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93-3367•Summary Calendar BOBBY R. HOOKFIN v. TERRY TERRELL, Warden, Allen Correctional Center
93-3367Court of Appeals for the Fifth CircuitMar 22, 2004
*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions
that have no precedential value and merely decide particular
cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes
needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal
profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 93-3367
Summary Calendar
BOBBY R. HOOKFIN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
TERRY TERRELL, Warden,
Allen Correctional Center and
RICHARD P. IEYOUB, Attorney General, State of Louisiana,
Respondents-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
(C.A. 93-116 M)
(March 11, 1994)
Before DAVIS, JONES, and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.*
PER CURIAM:
On his appeal of the denial of federal habeas relief,
appellant Hookfin contends that there was insufficient evidence to
convict him of attempted possession with intent to distribute
cocaine and that Louisiana's obstruction of justice statute is
unconstitutionally vague. There is no merit in either of these
contentions, and we affirm the district court's judgment.
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As an initial matter, we note that although Hookfin filed
a motion with this court to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal,
the district court had already granted this status. Hookfin's
motion is therefore denied as unnecessary.
1. Sufficiency of Evidence
Hookfin seems to contend that he was convicted of
attempted possession with intent to distribute bags containing
cocaine residue. This is incorrect, he was charged and convicted
of attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine, not
baggies. The evidence showed that Hookfin resided at a New Orleans
residence where he arranged with an undercover police officer to
sell two ounces of cocaine costing $2,800. Just as the deal was
about to be consummated, Hookfin was warned by his brother's beeper
that police were in the area, and, with the undercover officer
watching, Hookfin's co-defendants flushed the cocaine and the cash
down the toilet. This evidence was never recovered, but the police
have maintained copies of the bills destined for the transaction.
There was eyewitness testimony about the deal. There was drug-
dealing paraphernalia in the residence, and cocaine residue was
found in plastic baggies.
If this wasn't enough evidence to convict Hookfin, it is
difficult to see what would be sufficient.
2. Louisiana Obstruction of Justice Statute
Louisiana Revised Stat. Ann. § 14:130.1 (West 1986).
Hookfin was charged with obstruction of justice by
flushing cocaine and money down a toilet to prevent police
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officers, who were in the process of entering his fortified
residence to serve a search warrant, from obtaining the drugs and
money for use as evidence against him. He alleges, however, that
the cited state statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face
because people of ordinary intelligence could interpret it in a
variety of meanings, so that no one knows precisely what conduct is
proscribed. It is well settled that a plaintiff who engages in
some conduct that is clearly proscribed by the law cannot complain
of its vagueness as applied to the conduct of others. Home Depot,
Inc. v. Guste, 773 F.2d 616, 627 (5th Cir. 1985), citing Village of
Hoffman Estates v. FlipSide, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 495,
102 S. Ct. 1186 (1982). Further, a statute is not unconstitutional
unless it is vague in all of its applications. Id.
The Louisiana statute says that obstruction of justice
occurs if a defendant has knowledge that, e.g., tampering with
evidence, "reasonably may or will affect an actual or potential
present, past or future criminal proceeding . . . " Ordering the
destruction of the evidence of a drug deal that the defendant
himself has orchestrated easily falls within this statute. If
Hookfin did not believe that the evidence reasonably might affect
a criminal proceeding against him, why would he have bothered to
try to destroy it? This challenge is meritless.
AFFIRMED.
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