(caption unavailable)

* Local Rule 47.5.1 provides: "The publication of opinions that have no
precedential value and merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-
settled principles of law imposes needless expense on the public and burdens
on the legal profession." Pursuant to that rule, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 92-2522
Summary Calendar
_______________
JANE WALEY,
for FOREST WALEY, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
DONNA SHALALA,
Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
CA H 91 1723
_________________________
April 21, 1993
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jane Waley appeals the district court's dismissal of her
complaint seeking to reopen proceedings for social security
benefits pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.987. Finding no error, we
affirm.

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I.
The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied the applica-
tion for Forest M. Waley, Jr. (Forest), for social security
disability benefits on July 6, 1970. Forest's mother, Era L. Waley
(Era), applied in 1975 for child survivor disability benefits for
him. Her claim was denied on initial review and on reconsidera-
tion. Era was represented by counsel when her claim was denied on
reconsideration in 1977.
Forest applied again for child survivor disability benefits in
1988. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Forest had been
disabled by a mental impairment since 1964 and awarded benefits.
Forest, represented by counsel, then applied for reopening of
his 1970 application for benefits. The Appeals Council denied the
application.
Jane Waley (Waley), Forest's sister, filed a complaint in the
district court seeking judicial review of the Appeals Council's
denial of Forest's application to reopen his 1970 application,
naming as defendant the then-secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS). The district court eventually granted
the Secretary's motion to dismiss Waley's complaint.
II.
Waley first contends that HHS should have reopened Forest's
1970 application pursuant to Social Security Ruling 91-5p, 56 Fed.
Reg. 40,360. Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review HHS
denials of applications to reopen social security applications

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unless the applicant challenges the denial on constitutional
grounds. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107-09 (1977). The
district court therefore properly dismissed Waley's non-constitu-
tional contention.
Waley also contends that HHS violated his right to due process
by failing to apply SSR 91-5p to find good cause for reopening his
1970 application while applying it to reopen other applications.
Waley's constitutional contention is unavailing.
HHS regulations provide that an applicant dissatisfied with
agency determinations may request that his application be reopened.
20 C.F.R. § 404.987 (1991). The regulations allow such requests
within twelve months for any reason; within four years on a showing
of "good cause"; and at any time in a number of situations not
relevant to Waley's case. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.988-404.989 (1991).
According to SSR 91-5p,
It has always been SSA policy that failure to meet
the time limits for requesting review is not automatic
grounds for dismissing the appeal and that proper
consideration will be given to a claimant who presents
evidence that mental incapacity may have prevented him or
her from understanding the review process.
When a claimant presents evidence that mental
incapacity prevented him or her from timely requesting
review of an adverse determination, decision, dismissal,
or review by a Federal district court, and the claimant
had no one legally responsible for prosecuting the claim
(e.g., a parent of a claimant who is a minor, legal
guardian, attorney, or other legal representative) at the
time of the prior administrative action, SSA will
determine whether or not good cause exists for extending
the time to request review.
The Appeals Council found that Era's representation by counsel
in 1977 cured any defect resulting from Forest's lack of represen-

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tation in 1970 and denied Waley's application for reopening on that
ground. The Appeals Council's determination amounts to a finding
that Era's representation by counsel in 1977 meant that Forest's
mental incapacity in 1970 was not good cause for reopening his case
in 1991.
The Appeals Council's denial of Waley's application for
reopening Forest's 1970 application does not violate the Due
Process Clause. Counsel should have known in 1977 about the
procedures for review and reopening of cases. Counsel could have
moved for reopening in 1977. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.957 (1976). Cf.
Thibodeaux v. Bowen, 819 F.2d 76, 80-81 (5th Cir. 1987) (claim
preclusion applied to a social security case). In any event, the
only basis for a due process violation that Waley briefs is HHS's
alleged failure to follow SSR 91-5p. Sanders shows that failure to
follow HHS's policies, standing alone, is insufficient to confer
subject-matter jurisdiction on federal courts over HHS decisions
not to reopen social security applications. Waley has failed to
brief any other possible due process contentions on appeal and
therefore has abandoned any such contentions.
AFFIRMED.

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