Royster v. Johnson, et al

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-30254
Summary Calendar
ZANDRA ROYSTER,
Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant,
versus
JOSEPH W. JOHNSON, Etc.; ET AL.,
Defendants,
CITY OF SHREVEPORT; JESSIE J. ROBERTS, individually and in his
official capacity as Supervisor with the Shreveport Police
Department; KARL W. COPE, individually and in his official
capacity as senior supervisor of the Communications Department of
the Shreveport Police Department; CARTER L. SHAW, individually
and in his official capacity as a patrol officer with Shreveport
Police Department; TERESA A. BELL, individually and in her
official capacity as a patrol officer with Shreveport Police
Department; JAN JONES, individually and in her official capacity
as supervisor in the Communications Department of Shreveport
Police Department; SANDY RAINER, individually and in his official
capacity as a senior supervisor in the Communications Department
of Shreveport Police Department,
Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 00-CV-2155
--------------------
October 29, 2002
Before GARWOOD, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*

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No. 02-30254
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R. 47.5.4.
The City of Shreveport (“the City”), Sandy Rainer, and Karl
Cope appeal the district court’s partial denial of their motion
for summary judgment, which sought the dismissal of Zandra
Royster’s employment claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The individual officer defendants argue that the district court
erred in denying them qualified immunity because Royster failed
to allege a discriminatory motive for their actions.
This court reviews de novo the denial of a public official’s
motion for summary judgment predicated on qualified immunity.
Southard v. Texas Bd. of Criminal Justice, 114 F.3d 539, 548 (5th
Cir. 1997). Determining whether a public official is entitled to
qualified immunity from liability under § 1983 involves a
two-step analysis. First, if the official’s conduct did not
violate a clearly established constitutional right, the official
is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 550. Second, even if
the official’s conduct violated a clearly established
constitutional right, the official is nonetheless entitled to
qualified immunity if his conduct was objectively reasonable.
Id.
A review of the record reveals that Royster did not allege
that the defendants’ actions violated a clearly established
constitutional right. See id. Accordingly, the individual
officer defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. To
the extent that Royster urges a new basis for her employment

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No. 02-30254
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claims on appeal, this court will not consider her allegations.
See Leverette v. Louisville Ladder Co., 183 F.3d 339, 342 (5th
Cir. 1999). For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s
order denying the individual officers’ motion for summary
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is VACATED and the
matter is REMANDED to the district court.
Royster filed a notice of her intent to cross-appeal the
district court’s grant of partial summary judgment on her false
imprisonment claims. However, this court does not have
jurisdiction over her appeal. See Briargrove Shopping Ctr. Joint
Venture v. Pilgrim Enter., Inc., 170 F.3d 536, 538 (5th Cir.
1999). Additionally, in light of the disposition of this case,
this court declines to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction
over the City’s claims.
VACATED AND REMANDED; APPEAL DISMISSED; AND CROSS-APPEAL
DISMISSED.

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