Vaughn, et al v. St. Helena Police Jur

*District Judge of the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by
designation.
**Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
November 11, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 02-31243
IRA VAUGHN; BOBBY VAUGHN, doing business as Oak Ridge Lounge;
CHRISTY BARBER
Plaintiffs - Appellees
VERSUS
ST. HELENA POLICE JURY
Defendant - Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Louisiana, Baton Rouge
01-CV-772
Before DAVIS and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges and LITTLE*,
District Judge.
PER CURIAM:**
St. Helena Parish Police Jury prosecutes this appeal
challenging the district court’s order granting a preliminary

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injunction enjoining the Parish from enforcing Section 14:16 of its
Code of Ordinances regulating erotic dancing. The issue on appeal
is a very narrow one: whether the district court correctly
concluded that the ordinance violated the plaintiffs’ free speech
rights; more particularly whether the dress restrictions imposed by
the ordinance on dancers, patrons and non-dancing employees alike
in all establishments that serve alcohol is greater than necessary
for the furtherance of the governmental interests. United States
v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 888 S. CT. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672(1968).
This appeal is only a chapter in this case because the parties
will have the opportunity to produce more evidence at the hearing
on the permanent injunction and the district court will have an
opportunity to reconsider the application for injunction in light
of all the evidence. Mindful that this case is in a transitory
state, we conclude that we should make the following disposition:
1. We agree with the district court that the Parish does not
articulate any reasonable belief that a link exists between the
regulation of the dress of patrons of all establishments serving
alcohol and the furtherance of any legitimate governmental
interest. Baby Dolls Topless Saloons, Inc., v. City of Dallas, 295
F.3d 471, 481 (5th Cir. 2000. This is sufficient for us to
conclude that the ordinance violates O’Brien’s fourth factor and
violates rights secured to the plaintiff under the First Amendment.
2. On this record, we believe the district court’s conclusion
that the ordinance imposes dress restrictions for the dancers in

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such clubs that are more restrictive than necessary to further the
government’s legitimate interest is inconsistent with our recent
decision in Baby Dolls. We disagree with the district court that
the parish was required to find that the less restrictive ordinance
previously in effect was ineffective to regulate dancers in erotic
clubs before it could enact the more restrictive ordinance at issue
in this case. The restrictions placed on the dress of dancers in
the Dallas ordinance in Baby Dolls are indistinguishable from the
restrictions on the dress of dancers imposed by the ordinance in
our case.
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary
injunction. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court
and remand this case to that court for further proceedings.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

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