In Re: Stamps, et al

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
January 25, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 05-30621
Summary Calendar
_______________
IN THE MATTER OF:
JERRY JACKSON STAMPS AND THERESA LYNN WITT-STAMPS,
Appellants,
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
m 2:04-MC-1831
______________________________
Before SMITH, GARZA and PRADO,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jerry Stamps and Theresa Witt-Stamps, a
married couple, challenge the district court’s
order disbarring them from the practice of law
in the Eastern District of Louisiana. Finding
no error, we affirm.
I.
The order arises from the Stampses’ disbar-
ment by the Louisiana Supreme Court. The
principal basis for the state disbarment deci-
sion is that court’s finding that the Stampses
purposefully excluded, from their Louisiana
bar applications, information regarding past
legal employment. The court also found that
the legal employment the Stampses sought to
conceal constituted the unauthorized practice
of law and that disbarment was the only appro-
priate sanction.
After being notified of the state disbarment
order, the federal district court directed the
Stampses to show cause why an identical sanc-
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has de-
termined that this opinion should not be published
and is not precedent except under the limited cir-
cumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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tion should not be imposed on them in the
Eastern District of Louisiana. After holding an
oral hearing and considering the Stampses’
objections to the state disbarment proceeding,
the district court ordered them disbarred.
II.
The Stampses correctly point out that disci-
pline imposed by federal courts does not auto-
matically flow from discipline in state courts.
Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 282
(1957). A federal court, however, should rec-
ognize, and give effect to, the “condition cre-
ated by the judgment of the state court unless,
from an intrinsic consideration of the state re-
cord,” it appears that
(1) the state proceeding was wanting
in due process;
(2) the proof of facts relied on by the
state court to establish want of fair char-
acter was so infirm as to give rise to a
clear conviction on the federal court’s part
that it could not, consistent with its duty,
accept the state court’s conclusion as fi-
nal; or
(3) that to do so would, for some other
grave and sufficient reason, conflict with
the court’s duty not to disbar except upon
the conviction that, under the principles
or right and justice, it is constrained to do
so.
Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917).
The Selling factors continue to be the standard
by which federal courts determine whether
they will impose reciprocal discipline based on
a state court proceeding and have been ex-
pressly employed by this circuit.1
III.
The Stampses’ main objection to the district
court’s order is that, they claim, the state court
proceedings on which it was based denied
them due process. They argue that the evid-
entiary standards used by the Louisiana Su-
preme Court were unconstitutionally lax, and
they urge this court to require that state dis-
barment proceedings employ evidentiary
standards akin to criminal prosecutions if they
are to be afforded deference by the federal
courts. The Stampses also argue, without any
elaboration, that the state decision was based
on insufficient proof of misconduct.
A.
On the due process claim, the Stampses
contend that the Louisiana Supreme Court
should have strictly employed the state’s rules
of evidence throughout the disbarment procee-
dings. They object to the introduction of a
variety of hearsay evidence that would prob-
ably not have been admitted in a criminal trial;
they contend that their rights under the United
States Constitution to confrontation and cross-
examination were repeatedly violated by the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s procedures. They
also attack the disbarment procedures used in
their case as inconsistent with that court’s
rules.
This latter contention is irrelevant. Wheth-
er the procedures were adequate under Louisi-
ana law is not a proper question for this court.
The Stampses concede as much in their brief
when they note that we have no authority, at
1 In re Wilkes, 494 F.2d 472, 476-77 (5th Cir.
1974); In re Dawson, 609 F.2d 1139, 1142 (5th
Cir.1980); see In re Watson, 2000 WL 34507666,
at *2 (5th Cir. 2000) (unpublished).

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this stage, to review directly the propriety of
a state court disbarment order. See Selling,
243 U.S. at 50. The question properly posed
by this appeal is whether we should decline to
give reciprocal force to the state court’s dis-
barment order because it allegedly is based on
procedures that fall short of the due process
guarantees of the United States Constitution.
Attorneys facing disciplinary proceedings
are not entitled to receive all the guarantees af-
forded the accused in a criminal case. Sealed
Appellant 1 v. Sealed Appellee 1, 211 F.3d
252, 254 (5th Cir. 2000). Although due pro-
cess does include notice and an opportunity to
be heard in these cases, only rarely will more
be required. Crowe v. Smith, 151 F.3d 217,
229 (5th Cir.1998). “That attorney discipline
proceedings require proof only by clear and
convincing evidence, as opposed to ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt,’ is indicative of the mere
quasi-criminal nature of such proceedings,
which nature would not implicate all of the due
process requirements attendant purely criminal
proceedings.” Sealed Appellant 1, 211 F.2d at
254.
In its opinion disbarring the Stampses, the
Louisiana Supreme Court correctly noted the
principal justification for allowing relaxed evi-
dentiary rules in disbarment proceedings:
“Unlike a lay jury, this court, in its role as trier
of fact in disciplinary cases, has the ability to
consider the entire record and evaluate and
weigh the probative value of evidence based
on the totality of the circumstances.” In re
Stamps, 874 So. 2d 113, 123 (La. 2004).
By adopting the rule urged by the Stamps-
es, requiring strict application of the rules of
evidence, we essentially would be telling the
members of the Louisiana Supreme Court that
they are not able objectively to weigh the evi-
dence before them and should be shielded from
certain evidence because of its potential to
influence their decision improperly. We de-
cline to do so; that court is eminently qualified
to consider any and all evidence before it in a
disbarment proceeding and to ascribe the ap-
propriate weight to that evidence. There is no
reason, in the record before us, to doubt that
the court did exactly that in the Stampses’
proceeding.
Regarding their rights to cross-examination
and confrontation of witnesses, the Stampses
ask this court to announce a new rule of law
granting such rights to attorneys facing disci-
plinary action. As stated above, we have nev-
er required more than notice and an opportu-
nity to be heard in these cases. It is undisput-
ed that the Stampses received notice and a
hearing at the state court and federal district
court levels.
There is no justification to depart from our
precedent. The Stampses were afforded all the
process that is due to attorneys facing disbar-
ment.
B.
The Stampses contend, without serious ex-
planation or elaboration, that their disbarment
was based on insufficient proof of misconduct.
Our standard of review on this claim is height-
ened by Supreme Court law. Under Selling,
such a challenge will succeed only if the evi-
dence relied on by the state court was “so
infirm as to give rise to a clear conviction on
the federal court’s part that it could not . . .
accept the state court’s decision . . . .” Sell-
ing, 243 U.S. at 51.
The summary of the evidence against the
Stampses provided in the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s opinion accurately reflects the con-
tents of the state court record. Our review of
that record does not reveal evidence so scant

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as to give rise to a clear conviction that the
state court decision was faulty. The evidence
accumulated against the Stampses is sufficient
under Selling to allow us to accept the state
court’s finding that the Stampses lied on their
bar exam applications to hide the fact that they
had engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law.
C.
The third Selling factor requires this court
not to defer to the state disbarment order if “to
do so would, for some other grave and suffi-
cient reason, conflict with the court’s duty not
to disbar except upon the conviction that, un-
der the principles or right and justice, it is con-
strained to do so.” Id. Other than the alleged
due process violations and insufficient evi-
dence claim, the Stampses provide no rationale
why we should doubt the state court’s rea-
soning. Finding no “grave and sufficient” rea-
sons ourselves, we are constrained by law to
defer to the decision of the Louisiana Supreme
Court.
AFFIRMED.

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