Figgs v. Vrazel, et al

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
July 28, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-41002
Summary Calendar
CEDRIC CHARLES FIGGS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
VICTOR J. VRAZEL; CHARLES LACKEY; LAURIE MEDIA; KERRY DIXON;
MARK DIAZ; LEPHER JENKINS; HURKALOT, Director,
Defendants-Appellees.
--------------------
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. C-99-CV-81
--------------------
Before JONES, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Cedric Charles Figgs, Texas prisoner # 623481, appeals the
dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Figgs argues that the
district court erred in not raising the res judicata bar with
regard to his due process and malicious prosecution claims until
the pretrial conference and that the res judicata bar does not
apply. Regardless of whether the district court properly raised
the res judicata bar sua sponte, see Mowbray v. Cameron County,

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No. 03-41002
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Texas, 274 F.3d 269, 281 (5th Cir. 2001), as the district court
alternatively found, Figgs’s claims against Victor J. Vrazel and
Kerry Dixon failed as a matter of law. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
There is no longer a freestanding section 1983 claim for
malicious prosecution in this circuit. Castellano v. Fragozo, 352
F.3d 939 (5th Cir. 2003). Thus, Figgs’ claim that Vrazel initiated
disciplinary proceedings against him without probable cause does
not state a claim. In any event, as the district court concluded,
Vrazel had probable cause for initiating the disciplinary
proceeding. Therefore, the district court did not err in
dismissing Figgs’s claim against Vrazel.
Figgs also admitted at the pretrial hearing that he never
asked that witnesses be present. Therefore, the district court did
not err in dismissing sua sponte Figgs’s claim against Dixon for
not allowing him to call witnesses at his disciplinary hearing.
Finally, the fact that there was no tape recording of the
disciplinary proceeding is insufficient to establish a procedural
due-process violation. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558
(1974).
Figgs argues that the law-of-the-case doctrine dictates that
he receive a favorable ruling because the district court’s final
decision conflicts with its ruling on the summary-judgment motion
that there were outstanding fact questions precluding summary
judgment. However, those fact questions were answered during the

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pretrial hearing, and the district court’s dismissal of Figgs’s
claims against Vrazel and Dixon does not violate the law-of-the-
case doctrine. See Clifford v. Gibbs, 298 F.3d 328, 331 (5th Cir.
2002)
Figgs also argues that the district court erred in denying his
requests that counsel be appointed. However, Figgs’s claims were
not complex, his pleadings adequately advanced his claims and took
advantage of the rules of discovery, and he successfully appealed
the initial dismissal to this court and opposed dispositive
motions. Figgs’s claims were based on his own direct experiences
and did not require extensive investigation. Additionally, this
case was resolved before trial. As Figgs has not presented
exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his
motion to appoint counsel. See Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209,
213 (5th Cir. 1982).
Finally, Figgs argues that, in response to his discovery
motions, the district court should have ordered the defendants to
conduct an inventory of the prior and instant lawsuits to determine
what had been taken from him. However, Figgs did not move the
court for a complete “inventory” but made specific requests for,
inter alia, the defendants’ answers to interrogatories and
admissions. The district court’s discovery decisions were not an
abuse of discretion. See Moore v. Willis Indep. School Dist., 233

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No. 03-41002
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F.3d 871, 876 (5th Cir. 2000). The judgment of the district court
is AFFIRMED.

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