Latana Slayton v. Ohio Department of Youth Services

1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0091P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 00a0091p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
LATANA S LAYTON ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
OHIO DEPARTMENT OF
YOUTH S ERVICES,
Defendant-Appellant.
;>

1
No. 98-4528
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Akron.
No. 97-01742—David D. Dowd, Jr., District Judge.
Argued: January 28, 1900
Decided and Filed: March 14, 2000
Before: JONES, NORRIS, and SILER, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Noelle T. Tsevdos, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL EMPLOYMENT LAW SECTION,
Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Edward L. Gilbert, Akron,
Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Noelle T. Tsevdos, Joseph
D. Rubino, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

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2 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. No. 98-4528
EMPLOYMENT LAW SECTION, Columbus, Ohio, for
Appellant. Edward L. Gilbert, Akron, Ohio, for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellee
Latana Slayton sued Defendant-Appellant Ohio Department
of Youth Services (“DYS”), asserting that it violated her right
to be free from gender discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (West 1999).
Slayton claimed inter alia that DYS maintained a sexually
hostile work environment and that it terminated her because
of her gender. After trial, the jury returned a $125,000
judgment for Slayton on the hostile environment claim, but
ruled in DYS’ favor on the gender discrimination claim. DYS
then moved for a new trial, or, in the alternative, remittitur.
The district court denied these motions, and DYS now
appeals. We agree with the district court’s judgment and
AFFIRM it in all respects.
I.
On December 26, 1995, DYS hired Slayton to work as a
juvenile corrections officer at the Indian River School
(“IRS”), a maximum security institution for young, male
lawbreakers. IRS housed young people who had committed
a wide range of serious felony offenses, including homicide.
Slayton was aware of the environment in which she would be
working, and accepted the job with full knowledge that it
entailed continuous interaction with criminal offenders.
Slayton’s position required that she complete a
probationary period before graduating to regular status. In
early January 1996, Slayton began a several week training
period in which she learned various IRS procedures, including
its directives on the limited use of physical force against
inmates. After this training period, Slayton was assigned to
the “E-Unit.” Because of Slayton’s limited seniority,
No. 98-4528 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. 15
York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989)
(holding that a hostile environment deprived victim of “a fair
and equal opportunity . . . to succeed at her position”).
Indeed, given Slayton’s work environment, the district court
found that she was “programmed for failure.” J.A. at 110.
Without evidence that Slayton’s reinstatement would unduly
displace an innocent third party or result in unnecessary
hostility, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its
discretion in ordering reinstatement.
III.
Because we do not find error in any of the district court’s
holdings, we AFFIRM its judgment.

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14 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. No. 98-4528
adduced evidence), DYS has not demonstrated that the award
and underlying facts are so incongruous to shock the
conscience, fall outside the bounds supportable by proof, or
suggest mistake. Accordingly, we hold that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying DYS’ remittitur
motion.
E.
Finally, DYS challenges the district court’s grant of
Slayton’s reinstatement motion. We review the reinstatement
grant for an abuse of discretion. See Hudson v. Reno, 130
F.3d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1997). It is well-established that
reinstatement is an appropriate equitable remedy for Title VII
violations. Id. Indeed, reinstatement is “the presumptively
favored equitable remedy.” Roush v. KFC Nat’l.
Management Co., 10 F.3d 392, 398 (6th Cir. 1993).
However, this presumption may be negated where
reinstatement requires the displacement of an uninvolved
third party, where hostility would result, or where the plaintiff
has found other work. See id.; see also Hudson, 130 F.3d at
1202. Additionally, reinstatement may be inappropriate when
an employer is genuinely dissatisfied with a plaintiff’s actual
job performance. See Hudson, 130 F.3d at 1202; McKnight
v. General Motors Corp., 973 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir.
1992).
DYS argues that because the jury ruled against Slayton on
her gender discrimination claim – thereby finding that she
was not terminated because of gender – the district court
improperly granted reinstatement. However, the jury
explicitly found in an interrogatory that the hostile
environment adversely affected Slayton’s job performance.
Additionally, a hostile environment finding necessarily
recognizes that “sufficiently abusive harassment adversely
affects a ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of employment.”
Yeary v. Goodwill Industries-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443,
445 (6th Cir. 1997). Thus, reinstatement is an appropriate
remedy when a hostile environment prevented an employee
from adequately performing her job. See Carrero v. New
No. 98-4528 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. 3
however, she was often re-assigned to other units. When on
E-unit, Slayton worked alongside Corry Appline, a male
fellow corrections officer. Initially, Slayton had a “working
relationship” with Appline. However, in late February and
early March, Slayton’s professional relationship with Appline
degenerated. Slayton contended that Appline began “horse
playing” and “wrestling around” with the inmates. Appline
supplied the inmates with snacks, magazines, and sexually-
explicit CDs. Slayton further testified that Appline began
playing, often for the duration of an entire shift, lewd music
that featured lyrics including “f**k the bi**h” and “me and
my bi**h.”
Additionally, Appline played music videotapes for the
inmates. In Slayton’s view, these videos depicted an array of
sexually provocative conduct, including risque “grinding” and
simulated erotic acts. Moreover, Appline often led the
inmates in performing dances to the videos. During these
dances, performed in front of both Slayton and the inmates,
Appline touched his “private parts,” his head, his chest, and
“in between his leg[s].” J.A. at 229. Slayton testified that she
approached Appline more than twenty times about his
behavior, and that he merely replied “too bad.” Slayton
further asserted that, sometime in March 1996, she reported
this behavior to her immediate supervisor, Rose Davidson.
Slayton also alleged that Appline’s inappropriate conduct
extended to other areas as well. She asserted that he
encouraged the youth to drop their towels when she was on
shower duty. While she does not contend that he directly
instigated such activity, she does state that Appline joked with
the kids about this behavior. According to Slayton, Appline
laughed even more boisterously when inmates dropped their
towels while their penises were erect. Along these same
lines, Slayton also alleged that, on one occasion, Appline
intentionally sent her to check on an inmate who he knew was
masturbating. Slayton believes that Appline intentionally sent
her to find the inmate in that activity because Appline was
already laughing in her direction by the time she exited the
inmate’s cell. Finally, on another occasion, Slayton contends

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4 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. No. 98-4528
that in response to an inmate’s question as to why Slayton
was so mean, Appline responded, “maybe she’s on her
period[;] I don’t know what her problem is.” J.A. at 249.
In Slayton’s eyes, the inmates became increasingly hostile
towards her because of Appline’s conduct. The inmates
began referring to Slayton in a variety of derogatory terms,
including “ho ass b**ch” and “skinny[] chicken head.”
Indeed, Slayton contended that Appline directly undermined
her ability to perform her job by informing the inmates:
“[D]on’t worry about that b**ch; she’s not going to be here
that much longer; she’s going to be fired.” J.A. at 243.
After her futile attempts to seek redress from supervisor
Davidson, Slayton contends that she spoke with a number of
other INS supervisors, including Kirk Braithwaite, the unit
administrator, and Linda Bess, the contemporaneous
superintendent of IRS. Slayton testified that she began
informing Braithwaite of this behavior in March 1996, and
that he stated that he would “check into” Appline’s behavior.
While Braithwaite could not recall meeting with Slayton in
March, his notes indicated that by May 1996, he was aware of
Slayton’s concerns with Appline’s behavior. Despite
Slayton’s direct entreaties, Braithwaite did not promptly
report Appline’s conduct to anyone or further investigate
Slayton’s claims. Slayton’s contacts with Bess met a similar
fate, as Bess merely stated that she would “look into” the
situation.
On March 15, 1996, around the same time that Appline’s
conduct intensified, Slayton allegedly slapped an inmate who
shouted profanities at her. The DYS inspector’s office
conducted an investigation and issued a report on May 17,
1996. The report found that Slayton had unnecessarily used
physical force, that she had altered her description of the
incident several times, and that she acted negligently in failing
to adequately subdue the inmate. The report recommended
No. 98-4528 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. 13
court should reduce a jury’s verdict only when the judgment
“clearly exceeds” the maximum amount of compensatory
damages a jury could reasonably award. Id. at 156 (citation
omitted). Thus, we may reduce a jury award only if it is 1)
beyond the range supportable by proof, (2) so excessive as to
shock the conscience, or 3) the result of a mistake. Id.
Moreover, the excessiveness of a verdict is primarily a
“matter . . . for the trial court which has had the benefit of
hearing the testimony and of observing the demeanor of the
witnesses.” Wilmington v. J.I. Case Co., 793 F.2d 909, 922
(8th Cir. 1986).
DYS relies heavily on this court’s recent unpublished
opinion in Barna v. City of Cleveland, No. 96-3971, 1998 WL
939884 (6th Cir. Dec. 22, 1998) (unpublished opinion). In
Barna, the jury awarded the plaintiff $125,000 after she was
subjected to behavior by a supervisor who asked her to
perform oral sex, bragged about his sexual prowess, made
lewd gestures, called her a “white b**ch,” and stated that the
plaintiff did not “know what it’s like unless [she had] a black
man.” Id. at *1-*2. This Court found the award excessive,
noting that “[w]ithout persuasive proof that the plaintiff
suffered from serious and long lasting symptoms, an award of
$125,000 is disproportionate to the harm actually suffered by
the plaintiff during her three weeks of employment.” Id. at
*5.
Barna, however, is inapposite because the Court expressly
premised its holding on the short, three-week duration of the
harassment. The record here shows Slayton experienced
continuous harassment from Appline for almost fourth
months. These aforementioned incidents, occurring on an
almost daily basis, included incessant references to Slayton as
a “bi*ch,” continuous playing of sexually explicit music and
videos, and intentionally sending Slayton to observe a
masturbating inmate. Even if one might consider the award
generous, see Koster v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d
24, 34 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that remittitur is not
appropriate because the award is “extremely generous,” but is
only allowed when the award is “grossly disproportionate” to

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12 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. No. 98-4528
Robinson, nobly turning the other cheek and remaining
unaffected in the face of constant degradation.” See Torres v.
Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1997). With these
principles in mind, we look to the following factors to guide
this determination: the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening,
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance. Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, No.
98-6117, 2000 WL 38449, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 20, 2000).
We cannot conclude that the district court erred in denying
DYS’ directed verdict motions. Slayton testified, and the jury
may have believed, that Appline continuously called her a
“b**ch,” continuously played sexually explicit rap music and
videos, intentionally sent her to check on an inmate who was
masturbating, contended that her menstrual cycle was the
cause of her problems, and consistently told inmates that they
did not need to worry about her as she was a “bi**h” who
would be fired soon. Slayton further testified that this
conduct began in early March 1996 and continued for four
months until her June 20 termination. Moreover, DYS
personnel were well aware of Appline’s conduct, but
nevertheless failed to take any action. Because of the severity
and duration of this activity, we conclude that the jury could
have reasonably found that Slayton experienced a work
environment that a reasonable woman would find hostile. See
Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636-37 (6th Cir. 1987);
see also Pisano, 116 F.3d at 631-32 (holding that plaintiff’s
claims that supervisor continuously referred to her in sexually
derogatory terms raised jury issue on hostile environment
claim). Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying
the directed verdict motions.
D.
DYS additionally asserts that the district court erred in
denying its motion for remittitur. We review the denial of
remittitur for an abuse of discretion. See Bickel v. Korean Air
Lines Co., 96 F.3d 151, 156 (6th Cir. 1996). The district
No. 98-4528 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. 5
1The district court noted that it “listened carefully to the testimony of
the investigating officer and was unimpressed with the conduct and
fairness of that investigation.” J.A. at 110.
that DYS take “appropriate administrative action” in response
to this incident.1
On June 20, 1996, DYS terminated Slayton on the
purported basis that she inappropriately used physical force
during the March 15 incident. Slayton responded by filing an
administrative complaint with DYS, alleging that she had
been sexually harassed throughout her employment. When
those efforts failed to bear fruit, Slayton filed her Title VII
complaint in federal court. Slayton alleged inter alia that
DYS fired her because of her gender and that it maintained a
hostile work environment. The district court granted DYS
partial summary judgment on a claim not raised on appeal,
but denied summary judgment on Slayton’s discrimination
and hostile environment claims. During trial, DYS moved for
directed verdicts at the close of each side’s case, asserting that
Slayton’s allegations supported neither a discrimination nor
hostile environment finding. The district court denied these
motions, and the jury returned a $125,000 verdict for Slayton
on her hostile work environment claim, but ruled in DYS’
favor on her gender discrimination claim.
DYS then moved for a new trial, or remittitur in the
alternative, contending principally that the district court
improperly allowed lay opinion testimony, and that it should
not be liable under Title VII when a hostile work environment
is created by inmate conduct. Slayton simultaneously moved
for reinstatement to her position at IRS. The district court
denied a new trial and remittitur, and granted Slayton’s
motion for reinstatement. In granting reinstatement, the
district court noted that although the jury found that DYS had
not terminated Slayton on the basis of gender, it nevertheless
found – in an interrogatory – that the sexually hostile
environment adversely affected her performance. On appeal,
DYS challenges the district court’s denial of its directed
verdict motions, the denial of its new trial motion, and the

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6 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. No. 98-4528
denial of remittitur. DYS also appeals the grant of Slayton’s
reinstatement motion
II.
A.
The denial of a new trial motion “should be reversed only
on the showing of an abuse of discretion.” Cathey v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1573 (6th Cir. 1985);
see also United States v. Fullerton, 187 F.3d 587, 592 (6th
Cir. 1999). DYS contends that the district court improperly
allowed Braithwaite and Bess to offer lay opinion testimony
on whether Appline’s conduct violated its internal sexual
harassment policy. DYS cites a portion of Braithwaite’s
testimony where he was questioned on a letter he wrote
concerning “possible sexual harassment” against Slayton.
Additionally, DYS contends that the district court itself
elicited improper lay testimony from Bess. Slayton’s counsel
asked Bess, “if indeed Mr. Appline had brought in CDs that
refer to women as bi**hes and f*ck the bit**es, words to that
effect, did you feel or do you feel that’s a violation of the
sexual harassment policy?” J.A. at 366. Bess stated that
such conduct is “a violation of rules” and “offensive.”
Bess then stated that DYS would employ a third party to
investigate the claims. At that point, the district court asked
Bess to presume that the allegations had been established, and
to consider whether an investigator would be necessary. After
Bess twice reiterated the presumption that the court wanted
her to draw, the court emphasized:
Well, it’s been determined now. Hypothesize that the
plaintiff’s testimony is true. In your view does that
constitute under the terms of your policy, the state’s
policy, does that constitute sexual harassment in the
workplace?
J.A. at 368. Bess replied, “[a]ccording to our policy, yes; it
would be.” Id. After the district court’s exchange with Bess,
it instructed the jury that its “instructions [were] coming,” that
No. 98-4528 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. 11
inmates”). Indeed, where, as here, prison personnel
intentionally manipulate non-agents in ways that create a
discriminatory environment, and prison supervisors fail to
take steps to remedy known discrimination, the resulting
discrimination is properly attributable to the prison.
C.
DYS also appeals the denials of its directed verdict
motions, contending that Slayton’s allegations fail to establish
an objective hostile working environment under Title VII.
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a directed
verdict. See Snyder v. Ag Trucking, Inc., 57 F.3d 484, 490
(6th Cir. 1995). A directed verdict should be granted only if
“there is either a complete absence of proof on the issues or
no controverted issues of fact upon which reasonable persons
could differ.” Aparicio v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 84 F.3d 803,
806-07 (6th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
A plaintiff establishes a hostile work environment “[w]hen
the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an
abusive working environment.” Williams v. General Motors
Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 560 (6th Cir. 1999). A complainant
must establish that the working environment is both
subjectively and objectively hostile to satisfy this
requirement. Id. at 560-61.
To establish an objectively hostile environment, one must
establish that a “reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position,
considering all the circumstances” would find the
environment hostile. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc., 118 S.Ct. 998, 1003 (1998) (citation and internal
quotation omitted). Accordingly, “‘simple teasing,’ offhand
comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)
will not amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and
conditions of employment.’” Faragher, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 2283
(1998) (internal citation omitted). While a plaintiff must
make a substantial showing to establish a hostile
environment, “[h]arassed employees do not have to be Jackie

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10 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. No. 98-4528
inmates – people who have been deemed unsuited to live in
normal society.”).
However, this general rule against prison liability for
inmate conduct does not apply when the institution fails to
take appropriate steps to remedy or prevent illegal inmate
behavior. See Waymire v. Harris County, Tex., 86 F.3d 424,
428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that because prison took
prompt remedial action, jailer did not establish a hostile
environment where a fellow jailer circulated a sexually
offensive inmate drawing); Powell, 37 F.Supp.2d at 1017
(holding that prisons may be liable for sexual harassment
where they fail to take “proper preventive and remedial steps
with regard to inmate behavior”); Hicks v. Alabama, 45
F.Supp.2d 921, 933 (S.D. Ala. 1998) (holding that a prison
was not liable under Title VII for hostile work environment
when inmates engaged in sexually-explicit behavior, no
prison employees engaged in harassment, and no other
remedial avenues were available). Similarly, no authority
suggests that there is an absolute bar to Title VII liability
when prison personnel encourage or instigate illegal inmate
behavior. Cf. L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 122 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that where prison “independently created the
opportunity for and facilitated” an inmate’s assault of a prison
employee, it was subject to § 1983 liability).
In this case, we initially note that Slayton did not merely
allege that inmate conduct created a hostile environment. The
record principally supports a finding that Appline himself,
with the tacit approval of the prison, engaged in conduct that
created a hostile environment. The record shows that Appline
continuously played misogynistic rap music, referred
derogatorily to Slayton’s menstrual cycle, repeatedly called
her a “bi**h,” displayed sexually-explicit music videos, and
performed erotic dances in plain view. Moreover, while
inmate conduct is involved in a number of Slayton’s other
allegations of harassment, it is clear that Appline encouraged,
endorsed, and even instigated the inmates’ harassing conduct.
Cf. Hicks, 45 F.Supp.2d at 932 (in holding for prison, noting
that “[t]he offensive behavior is alleged only to be that of the
No. 98-4528 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. 7
it should not prematurely evaluate the evidence, and that even
if the jury concluded that “an action constitutes quote sexual
harassment [, it] does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff
wins.” J.A. at 368-369. DYS contends that the above
exchange, including the Braithwaite testimony, “irreparably
damaged” its ability to defend itself against Slayton’s suit.
Specifically, DYS avers that this purported lay opinion
testimony embraced a primary issue to be decided by the jury,
and that the court’s questioning of Bess constituted
impermissible vouching for the credibility of Slayton’s
claims.
We are not convinced by DYS’ claims. First, the district
court clearly did not vouch for the credibility of Slayton’s
claims. The court merely, and explicitly, asked Bess to
“hypothesize” that Slayton’s allegations were true and to offer
her conclusion on whether that conduct constituted “sexual
harassment” under department policy. By stating “what if it’s
established . . .” and “hypothesize,” the district court patently
asked Bess to respond to a hypothetical, and certainly was not
vouching for the verity of Slayton’s claims. Further, the
district court’s instruction re-emphasized that the jury should
not draw any premature inferences.
DYS’ evidentiary claim on the admission of Bess’ and
Braithwaite’s testimony on “sexual harassment” under
department policy presents a closer question. Courts should
generally exclude inquiries that ask non-expert witnesses to
pontificate upon legal questions. Torres v. County of
Oakland, 758 F.2d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1985); see Mitroff v.
Xomox Corp., 797 F.2d 271, 276 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding, in
ADEA action, that lay testimony was improper when witness
testified that defendants were engaged in a “pattern of [age]
discrimination”). Indeed the Mitroff court noted that while
lay opinion testimony embracing an ultimate issue is
specifically allowed by Fed.R.Evid. 704, it “seldom will be
the case when a lay opinion on an ultimate issue will meet the
test of being helpful to the trier of fact since the jury’s opinion
is as good as the witness’ and the witness turns into little
more than an ‘oath helper.’” Mitroff, 797 F.2d at 276.

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8 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. No. 98-4528
This case is distinct from the Torres/Mitroff line of cases
because, here, the internal policy clearly formed the predicate
of both Bess’ and Braithwaite’s testimony. The pertinent
portions of Bess’ testimony deal exclusively with her opinions
on the applicability of internal policy to Appline’s conduct.
At no point did the district court or counsel refer to Title VII
liability or standards during this questioning. Braithwaite’s
letter clearly and expressly addressed internal DYS policy,
and even when Bess assented to the district court’s query on
whether Appline’s conduct, if true, would have violated DYS
policy, she replied: “[a]ccording to our policy. . . it would
be.” J.A. at 368 (emphasis added). Thus, the testimony did
not, in fact, embrace an ultimate issue.
There remains, however, a question on the extent to which
the jury might have been confused concerning the interplay of
liability under internal policy and Title VII. Even when lay
opinion testimony does not technically implicate ultimate
legal issues, a district court may properly exclude testimony
if “terms used by the witness have a separate, distinct and
specialized meaning in the law different from that present in
the vernacular.” United States v. Sheffey, 57 F.3d 1419, 1426
(6th Cir. 1995). In this regard, we have concluded that a
district court abuses its discretion when it “allows a witness
to define legal terms, especially terms that carry a
considerable amount of legal baggage.” Woods v. Lecureux,
110 F.3d 1215, 1220 (6th Cir. 1997).
Therefore, a district court should not presume that a jury of
laypersons is well-versed on the distinct legal meanings of
“sexual harassment” under an agency’s policy and “sexual
harassment” under Title VII. Without a specific instruction
that policy liability does not equal statutory liability, juries
might improperly and prematurely presume guilt. While the
district court here did not provide a specific instruction on the
distinctions between policy and statutory liability, the district
court did immediately instruct the jury to refrain from
prematurely evaluating the evidence, or presuming guilt if it
found that Slayton established “harassment.” It further
ordered the jury to await its precise liability instructions
No. 98-4528 Slayton v.Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs. 9
before assessing the credibility of Slayton’s claims. Thus, to
the extent this testimony might have improperly confused the
jury, the district court’s instructions cured any potential
prejudice.
Moreover, Bess’ and Braithwaite’s brief testimony on this
issue was not so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. A
“[r]eversal based on improper admission of evidence is
appropriate only when the admission interfere[s] with
substantial justice.” Morganroth & Morganroth v. DeLorean,
123 F.3d 374, 382 (6th Cir. 1997). See Fed.R.Evid. 103(a).
Both Bess’ testimony and Braithwaite’s letter were extremely
brief evidentiary elements in the three-day trial, and Slayton
introduced wide-ranging evidence that DYS allowed Appline
to create a hostile work environment. Even if arguendo the
district court improperly admitted lay opinion testimony, DYS
has not shown that it was prejudiced.
B.
DYS also argues that it cannot be held liable for a hostile
work environment created by prison inmates. Although there
is scant appellate case law on this question, it is beyond doubt
that inmate conduct, without more, is an insufficient predicate
for a hostile environment claim. See, e.g., Maine v.
Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections, No. 97-6027, 1997 WL
602688, at *2 (10th Cir. 1997) (unpublished opinion) (holding
that inmate conduct per se is not attributable to a prison);
Powell v. Morris, 37 F.Supp.2d 1011, 1017 (S.D. Ohio 1999)
(noting that correctional employees assume attendant risks,
including lewd, sexual behavior by inmates). Prisoners, by
definition, have breached prevailing societal norms in
fundamentally corrosive ways. By choosing to work in a
prison, corrections personnel have acknowledged and
accepted the probability that they will face inappropriate and
socially deviant behavior. See Powell, 37 F.Supp.2d at 1017
(“[A]nyone who works at a prison . . . must expect some off-
color interactions. . . . It is absurd to expect that a prison can
actually stop all obscene comments and conduct from its

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