Hardy v. Simpson Cty Sch Dist, et al

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 99-60025
________________________
JOHN HARDY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SIMPSON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
______________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
(97-CV-325)
______________________________________________
February 7, 2000
Before GARWOOD, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam*
In this race discrimination case, Plaintiff-Appellant John
Hardy appeals the district court’s directed verdict in favor of
Defendant-Appellee Simpson County School District (“the school
district”) at the close of Hardy’s case-in-chief. Hardy asserts
that, in his application for employment as a high school principal,
(1) he was discriminated against because of his race, in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 et seq., and (2) he was deprived without

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due process of law of his property interest in a fair hiring
process, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. With respect to Hardy’s
race discrimination claim, the district court ruled that Hardy
failed to demonstrate that the race-neutral non-discriminatory
reasons proffered by the school district in support of its hiring
decision were pretextual in nature. With respect to Hardy’s due
process claim, the district court ruled that Hardy failed to show
that the school district’s actions were motivated by racial animus.
Hardy contests both of these rulings on appeal.
Hardy did not meet his burden of proof with respect to his
race discrimination claim at trial. Once the school district came
forward with race-neutral non-discriminatory reasons supporting its
hiring decision, the burden shifted to Hardy to demonstrate that
those reasons were mere pretexts and that the real reason that he
was not hired was his race. The only evidence of pretext that
Hardy offered at trial was that the school district expressed its
non-discriminatory reasons for hiring another applicant not only in
prose but also in the form of an objective scoring calculation. We
agree with the district court that the school district’s use of an
objective scoring calculation did not in any way taint its
proffered reasons or serve as an indication that the reasons were
pretextual in nature.
With respect to his due process claim, Hardy correctly points
out that the district court erred in requiring him to make a
showing that the school district’s actions were motivated by racial

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1 Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 1997).
animus. This was, however, harmless error. To make out a
successful due process claim, Hardy was required to demonstrate
that the school district’s actions were “so arbitrary and
capricious as to be irrational.”1 The district court explicitly
found that the school district “offered a rational explanation” for
its choice of another applicant over Hardy. We agree.
In light of the foregoing, and for essentially the same
reasons as those expressed in the thorough opinion of the district
court, the judgment below must be
AFFIRMED.

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