Dillon, et al v. TX Cmsn Env Quality, et al

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
May 23, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________
m 04-41307
Summary Calendar
_______________
IN THE MATTER OF:
SAM DILLON,
Debtor.
SAM DILLON AND PAM DILLON,
Appellants,
VERSUS
TEXAS COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND MICHAEL GROSS,
Appellees.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
m 9:04-CV-92-RHC
m 9:04-CV-93-RHC
m 9:04-CV-94-RHC
m 9:04-CV-95-RHC
______________________________

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Before DAVIS, SMITH, and DENNIS,
Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*
Pro se appellants Sam and Pam Dillon ap-
peal the district court’s order that affirmed the
bankruptcy court’s finding that they are ineli-
gible for relief under chapter 13 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Finding no error, we affirm.
I.
Sam Dillon and his wife filed for chapter 13
bankruptcy about three years after Dillon had
received a chapter 7 discharge. The Texas
Commission on Environmental Quality
(“TCEQ”)SSthe Texas state agency charged
with enforcing environmental lawsSSfiled a
timely claim against Dillon in connection with
the chapter 13 filing for governmental fines,
penalties, and other liabilities arising from al-
leged unlawful operation of public water utili-
ties. The Dillons objected to TCEQ’s initial
claim, asserting that they should not be fined
for periods before or during the pendency of
their chapter 7 proceeding. TCEQ amended
its claim to assert an unsecured interest in
$337,000 in fines and penalties only for unla-
wful operation allegedly conducted between
the dates of the chapter 7 discharge and the
chapter 13 filing.
The bankruptcy court denied the Dillons’
objection to TCEQ’s amended claim, finding
that the debtor had continued to operate the
water systems after the chapter 7 discharge.
Because TCEQ’s unsecured claim exceeded
$290,925 (the maximum amount of non-con-
tingent, liquidated, unsecured debt that a
debtor may have to receive relief under chap-
ter 13, see 11 U.S.C. § 109(e)), the court de-
nied confirmation of the Dillons’ chapter 13
plan, denied their motions for a hardship dis-
charge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b), and
dismissed their chapter 13 case without preju-
dice. The district court affirmed the bank-
ruptcy court’s rulings.
II.
We review the bankruptcy court’s factual
findings for clear error and its legal conclu-
sions de novo. See Lambert v. Miss. State Tax
Comm’n, 179 F.3d 281, 284 (5th Cir. 1999).
Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if we
have a definite and firm conviction that a mis-
take has been made. See Mabey v. Southwest-
ern Elec. Power Co., 150 F.3d 503, 513 (5th
Cir. 1998). “Strict application of the clearly
erroneous rule is particularly important whe[n]
the district court has affirmed the bankruptcy
court’s findings.” Coston v. Bank of Malvern,
987 F.2d 1096, 1099 (5th Cir. 1992).
The Dillons are pro se, so their briefs are
liberally construed and not held to the standard
of exactitude expected of briefs by attorneys.
See, e.g., Amin v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 706
F.2d 638, 640 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983). But, “pro
se litigants have no general immunity from the
rule that issues and arguments not briefed on
appeal are abandoned.” Geiger v. Jowers,
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 4572, at *4 n. 6 (5th
Cir. Mar. 21, 2005).
III.
The Dillons assert that the trustee, TCEQ,
and the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) are
liable for violating a plethora of federal stat-
utes, Texas regulations, and provisions in the
United States and Texas constitutions. As a
threshold matter, we refrain from considering
the claims made against the IRS, because they
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has
determined that this opinion should not be publis-
hed and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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are wholly irrelevant to the issues presented by
the instant appeal; the IRS is not a party to this
action, and the asserted liability has no
colorable impact on the issues that are present
vis-á-vis the parties that are properly part of
this action. Moreover, because the Dillons
merely string-cite the provisions and fail to in-
clude any facts or brief any argument explain-
ing why these laws were violated or how
finding liability under them would affect the
disposition in the district and bankruptcy
courts, the claims are deemed waived for in-
adequate briefing.1
IV.
As the district court properly found, the
dispositive issue is whether the bankruptcy
court properly allowed TCEQ’s claim, over
the Dillons’ objection, for an amount that ex-
ceeded $290,525; under 11 U.S.C. § 109(e),
an individual may not obtain relief under chap-
ter 13 unless, at the time of the petition, the
aggregated non-contingent, liquidated, un-
secured debts are lower than that amount.
Liberally construing the arguments presented
in the Dillons’ brief, they assert only two co-
herent challenges to the bankruptcy court’s al-
lowance of TCEQ’s claim: (1) that the claim
was fraudulent and (2) that it was error to ap-
prove the claim for $460,000 when the amen-
ded claim was for $337,000.2
The Dillons point to nothing in the record
that is probative of their assertion that TCEQ’s
claim was forged and fraudulent. Mere
conclusional assertions do not demonstrate
that the bankruptcy court was clearly errone-
ous in its factual finding that the claim was
legitimate. Even assuming arguendo that the
bankruptcy court erred in approving TCEQ’s
claim for $460,000 when it had requested only
$337,000, that would not affect the disposition
of the case, because $337,000 plainly exceeds
the $290,525 jurisdictional threshold limit for
chapter 13 bankruptcy relief established by §
109(e).
Because the bankruptcy court did not err in
allowing TCEQ’s claim for at least $290,525,
the Dillons are ineligible for relief under chap-
ter 13, because the debt exceeded the jurisdic-
tional limits established in §109(e). The re-
maining rulings of the bankruptcy court are
correct as a matter of law, because they flow
from the Dillons’ ineligibility for relief under
chapter 13; the court appropriately denied
certification of their plan, denied a hardship
discharge,3 and dismissed their case without
prejudice.
AFFIRMED.
1 See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(9)(A); see also
United States v. Martinez, 263 F.3d 436 (5th Cir.
2001) (noting that failure adequately to brief an
issue on appeal can constitute waiver of that argu-
ment); Geiger, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 4572, at *4
n. 6 (“[P]ro se litigants have no general immunity
from the rule that issues and arguments not briefed
on appeal are abandoned.”).
2 The Dillons do not argue that the method of
calculating TCEQ’s claim was in error, nor do they
(continued...)
2(...continued)
assert that the claim was not aggregated, non-
contingent, liquidated and unsecured, as required
for disqualifying a party from chapter 13 relief
under § 109(e).
3 A hardship discharge may be granted by the
bankruptcy court only “[a]t any time after the con-
firmation of the plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)
(emphasis added).

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