Blue, et al v. Lexington Indep Sch, et al

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
October 13, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-50339
Summary Calendar
JUDY BLUE; HALEY BECKHAM,
By next friend, Judy Blue,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
LEXINGTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT;
PATRICK CLARK,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
No. A-04-CA-149-SS
Before JONES, WIENER, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiffs Haley Beckham and Judy Blue appeal the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants.
Finding no error, we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
In May 2001, Patrick Clark, the Superintendent of the
Lexington Independent School District (“LISD”), received an
anonymous letter alleging an affair between Beckham, then a

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1 Because Blue’s cause of action is dependent on Beckham’s, we will
refer to Blue and Beckham as only “Beckham.”
2 We have considered Beckham’s contentions out of an abundance of
caution. The brief flies in the face of the FED. R. APP. PROC. 28 requirements,
and normally we will not consider claims on appeal that are not properly
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student, and one of LISD’s coaches. In their various complaints,
Beckham and her mother, Blue,1 complain of Clark’s subsequent
investigation of the matter.
Beckham initially deposed Clark under Texas Rule 202,
which provides for pre-suit discovery. About two years later, she
filed suit in state court against LISD and Clark, alleging
violations of state law and the federal Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act. Clark and LISD removed the case to federal court,
and the district judge eventually dismissed Beckham’s case.
In the interest of justice, the district court granted
Beckham’s Rule 59 motion and allowed her to replead her case. In
her latest complaint, Beckham alleged violations of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (purportedly for violating the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments) and 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), Title IX (purportedly for
creating a hostile environment). Clark and LISD then filed a
motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted. It
is this grant of summary judgment from which she appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
For much of her brief, Beckham strolls through the
history of English and American law without offering any relevant
claims of error.2 It appears her main contention is that the

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addressed with logical argument and citation to authority. E.g., Randall v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 13 F.3d 888, 911 (5th Cir. 1994).
3 At the outset, we also reject Beckham’s argument that the district
court somehow misapplied the standard for granting summary judgment. The court
considered matters outside the pleadings, and accordingly, granted summary
judgment instead of a motion to dismiss. The court’s ruling complied with Rule
12(c). Further, to the extent Beckham spends much of her brief arguing with the
district court’s calculation of time, this argument is mooted by the district
court’s January 31, 2005 order, wherein the district court explained that
Beckham’s affidavits and memorandum in opposition to summary judgment in no way
altered its grant of summary judgment.
The parties also spend a great deal of time discussing qualified
immunity and TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 202. We need not reach those issues, as
our affirmance of the district court’s grant of summary judgment to LISD and
Clark is sufficient to affirm the district court’s judgment. We also reject
Beckham’s plea for Rule 11 sanctions on the statute of limitations issue. Given
the frivolity of most of Beckham’s pleadings, we are hardly apt to award
sanctions to the other party for a good faith dispute over the limitations issue.
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district court erred in granting summary judgment to LISD and Clark
on Beckham’s § 1983 and Title IX claims.3
First, Beckham has not alleged a proper § 1983 claim.
The allegations and affidavits in opposition to summary judgment
merely conclude that Clark and LISD violated Beckham’s Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, Beckham argues that
Clark’s investigation of the anonymous letter, and in particular
his questioning of Beckham about it, constituted malicious
prosecution and an unreasonable search and seizure. Involving the
sheriff’s department in an investigation of an alleged student-
teacher relationship is not malicious prosecution. Moreover, even
if it were, malicious prosecution alone is not a constitutional
violation and is thus insufficient to support a claim under § 1983.
Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 942 (5th Cir.2003) (en banc).
Further, school officials have the power to summon students for the

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purposes of questioning them regarding rumors. Milligan v. City of
Slidell, 226 F.3d 652, 655 (5th Cir. 2000). Beckham’s attempt to
distinguish Milligan fails, and so do her unreasonable search and
seizure claims.
Beckham also fails on the Title IX claim. Beckham does
not allege that she herself suffered harassment at the hands of
school officials; rather, she alleges that these officials violated
her privacy by investigating the anonymous letter, thus creating a
hostile environment. The district court’s well reasoned
explanation of why her claims fail in these respects is not in
error, and the court properly granted summary judgment to Clark and
LISD.
CONCLUSION
Finding no error, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of
summary judgment. Given our previous warning to Plaintiffs’
counsel, see Cilauro v. Thielsch Eng’g, Inc., No. 04-50602
(5th Cir. Jan. 18, 2005), we award double costs to appellees. See
FED. R. APP. P. 38.

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