Leigh Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo

1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0092A (6th Cir.)
File Name: 00a0092a.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
LEIGH C LINE ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
C ATHOLIC DIOCESE OF
TOLEDO ; C ATHOLIC
DIOCESAN S CHOOL OF
TOLEDO ; S T . P AUL
ELEMENTARY S CHOOL;
HERBERT J. W ILLMAN ,
Administrator St. Paul
Elementary School,
Defendants-Appellees.
;>

1
No. 98-3527
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Toledo.
No. 97-07472—James G. Carr, District Judge.
Argued: October 25, 1999
Decided and Filed: March 14, 2000
Before: JONES, MOORE, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.

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2 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
No. 98-3527
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: David W. Leopold, DAVID WOLFE LEOPOLD
& ASSOCIATES, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Gregory
T. Lodge, SHUMAKER, LOOP & KENDRICK, Toledo,
Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: David W. Leopold,
DAVID WOLFE LEOPOLD & ASSOCIATES, Cleveland,
Ohio, for Appellant. Gregory T. Lodge, SHUMAKER,
LOOP & KENDRICK, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellees.
______________________
AMENDED OPINION
______________________
NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-
Appellant Leigh Cline (“Cline”) brought a pregnancy
discrimination suit against Defendants-Appellees, Catholic
Diocese of Toledo, et al., (“St. Paul”), under Title VII and
Chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code. She also asserted
claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel. Cline
appeals the summary judgment granted by the district court in
favor of St. Paul on all four claims. For the following
reasons, we reverse in part and affirm in part.
I.
St. Paul Elementary and High School employed Leigh Cline
as a teacher from June 1994 until St. Paul decided not to
renew her contract after the 1995-1996 year. St. Paul is a
parish of the Roman Catholic Church located within the
Catholic Diocese of Toledo. The defendants-appellees in this
case include St. Paul Elementary School, the Catholic
Diocese of Toledo, the Catholic Diocesan School of Toledo
and Father Herbert J. Willman. Father Willman is
responsible for all religious matters within the parish,
including oversight of the parish schools.

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No. 98-3527 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
3
After graduating from Bowling Green in 1993, Cline began
teaching at St. Paul as an elementary substitute teacher. In
June 1994, she was awarded a full-time eighth-grade teaching
position for the 1994-1995 school year, assuming religion and
math class duties, and also teaching high school math and
coaching girls’ basketball. After her first year, the school
renewed Cline’s teaching contract for the 1995-1996 school
term and granted her request to teach the second grade.
Cline’s position as a second-grade teacher involved
significant training and ministry in the Catholic faith. She
provided daily religious instruction to students, took students
to Mass on a regular basis, and prepared her second-grade
students for the sacraments of Reconciliation and Holy
Communion. Cline acknowledged that her position at St.
Paul required her to “build and live Christian community,”
“integrate learning and faith,” and “instill a sense of mission”
in her students.
For each of her two years at St. Paul, Cline’s employment
was governed by the standard St. Paul one-year employment
contract (titled the “Teacher-Minister Contract”) (“Contract”)
as well as the “Affirmations for Employment in the Diocese
of Toledo” (“the Affirmation”), both of which she signed for
each year. In addition to laying out basic terms of salary,
duration and other routine aspects of the position, the
Contract incorporates the provisions of the Affirmation
document as part of its terms and conditions. The
Affirmation outlines the ministerial responsibilities of the
“teacher/minister,” including the following provisions: 1) a
statement that the signer “believe[s] that the work of the
Catholic Church, [its agencies] and institutions has
characteristics that make it different from the work of other
agencies and institutions”; 2) a statement that the signer will
“work[] diligently to maintain and strengthen the Catholic
Church and its members,” and that “[b]y word and example,
[the signer] will reflect the values of the Catholic Church;” 3)
statements that the signer believes in “mutual trust” and “open
communication;” and 4) a statement by the signer that she “is
more than a professional.” J.A. at 96. The Contract also

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4 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
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No. 98-3527
1The Handbook describes the mission statement and broad
philosophy of the school, and lays out more specific matters of school
policy and administration, including describing teachers’ “religious
responsibilities” (e.g., teachers are “expected to uphold, by word and
example, all truths, values, and teachings of the Roman Catholic church,”
J.A. at 277), general “staff policies,” “staff certification and other
requirements,” and teacher salary and benefit provisions. J.A. at 277-94.
2In her deposition, Cline acknowledged that her pregnancy resulted
from sex before her marriage.
incorporates the Teacher Handbook, which states that the
mission of the school is to “instill in our children the Gospel
message of Jesus Christ.” J.A. at 277.1 Neither the Teacher’s
Handbook nor the Affirmation explicitly states, nor was Leigh
Cline ever expressly informed—in writing, orally or
otherwise —that premarital sex comprised a violation of the
terms of either the Contract or the Affirmation.
In the fall of 1995, Cline and her boyfriend (now husband)
Tom Cline met with Fr. Brickner, the associate pastor of St.
Paul Church, to discuss their intention to marry. The Clines
married at St. Paul in February 1996. In early March, Leigh
Cline informed the assistant principal, Stephen Schumm, and
other St. Paul teachers that she was pregnant. Around late
March or early April, Cline became visibly pregnant and
began to wear maternity clothing to school. Based on his
observation of Cline’s pregnancy, Fr. Willman correctly
concluded that she had engaged in premarital sex.2
On learning that she had engaged in premarital sex, St. Paul
officials did not immediately terminate Cline. Instead, Fr.
Willman considered “all options,” including immediate
termination. Ultimately, according to Fr. Willman, he
decided that the most appropriate course of action was to
permit Cline to continue teaching for the remainder of the
school year, without renewing her contract after the year had
finished. On May 3, 1996, Fr. Willman advised Cline in a
conference that “under the circumstances,” St. Paul “would
No. 98-3527 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
29
question St. Paul’s proffered reason for her non-renewal. The
law entitles her to make her case before a trier of fact. For
these reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s summary
judgment on the discrimination claims and AFFIRM on the
contract claims.

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28 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
No. 98-3527
reasons that Cline is entitled to pursue her federal
discrimination claim before a trier of fact, she is equally
entitled to press on with her claim under Ohio’s Civil Rights
Act.
E.
We agree with the district court that Cline’s contract claims
are meritless. The contract itself was for a one-year term, to
end on June 30, 1996, with no express or implied right to
renewal. Its terms were fulfilled. Her promissory estoppel
claim also lacks merit. To win under a theory of promissory
estoppel, a plaintiff must show “detrimental reliance of the
promisee upon the false representations of the promissor.”
Karnes v. Doctor’s Hosp., 51 Ohio St. 3d 139, 142 (1990).
Although Cline generally alleged that she was unsuccessful in
finding work immediately after she was informed of her non-
renewal, she presented no evidence showing that she
detrimentally relied on the school’s implication that her
contract would be renewed, or that she was injured by that
reliance. Thus, the district court correctly granted summary
judgment for St. Paul on her promissory estoppel claim.
IV.
When faced with a similar fact situation in Ganzy, Judge
Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York concluded:
Plaintiff’s evidence . . . might lead a jury to find that the
religious reason--premarital sex--for the termination is a
pretext. Contrariwise, a jury might well find that [the
school’s decision was made] because [of] the school’s
religious beliefs. . . . Or it might simply not believe the
Plaintiff’s version of the incident. . . . Under such
circumstances, a decision by a cross-section of the
community in a jury trial is appropriate.
995 F. Supp. at 360-61. The situation in this case is no
different. Cline has introduced sufficient evidence to make
out a prima facie case, and sufficient evidence to call into
No. 98-3527 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
5
not renew her contract or hire her for the next school year.”
According to Fr. Willman’s deposition, the “circumstances”
he was referring to were that “Leigh [] became pregnant
before she got married.” J.A. at 536. In a formal letter
explaining the decision not to renew her contract, sent May 4,
Fr. Willman wrote:
We expect our teachers to be good, strong role models
for our children. . . . It is stated in your contract, working
agreement that ‘by word and example you will reflect the
values of the Catholic Church.’ . . . [P]arents in the
community have serious concerns about a teacher who
marries and is expecting a child 5 months after the
wedding date. We expect teachers and staff members at
St. Paul to observe the 6 month preparation time for
marriage. . . . The Church does not uphold sexual
intercourse outside of marriage. We consider this a
breach of contract/working agreement.
J.A. at 313. Cline continued teaching at St. Paul through the
end of the school year. Her child was born on July 10, 1996.
Cline disputes some of St. Paul’s evidence about the events
preceding her non-renewal. She argues that when Fr.
Willman informed Cline of the decision not to renew, he only
stated that it was due to her pregnancy so soon after marriage;
according to Cline, he did not mention premarital sex. She
also presents other evidence contradicting Fr. Willman’s
assertion that, after discovering her pregnancy, the school
decided to retain her only through the remainder of the 1995-
1996 school year. In particular, Cline received a glowing
Teacher Performance Evaluation on April 19,1996, nearly
two months after the school concluded that she had premarital
sex. In addition to noting her “successful” performance in
almost all of fifteen objective criteria, Principal Schumm
praised Cline for “adjust[ing] very well” to the “busy and
changing year in regard to [her] classroom reassignment and

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6 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
No. 98-3527
3Father Willman stated in his deposition that he had read these
positive evaluations.
personal life.” J.A. at 183.3 Finally, the evaluation implied
that a contract renewal would be forthcoming for the
following year, concluding: “Your class of 2nd grade students
is well managed and respectful. I would expect continued
growth for the 1996-97 school year.” J.A. at 183.
On October 11, 1996, Cline filed a charge of discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The
EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue, and on June 17, 1997,
Cline filed her complaint in the district court claiming illegal
sex and pregnancy discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e et seq., and Chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code.
She also brought claims for breach of contract and promissory
estoppel. On January 30, 1998, defendants filed their Motion
for Summary Judgment. Finding that Cline had failed to
make out a prima facie case of discrimination, the court
granted summary judgment on April 3, 1998. This timely
appeal followed.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
judgment, using the same Rule 56(c) standard as the district
court. See Terry Barr Sales Agency, Inc. v. All-Lock Co., Inc.,
96 F.3d 174, 178 (6th Cir. 1996). Under that standard,
summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, we assess
the factual evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party. See National Enterprises, Inc.
v. Smith, 114 F.3d 561, 563 (6th Cir. 1997). Merely alleging
the existence of a factual dispute is insufficient to defeat a
No. 98-3527 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
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dispute fly in the face of the Supreme Court’s warning that
the district court must not “weigh the evidence and determine
the truth of the matter” at the summary judgment stage.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
Finally, St. Paul’s frequent reliance on Boyd, which
concluded that Boyd’s claim did not survive the rebuttal
stage, does not help its argument here; indeed, that case
bolsters Cline’s arguments. In Boyd, this Court did not
review an order of summary judgment, but affirmed a bench
trial decision. Its affirmance on the merits therefore provides
no support for St. Paul’s arguments that Cline is not entitled
to a trial at all. The fact that the parties in this case have
waged vigorous factual disputes over the central factors the
Boyd Court considered in its holding—namely, whether the
school applied its standards in a discriminatory manner, and
whether the school’s policy was based on pregnancy or
premarital sex—underscores that in this case there is indeed
a genuine dispute over the most important material facts.
This further highlights the district court’s error in granting
summary judgment.
D.
We also reverse the district court’s decision with respect to
the discrimination claim under Ohio law. Ohio courts utilize
the same McDonnell Douglas analysis described supra when
analyzing discrimination claims brought under the Ohio Civil
Rights Act, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112. See Ohio Civil
Rights Comm'n v. Ingram, 630 N.E.2d 669, 672 (Ohio 1994)
(holding that federal caselaw interpreting and applying Title
VII is generally applicable to cases involving Chapter 4112);
Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Comm. v. Ohio
Civil Rights Comm’n, 421 N.E. 128, 131-32 (Ohio 1981)
(applying McDonnell Douglas). This is no different for
discrimination claims brought against sectarian schools. See
Basinger v. Pilarczyk, 707 N.E.2d 1149, 1150-51 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1997) (stating that the McDonnell Douglas analysis
applies when teacher sues a sectarian school). For the same

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26 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
No. 98-3527
9On a number of occasions, St. Paul simply favors Fr. Willman’s
testimony over Cline’s. See, e.g., St. Paul’s Br. at 19-24. But this we
cannot do on summary judgment.
fact as to whether St. Paul enforces its policy solely by
observing the pregnancy of its female teachers, which would
constitute a form of pregnancy discrimination.
No doubt, St. Paul may have sharp retorts to many of
Cline’s factual claims. Indeed, many of its responses could
well convince a trier of fact of its case. But at this stage in the
trial, the district court’s and our role is not “to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the matter,” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 249, but “to determine whether there is a genuine
issue for trial.” Id. To do so, the court must look at the
evidence and make all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to Cline. See National Enterprises, Inc., 114 F.3d
at 563. If, in that light, “the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” a
trialCand not summary judgmentCis warranted. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248. Observed in a light most favorable to her,
Cline has clearly offered evidence sufficient to leap this
hurdle.
The district court’s contrary conclusion reflects an errant
approach to the summary judgment stage. At each step of its
analysis, rather than drawing inferences in Cline’s favor, the
court credited St. Paul’s account over Cline’s. For instance,
the court rebuts Cline’s statements that conversations with Fr.
Willman centered on her pregnancy by finding that Fr.
Willman “has explained that plaintiff’s pregnancy was
significant only because it accurately demonstrated her
decision to have premarital sex.” J.A. at 338. This
disagreement is a crucial dispute over a key material fact;
rather than reserving it for the trier of fact to resolve, the court
has favored the school’s explanation. St. Paul asks us to do
the same throughout its brief.9 This and other examples of
crediting St. Paul’s factual contentions amid a genuine factual
No. 98-3527 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
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4According to Section 2000e(k), the term “because of sex” means,
among other things, “on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical condition.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
summary judgment motion; rather, there must exist in the
record a genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-50 (1986).
III.
A.
Title VII’s prohibition on employment practices that
discriminate “because of [an] individual’s sex,” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1), applies with all its force to employers who
discriminate on the basis of pregnancy. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k);4 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 89-90
(1983); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983); Boyd v. Harding Academy of
Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Congress
manifested its belief that discrimination based on pregnancy
constitutes discrimination based on sex.”). Thus, a claim of
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy “must be analyzed
in the same manner as any other sex discrimination claim
brought pursuant to Title VII.” Boyd, 88 F.3d at 413. Such
a claim requires that the plaintiff first establish a prima facie
case of unlawful discrimination by showing that 1) she was
pregnant, 2) she was qualified for her job, 3) she was
subjected to an adverse employment decision, and 4) there is
a nexus between her pregnancy and the adverse employment
decision. See id. In a termination case such as this one, a
plaintiff meets the second prong by showing that she was
performing “at a level which met [her] employer’s legitimate
expectations.” McDonald v. Union Camp Corp., 898 F.2d
1155, 1160 (6th Cir. 1990). If the plaintiff successfully
establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts
to the defendant to articulate a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason” for its actions. Boyd, 88 F.3d at 413 (citing Texas
Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 238, 253

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8 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
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No. 98-3527
(1981)). If the defendant fails to satisfy this burden, plaintiff
prevails. If the defendant satisfies this burden, then the
presumption of intentional discrimination is negated; the
employee must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant intentionally discriminated against her.
She may do this by showing that the “nondiscriminatory”
reasons the employer offered were not credible, but were
merely a pretext for intentional discrimination. See id.; see
also St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511
(1993) (stating that the factfinder’s “disbelief of the reasons
put forward by the defendant” may, “together with the
elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional
discrimination”).
The Congressional drafters of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
recognized the sensitivity surrounding the status of religious
groups and institutions. Thus, while Title VII exempts
religious organizations for “discrimination based on religion,”
it does not exempt them “with respect to all discrimination
. . . . [] Title VII still applies . . . to a religious institution
charged with sex discrimination.” Boyd, 88 F.3d at 413; see
also Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166 (4th Cir. 1985) (“Title VII
does not confer upon religious organizations a license to make
[hiring decisions] on the basis of race, sex, or national
origin.”). Because discrimination based on pregnancy is a
clear form of discrimination based on sex, religious schools
cannot discriminate based on pregnancy. See Boyd, 88 F.3d
at 413-14; Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340,
349 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that restrictions on pregnancy
“are not permitted because they are gender discriminatory by
definition”); Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266,
270 (N.D. Iowa 1980) (stating that a school has violated Title
VII if it terminates a plaintiff for pregnancy alone). In suits
like Cline’s, courts have made clear that if the school’s
purported “discrimination” is based on a policy of preventing
nonmarital sexual activity which emanates from the religious
and moral precepts of the school, and if that policy is applied
equally to its male and female employees, then the school has
No. 98-3527 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
25
those relations are revealed through pregnancy. See also
Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802, 808 (N.D.
Cal. 1992) (stating that an anti-premarital sex policy violates
Title VII if it is enforced solely through observing pregnancy,
because such a policy subjects “only women” to termination
“for something that men would not be, and that is sex
discrimination, regardless of the justification put forth for the
disparity”). In other words, a school can not use the mere
observation or knowledge of pregnancy as its sole method of
detecting violations of its premarital sex policy.
In assessing Cline’s attempts to show pretext, the district
court far too hastily sided with St. Paul. Factually, this case
is a tightly-waged battle. Cline presented a variety of
concrete evidence casting into doubt the “reason” St. Paul
profferedCthat it decided not to renew her contract because
she had violated its blanket policy against premarital sexCand
raising an issue of fact as to whether the treatment was due to
her pregnancy. Most importantly, she presented evidence that
the school continued to view her as sufficiently qualified to
teach: the complimentary evaluation (mentioning both her
“personal” and “professional” life), its consideration of other
“options” for some time before opting to terminate her, and
Father Willman’s suggestion in the record that “things might
have worked out differently” had Cline notified him of her
pregnancy sooner. She also produced some evidence showing
that the school may have focused more on the fact of her
pregnancy than her sexual activity. For instance, she testified
to conversations and produced statements in which school
officials explicitly discussed her “pregnancy” rather than her
sexual actions. Finally, Cline adduced evidence that the
policy was not applied equally among men and women. St.
Paul officials acknowledged in their depositions that Cline’s
pregnancy alone had signaled them that she engaged in
premarital sex, and that the school does not otherwise inquire
as to whether male teachers engage in premarital sex. At oral
argument, counsel for St. Paul conceded that it was only
Cline’s pregnancy that made it evident that she had engaged
in premarital sex. These admissions raise an issue of material

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24 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
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No. 98-3527
Ganzy, 995 F. Supp. at 359 (stating that the defendant-school
“discharge[d]” its burden of production when it “stated that
Ganzy violated its religious teachings by engaging in
premarital sexual activity”). As in those cases, St. Paul has
“simply explain[ed] what [it] has done [and] produce[d]
evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.” Burdine,
450 U.S. at 256.
(b) Showing of Pretext.
The presumption of discrimination having been rebutted,
“the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity,”
with Cline shouldering the burden of “demonstrat[ing] that
the proffered reason was not the true reason for the
employment decision.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56. This
burden “merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the
court that she has been the victim of intentional
discrimination.” Id. Once again, therefore, Cline must
answer the ultimate question: did St. Paul discriminate against
her “because she was pregnant,” or “for engaging in sex
outside of marriage” in violation of the school’s moral code?
Boyd, 88 F.3d at 414; see also Ganzy, 995 F. Supp. at 349;
Dolter, 483 F. Supp. at 270.
Because Cline enjoys a “full and fair opportunity” to make
this showing, Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, she can pursue
several avenues of discovery. First, she can show intentional
discrimination directly by showing “that a discriminatory
reason more likely motivated the employer” than the reason
the employer proffered. Id. at 256. Second, she can indirectly
show “pretext” by showing “that the employer’s proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence.” Id. In the pregnancy
discrimination context in particular, Cline also may show that
St. Paul enforced its premarital sex policy in a discriminatory
mannerCagainst only pregnant women, or against only
women. See Boyd, 88 F.3d at 414. This is because a school
violates Title VII if, due purely to the fact that “[w]omen can
become pregnant [and] [m]en cannot,” Ganzy, 995 F. Supp.
at 344, it punishes only women for sexual relations because
No. 98-3527 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
9
5The district court stated that the first, third, and fourth prongs were
satisfied. This is undisputed by St. Paul.
not discriminated based on pregnancy in violation of Title
VII. See Boyd, 88 F.3d at 414-15; Ganzy, 995 F. Supp. at
344; Dolter, 483 F. Supp. at 270.
The central question in this case, therefore, is whether St.
Paul’s nonrenewal of Cline’s contract constituted
discrimination based on her pregnancy as opposed to a
gender-neutral enforcement of the school’s premarital sex
policy. While the former violates Title VII, the latter does
not. This is primarily a factual battle, to be resolved on
summary judgment only if Cline presented insufficient
evidence to create a genuine dispute over the material facts.
Because we find that Cline put forth sufficient evidence to
create such a dispute, we hold that summary judgment was
inappropriate.
B.
The district court granted St. Paul’s motion for summary
judgment, agreeing with the school’s arguments on all four of
Cline’s claims.
First, the court found that Cline failed to make a prima facie
case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas because she
did not satisfy the second prong required: showing she was
qualified for the job.5 By engaging in premarital sex, she had
violated both the Contract and Affirmation, and her promise
under them “to live according to the principles of the Catholic
Church.” J.A. at 332. Her own actions therefore rendered her
unqualified for the teaching position. In making this
conclusion, the district court reasoned that cases like Dolter,
which rejected motions for summary judgment for similar
pregnancy discrimination claims, were distinguishable
because Cline had offered no proof that the premarital sex
policy applied differently to men and women. In Dolter, such
a showing was made.

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10 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
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No. 98-3527
6The Supreme Court has recognized that “as a practical matter,” the
“real-life sequence of a trial” does not necessarily comport with this
model. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510 n.3. Indeed, it acknowledged that to avoid
summary judgment, “the defendant feels the ‘burden’ not when the
plaintiff’s prima facie case is proved, but as soon as evidence of it is
introduced.” Id. In his dissent in Hicks, Justice Souter also discussed the
The district court next reasoned that even if Cline had made
out a prima facie case, she had still failed to show that St.
Paul’s “nondiscriminatory” reason for the non-renewal was a
mere pretext for pregnancy discrimination. In concluding so,
the court parsed through the evidence of Fr. Willman’s
statements, finding that they demonstrated that “it was [not]
pregnancy [] that motivated the termination,” but the fact of
premarital sex. J.A. at 338. The court distinguished the
Ganzy case – where the district court refused to grant a
motion of summary judgment for similar circumstances – by
the fact that Ganzy had been able to show more decisively
that the discrimination was rooted in her pregnancy.
The court also set aside Cline’s breach of contract and
promissory estoppel claims. The contract claim failed
because the contract was “fully performed,” J.A. at 341,
while the promissory estoppel claim failed because Cline did
not show any detrimental reliance.
C.
Looking anew at the record, we conclude that the district
court fundamentally misapplied the McDonnell Douglas test.
Before we explain the nature of the court’s errors, we recite
the “first principles” of McDonnell Douglas’s burden-shifting
regime. The three-part inquiry provides “an allocation of the
burden of production and an order for the presentation of
proof in Title VII discriminatory-treatment cases.” Hicks, 509
U.S. at 506; see Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (stating that the McDonnell Douglas
regime is “meant only to aid courts and litigants in arranging
the presentation of evidence”).6 The framework is designed
No. 98-3527 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
23
2. Production and Rebuttal
Because Cline has successfully made a prima facie
showing, we next must consider the rebuttal phase: did St.
Paul satisfy its burden of producing a nondiscriminatory
reason for the non-renewal, and can Cline meet her burden of
establishing that this reason was a mere pretext? The district
court concluded that St. Paul satisfied its burden of
articulating a nondiscriminatory reason. It also concluded that
Cline did not demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether that reason was pretextual. While
we agree with the first conclusion, we disagree with the
second.
(a) Burden of Production
First, we agree with the district court that St. Paul
successfully articulated a nondiscriminatory reason for its
actions. The burden on St. Paul “is to rebut the presumption
of discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was
rejected . . . for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.”
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. This is a burden of production;
although “[t]he defendant need not persuade the court that it
was actually motivated by the proffered reasons,” it must raise
“a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against
the plaintiff.” Id. To do this, “the defendant must clearly set
forth . . . the reasons for the plaintiff’s rejection,” and that
explanation “must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment
for the defendant.” Id. at 255.
St. Paul satisfied this burden by asserting that it did not
renew Cline’s contract because she violated her clear duties
as a teacher by engaging in premarital sex. This conclusion
squares with Boyd and Ganzy, where schools articulated
similar reasons as their motivation for termination. See Boyd,
88 F.3d at 414 (agreeing with the district court’s conclusion
that the defendant “articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason by stating that it fired plaintiff Boyd not because she
was pregnant, but for engaging in sex outside of marriage”);

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22 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
No. 98-3527
regarding the employer’s true motives for making the
challenged employment decision.” Walker v. Mortham, 158
F.3d 1177, 1192 (11th Cir. 1998). Requiring a rebuttal by the
defendant “frame[s] the factual issue with sufficient clarity so
that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to
demonstrate pretext.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56. Without
a clearly articulated reason,
the plaintiff does not know whether the employment
decision was made upon his work record or upon an
illegitimate racial preference. His offer of proof is
somewhat thwarted by this confusion. A plaintiff cannot
disprove as a cause for his failure to be rehired a source
of dissatisfaction of which he is unaware.
Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., 690 F.2d 88, 97 (6th Cir.
1982) (emphasis added). Thus, a court distorts the
McDonnell Douglas framework by requiring a plaintiff to
show that the reason for which she was terminated is
nondiscriminatory before even requiring the defendant to
articulate that reason. This is precisely what the district court
did in this case.
Without considering the “ultimate question” of whether St.
Paul’s premarital sex policy was applied in a discriminatory
way, or whether it was the true reason the school terminated
Cline, there is little doubt that Cline made a prima facie case
showing that she was meeting St. Paul’s legitimate
expectations. “In order to show that [s]he was qualified, [the
plaintiff] must prove that [s]he was performing . . . ‘at a level
which met [her] employer’s legitimate expectations.’”
McDonald, 898 F.2d at 1160 (citation omitted). The evidence
Cline presented of her two-year record of success, and in
particular her positive April 1996 evaluation, is more than
enough to meet this standard. The fact that the school
allowed her to keep teaching for the remainder of the year
further bolsters this showing. She thus successfully made out
a prima facie case.
No. 98-3527 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
11
practical realities of pre-trial and trial structure. “The [McDonnell
Douglas] analysis of burdens describes who wins on various
combinations of evidence and proof. It may or may not also describe the
actual sequence of events at trial. In a bench trial, for example, the parties
may be limited in their presentation of evidence until the court has
decided whether the plaintiff has made his prima facie showing. But the
court also may allow in all the evidence at once.” Id. at 533 n.9 (Souter,
J., dissenting). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has continued to insist
that courts examine evidence as if it is introduced through the three-part
sequence described in McDonnell Douglas, although a district court will
be aware of a defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason before moving
beyond plaintiff’s prima facie stage.
to sharpen the inquiry to a “level of specificity” which best
allows the fact-finder to resolve the “ultimate question”:
whether the plaintiff established by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against her. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983); see Burdine, 450 U.S. at
255 n.8 (“[T]he allocation of burdens and the creation of a
presumption by the establishment of a prima facie case is
intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive
factual question of intentional discrimination.”); Kent County
Sheriff’s Ass’n v. County of Kent, 826 F.2d 1485, 1493 (6th
Cir. 1987). While the discrete stages are meant to facilitate
litigants and courts in reaching and resolving that ultimate
question of discrimination, when misapplied, they tend to
distract courts from the central issue. This is precisely what
happened below.
1. The Prima Facie Case
First, the district court improperly rejected Cline’s prima
facie case. In fact, the court’s analysis of the second prong
improperly precluded Cline from being able to challenge the
policy she claims to be discriminatory. This contravenes the
very purpose for the prima facie stage set out in McDonnell
Douglas and Burdine.

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12 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
No. 98-3527
The prima facie requirement for making a Title VII claim
“is not onerous,” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, and poses “a
burden easily met.” Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 500 (6th
Cir. 1987). The prima facie phase “merely serves to raise a
rebuttable presumption of discrimination by ‘eliminat[ing] the
most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the [employer’s
treatment of the plaintiff].’” Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d
652, 659 (6th Cir. 1999)(quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-
54). It is “only the first stage of proof in a Title VII case,” and
its purpose is simply to “force [a] defendant to proceed with
its case.” EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858,
861-62 (6th Cir. 1997). This division of intermediate
evidentiary burdens is not meant to stymie plaintiffs, but
simply serves to “bring the litigants and the court
expeditiously and fairly to the ultimate question.” Burdine,
450 U.S. at 253.
The district court ignored these precepts when it held that
Cline failed to make a prima facie showing. In addition to
setting a burden far too high, it conflated the distinct stages of
the McDonnell Douglas inquiry by using St. Paul’s
“nondiscriminatory reason” as a predicate for finding Cline to
have failed to make a prima facie case. The court found Cline
“unqualified” under prong two of the prima facie case
because she had not lived up to the promises she made to
“exemplify the moral values taught by the Church.” J.A. at
332. Because her pregnancy due to premarital sex meant that
“she no longer met all the qualifications of her position,” even
strong evidence as to her satisfactory performance (ie., her
evaluations and teaching record) could not overcome these
moral failings. J.A. at 333. This analysis improperly
imported the later stages of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry
into the initial prima facie stage. As discussed infra, St. Paul
alleges that it did not renew Cline’s contract because she
violated its premarital sex policy, which constituted part of
the broader ministerial requirements of being a St. Paul
teacher; conversely, Cline argues that this rebuttal is a pretext
for discrimination. Rather than resolve this debate at the
prima facie stage, McDonnell Douglas requires that the
No. 98-3527 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
21
49; McDonald, 898 F.2d at 1162. Failure at the latter stage is precisely
the result this holding would mandate. This point should alleviate St.
Paul’s underlying concern, exemplified by its driver’s license
hypothetical, that this decision will allow meritless discrimination suits to
clog the federal docket. This is not the case. The approach set forth in
this opinion will dispose of meritless cases as expeditiously as the
approach undertaken by the district court. Plaintiffs who lack evidence
undermining the reason articulated for their termination will falter on
summary judgment after a set amount of discovery—just as before, and
just as in Ang and McDonald.
Under Aikens, Hicks and this Court’s caselaw applying
those decisions, Cline is thus correct when she argues that the
district court wrongly assessed whether she made a sufficient
prima facie showing. The district court compounded this
error when it stated that a plaintiff in Cline’s position could
show she was qualified if she “were able to demonstrate
some basis for a finding that the job qualifications” were
discriminatory. J.A. at 335. In other words, the court would
require plaintiffs to show in their prima facie case that the
reason for which their employer terminated them is itself
discriminatory. This is errant for two related reasons. First,
once a defendant has articulated and proffered evidence that
it terminated a plaintiff because she failed to meet certain
expectations, it has by definition already taken the inquiry
beyond the prima facie stage with respect to that reason.
While the plaintiff must still show that she met her
employer’s legitimate expectations to get beyond the prima
facie stage, her attempts to rebut the defendant’s reason
comprise part of the ultimate factual questionCthe third stage
of McDonnell Douglas. Of course, if she fails to rebut the
defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason, she loses the suit on
that ground—but it is technically incorrect to rule that she
failed at the prima facie stage. Second, forcing plaintiffs to
make such a proof at the prima facie stage defies the very
purpose of the production stage and the overall sequence of
McDonnell Douglas. The burden-shifting analysis of
McDonnell Douglas exists, in part, to resolve “the disparity
in access to information between employee and employer

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20 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
No. 98-3527
8St. Paul argues in its petition for rehearing that our decision
“conflicts with a well-established line of Sixth Circuit precedent.” St.
Paul’s Pet. at 2. We disagree.
This opinion in fact adheres to the fundamental rule of law emerging
from the cases which St. Paul puts forth: that a plaintiff must show that
she was meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations and was
performing to her employer’s satisfaction. See, e.g., Warfield v. Lebanon
Correctional Inst., 181 F.3d 723, 729 (6th Cir. 1999); Ang v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540, 548 (6th Cir. 1991); McDonald , 898 F.2d at
1160. It also adheres to the long line of cases properly applying the rule
from Aikens. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d at 860;
Brownlow, 867 F.2d at 963; Fields v. Bolger, 723 F.2d 1216, 1219 (6th
Cir. 1984).
We also do not believe that this opinion varies from any firm or
uniformly applied legal principle guiding the determination of whether a
plaintiff has met her employer’s expectations. Indeed, due in part to the
variety of factual situations that arise in discrimination cases, circuit
panels appear to have utilized approaches which are at odds. Compare,
e.g., Ang, 932 F.3d at 548-49; and McDonald, 898 F.2d at 1159-60, with
Barnett, 153 F.3d at 341 (treating failure to pass a basic test as the
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff’s termination, rather
than a factor making her unqualified); Danielson, 938 F.2d at 683
(treating “poor work performance” as the legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason, and not as a prima facie factor); and Mills, 800 F.2d at 638-39
(considering unsatisfactory ratings as defendant’s “production,” and not
at prima facie stage). This opinion is thus an effort to add clarity and
consistency to what has been an inconsistent approach to assessing the
legitimate expectations standard. It does so by faithfully applying the
logic from cases that preceded the divergence in those approaches, in
addition to clear and binding Supreme Court caselaw.
Finally, not only does this case adhere to the underlying legal
standard espoused in cases such as Ang and McDonald, but the more fine-
tuned approach we have put forth would change neither the outcome nor
the economy of such cases. Plaintiffs in those cases lost at both the first
and third stages of McDonnell Douglas inquiry. See Ang, 932 F.2d 548-
precedent dictate that the district court reserve for the rebuttal
stage its assessment of the justification St. Paul “produced” to
explain its decision not to renew Cline. Here, the court has
improperly applied that justification to defeat Cline at the
prima facie stage.8
No. 98-3527 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
13
district court consider this dispute at the inquiry’s third stage,
when its role is to decide the “ultimate question” of
discrimination. In other words, when assessing whether a
plaintiff has met her employer’s legitimate expectations at the
prima facie stage of a termination case, a court must examine
plaintiff’s evidence independent of the nondiscriminatory
reason “produced” by the defense as its reason for terminating
plaintiff. The district court clearly failed to do this,
improperly conflating the distinct stages of the McDonnell
Douglas inquiry.
While St. Paul argued in its petition for rehearing that this
requirement defies Circuit law, we believe that this approach
not only comports with circuit caselaw, but is the only one
that remains faithful to the purpose and structure of
McDonnell Douglas. Aikens best illuminates this point.
Aikens reminds us that once a defendant “responds to the
plaintiff’s proof by offering evidence of the reason for the
plaintiff’s rejection,” whether or not the plaintiff made out a
prima facie case “is no longer relevant.” 460 U.S. at 714; see
Avery Dennison, 104 F.3d at 860-63. Rather, by producing
evidence of its nondiscriminatory reason, a defendant has
moved the inquiry to the ultimate factual question of whether
its action against the plaintiff was discriminatory or not, and
plaintiff thereafter enjoys the opportunity to rebut that reason
and show discrimination. At this point, a district court cannot
resolve the case by returning to the prima facie stage. See
Aikens, 460 U.S. at 717; Avery Dennison, 104 F.3d at 862-63.
To do so would mistakenly “apply[] legal rules which were
devised to govern ‘the basic allocation of burdens and order
of presentation of proof’ in deciding this ultimate question.”
Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252).
This circuit has long recognized the importance of Aikens in
structuring appellate and district court review of
discrimination decisions. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp.,
104 F.3d at 860; Brownlow v. Edgecomb Metals Co., 867
F.2d 960, 963 (6th Cir. 1989); Simpson v. Midland-Ross
Corp., 823 F.2d 937, 942 (6th Cir. 1987); Fields v. Bolger,
723 F.2d 1216, 1219 (6th Cir. 1984).

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14 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
No. 98-3527
This case simply requires that the rule from Aikens be
applied in the pre-trial context. On a motion for summary
judgment, a district court considers whether there is sufficient
evidence to create a genuine dispute at each stage of the
McDonnell Douglas inquiry. The court first determines if a
plaintiff has put forth sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury
to find her to have met the prima facie requirements,
including whether she has met the legitimate expectations of
her employer. It performs the same function with respect to
defendant’s production of evidence, and again for the
plaintiff’s response to that production. For the same reason
that it is inappropriate under Aikens for the district court to
revisit the prima facie stage using defendant’s evidence of its
nondiscriminatory reason, it is equally inappropriate for the
district court in the pre-trial stage to rely on the
nondiscriminatory reason for termination to find plaintiff’s
prima facie case inadequate. This is true even if that
“production” evidence happens to show that, in the
employer’s view, the plaintiff was not meeting its legitimate
expectations for the position at issue. Aikens instead
mandates that at least with respect to the employer’s proffered
nondiscriminatory reason, the prima facie case is no longer
relevant—it has “dropped out” of the inquiry. The plaintiff
thus enjoys the full opportunity to show that reason to be
pretextual as part of the third stage of McDonnell Douglas.
While a plaintiff may very well lose on summary judgment
because she fails to proffer evidence on that “ultimate issue,”
a court misapplies the structure of McDonnell Douglas by
holding that she fails at the prima facie stage due to
defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason.
We need look no further than some of the most important
Supreme Court cases in this area Cscrutinizing not only what
the Court said, but the trials which it reviewedCto see that
this position is the only logical application of the McDonnell
Douglas test. In Aikens, the district court noted Aikens’s
general qualifications and positive employer reviews to
conclude initially that Aikens had made out a prima facie
case. See 460 U.S. at 713 n.2 & 714 n.4. At trial, the defense
No. 98-3527 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
19
for plaintiff’s termination, rather than a factor making her
unqualified); Danielson v. City of Lorain, 938 F.2d 681, 683
(6th Cir. 1991) (treating “poor work performance” as the
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, and not as a prima facie
factor); Mills v. Ford Motor Co., 800 F.2d 635, 638-39 (6th
Cir. 1986) (considering unsatisfactory ratings as defendant’s
“production,” and not at prima facie stage); McRory v. Kraft
Food Ingredients, 98 F.3d 1342, 1996 WL 571146 at *4 (6th
Cir. 1996) (unpublished) (looking only at a plaintiff’s
successful work record prior to the onset of poor work
performance to find the prima facie stage satisfied, worried
that otherwise, “most plaintiffs in discrimination cases will be
barred from pursuing their claims before ever getting to the
employer’s conduct”); Thompson v. Union Carbide Corp.,
815 F.2d 706, 1987 WL 36807, at *3-*4 (6th Cir. 1987)
(unpublished) (affirming decision by district court to move to
the “ultimate issue” once defendant offered evidence of
reasons for termination, rather than scrutinizing the prima
facie stage); Wilson v. Advance Mortgage Corp., 798 F.2d
1417, 1986 WL 17234 at *3 (6th Cir. 1986)
(unpublished)(castigating a district court’s prima facie
requirement that a plaintiff rebut the “causes” for her
demotion as invalid because it required her “to prove her
entire case at the first stage” and because the company’s
justifications “are of the type generally considered in the
second stage of the Title VII inquiry”).
Unsurprisingly, precedent within the pregnancy
discrimination context also stands against St. Paul.
Consistent with the analysis above, the legal battles in cases
like this have largely been waged at the rebuttal phase, not the
prima facie phase. In Boyd, the teacher’s qualification for the
job was simply not a contested issue even though she violated
the school’s extramarital sex policy. See 88 F.3d at 413. In
Ganzy, the district court held plainly that the plaintiff was
“qualified for the position she held and was satisfactorily
performing her job” even though she had engaged in
premarital sex in violation of the school’s religious principles.
Ganzy, 995 F. Supp. at 359. In sum, both logic and

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18 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
No. 98-3527
rebutting plaintiff’s prima facie case belong in the later stages of
McDonnell Douglas, and relying on plaintiff’s evidence alone to find the
prima facie case satisfied); Yarborough v. Tower Oldsmobile, Inc., 789
F.2d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that defendant’s argument that
plaintiff refused a job assignment and thus failed to meet its legitimate
expectations was not “appropriately brought as a challenge to the
sufficiency of [the] prima facie case,” and considering only plaintiff’s
testimony to find a prima facie case to be made); Davenport v. Riverview
Gardens Sch. Dist., 30 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir. 1994)(disapproving of
district court’s prima facie analysis because it “required plaintiff, at the
outset, to disprove defendant’s alleged business reasons for its adverse
employment actionCin other words, to prove pretext and the ultimate
issue of intentional discrimination”); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528,
533 (9th Cir. 1981) (considering a defendant’s evidence of unsatisfactory
job performance as its production, and not at the prima facie stage);
Thomas v. Denny’s, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1510 (10th Cir. 1997) (troubled
that “[i]f at the prima facie stage the factfinder credits the reasons offered
by the defendant for the failure to be promoted, the jury is not required to
even consider the plaintiff’s evidence on the critical issue of pretext”); id.
(“[R]elying on a defendant’s reasons for the adverse action as a basis for
ruling against a plaintiff at the prima facie stage raises serious problems
under the McDonnell Douglas framework . . . .”); Kenworthy v. Conoco,
Inc., 979 F.2d 1462, 1469-70 (10th Cir. 1992)(stating that district court’s
ruling that the plaintiffs do not establish a prima facie case based on the
employer’s reasons for their discharge raises “serious problems under the
McDonnell Douglas analysis” and “short-circuit[s] the analysis at the
prima facie stage” before allowing plaintiff to show that proffered reason
to be pretextual); Rosenfield v. Wellington Leisure Products, Inc., 827
F.2d 1493, 1495 n.2 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating that “any disagreement
between parties regarding whether a particular plaintiff was adequately
performing his job” belongs at the later stages of McDonnell Douglas)
(11th Cir. 1987); Paquin v. Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 119 F.3d 23,
27 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (looking at plaintiff’s evidence, including her “twenty
year tenure” and “series of promotions,” prior to negative performance
evaluations proffered by defendant to find plaintiff to surpass the prima
facie stage).
Finally, Circuit caselaw has long recognized the logic of
Aikens, utilizing the careful analysis we articulate in this case
rather than conflating the distinct stages of McDonnell
Douglas. See, e.g., Barnett v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 153 F.3d 338, 341-42 (6th Cir. 1998) (treating failure
to pass a basic test as the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
No. 98-3527 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
15
argued that Aikens had not been promoted because he failed
to accept several lateral transfers which would have
broadened his Postal Service experience. See id. at 715.
Ultimately, the district court ruled against Aikens for having
failed to make out his prima facie case, see id. at 716, finding
him unqualified due to the Postal Service’s explanation. See
Aikens v. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors, 642
F.2d 514, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1980). While the D.C. Circuit found
this reliance on the Postal Service’s evidence unconvincing as
a matter of fact, see id. at 518, the Supreme Court made clear
that both courts’ analyses were more deeply flawed because
they used the defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason to assess
whether the plaintiff met his prima facie case. Given
defendant’s production, the court was “in a position to decide
the ultimate factual issue in the case,” and should have done
so. 460 U.S. at 715. The Supreme Court remanded the case
to the district court, adding: “Of course, the plaintiff must
have an adequate ‘opportunity to demonstrate that the
proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment
decision.’” Id. at 716 n.5 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
Except for the fact that Cline’s suit was decided at the pre-
trial stage, the district court’s error in Aikens—relying on the
nondiscriminatory reason produced by the Postal Board to
rule against Aikens at the prima facie stage—is identical to
the district court’s in this case. Indeed, just as St. Paul’s
argument here, the defendant’s argument in Aikens was
essentially that Aikens was not qualified, yet the Supreme
Court reprimanded the district court for considering that
argument as bearing on the prima facie proof. Defendant’s
argument should instead have been treated as its production
of a nondiscriminatory reason, enabling the fact-finder to
proceed to the ultimate question of whether the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. See id. at
715. To assess this evidence at the prima facie stage is to
misapply legal rules governing the allocation of burdens and
order of proof to the determination of “the ultimate question.”
Id. at 716.

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16 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
No. 98-3527
The Hicks decision confirms the logic of Aikens and applies
it to the termination context. In that case, after a number of
years of successful employment which included a promotion,
St. Mary’s fired Hicks following a series of disciplinary
actions and a demotion. See 509 U.S. at 504-05. The district
court nevertheless found him “qualified” for prima facie
purposes by looking only at the evidence of Hicks’s
employment record prior to the events that spurred his
demotion and consequent termination. See Hicks v. St.
Mary’s Honor Ctr., 756 F.Supp. 1244, 1249 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
In other words, the court did not consider Hicks’s alleged
violation of various rules as part of the prima facie case (even
though they arguably showed that he was not “qualified,” just
as Cline’s violation of an essential rule allegedly deemed her
“unqualified” in St. Paul’s eyes), but properly reserved its
consideration of those alleged violations until the production
stage. At that point, the Hicks Court emphasized, the prima
facie inquiry “drops from the case” and the plaintiff once
again has the “full and fair opportunity to demonstrate” that
he has been the victim of intentional discrimination. 509 U.S.
at 507. Although the Court reversed the court of appeals on
the question of whether Hicks met that ultimate burden, the
structure of the Hicks trial reflects the logic of Aikens in the
termination context: that whether or not a plaintiff makes a
prima facie case must be ascertained by weighing the
plaintiff’s evidence that she was meeting her employer’s
legitimate expectations, not by considering the
nondiscriminatory reasons produced by the defendant as its
reason for terminating her. Moreover, the Hicks trial shows
that in the termination context, this determination will often
involve assessing whether the plaintiff was meeting the
employer’s expectations prior to the onset of the events that
the employer cites as its reason for the termination, because
weighing the litigants’ evidence on the veracity and propriety
No. 98-3527 Cline v. Catholic Diocese
of Toledo, et al.
17
7The Hicks trial in particular displays how best to assess the
hypothetical posed by St. Paul in its petition for rehearing: that of the
truck driver who has lost her license. Clearly, St. Paul argues, such a
driver should automatically lose under the “legitimate expectations” prong
of the prima facie case. Despite the surface-level appeal of this
hypothetical, we believe Hicks requires more than a summary conclusion
that an employee was unqualified for the reason offered by a defendant,
no matter how purportedly objective and neutral that reason might seem.
Rather, as in Hicks, we should look instead at whether an employee met
her employer’s legitimate expectations prior to the event(s) that sparked
the termination, even if the event is as seemingly objective as losing one’s
license or violating clear rules, as in Hicks. Whether she makes her prima
facie case depends on whether she can make this showing.
Meanwhile, as in Hicks, the reason proffered by defendant for its
termination of a driver (ie., that she lost her license) would by definition
constitute the defendant’s “production,” which entitles plaintiff the
opportunity for a full evidentiary rebuttal of that articulated reason.
Regarding that issue, a court will thus have reached the ultimate factual
question: did her employer fire her because she lost her license, or due to
her gender? Perhaps the plaintiff can now put forth evidence that the
license justification was merely a pretext for discrimination; for example,
perhaps her employer had only suspended men who lost their licenses
until they received new licenses; or perhaps she never had a license and
always received positive evaluations anyway, but once she became
pregnant, she was fired for not having her license. On the other hand, if
the company uniformly fires all its employees the moment they lose their
licenses, she will likely have no evidence to show discrimination, and will
therefore lose on summary judgment. But again, because her lack of a
license comprises defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason for firing her, she
can not lose at the prima facie stage on that ground, even though she
would lose on summary judgment anyway barring evidence showing
discrimination.
Panels from most other circuits have recognized this insight, and have
distinguished between the prima facie and later stages of McDonnell
Douglas accordingly. See, e.g., Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d
1331, 1335-36 (1st Cir. 1988)(looking only at plaintiff’s evidence that he
was qualified for prima facie purposes, and considering defendant’s
evidence to the contrary at the rebuttal stage); Siegel v. Alpha Wire Corp.,
894 F.2d 50, 54 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that defendant’s arguments
of that nondiscriminatory explanation comprises the “ultimate
issue” of the case.7

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