(caption unavailable)

*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that have no precedential value and merely decide
particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens
on the legal profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be
published.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 92-8593
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
GASPAR MONTOYA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Texas
(MO 92 CR 61 1)
April 21, 1993
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Gaspar Montoya pleaded guilty to conspiracy to laundering
money. In the presentence report (PSR), the probation officer
found that the offense conduct indicated that Montoya directed the
actions of his co-conspirators in the money-laundering scheme and
recommended a four-level upward adjustment for his leadership role
in the offense. PSR, ¶ 22. The probation officer also recommended

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against a two-level reduction of the offense level for acceptance
of responsibility. Id. at ¶ 15-16.
Montoya filed objections to these recommendations. PSR
Addendum, 18. The district court overruled the objections and
sentenced Montoya to the maximum statutory term of imprisonment of
60 months, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised
release.
Montoya argues that there was no evidence presented to support
the district court's finding that he held a leadership role in the
transaction on which the conviction was based and, therefore, the
finding was clearly erroneous.
The review of a sentence under the guidelines is limited to a
determination of "whether the sentence was imposed in violation of
the law or as a result of an incorrect application of the
sentencing guidelines." United States v. Follin, 979 F.2d 369, 375
(5th Cir. 1992). An application of the guidelines based on factual
findings will be affirmed if they are not clearly erroneous. Id.
"A factual finding is not clearly erroneous as long as it is
plausible in light of the record as a whole." Id.
A defendant's offense level may be increased by four levels if
he "was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved
five or more participants or was otherwise extensive." U.S.S.G. §
3B1.1. Factors which may be considered by the district judge in
determining whether a defendant held a leadership role include the
exercise of decision making authority, the nature of his
participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of

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accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of
the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing
the offense, and the degree of control and authority exercised over
the others. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.3). The district court
may rely on information contained in the pre-sentence report in
making factual sentencing determinations, if the information has
"some minimum indicium of reliability." United States v. Shipley,
963 F.2d 56, 59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 348 (1992)
(citation omitted).
The pre-sentence investigation revealed Montoya provided
$92,259 in currency to co-defendants, Romero and Beamann, who were
affiliated with Farmers Construction Company (FCC). PSR, ¶ 6. The
funds were used to purchase unpaid invoices from FCC which were
placed in the name of Montoya's company, Gasper Tractor Service.
Id. Beamann used $45,000 of the funds to purchase a cashier's
check and money orders from co-defendant Alexander, a vice-
president of Commercial State Bank of Andrews, and deposited them
into the FCC business account at the First National Bank. Id.
Each of the deposits made in the FCC accounts were in amounts less
than $10,000. Id. at ¶ 8. After the deposits were completed, FCC
wrote checks totalling $85,902, payable to Gasper Tractor Service,
and deposited the checks into that company's account. Id. at ¶ 6.
Juanita Barrera, an assistant vice-president of First National
Bank, took personal money orders from Beamann and two bank money
orders from Montoya, which Montoya had purchased for $6500 in
currency at the bank. PSR, ¶ 9. Montoya purchased an additional

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money order for $3500 and delivered it to Barrera. Id. Barrera,
who was aware that Montoya was a drug dealer, used the money order
to provide a $10,000 down payment on a mobile home for Montoya.
Id.
Montoya provided co-defendant William Rich with currency in
excess of $10,000 and instructed Rich to deposit funds in a manner
to avoid currency transaction reports. PSR, ¶ 10. Rich made two
separate deposits of $5000 each at two different financial
institutions in Andrews, Texas. Id. Montoya also provided his
brother, Jessie Montoya, with $5000 in currency on two consecutive
days, and Jessie made separate deposits of the funds into the
Gasper Tractor Service account in the First National Bank. PSR, ¶
11.
Romero and Rich admitted that they were aware that Montoya was
a drug dealer and that the currency was derived from the drug
business. Id. at ¶ 12. They also acknowledged that the deposits
of the currency were made to avoid filing currency transaction
reports. Id.
In order to prove a money laundering violation, the Government
must show that the defendant conducted a financial transaction
involving proceeds from an illegal transaction, and structured the
transaction so as to disguise the source or nature of the proceeds
or to avoid state or federal transaction reporting requirements.
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(B)(i)(ii). Financial institutions are required
to report transactions in currency in amounts over $10,000. 31
U.S.C. § 5313(a). A person who structures or assists in

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structuring transactions for the purpose of evading currency
transaction reporting requirements or causes a financial
institution to fail to file the required reports is acting in
violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324.
The information contained in the PSR reflected Montoya
recruited his four co-defendants and two other individuals to
assist him in laundering the proceeds of his drug-trafficking
operation. The evidence reflected that Montoya instructed his
accomplices to structure deposits of money into his account in such
a manner as to avoid the currency transaction reporting
requirements. The majority of the laundered funds were placed into
Montoya's business account.
"[T]he facts necessary to support an adjustment in sentencing
must only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence." United
States v. Hinojosa, 958 F.2d 624, 633 (5th Cir. 1992). The
preponderance of the evidence reflects that Montoya held a
leadership role in a money laundering scheme involving five or more
participants.
Montoya argues that the district court failed to make specific
findings with respect to his leadership role in the offense.
"[T]he district court is not required under section § 3B1.1 to make
any finding of fact more specific than that the defendant was a
`leader' or `organizer'." United States v. Rodriguez, 897 F.2d
1324, 1327 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 158 (1990). "The
court is required to resolve specifically disputed issues of fact
if it intends to use those facts as a basis for its sentence." Id.

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During the sentence hearing, Montoya's counsel asserted that
Montoya was recruited by co-defendant Romero, who devised the money
laundering scheme. Objections which are merely in the form of
unsworn assertions are considered to be unreliable and should not
be considered by the district court. United States v. Lghodaro,
967 F.2d 1028, 1030 (5th Cir. 1992). Therefore, the trial court
did not err in overruling the objection and relying on the
information contained in the PSR.
Montoya argues that the district court may not look beyond the
transaction underlying the offense of conviction in determining the
number of participants involved in the criminal activity. The
criminal activity considered by the district court in making an
adjustment under § 3B1.1 must be "anchored to the transaction
leading to the conviction." United States v. Whitlow, 979 F.2d
1008, 1011 (5th Cir. 1992). However, the district court may
"consider all conduct linked to the transaction[,] . . . even if it
falls outside the four corners of the conviction itself." Id.
This argument is without merit.
Further, Montoya did not object to the finding in the PSR that
the scheme involved five participants and, thus, this factual issue
is not subject to review on appeal. United States v. Sherbak, 950
F.2d 1095, 1101 (5th Cir. 1992).
Montoya contends that the district court erred in refusing to
adjust the offense level downward for his acceptance of
responsibility. Montoya argues that his acceptance of
responsibility was evidenced by the fact that he pleaded guilty,

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did not force the Government to go to trial, and because he
admitted the source of the currency.
A defendant is entitled to a two-level reduction in the
offense level if he "clearly demonstrates a recognition and
affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal
conduct." U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. A district court's determination of
whether a defendant has accepted responsibility is entitled to even
greater deference on review than that accorded under a clearly
erroneous standard. Shipley, 963 F.2d at 58.
The entry of a guilty plea prior to trial does not entitle a
defendant to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility if the
evidence reflects the defendant has not truthfully admitted his
involvement in the offense and related conduct. Id. A defendant
who attempts to minimize his leadership role in the offense, in
spite of reliable evidence to the contrary, is not entitled to a
reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Id. at 58-59.
As discussed previously, Montoya denied his leadership role in
the scheme and also claimed that a portion of the money paid to
Gasper Tractor Service was for services rendered. See PSR
Addendum, 17. Because Montoya did not accept responsibility for
all of his relevant criminal conduct, the district court did not
err in denying him the two-level reduction.
Montoya argues that the district court abused its discretion
in imposing his sentence to run consecutively to a sentence imposed
in another case in the Western District of Texas. Montoya argues
that the district court failed to discuss the factors set out in 18

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U.S.C. § 3553. Id. at 8. Montoya was sentenced in an unrelated
case on January 15, 1992, following a guilty plea to possession of
a firearm during a drug-trafficking crime.
Generally, multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different
times run consecutively unless the court orders that the terms are
to run concurrently. 18 U.S.C. § 3584; see also U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3
(if defendant is serving a sentence or has been sentenced for
another offense not yet discharged, the sentence for the instant
offense shall be imposed consecutively). A district court has
broad discretion in deciding to impose a sentence consecutively or
concurrently. United States v. Parks, 924 F.2d 68, 72 (5th Cir.
1991). The district court should consider the guidelines and
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission in making the
sentencing decision. Id.
During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel requested that
the court impose a sentence concurrent to the January 1992
sentence, so that Montoya would have a greater opportunity to spend
time with his wife and child and to improve his potential for
earning a living. The district court recognized that the
defendant's imprisonment would be a hardship on his family, but
noted that the laundering offense was serious and imposed a
consecutive sentence. Montoya has not shown that the district
court abused its discretion in imposing the consecutive sentence.
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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