(caption unavailable)

*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 93-4850
Summary Calendar
IN THE MATTER OF: JOHN C. GRAHAM and
BECKY A. GRAHAM.
Debtor.
H. Glenn Gunter, Appellant,
versus
John C. Graham and Rebecca A. Graham, Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
(6:92-CV-568)
September 30, 1993
Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
H. Glenn Gunter challenged in bankruptcy court the discharge
of debts owed him by his former wife, Rebecca A. Graham, and her
current husband, John C. Graham. The bankruptcy court denied
Gunter's objections to dismissing any debts Mr. or Mrs. Graham
might owe him. The court did note, however, that Mrs. Graham

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1 Gunter also alleges that the Grahams violated the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act by failing to allow him access to the premises
he rented. He cites Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.45 (Vernon
1987) for the assertion that he was denied "services" within the
scope of the Act. Neither the bankruptcy court nor the district
court addressed this issue. As Gunter invokes a law that, on its
face, does not apply to his situation, we dismiss this claim.
2
conceded Gunter's right to three items of personal property in her
possession. On appeal, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy
court order. In the present action, Gunter appeals the order of
the district court. We AFFIRM.
I.
Gunter argues that the bankruptcy court erred in failing to
apply properly 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a). Section 523(a)(2)(A) excludes
from discharge a debt obtained by "false pretenses, a false
representation, or actual fraud . . . ." Similarly, section
523(a)(6) excludes any debt resulting from a "willful and malicious
injury" caused by the debtor. Gunter claims that the Grahams owe
him several debts that resulted from their dishonest and malicious
actions. Gunter's allegations include: (1) that his wife
fraudulently transferred ownership in his pickup truck to a third
party; (2) that his wife and her current husband took possession of
and converted various items of his personal property; (3) that his
wife withdrew without authority $4,500 from his bank account; and
(4) that his wife kept approximately $100.00 in utility deposits
that were registered to his former residence.1 The bankruptcy
court denied Gunter's objections to the discharge of any debts that
the Grahams might owe him.
II.

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3
We review the findings of fact of the bankruptcy court under
the clearly erroneous standard. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 8013; Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762
F.2d 1303, 1308 (5th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). We will rule that
the findings of the bankruptcy court are clearly erroneous only if
we have a firm and definite conviction that the bankruptcy court
has erred. Matter of Monnig's Dept. Stores, Inc., 929 F.2d 197,
201 (5th Cir. 1991). Moreover, we give due regard to the
bankruptcy court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses.
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013; Richmond Leasing, 762 F.2d at 1308. The
bankruptcy court's conclusions of law, however, are subject to de
novo review. Richmond Leasing, 762 F.2d at 1307.
Gunter's testimony provided the only evidence that the money
and goods that he exchanged for the pickup truck were exclusively
his property. The bankruptcy court found that Gunter's testimony
was motivated by a desire to intimidate and punish his ex-wife and
refused to rely on it. The court ruled, therefore, that Gunter
failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the truck
which Mrs. Graham sold to a third party was not community property.
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 5.02 (Vernon 1993) ("property possessed
by either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is presumed
to be community property"). The bankruptcy court had an
opportunity to evaluate Gunter's testimony not available to this
court on review. As the record does not controvert the bankruptcy
court's finding that Gunter's testimony was untrustworthy, we hold
that that finding was not clearly erroneous. Moreover, as the

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4
district court noted, title to the truck was restored to Gunter
subsequent to the issuance of the bankruptcy court's order. As a
result, this issue is moot.
The bankruptcy court also did not find credible Gunter's
assertion that the Grahams converted his personal property.
Gunter's testimony figured prominently in the evidence he adduced
to support this accusation. The bankruptcy court did not commit
reversible error in discounting his testimony and in dismissing
this general claim. Three of these items require separate
attention, however.
In bankruptcy court, the Grahams waived their rights to a bed,
a trunk, and a waterbed mattress. Gunter complains that the
Grahams have not yet returned these items to him. As the district
court noted, Gunter may pursue this issue in a contempt proceeding
in bankruptcy court. It is not ripe for appeal.
Finally, Gunter alleges that the Grahams owe him approximately
$4,600. The bankruptcy court found that Gunter had been reimbursed
for the $4,500 that he alleges his ex-wife lacked authority to
withdraw from his bank account. As Gunter suffered no damages, the
court dismissed this claim. The court also dismissed Gunter's
claim for $100 in utility security deposits as de minimis and
petty. The record fully supports these decisions.
Conclusion
Gunter's testimony played a central role in the litigation in
bankruptcy court. That court found that Gunter's testimony was not
reliable. The court refused, therefore, to rule based on his

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5
unsubstantiated allegations. We defer to the court's assessment of
Gunter's credibility. As the bankruptcy court's findings were not
clearly erroneous, we AFFIRM.

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