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1 Local Rule 47.5.1 provides: "The publication of opinions
that have no precedential value and merely decide particular
cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes
needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal
profession." Pursuant to that rule, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________________
No. 92-5637
Summary Calendar
_________________________________________
ROBERT LOZA, Individually and
as representative of the Estate
of and community survivor of
the Estate of Esperanza Loza,
deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(SA-91-CV-376)
_________________________________________________________________
(December 22, 1992)
Before JOLLY, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Robert Loza appeals an adverse summary judgment that
benefits were not due under his deceased wife's expired life
insurance policy. We AFFIRM.

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I.
Esperanza Loza worked as a district manager for Parklane
Hosiery Company until January 15, 1986; and her benefits included
$100,000 group life insurance coverage with Massachusetts Mutual
Life Insurance Company. Although Mrs. Loza was terminated on
January 15, Parklane continued to pay her full salary and
insurance benefits until February 28. Mrs. Loza died on March
25, 1986. On several occasions, Mr. Loza was advised by Parklane
and Massachusetts Mutual that Mrs. Loza did not have coverage
when she died.
The policy read, in pertinent part:
Part IV -- DISCONTINUANCE OF THE PERSONAL
INSURANCE OF AN EMPLOYEE
1. Except as may be provided to the contrary
in this Part, an employee's Personal
Insurance under any Part of this policy
shall cease on the first to occur of the
following dates:
* * *
f. The date of termination of the
employee's employment. Termination
of employment, for the purpose of
this section, and for no other
purpose, means cessation of active
work as an employee in a class of
employees eligible for insurance
hereunder....
* * *
Section V -- PRIVILEGE OF CONVERTING TO AN
INDIVIDUAL POLICY OF LIFE INSURANCE
1. An insured employee shall be entitled to
have an individual policy of life
insurance, without disability benefits,
issued to him without evidence of
insurability upon written application and

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the payment of the first premium to
Massachusetts Mutual within thirty-one
days after the date of
a. discontinuance of his Personal Group
Life Insurance due to termination of
his employment ....
* * *
4. The maximum amount of insurance which an
employee is entitled to convert by reason
of this Section shall be payable under
this Part in the event of his death
during the thirty-one day period during
which the conversion privilege may be
exercised.
(Emphasis added.)
Loza filed suit against Massachusetts Mutual in Texas state
court in February 1991 seeking, inter alia, $100,000, representing
the death benefit of the policy. Massachusetts Mutual removed to
federal court, where it was granted summary judgment on the
grounds: that the "clear and unambiguous" policy language required
Mrs. Loza to exercise her conversion option within 31 days of
January 15, 1986; and that the claim was barred by Texas's four
year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions, because
Mr. Loza knew as early as the spring of 1986 that Massachusetts
Mutual would take the position that there was no coverage.
II.
On appeal, Loza contends that summary judgment was improper
because 1) interpretation of the insurance contract's conversion
provision created a genuine issue of material fact and 2) the
district court erred in calculating the date at which his cause of
action accrued. When properly calculated, he claims, the action

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was filed well within the limitations period. We agree with the
district court's holding that the language of the policy was clear
and unambiguous and that, pursuant to that language, she was not
covered at the time of her death. Therefore, even if Mr. Loza
filed his claim within the limitations period, adverse summary
judgment was proper on the merits of the case. Accordingly, we
need not determine whether he filed his claim within the
limitations period.
An appeal from the grant of summary judgment, of course,
requires this court to conduct a de novo review of the record
before the district court. E.g., Sheline v. Dun & Bradstreet, 948
F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1991). And, summary judgment is appropriate,
inter alia, where, as here, the only question before the court is
a legal one. Id. The only matter before the district court in
this case was interpretation of the life insurance contract.
Contract interpretation, and the preliminary issue of whether the
contract is ambiguous present purely legal questions. National
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Kasler Corp., 906 F.2d 196, 198 (5th Cir.
1990). Because this is a diversity action, we interpret the
insurance contract according to Texas law. E.g., Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Texas law requires that insurance contracts be liberally
construed in favor of the insured, but only when the contract is
ambiguous. "Where no ambiguity exists, it is the duty of the court
to enforce the policy in accordance with its plain meaning."
Kasler, 906 F.2d at 198 (citing Puckett v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 678

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S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex. 1984)). Mrs. Loza's policy clearly stated
that coverage ceased on the "date of termination of the employee's
employment". In his Original Petition, her husband admitted that
Mrs. Loza was "terminated from employment with Parklane Hosiery" on
January 15, 1986. Furthermore, the policy itself defined
termination as "cessation of active work as an employee". Loza
does not even attempt to establish that his wife continued active
work for Parklane after January 15. Instead, he contends that
because Mrs. Loza was paid until February 28, her option to convert
the insurance policy to a personal one did not kick in until that
date. Therefore, he asserts, under paragraph 4 of Section V.,
providing maximum coverage for 31 days after the conversion option
becomes available, Mrs. Loza was automatically covered for 31 days
after February 28, despite the fact that she did not exercise her
conversion option. Under this calculation, coverage would have
been in effect on March 25.
We cannot agree with this position. The conversion provision
states that the option may be exercised "within thirty-one days
after the date of ... discontinuance of [the] Personal Group Life
Insurance due to termination of ... employment". As stated above,
the policy expressly and plainly defines "termination", which, in
this case would be January 15. A provision which discontinues
coverage upon termination is valid under Texas law. Bliss v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society, 620 F.2d 65, 69 (5th Cir. 1980).
Parklane could not change the contractual provisions simply by
promising Mrs. Loza six more weeks of insurance coverage and paying

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the premiums for that period of time: "The mere fact that premiums
were paid and received by the insurance company covering a period
of time extending beyond the termination of employment under the
terms of [the] policy does not have the legal effect of extending
policy coverage". Massey v. Aztec Life Ins. Co., 532 S.W.2d 702,
706 (Tex. App. -- Fort Worth 1976, no writ). In sum, we hold that
Mrs. Loza's conversion option became effective on January 15, 1986.
She was automatically covered for 31 days thereafter. But, because
she did not exercise that option, she had no coverage on March 25,
the date of her death.
III.
Accordingly, the judgment is
AFFIRMED.

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