Wyandot , Inc v. Local 227, United Food and Commercial Workers Union

16 Wyandot, Inc. v. Local 227 No. 99-5013
argument does not relate to how or why the enforcement of
the Archer Award would impact the outcome of this case.
Thus, the district court properly determined that the Union’s
counterclaim to have the Archer Award enforced is moot.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of
the district court.
*The Honorable James G. Carr, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0085P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 00a0085p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
W YANDOT , INC.,
Plaintiff/
Counter-Defendant-Appellee,
v.
LOCAL 227, UNITED FOOD
AND C OMMERCIAL W ORKERS
UNION ,
Defendant/
Counter-Plaintiff-Appellant.
;>

1
No. 99-5013
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.
No. 97-00785—John G. Heyburn II, District Judge.
Argued: December 7, 1999
Decided and Filed: March 9, 2000
Before: COLE and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; CARR,
District Judge.*

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2 Wyandot, Inc. v. Local 227 No. 99-5013
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Jonathan D. Karmel, KARMEL & GILDEN,
Chicago, Illinois, for Appellant. David B. Sandler,
GREENEBAUM, DOLL & McDONALD, Louisville,
Kentucky, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jonathan D. Karmel,
KARMEL & GILDEN, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellant.
David B. Sandler, GREENEBAUM, DOLL & McDONALD,
Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
JAMES G. CARR, District Judge. This is an appeal from
a labor arbitration. Wyandot, Inc. (the “Company”) filed suit
in the district court to vacate the arbitration award of
Arbitrator Fred Witney (the “Witney Award”), which
reinstated discharged union member, Sue Pollard. United
Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 227, (the
“Union”) counterclaimed to enforce the Witney Award and
also to enforce the arbitration award of Arbitrator Edward
Archer (the “Archer Award”), which required the Company
to remove absences charged against employees for missed
work due to a snow day. The district court vacated the
Witney Award and found the Archer Award to be moot
regarding the issues presented in this case. The Union
appeals pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. For the following reasons,
we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
BACKGROUND
I. The Witney Award
The Witney Award involved the discharge of Sue Pollard,
a member of the Union, who was terminated for excessive
absences. Under the express terms of the Collective
No. 99-5013 Wyandot, Inc. v. Local 227 15
case of misinterpretation to which the court must defer. This
is a case of no interpretation. Indeed, this is a case where the
Arbitrator ignored the plain language of the Agreement.
Fourth, the district court appropriately found that the
Witney Award was based on general considerations of
fairness and equity instead of the precise terms of the
Agreement. Although Arbitrator Witney avoided using the
terms “fairness” and “equity” in his award, the district court
concluded that these motivations must underlie the
arbitrator’s decision to ignore the Agreement’s deadlines
requirements. Here, the Arbitrator not only ignored the
Agreement’s deadlines, he did so while acknowledging that
the Company did not waive the deadlines and had not been
lax in enforcing them.
In sum, all of the four Dobbs factors were violated in this
case. Thus, based on the undisputed facts, it is clear that
Arbitrator Witney’s decision departed from the essence of the
Agreement and was properly vacated by the district court.
III. Did the District Court Err in Finding the Archer
Award to be Moot?
The Union contends that the Archer Award, issued six
months before the Witney Award, must be enforced because
the Company allegedly ignored the decision. The Company,
however, maintains that the Archer Award does not affect
Pollard’s discharge because Pollard still accumulated enough
absences from work — not including the day at issue in the
Archer Award — to be discharged under the Company’s
attendance policy.
After the district court vacated the Witney Award rendering
Pollard’s grievance barred from arbitration, the district court
held that enforcement of the Archer Award would have no
impact on the outcome of this case because the merits of
Pollard’s grievance would never be reached. On appeal, the
Union argues that the issue is not moot because the Union is
entitled to attorney’s fees incurred from re-litigating the
Archer Award during the Witney arbitration. But this

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14 Wyandot, Inc. v. Local 227 No. 99-5013
5During oral argument, the Union contended that because the practice
of commencing discharge cases at Step C rather than Step A was not
explicitly written in the Agreement, the Arbitrator was interpreting
ambiguous contract terms when he found the July 1st letter to be
sufficient notice. Although, if true, this would require the district court
to affirm Arbitrator Witney’s Award, this is not what happened. Rather
than finding any ambiguity, Arbitrator Witney explicitly determined that
the time deadline for filing Pollard’s grievance was not met, but
nevertheless concluded that the letter “cured the defect.” In other words,
the arbitrator ignored the explicit time limit set forth in the Agreement.
decision conflicts with the express terms of the Agreement,
and thus fails to draw from the essence of the Agreement.5
Second, the district court correctly determined that the
Witney Award imposes additional requirements not explicitly
provided for in the Agreement. The award requires the
Company to accommodate all written demands for arbitration.
This contradicts the deadlines provided in the Agreement, not
to mention Arbitrator Witney’s own conclusion that the
deadlines are mandatory, and imposes additional requirements
on the Company.
Third, the district court accurately concluded that the
Witney Award is not rationally derived from the terms of the
Agreement. Witney provided no support in the Agreement
for finding the grievance arbitrable. He refers to no provision
supporting his view that the July 1st letter cured the deadline
problems. Rather, he merely concludes that the letter is “clear
and unmistakable notice.”
The language in the Agreement regarding written notice to
the Company gives special weight to missing deadlines. A
missed deadline creates a conclusive presumption that the
Union accepts the Company’s answer to the grievance. (See
Section 6.1, Step D). Conclusive presumptions cannot be
overcome by any amount of evidence to the contrary. Further,
the Arbitrator’s “cure” of the deadline is not rationally
derived from the terms of Agreement. In fact, the letter and
the effect the Arbitrator gave to it contradicts the clear terms
of the Agreement. This, as the district court noted, is not a
No. 99-5013 Wyandot, Inc. v. Local 227 3
Bargaining Agreement (the “Agreement”) between the
Company and the Union, a grievance protesting a discharge
must be filed in a timely manner or the grievance is barred.
The Agreement provides in pertinent part:
Article 6
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE AND ARBITRATION
Section 6.1 Any dispute, complaints or grievances
arising from alleged violations of the Agreement by the
Company shall be settled and determined through the
following procedure:
Step A: Any Employee and/or steward having a
grievance will first attempt to adjust same by
conference between the Employee and/or
steward involved and his or her Area Manager.
Step B: If a grievance is not settled in Step A of the
grievance procedure, the Employee will next
attempt to adjust same with his or her steward
and the Department Manager.
Step C: If a grievance is not settled in Step B of the
grievance procedure, then it shall be reduced to
writing and the aggrieved Employee, the
Steward, and a Union Representative . . . and a
designated representative of the Company . . .
shall then attempt to settle the grievance.
Step D: If the grievance has not been satisfactorily
settled and if the grievance is otherwise
arbitrable under this Agreement, it may be
referred to arbitration . . .
Section 6.2 Any disputes, complaints or grievances
arising from alleged violations of this Agreement by the
Company shall be deemed, considered and held to have
been waived unless the same are presented for

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4 Wyandot, Inc. v. Local 227 No. 99-5013
1It is undisputed that, in a discharge situation, the parties commence
the grievance procedure at Step C instead of Step A. (J.A. 185).
settlement and determination of Step (A)1 of the
Grievance Procedure of this Agreement within five (5)
working days from the date on which said dispute,
complaint or grievance first arose. ***
Section 6.6 All time limits for the processing of
grievances, up to and including the actual appeal in
writing to arbitration, shall be deemed mandatory
requirements and the failure to comply with such
specified time limits shall cause the grievance to be
barred and considered completely disposed of from the
standpoint of the Company, the Union and the
Employee or Employees involved. However, it is
understood that the parties, through mutual agreement,
may extend or waive the time limits of any of the above-
mentioned steps of the grievance procedure.
Section 6.7 The function of the Arbitrator shall be of a
judicial rather than a legislative nature. The Arbitrator
shall not have the authority to add to, ignore or modify
any of the terms or provisions of the Agreement. The
Arbitrator shall never in any degree or to any extent
substitute his judgment for the Company’s judgment,
and where matters of judgment are involved (if the case
is otherwise arbitrable under this Agreement) he shall be
limited to deciding whether or not the Company acted
capriciously or in bad faith. . . . Subject to the
foregoing qualifications and limitations, the
Arbitrator’s award shall be final and binding upon the
Company and the Union and the aggrieved Employee or
Employees.
Section 6.8 If the Union fails, refuses, or declines to
prosecute a grievance on behalf of an Employee, or if the
Company and the Union settle any grievance on behalf of
an Employee hereunder, the Employee who has filed
such grievance or on whose behalf it has been filed shall
No. 99-5013 Wyandot, Inc. v. Local 227 13
4Even if the ten-day deadline applied from Section 6.1 of the
Agreement, the July 1, 1996 letter was too late.
Section 6.7 The function of the Arbitrator shall be of a
judicial rather than of a legislative nature. The Arbitrator
shall not have the authority to add to, ignore or modify
any of the terms or provisions of the Agreement.
In the instant matter, the district court did not substitute its
judgment for the judgment of the arbitrator. Rather, it applied
the Dobbs factors and properly found that Arbitrator Witney’s
decision departed from the essence of the Agreement.
First, the district court held Witney’s decision conflicted
with the express terms of the Agreement. The July 1, 1996
letter, on which Witney relied to find the grievance arbitrable,
is inconsequential to the determination of whether the Pollard
grievance was timely filed. Although Witney decided that the
letter clarified the Union’s intention to arbitrate Pollard’s
grievance, the fact remains that the notice was too late.
Under the express terms of the Agreement, the grievance
was required to be submitted within five working days of
Pollard’s termination on May 31, 1996. The failure to comply
with such times limits “shall cause the grievance to be barred
and considered completely disposed of from the standpoint of
the Company, the Union and the Employee.” Nowhere in the
Agreement is there a provision allowing a grievant to
circumvent the time deadline by letter of intent.
The July 1st letter — submitted over a month after
Pollard’s termination — clearly does not conform to this
requirement.4 Indeed, Witney recognized that the letter itself
did not meet the time limits set forth in the Agreement. But
then, without a reasoned explanation, Witney concluded that
the letter somehow cured the defect regarding time deadlines.
Based on these undisputed facts, it is clear that the arbitrator’s

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12 Wyandot, Inc. v. Local 227 No. 99-5013
3Although the district court found that all four of the Dobbs factors
were present in this case, only one is required to find that the arbitrator
departed from the essence of the agreement.
agreement, not the court’s construction, to which the parties
have agreed. See Misco, 484 U.S. at 37-38. Indeed, an
arbitrator’s factual errors and even misinterpretation of a
collective bargaining agreement are not subject to
reconsideration by the court. Id. at 36. Accordingly, the
arbitrator’s decision will be upheld if it “draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement,” see Discussion
Part I, supra, and is not merely the arbitrator’s “own brand of
industrial judgment.” United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
An arbitrator, however, does not have unfettered discretion.
An “arbitrator is confined to the interpretation and application
of the collective bargaining agreement, and although he may
construe ambiguous contract language, he is without authority
to disregard or modify plain and unambiguous provisions.”
Dobbs, Inc. v. Local 614, Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 813
F.2d 85, 86 (6th Cir. 1987). When an arbitrator disregards the
collective bargaining agreement and its terms or departs from
arguably construing the contract, the court must vacate the
award. The Sixth Circuit in Dobbs identified four ways in
which an arbitrator may depart from the essence of the
agreement:
(1) an award conflicts with express terms of the
agreement; (2) an award imposes additional requirements
not expressly provided in the agreement; (3) an award is
without rational support or cannot be rationally derived
from the terms of the agreement, or (4) an award is based
on general considerations of fairness and equity instead
of the precise terms of the agreement.3
Dobbs, 813 F.2d at 86 (quoting National Gypsum Co. v.
United Steelworkers of Am., 793 F.2d 759, 766 (6th Cir.
1986)). The requirements set forth in Dobbs also are reflected
in part in the language of the Agreement:
No. 99-5013 Wyandot, Inc. v. Local 227 5
thereafter be estopped to revive or further prosecute said
grievance.
(J.A. 38-39) (emphasis added).
John Holzapel, the Company’s Human Resource Manager,
mailed a letter to Sue Pollard on May 31, 1996, notifying her
that her employment was terminated because of a violation of
the Company’s Attendance Policy. (J.A. 176). Although
Pollard received the termination letter on June 1, 1996, no
written grievance was presented to the Company until June
18, 1996. (J.A. 177). Under the Agreement Pollard was
required to present her grievance in writing within five (5)
working days of receiving notification of her discharge — i.e.,
five working days after June 1, 1996. (J.A. 157, 185).
On June 14, 1996, a meeting was scheduled to discuss two
other grievances. (J.A. 185). Alex Hernandez, the Union’s
business representative, and Ben Campbell, the Chief Union
Steward, represented the Union at the meeting. (Id.). Pollard
also appeared at the meeting. (Id.). Although Holzapel was
surprised to see Pollard, he agreed to listen to what the Union
had to say while making it clear that the Company did not
agree to waive the time limits for her grievance. (Id.). In fact,
Hernandez asked Holzapel during the meeting to consider
waiving the time limits, but Holzapel refused. (Id.).
Moreover, at the meeting — thirteen days after Pollard
received her termination letter — the Company still had not
received a written grievance regarding Pollard’s termination.
(Id.).
Seventeen days after Pollard received her termination letter,
on June 18, 1996, the Union submitted a written grievance on
her behalf. (Id. at 185-186). In response, the Company
informed the Union in writing that the grievance was not filed
in accordance with the time deadlines set forth in the
Agreement and therefore would be denied:
Grievance 5316, pertaining to Sue Pollard (termination),
was not submitted in a timely manner, therefore,
grievance is denied. Sue Pollard was terminated on

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6 Wyandot, Inc. v. Local 227 No. 99-5013
5/31/96. Grievance was not submitted to Company until
6/18/96.
In addition, the Company denied two other grievances in
the same letter because neither had been submitted in a timely
manner under the grievance procedure of the Agreement.
On July 1, 1996, the Union mailed a letter to the Company
advising it that the Union still was submitting Pollard’s
grievance to arbitration. (Id.). Pollard’s grievance was then
presented to Arbitrator Fred Witney. Two issues were raised
at the hearing: (1) whether the grievance was arbitrable; and
(2) if so, whether Pollard was terminated for just cause. At
arbitration, the Company maintained that Pollard’s grievance
was untimely, while the Union asserted that Pollard’s
discharge did not conform to the Company’s No-Fault
Attendance Policy.
Arbitrator Witney issued an Award on October 20, 1997,
reinstating Pollard. Witney recognized that the Company
discharged Pollard effective on May 31, 1996 and that the
written grievance protesting her discharge was not filed until
June 18, 1996. In addition, Witney acknowledged that
“[t]here is no showing that Wyandot has been lax in the
enforcement of the time limits. Likewise, no testimony was
offered by either side to show that time limits were either
waived or extended in this case.” (Id. at 186). Nevertheless,
the Arbitrator deemed the Agreement deadlines inapplicable:
As said, Wyandot discharged Pollard effective May 30,
1996. Accordingly, she or the Union had five (5) days
(Section 6.2) or ten (10) days (Section 6.1) Step D to file
the grievance. Since it was not submitted until June 18,
1996, the Company asserts the grievance was not timely
and thus not arbitrable. To be sure about it, the
Arbitrator fully understands the position of the Company.
Scores of decisions demonstrate that enforcement of time
limits has frequently been upheld by many arbitrators.
Indeed, the published and unpublished cases of the
instant Arbitrator are proof positive of his understanding
that time limits hold a venerable place in the arbitration
No. 99-5013 Wyandot, Inc. v. Local 227 11
2Moreover, it is important to note that while the Union characterizes
the time deadline as “procedural,” it is not truly so. The time limit set
forth in the Agreement is not analogous to a statute of limitations. Rather,
the time bar is explicitly set forth in the Agreement and presumably was
a bargained-for provision. In this sense, the deadline for filing grievances
is substantive, not procedural.
should be left to the arbitrator.” Id. (emphasis added); see
also Misco, 484 U.S. at 39-40 (same).
Accordingly, the Union’s reliance on the “procedural”
standard of review set forth in Misco is misplaced. In Misco,
the matter at issue was subject to arbitration, and — after
finding that the matter was arbitrable — the Supreme Court
reviewed the arbitrator’s “procedural” decisions relating to
the merits of the dispute. In the instant matter, the Company
challenges whether the matter is arbitrable. The district court
found that the Pollard dispute was not arbitrable and therefore
never examined the arbitrator’s “procedural” decisions. Thus,
the standard of review set forth in Misco is not applicable to
the instant matter.2
In sum, the district court applied the proper standard of
review in vacating the Witney Award. Namely, the court
examined whether the Pollard grievance was arbitrable by
determining whether the Witney Award drew its essence from
the Agreement. See Interstate Brands, 909 F.2d at 890-891
(rejecting Union’s contention that an arbitrator’s decision
regarding arbitrability is reviewed under the Misco
“affirmative misconduct” standard and holding that the proper
standard of review requires the court to determine whether the
decision draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement).
II. Did the District Court Substitute its Interpretation of
the Agreement for That of Arbitrator Witney?
The Supreme Court has made clear that courts must give an
arbitrator’s decision substantial deference because it is the
arbitrator’s construction of the collective bargaining

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10 Wyandot, Inc. v. Local 227 No. 99-5013
arbitrability only if it finds that the arbitrator’s decision “fails
to draw its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement”).
In the instant matter, the district court vacated Arbitrator
Witney’s decision under the correct standard — the court
found that the Witney Award did not draw its essence from
the Agreement. The Union, however, argues that this is the
wrong standard of review. Because the applicability of time
limits provided in the Agreement is a procedural question, the
Union contends, the district court must determine that the
arbitrator acted in bad faith or was guilty of misconduct in
order to vacate the award.
It is true that in cases where “procedural” decisions are
reviewed, the Supreme Court has ruled that federal courts are
empowered to set aside an arbitration award only when the
arbitrator acted in bad faith or was guilty of misconduct.
United Paperworks Intern. Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 40
(1987). But “procedural” decisions made in arbitration are
different than those made in other contexts. As used in the
arbitration setting, procedural decisions occur when the
arbitrator is faced with an issue that is not clearly specified in
the collective bargaining agreement while resolving the merits
of the dispute. For example, the Supreme Court in Misco
ruled that the arbitrator’s decision to limit evidence proffered
to resolve the merits of a dispute was procedural and best left
to the arbitrator. Misco, 484 U.S. at 39-40. This was because
the evidentiary decision was in effect “a construction of what
the contract required when deciding discharge cases.” Id. at
39.
To make such a “procedural” decision, it must previously
be determined that the matter at issue is subject to arbitration.
In John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557-
58 (1964), the Supreme Court held that “[o]nce it is
determined . . . that the parties are obligated to submit the
subject matter to arbitration, ‘procedural’ questions which
grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition
No. 99-5013 Wyandot, Inc. v. Local 227 7
process. Not for the Union’s letter to Wyandot of
July 1, 1996, the Arbitrator would have denied
Pollard’s grievance upholding her termination.
(Id. at 187-188) (emphasis added).
Although Arbitrator Witney recognized that the July 1st
letter from the Union (advising the Company that it was
proceeding to arbitration) did not meet the time limits set
forth in the Agreement, he determined that the letter was
“clear and unmistakable notice to Wyandot that the Union
intended to arbitrate the Pollard grievance,” (id. at 188), and
“overcomes whatever defects [the Union] has in terms of time
limits.” (Id. at 189). Based on this analysis, Witney ruled
that Pollard’s grievance was arbitrable. (Id.).
The Company subsequently filed suit in the district court to
vacate the Witney Award. In examining the Award, the
district court recognized that courts have extremely limited
authority to review arbitration awards. An arbitrator’s factual
errors and even misinterpretation of the Agreement are not
subject to judicial reconsideration. An arbitrator is, however,
without authority to disregard or modify the plain and
unambiguous provisions of the Agreement. (J.A. 48).
The district court then found that the “Union failed to
timely grieve Pollard’s discharge,” and that the arbitrator
ignored the Agreement’s deadlines “while acknowledging that
the Company did not waive the deadline and had not been lax
in enforcing the grievance procedure deadlines.” (Id.) Thus,
the lower court concluded:
[S]imply because the Union and Witney assert that the
Witney Award draws its essence from the contract, does
not necessarily make it so. The Arbitrator’s finding that
Pollard’s grievance and the July 1, 1996 letter were
timely fails to draw its essence from the [Agreement].
Furthermore, the Arbitrator ignored the terms of the
[Agreement] in finding the grievance arbitrable. Thus,
Arbitrator Witney’s award will be vacated.

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8 Wyandot, Inc. v. Local 227 No. 99-5013
(Id. at 48) (internal citations omitted).
II. The Archer Award
Sue Pollard and other Wyandot employees were considered
absent under the Company’s no-fault attendance policy for
missing work on January 7 and 8, 1996. (Pollard missed only
January 8). The Union submitted a class grievance to
arbitration before Arbitrator Archer claiming that the
absences were due to bad weather and should be excused. On
April 18, 1997, Arbitrator Archer agreed and ordered the
Company to remove these infractions, including the infraction
for Pollard’s January 8th absence.
The Company allegedly did not comply with the Archer
Award and failed to remove the January 8th absence from
Pollard’s record. Then, in May 1996, the Company
discharged Pollard for excessive absences under its no-fault
attendance policy. Under the no-fault policy, employees are
terminated after 13 unexcused absences. Pollard had 14
unexcused absences including the January 8th absence.
After the Company filed suit in the district court to vacate
the Witney Award, the Union counterclaimed to enforce the
Archer Award as well as the Witney Award. The district
court, however, held the Archer Award to be moot to the
outcome of this case:
Enforcement of the Archer Award would not change this
result. As a result of vacating the Witney Award, the
merits of Pollard’s grievance and the specific
enforcement of the Archer Award are no longer material
to this case. Thus, the Union’s counterclaim to have the
Archer Award enforced is now moot. ***
Enforcement of the Archer Award with regard to Pollard
alone would not have prevented her dismissal. At the
time of her discharge, she had fourteen occurrences on
her attendance record when only thirteen are necessary to
result in termination. Thus, enforcing the Archer Award
would have no substantive effect on Pollard. It would
No. 99-5013 Wyandot, Inc. v. Local 227 9
only help her if the Witney Award were to be upheld.
Presumably, the Archer Award will still have effect in
every other applicable circumstance. (J.A. 48, n. 6).
DISCUSSION
The principal issues on appeal are whether (1) the Pollard
grievance is arbitrable, (2) Arbitrator Witney’s decision draws
its essence from the Agreement, and (3) the Archer Award is
moot regarding the issues of this case.
The Union argues that the district court erred in vacating
the Witney Award because (1) it applied the wrong standard
of review, and (2) it improperly substituted its interpretation
of the Agreement for that of Arbitrator Witney. Further, the
Union contends that the district court erred in finding the
Archer Award to be moot even if it properly vacated the
Witney Award because the enforcement of the Archer Award
affects other remedies available to Pollard.
The Company argues that the district court properly vacated
the Witney Award because (1) the Pollard grievance is not
arbitrable, and (2) the arbitrator exceeded his authority by
disregarding the plain and unambiguous provisions of the
Agreement. Thus, according to the Company, the Witney
Award did not draw its essence from the terms of the
Agreement. Moreover, the Company contends that the
district court properly held the Archer Award to be moot
because it has no impact on the outcome of this case.
I. Did the District Court Apply the Wrong Standard of
Review?
An arbitrator’s decision on the issue of arbitrability will be
affirmed “unless it fails to ‘draw its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement.’” Vic Wertz Distributing v.
Teamsters, Local 1038, 898 F.2d 1136, 1140 (6th Cir. 1990)
(citing Eberhard Foods, Inc. v. Handy, 868 F.2d 890, 891
(6th Cir. 1989)). See also Interstate Brands v. Chaffeur,
Teamsters Local 135, 909 F.2d 885, 891 (6th Cir. 1990)
(holding that a court could overturn an arbitrator’s ruling on

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