(caption unavailable)

* Local Rule 47.5.1 provides: "The publication of opinions that have
no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-
settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens on
the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 94-10369
(Summary Calendar)
_______________
GENE O. YEE, JR. and
MARY LYNN YEE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
CITY OF DALLAS, TX, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
_______________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas
(D-92-CV-257)
______________________________________________
(October 3, 1994)
Before SMITH, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Gene and Mary Lynn Yee filed suit against the City of Dallas
and various of its officials alleging that Mr. Yee had been
suspended from his job as a Dallas police officer in retaliation
for a grievance he filed against his supervising lieutenant. The
district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment,
and the Yees appeal. We affirm.

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1 Yee's wife claims loss of consortium damages resulting from the
trauma of Yee's suspension.
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I
At the time of suit, Gene Yee was a police officer with the
Dallas Police Department ("DPD"). In August, 1989, Yee filed a
grievance against lieutenant, William Carter, alleging that Carter
had violated the DPD's Code of Conduct. One week after the DPD's
Internal Affairs Division ("IAD") commenced a formal investigation
of Yee's complaint, Yee himself became the subject of an
investigation. Several police officers reported to the IAD that
Yee had encouraged them to engage in a work slow-down, allegations
that Yee denied.
The IAD sustained the allegations against both men. After a
pre-termination hearing, Yee was discharged for violating various
sections of the DPD Code of Conduct and the City of Dallas
Personnel Rules. Yee then appealed his discharge to the Dallas
Assistant City Manager, who sustained the DPD's findings in part
and reduced Yee's termination to a four-month suspension.
Yee and his wife1 sued the City of Dallas and various City
officials in their official capacities ("the City") in state court.
They alleged that Yee's suspension was in part "a retaliation for
[his] filing a grievance against a superior," and that this
retaliation was part of policy encouraged by the City of Dallas.
The City removed the case to federal court, and the district court
granted the City's subsequent motion for summary judgment

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2 The district court also declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the Yees' state law claims and dismissed them without
prejudice. The Yees do not appeal the dismissal of their state law claims.
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dismissing the Yees' § 1983 claims.2
II
The Yees argue that the district court erroneously granted the
City's motion for summary judgment on their § 1983 municipal
liability claim against the City. In an appeal from summary
judgment, we review the record de novo, drawing all inferences most
favorable to the party opposing the motion. Garcia v. Elf Atochem
N.A., 28 F.3d 446, 449 (5th Cir. 1994). "Summary judgment is
proper if the movant demonstrates that there is an absence of
genuine issues of material fact." Duckett v. City of Cedar Park,
950 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed.
2d 202 (1986)). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to "direct
the court's attention to evidence in the record sufficient to
establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact for
trial))that is, the nonmovant must come forward with evidence
establishing each of the challenged elements of its case upon which
it will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id.
As a local government entity, the City will be liable under
§ 1983 only for acts of local officials pursuant to official
government policy. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2037, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978);
Guidry v. Broussard, 897 F.2d 181, 182 (5th Cir. 1990). "There
must have been execution of government policy either by the

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lawmaker . . . or by a person `whose edicts or acts may fairly be
said to represent official policy.'" Guidry, 897 F.2d at 182
(quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478, 106 S. Ct. 1292,
1297, 89 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1986)).
The Yees argue that the district court erroneously placed the
burden of proof on them to prove the existence of a policy or
custom (or a policy-maker's knowledge of the alleged custom). The
Yees contend that "it is the movants' burden to set forth facts
refuting Plaintiffs' claims." However, this argument misstates the
legal standard for summary judgment. The movant bears the initial
burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material
fact. Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167,
178 (5th Cir. 1990). "To satisfy this burden, the moving party may
either submit evidentiary documents that negate the existence of
some material element of the nonmoving party's claim . . . or, if
the crucial issue is one for which the nonmoving party will bear
the burden of proof at trial, merely point out that the evidentiary
documents in the record contain insufficient proof concerning an
essential element of the nonmoving party's claim . . . ." Id. In
this case, the City has done both. It introduced documentary
evidence that the City's personnel rules prohibit retaliation
against employees for using the grievance or appeal procedures. It
also pointed out that the Yees had offered no summary judgment
evidence of either a policy of retaliation or a policy-maker's
knowledge of a custom of retaliation.
The burden then shifted to the Yees to provide "significant

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3 The Yees argue in their brief that "[i]n their pleadings, [they]
stated that the practice of retaliation and wrongful termination were [sic] taken
by individuals in the highest policy-making and decision-making authority within
the [sic] Dallas." We have previously explained, however, that "`only evidence--
not argument, not facts in the complaint--will satisfy' the burden," and
"[u]nsworn pleadings, memoranda or the like are not, of course, competent summary
judgment evidence." Johnston v. City of Houston, 14 F.3d 1056, 1060 (5th Cir.
1994) (quoting Solo Serve Corp. v. Westowne Ass'n, 929 F.2d 160, 164 (5th Cir.
1991), and Larry v. White, 929 F.2d 206, 211 n.12 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1946, 123 L. Ed. 2d 651 (1993)).
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probative evidence" showing that there was a genuine issue for
trial. State Farm Life Ins. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th
Cir. 1990). On appeal, the Yees argue that the "record is replete
with genuine issues of material fact as to [their] allegations
regarding their Section 1983 claims which would preclude the
Defendants from summary judgment . . . ." However, the Yees have
not pointed to any evidence in the summary judgment record to
support this claim. Neither have the Yees pointed to any evidence
in the record supporting the elements of their municipal liability
action against the City.3
Our independent review of the summary judgment record leads us
to agree with the district court's conclusion that the Yees failed
to come forward with summary judgment evidence proving the crucial
elements of their § 1983 claim against the City. The record is
simply devoid of significant probative evidence that Mr. Yee was
suspended pursuant to a policy or custom attributable to the City.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting the City's
motion for summary judgment on Yee's § 1983 claims.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

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