Reeves v. Sanderson Plmbg Prod

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-60334
ROGER REEVES Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC. Defendant-Appellant,
- - - - - - - - - -
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
(96CV197-S-D)
- - - - - - - - - -
September 13, 2000
ON REMAND FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
In this age discrimination suit, pursuant to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, Plaintiff-
Appellant Roger Reeves brought suit against Defendant-Appellant
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. (“Sanderson”) alleging that he
was terminated because of his age. The district court awarded
Reeves $28,490.80 in front pay, representing two years’ lost

-- 1 of 3 --

1 See Shattuck v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 49 F.3d 1106, 1110
(5th Cir. 1995); Hadley v. VAM, 44 F.3d 372, 375 (5th. Cir. 1995).
2Walther v. Lone Star Gas Company, 952 F.2d 119, 127 (5th.
Cir. 1992) (emphasis added).
2
income, and $35,000 in liquidated damages, as determined by the
jury.
We reversed the district court’s denial of Sanderson’s motion
for judgment as a matter of law. The Supreme Court of the United
States then reversed our decision and remanded the case to us for
further proceedings not inconsistent with their decision. By
motion, Sanderson has asked us to address on remand the propriety
of the district court’s award of front pay, an issue not addressed
in our earlier decision. We grant that motion and proceed to
address the question of front pay.
The standard of review here is abuse of discretion.1
“[A] substantial liquidated damages award may indicate that an
additional award of front pay is inappropriate or excessive.”2
Sanderson argues that the district court should not have granted
front pay here as the liquidated damages are greater than two
years’ lost income and thus their award would be punitive in
effect. Even though district courts may, in their discretion,
refuse to award front pay when awarding substantial liquidated
damages, this does not mean that they must refuse to do so. We
cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in
awarding front pay in addition to liquidated damages.

-- 2 of 3 --

3
We therefore affirm the district court’s original judgment, as
instructed by the Supreme Court, including the award of front pay,
and remand this case to the district court for reentry of its
original judgment.
AFFIRMED and REMANDED.

-- 3 of 3 --