be suppressed either because (1)
it was in plain view or (2) it was abandoned by Reed. These
arguments have little merit. Based on my view that the arrest
of Reed was illegal, and because the illegal arrest caused
Reed to remove the Frito-Lay bag from his pocket and throw
it toward a friend standing nearby, the evidence from the bag
is inadmissible under the “fruits of the poisonous tree”
doctrine. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963) (explaining the doctrine); United States v. Simpson,
944 F. Supp. 1396, 1404 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (holding that if
there is a causal nexus between the police’s misconduct and
the “abandonment,” then the evidence must be suppressed);
United States v. Foster, 566 F. Supp. 1403, 1412 (D. D.C.
1983) (“[A]n abandonment that is the product of police
misconduct is not voluntary and cannot, therefore, vitiate the
taint of an illegal detention.”).
In summary, the circumstances presented by this case gave
the officers nothing more than a reasonable suspicion to
believe that Reed was trespassing. This is far short of
No. 99-3394 United States v. Reed 5
1According to the dissent, “the fact that Reed started to walk away
when the officers approached may raise a suspicion that he was engaged
in any one of a multitude of improper activities....” While that may be, the
officers were entitled to infer that he was walking away because he knew
he was not privileged to be there. They were not required to eliminate all
other reasonable inferences. See Strickland, 144 F.3d 412, 416(6th Cir.
1998)(stating “[t]o find probable cause, the law does not require that we
rule out every conceivable explanation other than a suspect’s illegal
conduct.”)
posted throughout the BMHA property, providing adequate
notice; (5) Reed walked away upon the lawful approach of the
officers. These factors must be measured up to the time at
which Reed thought he was not reasonably “free to leave.”
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). The
factors do not have to establish a prima facie case for criminal
trespass; however, said factors must be sufficient to indicate
to a reasonable person that an illegality has occurred or is
about to occur. See Strickland, 144 F.3d at 416.
Where probable cause exists, “[a] police officer is
permitted to make an arrest without a warrant for a
misdemeanor committed in his presence.” United States v.
Smith, 736 F.3d 1414, 1416 (6th Cir. 1996). The Court finds
that these five factors constitute the level of evidence
necessary to establish probable cause for Reed’s arrest. All
five factors existed during the time in which Reed was free to
leave.1 A reasonable officer in the position of either
Thompson or Horton could conclude from the totality of the
circumstances that probable caused existed to arrest Reed for
criminal trespass. Although Reed has set forth no controlling
authority indicating that the officers must conclude prior to
the arrest whether Reed enjoyed the privilege of entering or
remaining on BMHA property, we are mindful of the
discussion during oral argument that Washington v. Blair, 827
P.2d 356 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992), finds probable cause to be
lacking in circumstances in which an officer had no
knowledge of the existence of privilege prior to an arrest for
criminal trespass. However, we believe the Washington state
court decision was based upon a requirement negating the
affirmative defense of privilege prior to arresting a person for

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6 United States v. Reed No. 99-3394
trespass. This Circuit does not require such an added inquiry
to the probable cause determination.
III. Conclusion
There is no indication that the district court’s findings of
fact are erroneous. A review of the law applied to said
findings of fact leads to a determination that the district court
did not err in refusing to suppress the crack cocaine possessed
by Reed on the night of his arrest. Said evidence was
subsequently obtained by Officers Thompson and Horton
incidental to Reed’s arrest. Accordingly, we AFFIRM
Reed’s conviction and sentence.
No. 99-3394 United States v. Reed 15
Q. All right. So you had approached along with Officer
Thompson to pat down some individuals that you
saw standing on BMHA property; is that correct?
A. I grabbed my party to pat him down.
. . .
Q. And now how many people altogether were there
when you approached that scene?
A. Initially there were approximately four, I believe
four other parties.
Q. And when you approached that scene, was it your
intention to search all four of those people?
A. We were going to pick up Mr. Reed for sure. I
could not state what we were going to do with the
others. They started to walk away as we
approached.
Q. So if they hadn’t walked away, you would have went
ahead and done a pat-down on those people also; is
that right?
A. Probably after we got Mr. Reed into custody, yes.
Q. And that’s even though you had no idea whether
those other two people were actually trespassing or
not; is that right?
. . .
A. I didn’t get to see who they were, so I’m not sure.
Q. So you had no idea whether they would have been
trespassing or not, is that right –
A. The two people.
Q. – because they could have been residents?
A. That’s fair to say.
The above testimony from the arresting officers clearly
demonstrates that they thought it irrelevant whether or not
Reed was privileged to be on the property. In other words,
the officers admit that at the time of the arrest they did not
know whether Reed had recently moved into the BMHA
property or had been invited there by others. They decided to
arrest him for criminal trespass as soon as they spotted him,
no questions asked. Under these circumstances, the wisdom
of Blair, Jones, and Jason Allen D. cries out for a result
contrary to that reached by the majority.

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14 United States v. Reed No. 99-3394
engaged in any one of a multitude of improper activities, but
is not particularly probative as to whether Reed was
privileged to be on the property. In any event, both officers
admitted that even before they saw Reed start to walk away,
they had already decided to arrest him for criminal trespass.
Even if all five factors are considered collectively, they at
most gave the officers a reasonable suspicion that Reed had
no legitimate purpose for being there. This would have
justified stopping Reed to inquire as to whether he lived on
BMHA’s property or was there by invitation. See Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Washington v. Blair, 827 P.2d 356,
359 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). The officers, however, made no
such inquiry.
At the suppression hearing, Officer Thompson gave the
following response to the government’s question:
Q. And do you have information as to whether or not
Mr. Reed had permission from the Housing
Authority to be on that property?
A. No, I did not.
Thompson also made the following statements on cross-
examination:
Q. Did you find out during the course of your
investigation, though, that he did have a girlfriend
there who had – he had a child by?
A. I don’t recall. I mean, I don’t remember him saying
that but it’s possible, but it would have been
irrelevant.
Q. I’m sorry?
A. It would have been irrelevant whether he was – had
a girlfriend on the property.
Q. Now, you would have stopped him anyway; is that
right?
A. That’s correct. He wasn’t with her at the time.
In addition, Officer Horton testified as follows in response
to questions from the government’s attorney:
No. 99-3394 United States v. Reed 7
________________
DISSENT
________________
RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. In
affirming the district court’s denial of Reed’s motion to
suppress, the majority holds that he was legally arrested for
criminal trespass even though the police failed to first
ascertain whether Reed had a legitimate reason for being on
the property. I respectfully dissent because, in my view, the
police officers arrested Reed without having probable cause
to do so.
Although not cited by Reed, I have found three cases with
facts very similar to those before us that address the issue of
probable cause in relation to criminal trespass. In each case,
the court concluded that the officers must have probable cause
to believe that the defendant was on the property without
privilege before making an arrest.
The earliest case is Washington v. Blair, 827 P.2d 356
(Wash. Ct. App. 1992). Faced with an almost identical fact
pattern, the Washington Court of Appeals held as follows:
Officer Williams simply drove up to Blair and ordered
him into the police cruiser where he arrested him. Had
Officer Williams taken a moment to ask Blair where he
was going and for what purpose, he could have
determined whether Blair was in fact visiting a friend or
was trespassing. Because he knew Blair did not live in
Roxbury Village, had admonished Blair not to return and
had arrested him nearby for a drug transaction, Officer
Williams had an articulable suspicion that Blair might be
trespassing on September 1. Based on this information,
Officer Williams could properly stop Blair, ask him why
he was on the premises, and investigate to see if his
purpose for being there was in fact legitimate. However,
the fact that the officer had told Blair not to return to the

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8 United States v. Reed No. 99-3394
premises does not, in itself, create probable cause for
arresting him on the charge of criminal trespass.
Id. at 359 (citation omitted).
The majority attempts to distinguish Blair on the following
basis:
Blair . . . finds probable cause to be lacking in
circumstances in which an officer has no knowledge of
the existence of privilege prior to an arrest for criminal
trespass. However, we believe the Washington state
court decision was based upon a requirement negating
the affirmative defense of privilege prior to arresting a
person for trespass. This Circuit does not require such an
added inquiry to the probable cause determination.
I do not believe, however, that Blair can be so easily
distinguished. The ordinance in Blair made it illegal for a
person who is not licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to
enter or remain on private property. See Blair, 827 P.2d at
358. Deciding if Officer Williams had probable cause to
believe that Blair was committing a crime thus depended “on
whether the circumstances known to the officer indicated that
Blair was not on the property for legitimate purposes.” Id. at
359.
Although the State of Washington provides an affirmative
defense to criminal trespass if “[t]he actor reasonably believed
that the owner of the premises . . . would have licensed him
or her to enter or remain,” see Blair, 827 P.2d at 359, that was
not the focus of the Blair court’s inquiry. Instead, the court
focused on the officer’s reasonable beliefs, not the actor’s.
Contrary to the majority’s analysis, the Blair court did not
require the state to negate an affirmative defense. What it did
require was a showing that the officer had probable cause to
believe that the defendant was on the property without a
legitimate purpose at the time of his arrest.
The next case with facts very similar to those before us is
Jones v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 189 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
No. 99-3394 United States v. Reed 13
on BMHA’s property without privilege at the time of his
arrest.
First of all, the fact that on one prior occasion Reed had
been ordered off of BMHA’s property by Officer Thompson
indicates at most that Reed may not have been on the property
by invitation on that particular occasion. On the other hand,
because Officer Thompson could not recall whether his
previous encounter with Reed was weeks or months earlier,
Reed could have become a resident in the interim. Moreover,
Thompson’s past encounter with Reed provides no answer to
the question of whether Reed had been invited onto BMHA’s
property on the day he was arrested.
Second, the majority cites the uncontested fact that Reed
was on BMHA’s property. This, however, has no bearing on
the issue of whether the officers had probable cause to believe
that Reed was on the property without privilege. The case
would be different if the apartment manager had complained
about Reed, or had requested the officers to remove him,
because then the officers would have had probable cause to
believe that he was not privileged to be there.
Third, there is no indication in the record that at the time of
Reed’s arrest the officers knew that Reed was not a resident.
In fact, the district court did not even make such a finding.
The testimony at the suppression hearing indicates that the
basis for Officers Thompson and Horton believing that Reed
was not a resident of the BMHA property was solely
Thompson’s past encounter with Reed. I thus find the
majority’s reliance on this factor to be misplaced.
Fourth, the fact that there were twenty-six “No
Trespassing” signs posted on BMHA’s property is similarly
irrelevant as to whether the officers had probable cause to
believe that Reed was not a resident or did not have an
invitation to be on the property. The government conceded
this point at oral argument.
Fifth, the fact that Reed started to walk away when the
officers approached might raise a suspicion that he was

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12 United States v. Reed No. 99-3394
I fully agree with the result in Strickland, but find its factual
setting a world apart from that in the present case. Based on
the overwhelming evidence in Strickland, the detectives had
probable cause to believe that Strickland had engaged in a
drug transaction. Because of that, they did not need to dispel
all innocent explanations for the meeting between Strickland
and Haggard before arresting Strickland. The officers in the
case at hand, however, never had probable cause to arrest
Reed for criminal trespass in the first place.
To explain the difference another way, let us assume that
BMHA’s apartment manager had informed the officers that
Reed was trespassing. The officers would then have had
probable cause to arrest Reed for criminal trespass. If, after
his arrest, Reed had argued that his seizure was illegal
because the officers had failed to inquire as to whether he was
invited onto the property by a tenant, his argument would fail.
At that point, like in Strickland, the officers would have had
probable cause to arrest and would not have had to dispel
every innocent explanation. Those, however, are not the facts
of the present case.
The trespass ordinance in the case before us, like the ones
in Blair, Jones, and In re Jason Allen D., provides that a
person must enter or remain on another’s property without
privilege. See Ohio v. Clelland, 615 N.E.2d 276, 287 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1992) (“The concept of privilege has been broadly
construed, and the state has been required to prove lack of
privilege.”). The majority concludes that the following facts
establish probable cause for Reed’s arrest for criminal
trespass: (1) Reed had been given a prior warning not to
enter the BMHA property by Officer Thompson, (2) Reed was
observed on the BMHA property, (3) Reed was not a resident
of the BMHA housing project, (4) there were twenty-six “No
Trespassing” signs posted throughout the BMHA property,
and (5) Reed walked away when the officers approached. For
the reasons set forth below, I do not believe that any of the
five factors that the majority relies upon justify the conclusion
that the officers had probable cause to believe that Reed was
No. 99-3394 United States v. Reed 9
In Jones, an owner of an apartment complex who had posted
“No Trespassing” signs complained to the City of
Richmond’s police department that he was having problems
with trespassers and drug dealers in the parking area. He
asked for police assistance. Shortly thereafter, a man named
Jones was seen “hanging out” in the parking lot and was
arrested by the Richmond police for criminal trespass. The
search incident to the arrest uncovered heroin. In ordering the
heroin suppressed, the Virginia Court of Appeals held as
follows:
Jones’s mere presence with another man on the premises
at four o’clock in the afternoon near an automobile
parked on a street by an apartment complex was
insufficient to establish probable cause to believe that
Jones was neither a resident of the apartment complex
nor legitimately upon the premises at the invitation of a
resident. The officer’s observation permitted only a bare
suspicion. Indeed, the officer’s assertion that Jones and
the other man were “hanging out” did not add sufficient
information to raise his suspicion of trespassing to
probable cause.
Id. at 191.
Finally, in a case where the facts were much more
compelling for the state than the ones at bar, the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals reversed the appellant’s trespass
conviction, holding as follows:
Officer Custead’s mere observation of Jason “hanging
out” on the sidewalk at the housing project two hours
after an earlier and arguably invalid arrest for trespassing
was insufficient to establish probable cause that Jason
was a criminal trespasser. We reiterate that, in
evaluating probable cause, we must relate what the
officer knew about the circumstances of the arrest to the
elements of the offense that the officer believed was
being or had been committed. Here, appellant was
arrested for trespassing, not for loitering. Thus, the fact
that appellant was “hanging out” on the property

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10 United States v. Reed No. 99-3394
provides very little guidance as to whether Officer
Custead had probable cause to believe appellant was a
trespasser. . . . For the purpose of analyzing probable
cause, we review what Officer Custead knew when he
sought to arrest Jason for trespassing: 1) Jason was on
Sagner property; 2) Jason was not a resident; 3) Jason
had received a no-trespassing notice; 4) Jason had been
arrested less than two hours earlier for trespassing at
Sagner, although Jason was not on Sagner property when
the first arrest occurred. Yet, Officer Custead’s own
knowledge about the questionable validity of the earlier
arrest diffuses the import of Jason’s later reappearance on
the property. Further, although the officer saw appellant
with a group of people, he conceded that he had no
information about Jason’s relationship to the persons
who were with him, no knowledge as to whether any of
the persons with Jason resided at Sagner, nor did the
officer inquire of Jason or the others about Jason’s
presence at Sagner. As in Blair and Jones, Officer
Custead ignored the possibility that appellant was at
Sagner at the invitation of an authorized resident. Like
Blair and Jones, we conclude that, on these facts, Officer
Custead did not have probable cause to make an arrest.
In re Jason Allen D., 733 A.2d 351, 371-72 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1999) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis added).
All three of the above cases require that an officer have
probable cause to believe that a person is on private property
without privilege before making an arrest for criminal
trespass. This is an appropriate requirement because there are
only two elements to criminal trespass: (1) a person has to be
on private property, and (2) he or she has to be there without
privilege. See City of Hamilton, Ohio, Ordinance § 541.05.
If police officers do not need probable cause to believe that a
suspect lacks a legitimate reason for being on private property
before making an arrest for criminal trespass, then they could
legally arrest and search anyone they see on private property.
Such is clearly not the law.
No. 99-3394 United States v. Reed 11
Instead of addressing or attempting to distinguish Jones and
In re Jason Allen D., which deal specifically with the issue at
hand, the majority cites and relies heavily upon general
language from United States v. Strickland, 144 F.3d 412 (6th
Cir. 1998). In Strickland, the police used a man named
Haggard, an indicted drug offender who was working as a
police informant, to set up a drug transaction with a suspected
dealer named Strickland. Haggard telephoned Strickland in
the presence of police detectives. The detectives heard
Haggard agree to a meeting with Strickland at 7:30 p.m. that
evening at a convenience store called the Corner Market.
Upon finishing his call with Strickland, Haggard informed the
detectives that he had arranged to purchase cocaine from
Strickland for $1,000. Haggard also explained that he and
Strickland had a course of dealing where they would meet
inside an automobile, talk for a few moments, and then
exchange money for drugs. One of the detectives then gave
Haggard $1,000 in marked bills. Shortly thereafter, the
detectives, who had the Corner Market under surveillance,
observed Haggard meeting Strickland at 7:30 p.m. at the
Corner Market, Strickland getting into Haggard’s car, the two
men chatting, and Strickland leaving Haggard’s vehicle a few
minutes later. Strickland was then arrested and searched,
uncovering the $1,000 of marked bills.
Claiming a lack of probable cause, Strickland filed a
motion to suppress the evidence. The issue before this court
was whether the police had probable cause to arrest Strickland
for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute when
they had not actually seen the transaction take place in the car.
In other words, Strickland argued that the detectives did not
“know” that he had sold drugs to Haggard, and that there
could be other innocent explanations for his meeting Haggard
at the Corner Market. Based on the compelling circumstantial
evidence summarized above, this court held that the
detectives had probable cause to believe that Strickland had
sold cocaine to Haggard, despite the possibility that there
could have been an innocent explanation for the meeting
between them.

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