Walton v. Thayler, et al

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-20938
Summary Calendar
RICKY D. WALTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
M. BRUCE THAYLER; S. NANCE;
B. BACHMANN; L.L. BREWER,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H-97-CV-406
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September 5, 2000
Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Ricky D. Walton, Texas prisoner # 581164, appeals the
district court’s order granting summary judgment to the
defendants. On appeal, Walton restates the arguments raised in
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prisoner’s civil rights complaint. He
argues that the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because they
acted with deliberate indifference to his foot and knee condition
when they revoked his soft-soled shoe pass. He further argues
that the defendants retaliated against him because he complained

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No. 99-20938
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about the revocation of his shoe pass. Walton seeks the
restoration of good time credit and the restoration of his shoe
pass. He has filed a motion for appointment of appellate
counsel. This motion is DENIED. See Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691
F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982)(explaining that § 1983 complainant
is not entitled to appointment of counsel absent exceptional
circumstances).
Walton has not presented any summary judgment evidence that
demonstrates a deliberate indifference to his medical condition.
He merely expresses disagreement over the course of treatment,
i.e., whether his condition requires that he wear soft-soled
shoes instead of prison work boots. A mere disagreement over the
method of medical treatment, however, does not state a claim for
Eighth Amendment indifference to medical needs. Norton v.
Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997). Walton makes only
conclusional allegations of retaliation, which are insufficient
to support a § 1983 retaliation claim. See Johnson v. Rodriguez,
110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1997). Walton’s request for the
restoration of good time credit is not a cognizable § 1983 claim.
See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Clarke v.
Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 1052 (1999). Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.
AFFIRMED; MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL DENIED.

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