Ruben Espronceda, doing business as Save Our Services v. CYNDI TAYLOR KRIER, Judge, Individually

*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 02-50154
_______________________
RUBEN ESPRONCEDA, doing business as Save Our Services,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
CYNDI TAYLOR KRIER, Judge, Individually and as County Judge, Bexar
County; ELTON BOMER, in his official capacity as Texas Secretary of
State; HOWARD PEAK, in his official capacity as Mayor, City of San
Antonio; NORMA RODRIGUEZ, in her official capacity of Clerk, City
of San Antonio; HEARST CORPORATION, individually, by and through
San Antonio Express News,
Defendants-Appellees
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas, San Antonio Division
SA-00-CV-1259
_________________________________________________________________
February 6, 2003
Before JONES, WIENER, and DEMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant Ruben Espronceda (“Espronceda”) appeals the
dismissal of his claim against appellee Hearst Corporation
(“Hearst”) under Rule 12(b)(6) and the grant of summary judgment in

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1However, this court has previously observed that the Supreme
Court has “strongly implie[d] that it would accept an appeal of
2
favor of Cyndi Taylor Krier, Elton Bomer, Howard Peak, and Norma
Rodriguez (“government appellees”) on his claims under the Sections
2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and Texas state election laws. The order
of dismissal, grant of summary judgment, and the subsequent final
judgment were entered by a three-judge district court created
pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000) (section 5
of the Voting Rights Act) and 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (2000).
Appeals from three-judge district courts created pursuant
to section 5 must be brought in the Supreme Court of the United
States. 28 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000). As such, this court does not
have appellate jurisdiction over Espronceda’s section 5 claim. 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district
courts of the United States . . . except where a direct review may
be had in the Supreme Court.”)
Further, it is not clear whether the three-judge district
court had jurisdiction over the non-Section 5 claims upon which it
entered judgment. Whether or not the three-judge district court
had jurisdiction over them, however, only the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to consider a direct appeal on those claims at this
juncture.1

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some matter by itself normally unreviewable on direct appeal if
that appeal is included in an appeal from an injunctive order [over
which it had jurisdiction].” Hays v. Louisiana, 18 F.3d 1319, 1321
n.9 (5th Cir. 1994).
3
For these reasons, we DISMISS this appeal for lack of
jurisdiction and we REMAND the case to the three-judge district
court for entry of a new judgment so that Espronceda may timely
file an appeal to the Supreme Court.
APPEAL DISMISSED and CASE REMANDED.

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