Marks v. School Bd St Landry

*Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R.
47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
September 9, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________________________
Summary Calendar
No. 02-31217
____________________________
NICOLE L. MARKS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ST. LANDRY PARISH SCHOOL BOARD,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
No. 01-CV-1886
_________________________________________________________________
Before JONES, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant Nicole Marks (“Marks”) appeals the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee St. Landry
Parish School Board (“School Board”). Marks alleges that the
School Board, in violation of Title VII, refused to rehire her as

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1In fact, Marks taught in the St. Landry Parish school district during the 1999-2000 school
year under a one-year contract. During that school year, Marks was re-assigned. At the
conclusion of the one-year contract, the School Board decided not to rehire Marks as a teacher in
the parish.
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a teacher because of her race.1 The district court held that: (1)
Marks had not set forth a prima facie case of race discrimination;
(2) the School Board’s decision not to rehire Marks was legitimate
and non-discriminatory; and (3) Marks did not establish that the
School Board’s proffered reason was pretext for discrimination.
Finding no reversible error in the judgment, we affirm.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377,
380 (5th Cir. 1998); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). At the summary
judgment stage, a court may not weigh the evidence or evaluate the
credibility of witnesses, and all justifiable inferences will be
made in the nonmoving party’s favor. Morris, 144 F.3d at 380
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
Nevertheless, this burden is not satisfied with some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by
unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.
Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en
banc).
To meet her prima facie burden under Title VII, Marks
must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she

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sought and was qualified for an available employment position; (3)
she was rejected for that position; and (4) the employer continued
to seek applicants with the plaintiff’s qualifications. See
LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 448 (5th Cir.
1996)(citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973)). Marks fails to meet the second prong of the prima facie
case.
As the district court properly found, Marks did not
establish that she was qualified for the position. The School
Board intended to fill its available teaching position with a
certified teacher. Marks admitted on both her application for
employment and in her deposition that she was not a certified
teacher. Additionally, Marks offered no further evidence or
testimony establishing that she met the requisite qualifications
for the position. Accordingly, Marks failed to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination.
However, even if Marks established a prima facie case,
summary judgment is nonetheless warranted. Under the well-
established McDonnell Douglas framework, once the plaintiff
satisfies the prima facie test, the burden shifts to the employer
to articulate a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for the
employment decision. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-804.
Once the employer does so, the plaintiff must offer evidence that
the proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. Id.

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The School Board’s basis for not re-hiring Marks is
legitimate and non-discriminatory. While employed as a teacher in
St. Landry Parish, Marks sent home a letter to the parents of her
students filled with numerous grammatical errors. Moreover, as
discussed above, the School Board intended to fill the position
with a certified teacher, which Marks admittedly was not. The
School Board’s decision not to rehire Marks because of her lack of
qualifications and the grammatically incorrect letter satisfies the
School Board’s burden under McDonnell Douglas.
Accordingly, to survive summary judgment Marks needs to
establish that the School Board’s legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason was a pretext for discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 804. However, in her effort to establish pretext,
Marks offers only her subjective belief that the School Board
discriminated against her. “[W]e have recognized that generalized
testimony by an employee regarding [her] subjective belief that
[her] discharge was the result of . . . discrimination is
insufficient to make an issue for the jury in the face of proof
showing an adequate, nondiscriminatory reason for [her] discharge.”
Elliot v. Group Med. & Surgical Serv., 714 F.2d 556, 564 (5th Cir.
1983)(stating that this Circuit is “not prepared to hold that a
subjective belief of discrimination, however genuine, can be the
basis of judicial relief”)(citation omitted); see also see Liberty
v. Republic Refining Co., Ltd., 924 F.2d 93, 96 (5th Cir. 1991).

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In the end, Plaintiff offers no evidence to substantiate her
subjective belief of discrimination. Hence, Marks is unable to
establish that the School Board’s proffered reason for its decision
was pretext for discrimination.
Finally, Marks alleges, both in her opposition to summary
judgment and on appeal, that the School Board violated La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 17:442. Marks claims that, under this statutory
provision, the School Board was obligated to provide written
reasons for its decision not to rehire her. However, Marks did not
state an independent cause of action in her complaint based upon
this statute. Rather, the complaint states a single cause of
action for violation of Title VII. This statute does not bear on
the resolution of the Title VII claim. The judgment of the
district court is therefore AFFIRMED.

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