Deylin Ortega Villalba v. TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 26a0355n.06

Case No. 25-3980

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

DEYLIN ORTEGA VILLALBA,
Petitioner,

v.

TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,

Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD
OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

OPINION

Before: SILER, DAVIS, and RITZ, Circuit Judges.
SILER, Circuit Judge. Deylin Ortega Villalba petitions for review of the denial of
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
She also challenges the immigration judge’s (IJ) decision to rescind administrative closure.
Because Ortega Villalba forfeited review of several dispositive grounds supporting the denial of
relief and has not shown prejudice from the closure ruling, we deny the petition for review.
I.
Ortega Villalba, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States with her two
older siblings in 2014, when she was five years old. Shortly thereafter, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) charged her as removable for lacking valid entry documents, and she
conceded removability. She later sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under
the CAT. Her claims rested on childhood abuse by family members, relatives’ alleged cartel ties,
and the risks facing vulnerable children in Mexico.

No. 25-3980, Ortega Villalba v. Blanche

2
Ortega Villalba did not testify at the merits hearing; her mother and sister testified on her
behalf. Her sister testified that their grandmother sometimes took the children to work in the fields
and struck Ortega Villalba with a tree branch more often than the other children. No one reported
that conduct to Mexican authorities. Her mother testified that some relatives had cartel ties, that a
paternal uncle was killed by hitmen in 2012 or 2013, and that relatives warned her to watch the
children because gangs were after the family. No cartel member directly threatened or harmed
Ortega Villalba.
By December 2020, the removal proceedings had been pending for more than five years.
At the merits hearing that month, Ortega Villalba asked the IJ to administratively close the case
while her mother’s T-visa application remained pending, through which Ortega Villalba sought
derivative status. The IJ denied the oral request but allowed her to file a written motion within
five days and gave DHS five days to respond. By the end of the hearing, the parties had completed
the evidence and argument. Ortega Villalba filed her written request on December 9. DHS filed
an opposition on December 16, but the immigration court rejected it for filing defects; DHS refiled
the opposition on December 21.
On January 15, 2021, the IJ granted administrative closure, relying in part on his
understanding that DHS had filed no opposition. Four days later, DHS moved for reconsideration.
The IJ granted the motion that day and returned the case to the active docket. He relied on DHS’s
opposition, the age of the proceedings, the completed merits hearing, and the anticipated wait of
up to 29 months for a decision on the mother’s T-visa application.
The next day, the IJ denied Ortega Villalba’s applications for asylum, withholding of
removal, and CAT protection and ordered her to be removed to Mexico. He found no past
persecution and no showing that Mexican authorities were unable or unwilling to control the

No. 25-3980, Ortega Villalba v. Blanche

3
alleged private actors. He also found that Ortega Villalba’s proposed social groups were not
cognizable, that the alleged harm lacked a nexus to a protected ground even if the groups were
cognizable, and that she lacked an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution. For CAT, he
found that she had not shown that she more likely than not would be tortured by, or with the
acquiescence of, a public official.
Nearly five years later, the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) adopted and affirmed
those rulings and dismissed the appeal. It also rejected Ortega Villalba’s administrative-closure
challenge because she had not shown prejudice. This petition, and a motion to stay removal
pending these proceedings, followed.
II.
Because the Board adopted the IJ’s decision and added its own reasoning, we review the
IJ’s decision as supplemented by the Board. Karimijanaki v. Holder, 579 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir.
2009). We review due-process claims de novo. Bi Qing Zheng v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 287, 296 (6th
Cir. 2016).
III.
A.
Ortega Villalba first challenges the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT
protection. The claims turn on what she does not challenge.
An asylum applicant must show “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of” a statutorily protected ground. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). When
the alleged persecutor is a private actor, the applicant also must show that the government is
“unable or unwilling to control” the actor. Ortiz v. Garland, 6 F.4th 685, 688 (6th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985)). Withholding likewise requires

No. 25-3980, Ortega Villalba v. Blanche

4
a protected-ground nexus but demands a higher likelihood of persecution. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(A); Vasquez-Rivera v. Garland, 96 F.4th 903, 907–08 (6th Cir. 2024). CAT
protection requires proof that the applicant would more likely than not be subject to torture by or
with the acquiescence of a public official if removed. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1).
Ortega Villalba’s opening brief develops only two merits arguments. She argues that her
grandmother’s repeated use of a tree branch amounted to past persecution and that the country-
conditions evidence showed that Mexican authorities were unable or unwilling to protect her. She
does not meaningfully challenge the agency’s no-nexus ruling, its ruling that her proposed social
groups were not cognizable, or its future-persecution findings. Her CAT discussion consists of
one conclusory sentence.
Those shortcomings are fatal. Arguments not meaningfully developed in an opening brief
are forfeited. Cruz-Samayoa v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1145, 1154–55 (6th Cir. 2010). And when an
unchallenged agency ground independently supports the denial of relief, we need not address
challenges to other grounds. See Aguilar Peralta v. Garland, No. 23-3483, 2024 WL 196665, at
*2–3 (6th Cir. Jan. 18, 2024).
The unchallenged no-nexus ruling resolves asylum and withholding. The agency found no
connection between the alleged harm and a protected ground, even assuming Ortega Villalba’s
proposed groups were cognizable. Ortega Villalba does not challenge that finding, which defeats
both claims regardless of whether she is right about past persecution and government protection.
Her other omissions leave the agency’s social-group and future-persecution rulings undisturbed
too.
The CAT claim meets the same fate. Ortega Villalba does not develop an argument about
likely torture, official involvement, consent, or acquiescence. Her asylum argument about

No. 25-3980, Ortega Villalba v. Blanche

5
government protection does not address CAT’s distinct requirements. One conclusory sentence
does not preserve the claim. See Guzman-Torralva v. Bondi, 154 F.4th 880, 883–84 (6th Cir.
2025).
These forfeitures dispose of all three protection claims, so we need not reach the two merits
arguments Ortega Villalba developed.
B.
Ortega Villalba next argues that the IJ violated due process by granting DHS’s
reconsideration motion on the day it was filed and deciding the merits the next day. She says that
the timing denied her a meaningful chance to respond and, coupled with the IJ’s treatment of the
parties’ filings, calls his neutrality into question.
Noncitizens in removal proceedings are entitled to “a full and fair hearing.” Huicochea-
Gomez v. INS, 237 F.3d 696, 699 (6th Cir. 2001). But a procedural defect alone does not establish
a due-process violation. Ortega Villalba also must show prejudice—that the defect “led to a
substantially different outcome.” Bi Qing Zheng, 819 F.3d at 297 (citation omitted). Even
assuming the IJ should have allowed her more time to respond, Ortega Villalba has not made that
prejudice showing.
Start with the reconsideration order. The IJ retained authority to reconsider his own
decision before jurisdiction vested in the Board. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). Even assuming
administrative closure was available here, it remained discretionary. See id. § 1214.2(a).
Administrative closure was only a docket-management device. It did not terminate the
proceedings, grant relief from removal, or confer lawful status. See Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I. & N.
Dec. 17, 18 (B.I.A. 2017).

No. 25-3980, Ortega Villalba v. Blanche

6
More time to respond would not likely have changed the closure ruling. Ortega Villalba
says that she would have challenged the timing and defects of DHS’s filing. But the IJ did not
treat DHS’s opposition as a veto of administrative closure. He treated it as one consideration. He
also relied on case-management reasons independent of those filing defects: the proceedings had
been pending for years, the merits hearing was complete, and a decision on the T-visa application
could take up to 29 months. Ortega Villalba does not explain how additional briefing about DHS’s
filings likely would have changed the ruling in light of those reasons.
The broader record confirms the absence of prejudice. Nothing showed that her mother’s
T-visa application was likely to be granted or that a decision was imminent. Nor did the record
show that Ortega Villalba’s derivative request was likely to change the removal outcome. Nearly
five years passed before the Board decided the appeal, and the record still contained no favorable
T-visa decision. Rescinding closure also did not prevent Ortega Villalba from presenting her
protection claims. By then, the parties had completed the evidence and arguments at the merits
hearing.
That leaves the neutrality argument. Adverse rulings and ordinary case-management
decisions, without more, do not establish bias. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555–56
(1994). IJs have broad discretion to conduct hearings, but they must remain neutral adjudicators.
Bi Qing Zheng, 819 F.3d at 297. The record shows quick and unfavorable rulings. But it does not
show “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism,” prejudgment, or advocacy by the IJ. See Liteky,
510 U.S. at 555. Without prejudice or evidence of bias, Ortega Villalba’s due-process claim fails.
IV.
We deny Ortega Villalba’s petition for review and deny her outstanding motion for a stay
of removal as moot.