United States v. Dimas

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
September 13, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-40483
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DOMINGO NOE DIMAS, also known as Mingo,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. L-99-CR-607-5
--------------------
Before DAVIS, SMITH and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Domingo Noe Dimas appeals his convictions for conspiracy and
aiding and abetting under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1951. He
argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
convictions, that the district court erred in not giving a specific
cautionary instruction regarding the testimony of Jesse Salas, and
that the district court erred in denying his motion for new trial.
To establish a Hobbs Act violation, the Government is required
to show (1) an act of extortion or an attempt or conspiracy to

-- 1 of 3 --

No. 03-40483
-2-
extort and (2) interference with interstate commerce. See United
States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1212 (5th Cir. 1997). To be
convicted of aiding and abetting, Dimas “must have associated with
the criminal venture, purposefully participated in it, and sought
by his actions to make it succeed.” United States v. Edwards, 303
F.3d 606, 637 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 1192 (2003). “Proof of a conspiracy does not require direct
evidence of an actual agreement between the co-conspirators, but
may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.” United States v.
Stephens, 964 F.2d 424, 427-28 (5th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government and giving the Government the benefit of all reasonable
inferences, we conclude that “a reasonable trier of fact could
[have] f[ou]nd that the evidence established guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 549 (5th
Cir. Unit B 1982)(en banc), aff’d on other grounds, 462 U.S. 356
(1983). Contrary to Dimas’ contentions, the jury could reasonably
infer from the totality of the circumstances involving Ronald
Taylor’s case alone that Dimas was participating in the case-fixing
conspiracy of Jose Marcelino Rubio, Sr. See Stephens, 964 F.2d at
427-28. Furthermore, a reasonable jury could have concluded beyond
a reasonable doubt that Dimas aided and abetted Salas and Rubio in
extorting money from Taylor for fixing his case. See Robinson, 119

-- 2 of 3 --

No. 03-40483
-3-
F.3d at 1212. Therefore, Dimas’ challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence is unavailing.
Because the admission of the testimony of a paid informant
raises serious concerns about the fairness of a trial, we require,
inter alia, the trial court to “give a careful instruction to the
jury pointing out the compensated witness’ suspect credibility.”
United States v. Narviz-Guerra, 148 F.3d 530, 538 (5th Cir. 1998).
Contrary to Dimas’ contentions, which he asserts for the first time
on appeal, the district court gave a specific cautionary
instruction regarding Salas’ credibility. Dimas fails to
demonstrate any error, plain or otherwise. See id.
As to Dimas’ last issue, the district court issued a detailed
memorandum and order in which it determined that the juror alleging
misconduct was not credible and that Dimas’ motion for new trial
consequently should be denied. Dimas does not address the district
court’s order setting forth its reasons for denying his motion for
new trial. He, thus, has abandoned the issue. See Yohey v.
Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993); Brinkmann v. Dallas
County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).
Based on the foregoing, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --