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*Judge Jones did not sit for oral argument due to illness, but will
participate in the opinions with the aid of tape recordings.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
for the Fifth Circuit
_____________________________________
No. 92-4727 & 93-4079
_____________________________________
JAMES EDMONSON, d/b/a Canton Bail Bonds,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
THE COUNTY OF VAN ZANDT, PAT JORDAN, D.W. (WAYNE) MILLER
and BETTY T. MILLER, d/b/a Free State Bail Bond Service,
Defendants-Appellants.
_____________________________________
No. 93-4431
_____________________________________
JAMES EDMONSON, d/b/a Canton Bail Bonds,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
THE COUNTY OF VAN ZANDT,
Defendant,
PAT JORDAN and D.W. (WAYNE) MILLER,
Defendants-Appellants.
______________________________________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
(6:90 CV 373)
______________________________________________________
(January 14, 1994)
Before GOLDBERG, JONES and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.*

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1 Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
2
DUHÉ, Circuit Judge:1
Plaintiff James Edmonson, owner of Canton Bail Bonds, brought
this § 1983 action alleging a conspiracy to violate his
constitutional rights. Edmonson alleged that Defendants conspired
to monopolize the bail bond business in Van Zandt County and drive
him out of business. The constitutional violations were
deprivations of property and liberty interests in violation of the
Due Process Clause and arbitrary and irrational treatment in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court found
defendants Sheriff Pat Jordan, the former Chief Deputy Wayne
Miller, Betty Miller d/b/a Free State Bail Bond Service (wife of
Wayne Miller), and Van Zandt County, liable under § 1983 for
conspiracy and enjoined them from impeding Plaintiff's bail bond
business. Defendants appealed (no. 92-4727).
After a bench trial on damages, Defendants were adjudged
jointly and severally liable for $359,305 in compensatory damages
and separately liable for punitive damages as follows: Pat Jordan
(individually) for $25,000, Wayne Miller (individually) for
$25,000, and Betty Miller for $83,300. Only the issue of attorney
fees remained pending in district court. Defendants again appealed
(no. 93-4079).
The County then settled with Plaintiff all the claims for

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2 The appeals of Van Zandt County and Sheriff Jordan and Wayne
Miller in their official capacities were dismissed on May 11, 1993.
3
compensatory damages and attorney's fees.2 After the district
court denied relief on the attorney's fee issue as moot, Defendants
Jordan and Wayne Miller filed a third appeal (no. 93-4431), out of
concern that this court would regard the latest district court
order as the final judgment for purposes of appeal. The third
appeal was unnecessary, however, since an unresolved issue of
attorney fees does not prevent a judgment on the merits from being
final. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202
(1988). Accordingly, the third appeal, no. 93-4431, is dismissed.
Otherwise, we agree with the parties that we have jurisdiction of
these appeals.
The only remaining issues concern the denial of qualified
immunity for Sheriff Jordan and Wayne Miller, the sufficiency of
evidence of Betty Miller's participation in the conspiracy, and the
punitive damage awards.
I.
We first address the question whether the court erred in
denying the qualified immunity defense of Defendants Jordan and
Wayne Miller. This court reviews a denial of qualified immunity de
novo. McDuffie v. Estelle, 935 F.2d 682, 684 (5th Cir. 1991).
Qualified immunity shields officials from personal liability for
conduct which does not violate well-established law. See Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). However, the qualified
immunity defense fails if a reasonable official would know that the

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4
action taken would violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights.
See id. at 815.
The reasonableness test is measured in light of clearly
established legal rights at the time the action was taken: "the
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
Defendants first challenge the district court's conclusion
that Edmonson had a clearly established property right in operating
his bail bond business such as would entitle him to some due
process protection. It is well established that "a reasonable,
continued expectation of entitlement to a previously acquired
benefit constitutes a cognizable property interest for purposes of
due process protection." Ramirez v. Ahn, 843 F.2d 864, 867 (5th
Cir. 1988) (citing Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 579 (1972)), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1085 (1989). We need
not determine what process was due to agree with the district court
that a due process violation occurred. Sheriff Jordan's policies
provided no process either pre- or post-deprivation. Jordan
revoked Edmonson's license at least three times without providing
any pre-deprivation notice and refused to give Edmonson access to
the information upon which suspension was based. No prompt post-
deprivation hearing was offered. In sum, it was clearly
established that some process was due before Edmonson could be
deprived of his license; the sheriff's department provided none.
Defendants also contend that they violated no clearly

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5
established liberty interest. We reject this challenge as well.
Edmonson had a liberty interest under clearly established notions
of due process in operating a business free from arbitrary
interference from state officials. Pursuit of one's livelihood is
a constitutionally protected liberty interest. See generally
Phillips v. Vandygriff, 711 F.2d 1217, 1222-23 (5th Cir. 1983)
(characterizing the right to work for a living as the very essence
of personal freedom secured by the Fourteenth Amendment), clarified
on rehearing, 724 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821
(1984).
Defendants next argue that the court erred in considering the
constitutional rights in a much too general sense, eviscerating the
purpose of qualified immunity. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639-40
(requiring that test of "clearly established law" be applied in a
more particularized sense rather than at a very general level, such
as the general right to due process. According to Defendants, the
more narrow and properly framed issue under Anderson is whether a
reasonable officer would know that Defendants' particular acts--
preferring another bail bonding company over Edmonson's business--
was unlawful.
To deny qualified immunity, the court need not conclude that
"the very act in question has previously been held unlawful, but
. . . in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be
apparent." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. The contours of the rights
at issue were sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that Defendants' particular acts did violate those

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rights: they enforced discriminatory treatment of Edmonson by
instructing employees to deny Edmonson and his company privileges
enjoyed by Betty Miller and Free State, by harassing or
intimidating jailers who questioned the policy of favoritism
towards Betty Miller's business, by rewarding jailers or trusties
who approved of their policy or treated her business
preferentially, by harassing Edmonson, and by allowing and
encouraging solicitation of business only for Free State. No
reasonable officer could conclude that such invidiously
discriminatory conduct and policies would not infringe Edmonson's
rights.
II.
We next address the issue whether the district court clearly
erred in finding that Betty Miller conspired with Sheriff Jordan
and Wayne Miller to deprive Edmonson of his constitutional rights.
Betty Miller argues that there is no evidence to support the
district court's conclusion that she was part of the conspiracy, or
that the conspiracy theory is supported only by "snippets of
testimony." She specifically argues that there is no evidence that
she agreed, jointly acted, or reached an understanding with the
state actors to violate the rights of Plaintiff.
In order to prevail on a §1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff
must establish that Defendants agreed to commit an unlawful act.
Crowe v. Lucas, 595 F.2d 985, 993 (5th Cir. 1979). Plaintiff must
show both the existence of a conspiracy involving state action and
a deprivation of civil rights in furtherance of the conspiracy by

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a party to the conspiracy. Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, 918 F.2d
1178, 1187 (5th Cir. 1990). The district court found that
Defendants Sheriff Jordan, Wayne Miller, and Betty Miller conspired
to impede Edmonson's bail bond business and assist Betty Miller's
business. The finding that Betty Miller participated in such a
conspiracy is not clearly erroneous.
Some evidence showed that Betty Miller willingly accepted
business knowing it had been illegally solicited. With full
knowledge that there was a rule against solicitation, she told jail
employees that solicitations were permitted. Further evidence
showed that Betty Miller repeatedly went to the jail despite her
knowledge of a rule that bailbond agents were not allowed into the
jail. When confronted about her continued access to the jail, she
replied that she could do whatever she wanted because she was the
chief deputy's wife.
Evidence showed that Betty Miller brought gratuities or treats
to trusties who recommended her as a bondsman. She violated posted
rules regarding giving out food and suggested to jail employees
that she had special influence with the sheriff's department.
For his part, Jordan condoned the solicitation of business for
Free State and allowed Miller special privileges denied Edmonson.
Wayne Miller solicited business for his wife on at least three
occasions. Though he was in charge of disciplining trustees, Wayne
Miller encouraged them to solicit business for Free State when some
admonishment would have been in order. Based on this
circumstantial evidence, a fact finder could reasonably infer that

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Betty Miller had agreed with the sheriff and her husband to
monopolize the bailbond business at the expense of Plaintiff.
III.
We finally reach the question of punitive damages. The fact
finder may assess punitive damages in a §1983 action "when the
defendant's conduct . . . involves reckless or callous indifference
to the federally protected rights of others." Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30, 56 (1983). Defendants Jordan and Wayne Miller maintain
that Plaintiff failed to establish his entitlement to punitive
damages. More specifically, they complain that the court failed to
enumerate what factors distinguish their conduct as reckless or
callous indifference to Edmonson's rights.
The infliction of punitive damages is within the discretion of
the trier of fact. Fairley v. Jones, 824 F.2d 440, 444 (5th Cir.
1987); Hale v. Fish, 899 F.2d 390, 404 (5th Cir. 1990). The trial
court correctly recognized that in assessing punitive damages a
fact finder is required to evaluate "'the nature of the conduct in
question, the wisdom of some form of pecuniary punishment, and the
advisability of a deterrent.'" Fairley, 824 F.2d at 444 (quoting
Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 294 (5th Cir.
1970)). See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 11-12 (no.
93-4079, I R. 180-81).
The district court found that Jordan and Wayne Miller "acted
maliciously and with reckless or callous indifference" to
Edmonson's federally protected rights, referring to their actions
described at length in findings numbered 21-76 of the liability

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phase of the trial. The court also noted that these Defendants
were aware that their actions violated county policy.
No further or more specific explanation of the Defendant's
conduct meriting punitive damages is required. In those fifty-six
findings of the liability opinion, the court found the conspiracy,
explained how Sheriff Jordan and Wayne Miller permitted and
encouraged solicitation of business for Free State, found that
Sheriff Jordan allowed Betty Miller special privileges not granted
to Plaintiff, found that Sheriff Jordan repeatedly suspended
Edmonson's bail bond license without procedural safeguards, and
found that Wayne Miller repeatedly improperly solicited business
for his wife. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the
district judge in concluding that these Defendants exhibited
reckless or callous indifference to Edmonson's rights.
Defendants Jordan and Wayne Miller also argue that some
(selected) testimony does not support an inference of reckless or
callous disregard of the Plaintiff's rights. We review facts
underlying a punitive damage award only for clear error. Raley v.
Fraser, 747 F.2d 287, 290 (5th Cir. 1984). The court as trier of
fact had sufficient evidence of conduct constituting callous or
reckless disregard.
Defendants Wayne Miller and Jordan finally complain that a
deterrent is not needed because the injunctive relief succeeds in
serving this purpose. This argument ignores the fact that
punishment and deterrence of others is a proper purpose of punitive
damages. Punitive damages serve both to punish the defendant for

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his conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar
behavior. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 54.
As for Betty Miller, most of her complaints about damages are
moot in view of the settlement of all compensatory damages.
However, she expands one argument--that the damage awards are
speculative--to the punitive damage award, too. Specifically, she
complains that a witness calculated her ability to pay punitive
damages based not on the value of Betty Miller's business alone but
rather on the combined values of her business and her daughter-in-
law's bond business.
The amount of punitive damages lies within the discretion of
the trier of fact and is never proven by a plaintiff with
certainty. See Lee, 429 F.2d at 294. Betty Miller's argument that
the award is speculative assumes that either the court's finding
that the two entities were operating as one company was clearly
erroneous, or that the court abused its discretion in considering
the value of both businesses in assessing punitive damages.
We find neither clear error nor abuse of discretion. The
finding regarding the operation of two companies as one was based
on ample evidence. E.g., III R. 9, 43-45, 85, 236-40 (no. 93-
4079). If Betty Miller attempted to show modest means in
mitigation of a punitive damage award (by showing that the value of
her business alone should be considered), the trial court was not
persuaded. Our only other inquiry is whether the district judge
abused his discretion in considering the value of the two
businesses in view of the finding that they operated as one. We

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find no abuse of discretion.
Because we find no error regarding the punitive damage awards,
we affirm.
Conclusion
Appeal number 93-4431 is DISMISSED; with respect to the other
two appeals, the judgment of the district court is in all respects
AFFIRMED.

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