(caption unavailable)

* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions
that have no precedential value and merely decide particular
cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes
needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal
profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
__________________
No. 92-7364
Conference Calendar
__________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHARLES RAY MOORE,
Defendant-Appellant.
- - - - - - - - - -
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. CR-L-91-264
- - - - - - - - - -
March 19, 1993
Before KING, DAVIS, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Moore argues that the Government produced insufficient
evidence of the knowledge element essential for his convictions
for possession with intent to distribute and importation of
marijuana. He asserts that he was "duped" into driving the car
which was found to contain 86.5 pounds of marijuana. Moore moved
for a judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of evidence at
the conclusion of the presentation of the Government's evidence,
but failed to renew this motion at the conclusion of the

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No. 92-7364
-2-
presentation of his defense. Consequently, this Court's review
is not under the usual standard of review for claims of
insufficiency of evidence, but rather under a much stricter
standard. See United States v. Ruiz, 860 F.2d 615, 617 (5th Cir.
1988). The review of Moore's claim is limited to the
determination of whether there was a manifest miscarriage of
justice. Such a miscarriage exists only if the record is devoid
of evidence pointing to guilt. See id.
Moore contested only the element of knowledge, which was
required for each offense of conviction. In cases involving
hidden compartments, reliance may not be placed solely on the
defendant's control of the vehicle. United States v. Gibson, 963
F.2d 708, 710 (5th Cir. 1992). In such instances, possession can
be inferred only if knowledge is indicated by additional factors,
such a circumstances evidencing a consciousness of guilt on the
part of the defendant. Id. at 710-11. Circumstantial factors
evidencing a consciousness of guilt include an implausible
explanation for one's travels, conflicting statements, and
nervousness when questioned. Id.; see also United States v.
Greenwood, 974 F.2d 1449, 1456 (5th Cir. 1992).
Moore's explanation of his travels is implausible at best.
Moore acknowledged that he knew that his employer, Rosa, was
involved in drug trafficking. Moore was to be paid $200 to drive
a car with an approximated value of only $400. He agreed to
drive the car to Monterrey for Maria and Delio, yet they
accompanied him on the trip to Monterrey.
The INS agent testified that Moore was extremely nervous at

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No. 92-7364
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the checkpoint. The agent also testified that Moore was in a
"panic state" when he saw the narcotics dog. Although Moore
contends that he visited Monterrey, Nuevo Laredo, Guadalajara,
and San Juan, he told the INS officer he had been vacationing in
Mexico City. Finally, Moore asserts that he was "set up" by
Maria and Delio, yet when he was confronted with the news that
contraband was found in the car, he never mentioned Maria and
Delio.
A review of the record demonstrates that Moore had knowing
possession of the marijuana. Thus, there was sufficient evidence
to support his convictions. The judgment of the district court
is AFFIRMED.

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