Sarah Gable v. Ronald G. Lewis; Kenneth T. Woehrmyer

*The Honorable Avern Cohn, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0019P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 00a0019p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
S ARAH GABLE ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
R ONALD G. LEWIS; KENNETH
T. W OEHRMYER,
Defendants-Appellants,
R OGER HANNAY , et al.,
Defendants.
;>

1
No. 98-3819
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati.
No. 96-00973—Susan J. Dlott, District Judge.
Argued: November 3, 1999
Decided and Filed: January 13, 2000
Before: MERRITT and NELSON, Circuit Judges;
COHN,* District Judge.

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2 Gable v. Lewis, et al. No. 98-3819
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Todd R. Marti, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL, CORRECTIONS LITIGATION SECTION,
Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants. Alphonse A. Gerhardstein,
LAUFMAN, RAUH & GERHARDSTEIN, Cincinnati, Ohio,
for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jeffery W. Clark, Allen P. Adler,
O F FICE OF THE ATTORNEY G E N E R A L,
CORRECTIONS LITIGATION SECTION, Columbus, Ohio,
for Appellants. Alphonse A. Gerhardstein, LAUFMAN,
RAUH & GERHARDSTEIN, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee.
MERRITT, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which
COHN, D. J., joined. NELSON, J. (pp. 7-9), delivered a
separate dissenting opinion.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
MERRITT, Circuit Judge. In this § 1983 case, plaintiff
Sara Gable, who operates an automobile towing company in
Lebanon, Ohio, claimed that the defendant, Ronald Lewis, an
official of the Ohio Highway Patrol, retaliated against her by
removing her from the patrol’s towing referral list because
she had filed with the state agency an official written
complaint of sex discrimination in the allocation of the
patrol’s automobile towing business. Her retaliation claim
was brought as a violation of the petition clause of the First
Amendment which bars government from “abridging . . . the
right of the people . . . to petition the government for a redress
of grievances.” After a three-day trial, the jury found that the
defendant was guilty of violating the petition clause when he
removed her from the towing list in retaliation for filing her
discrimination complaint. The jury awarded damages of
$55,000. On appeal, we take as true these facts as found by
the jury.

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No. 98-3819 Gable v. Lewis, et al. 3
The defendant presents two issues of law on appeal: First,
he argues that the petition clause is inapplicable to her
grievance filed with the patrol because “only speech
concerning matters of ‘public concern’ is protected from
retaliatory conduct” by the petition clause and that plaintiff’s
discrimination complaint is personal to her and is not such a
matter of “public concern,” as required by Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 145-48 (1983). Second, he argues that the
defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because the
“constitutional right [asserted] must be clearly established in
a particularized sense” under Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640 (1987), in order for a state official to be held
personally liable in damages for a constitutional tort and that
the constitutional right claimed in this case under the petition
clause was not “clearly established” at the time of the
retaliatory conduct.
Although historically the right of “petition” was confined
to seeking legislative or judicial relief, see Higginson, A Short
History of the Right to Petition Government for the Redress
of Grievances, 96 YALE L. J. 142 (1986), and although some
scholars insist that the scope of the petition clause should
remain so limited through judicial interpretation, Strauss,
Public Employees’ Freedom of Association, 61 FORDHAM L.
R EV .473, 486 (1992), the Supreme Court has held to the
contrary. In California Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508, 510 (1972), the Court, after explaining the
philosophy underlying the petition clause, said that the “same
philosophy governs the approach of citizens or groups of
them to administrative agencies,” and concluded that “the
right to petition extends to all departments of the
Government.” In extending the right of petition to
administrative agencies, the Court stated “that it would be
destructive of rights of association and of petition to hold that
groups with common interests may not . . . use the channels
and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to
advocate their causes and points of view respecting resolution
of their business and economic interests viz-a-viz their
competitors.” Id. at 510-11. The petition clause is
analytically distinct from, although related to, the free speech

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4 Gable v. Lewis, et al. No. 98-3819
clause; and the California Transport case clearly establishes
that the submission of complaints and criticisms to
nonlegislative and nonjudicial public agencies like a police
department constitutes petitioning activity protected by the
petition clause.
The question before us is whether we should read into the
petition clause the “public concern” test established in
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145-48 (1983), a case
brought by a public employee under the speech clause of the
First Amendment. In Connick the Court said that a
governmental agency may discipline or impose punishment
against a public employee for speech if the sanctioned speech
is a matter of “private” concern rather than “public concern.”
The Court made it clear that the reason for this distinction
between “private” and “public” matters is to enable
governmental agencies, like private employers, to maintain
order, discipline and civility in the workplace and to allow
supervisory officials to discipline employees for offensive,
insulting, or disruptive speech unrelated to expressions of
opinion about policy matters. On the other hand, the Court
sought to retain the right of all citizens, including public
employees, to comment and express their views on matters of
governmental policy. In Connick, the Court did not apply the
“public concern” test to the petition clause, nor has it decided
since Connick a case raising that point. Nor has the Court
applied the test to citizens who are not governmental
employees.
We believe that the law is clearly established that the
“public concern test” does not apply to the petitioning activity
in the instant case. First, in the California Transport case the
Supreme Court included within the scope of the petition
clause complaints “respecting resolution of their [petitioners’]
business and economic interests . . . .” 404 U.S. at 511.
Thus, the petition clause itself is not generally limited to
matters of “public concern” as described in the Connick case
but includes the petitioner’s private business interests.
Second, the reason for the “public concern” test in Connick —
to maintain order and avoid disruption in the governmental
No. 98-3819 Gable v. Lewis, et al. 9
One relationship “analogous to an employment
relationship,” as it happens, is the relationship between a
police force and a towing company to which the police force
has historically referred business. See White Plains Towing
Corp. v. Patterson, 991 F.2d 1049 (2d Cir. 1993), where the
Second Circuit assumed for First Amendment analysis
purposes that the assignment of work to a towing company by
the New York State Police “was tantamount to employment.”
Id. at 1059.
The towing company that brought the White Plains suit
could not recover damages for an allegedly retaliatory
termination of its referral arrangement, the Second Circuit
held, absent a showing that the “speech” for which the
company claimed it had been delisted – primarily demands for
an increase in towing referrals – rose to the dignity of
“comments upon a matter of public concern.” Id. It was
partly because the communications at issue flunked the
public-concern test that a judgment entered in favor of the
plaintiff towing company was reversed by the Second Circuit.
We must, of course, give defendants the benefit of the
qualified immunity doctrine in any case where the doctrine is
properly raised and to which it properly applies. The doctrine
applies, as I understand it, with respect to any legal issue on
which there is no controlling Supreme Court or circuit
precedent and on which “officers of reasonable competence
could disagree. . . .” See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341
(1986). The underlying issue in the case at bar – whether the
First Amendment prohibits termination of a business
relationship in retaliation for the assertion of a private
grievance – is one on which there has heretofore been no
controlling Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit authority and as
to which federal judges of reasonable competence could
disagree and in fact have disagreed. Because I do not think
we ought to require Highway Patrol officers to be more
prescient than Article III judges when it comes to divining
future developments in the law, I would recognize the
defendants’ right to qualified immunity here.

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8 Gable v. Lewis, et al. No. 98-3819
late as March of 1997 – some seven months after Ms. Gable’s
name was removed from the towing referral list – a judge of
this court was able to maintain without qualification that “the
right to petition is limited to matters of public concern.” See
Valot v. Southeast Local School District Board of Education,
107 F.3d 1220, 1226 (6th Cir. 1997) (lead opinion by Engel,
J.). Judge Engel marshalled a number of cases in support of
this point of view, and noted only one case – San Filippo v.
Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 440-43 (3d Cir. 1995) – to the
contrary. Id.
It is true that the other members of the Valot panel (Merritt
and Ryan, JJ.) disagreed with Judge Engel. Judge Ryan
reached the same result by a different analytical route, see
Valot, 107 F.3d at 1230-31 (Ryan, J., concurring), and Judge
Merritt, in dissent, said that he would follow San Filippo.
Valot, 107 F.3d at 1234 (Merritt, J., dissenting). But if
reasonable members of this court could disagree in March of
1997 over the applicability of the public-concern test in the
Petition Clause context, how can we say that the law was so
clearly established seven months earlier that there was no
room at that time for disagreement among reasonable
Highway Patrol officials?
I must acknowledge, to be sure, that the Valot plaintiffs –
untenured substitute bus drivers – were sometime employees
of the public body that stood accused of having retaliated
against them, while Ms. Gable was not an employee of the
Ohio State Highway Patrol. But as the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit observed in Blackburn v. City of Marshall,
42 F.3d 925, 932 (5th Cir. 1995), “[a]lthough the
Pickering/Connick [public-concern] test arose in the context
of public employment, courts have not strictly cabined its
application. . . . Courts have extended [its] analysis to cases
involving relationships analogous to an employment
relationship.” See, in this connection, Copsey v. Swearingen,
36 F.3d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir. 1994) (a blind operator of a
concession stand in a public building “was more like a public
employee than an ordinary citizen,” so the public-concern test
had relevance to his situation).
No. 98-3819 Gable v. Lewis, et al. 5
workplace — does not apply in this case because the plaintiff
was not a governmental employee subject to the discipline of
a governmental employer. She was simply a citizen offering
services to a state agency. Since the reason for the test is
missing in the present case — maintaining order in the
governmental workplace — the test should not be applied
here, and the district court was correct in not including in its
instructions to the jury a limitation on liability based on the
Connick public concern test. Third, we find no authority in
the Sixth Circuit limiting petitioning activity by public
employees to matters of “public concern” either generally or
in the governmental employment context. In Valot v.
Southeast Local School District Board of Education, 107 F.3d
1220 (1997), one judge believed that the petition clause
should be so limited in actions by public employees against
their employers, but two other judges of the court did not
agree. See also San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424 (3rd
Cir. 1995)(holding that the “public concern” test does not
apply to petitioning public employees), discussed and
analyzed extensively in Shea, San Filippo v. Bongiovanni:
The Public Concern Criteria and the Scope of the Modern
Petition Right, 48 VAND . L. R EV .1697 (1995), and Thaddeus-
X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 392 (6th Cir. 1997, en
banc)(holding that a prisoner’s right to petition the
government for redress of grievances is not subject to the
public concern limitation imposed in free speech actions
involving public employees). Thus there is no basis in our
First Amendment jurisprudence for applying Connick’s public
concern test to petitioning activity by a private business
woman who is simply supplying services to a governmental
agency as an independent contractor.
The fact that there is a judge somewhere, as imagined by
our dissenting colleague, who in this case might conclude
erroneously that a private citizen like plaintiff, who tows cars
for a living and receives no compensation from the state, is
“tantamount” or “analogous” to a government employee, does
not persuade us. After many years watching judges, we agree
that a judge or judges somewhere might so conclude. But
when such a ruling would be clearly contrary to a Supreme

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6 Gable v. Lewis, et al. No. 98-3819
Court case like California Transport, supra, and entirely
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s orderly-public-
workplace reasoning in the Connick case, we should not be
dissuaded by the error of such a hypothetical judge. This is
especially true when we recognize that government retaliation
for filing a petition violates the literal language of the Petition
Clause which forbids “abridging . . . the right of the people
. . . to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”
Most cases can be imagined to be “tantamount” or
“analogous” to some other case. We should not split hairs
when the conduct literally violates the language of the
Petition Clause and when the Supreme Court seems to be
clear on the subject.
For these reasons, we conclude that the law interpreting the
petition clause protects the plaintiff in filing a complaint with
the Ohio Highway Patrol claiming sex discrimination, and
this law was clearly established prior to the retaliatory
conduct found by the jury in the present case. We also
conclude that the law was clearly established that the “public
concern” test does not apply to plaintiff’s petitioning activity.
Hence the doctrine of official immunity is inapplicable, and
the jury verdict should not be set aside for either of the two
reasons advanced by the defendant.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
No. 98-3819 Gable v. Lewis, et al. 7
1Ms. Gable failed to prove that her sex was a motivating factor in her
removal from the list, but we must take it as given, the jury having so
found, that the filing of her complaint of sex discrimination was a
motivating factor insofar as defendant Lewis was concerned.
_________________
DISSENT
_________________
DAVID A. NELSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting. With the
publication of the court’s opinion in this case, it becomes a
settled rule of law in the Sixth Circuit that even where a
plaintiff cannot meet the “public concern” test of Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), government officials may not
withdraw a business advantage in retaliation for the plaintiff’s
exercise of the First Amendment right to petition for a redress
of grievances. It is unlikely, in my opinion, that the Supreme
Court would disagree with our holding on this point.
I part company with my colleagues on the panel, however,
when it comes to the proposition that the non-applicability of
Connick’s public-concern test in Petition Clause cases had
been clearly established by July of 1996, the point at which
the name of towing company operator Sara Gable was
removed from the Ohio State Highway Patrol’s referral list.1
And if the rule announced today was not clearly established
in July of 1996 – in other words, if the state of the law was
such that officials of reasonable competence could disagree as
to the applicability of the public-concern test in a Petition
Clause situation – the defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity.
I am not prepared to say that the non-applicability of the
public-concern test in Petition Clause cases was clearly
established in mid-1996. To begin with, neither the Supreme
Court nor the Sixth Circuit had ever decided the question.
The answer given by this court today was not clearly
foreshadowed by the Supreme Court’s opinion in California
Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), so as

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