Paige v. Cochran, et al

*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 98-20236
Summary Calendar
_____________________
CHRISTINE PAIGE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GARY COCHRAN; CITY OF BAYTOWN,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H-96-CV-978
_________________________________________________________________
April 7, 2000
Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Christine Paige appeals the district court’s grant of judgment
as a matter of law dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against
the City of Baytown. Paige contends that Baytown failed to conduct
an adequate investigation of her complaint that a Baytown police
officer, Gary Cochran, raped her.
This court reviews a judgment as a matter of law de novo. See
Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 313 (5th Cir. 1997).
Judgment as a matter of law is proper only when “there is no
legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find

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for that party on that issue.” FED.R.CIV.P. 50(a)(1). The record
is reviewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion. See Burch, 119 F.3d at 313.
A municipality may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the
actions of non-policymaking employees only if those actions were
taken pursuant to an official policy of the municipality. See
Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
Paige contends, however, that § 1983 provides an independent cause
of action against a municipality for failure to investigate
constitutional misconduct by police officers. We need not reach
this issue. Regardless of whether such a cause of action exists,
and regardless of what standard we might apply in determining what
constitutes an adequate investigation, the district court’s
decision was correct; no reasonable factfinder could have found
that Baytown failed to investigate or that the investigation was so
inadequate as to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
FED.R.CIV.P. 50(a)(1). Further, there is no evidence of any Baytown
policy to conduct inadequate investigations of alleged
constitutional violations by its personnel. Accordingly, we AFFIRM
the judgment of the district court.
A F F I R M E D.

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